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Abstract of Thesis 
The thesis seeks to examine the ethical, phenomenological and diagnostic renewal of psychiatry in 
post-war France. The particular focus of study will be to bring to light (1) the emergence of a 
psychiatric movement that was to become known as Institutional Psychotherapy in 1952, (2) the 
inauguration of a particular post-war clinical sentiment of sympathy, (3) and the more specific 
developments of the psychopathology of schizophrenia undertaken by Dr. Franyois Tosquelles and Dr. 
Jean Oury. The thesis is composed of three chapters: 
The first chapter of the thesis, presents a bi-focal analysis of a philanthropic politic characterising two 
significant moments of medical reform, where psychiatry finds its Hippocratic and Apostolic definition 
as a vocation addressing the imperial need of man. The first moment, is that of Philippe Pinel in a Post-
Revolutionary France, who urged for more specialised spaces employing the non-violent treatment of 
the insane. The second, is the German Occupation of France, where the psychiatrist's personage in the 
questionably 'free' Vichy South is one that is dramatic and resistant. This historical study is conducted 
in order to bring to light the methodological shift within the history of European psychiatry: what was 
the art of medicine and alienation for Pinel of the Paris Pi tie Salpetriere, is extended and redefmed as 
the art of sympathy and dis-alienation for those of the clinical fraternity of Saint-Alban. 
The second chapter, observes the 1948 doctoral thesis ofDr. Franyois Tosquelles and the conditions of 
its emergence. Addressed is the "polydimensional" approach of Institutional Psychotherapy in its 
marrying the psychoanalytical, the biological, the theological, the neurological and the 
phenomenological, and as to how such an approach reasons the negation of madness to be said of a 
positive, constructive, aesthetic and industrial paradigm 
The third chapter seeks to demonstrate the empirico-phenomenological attitude of Institutional 
Psychotherapy by observing the works of Dr. Jean Oury, Jacques Schotte, Viktor von Weizsacker and 
Henri Maldiney, and as to how they pertain to a "pathic" diagnostic of schizophrenia, a diagnostic of 
the felt rather than the thought, where the psychiatric symptom is at once empirical and transcendental. 
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The Diagnostic is not etiquette, it is an ethical undertaking ... To perform a 
diagnostic is of the phenomenological 
- Dr. Jean Oury, La Borde Clinic, 11th September 2004. 
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Introduction: Institutional Psychotherapy 
We don't set out to establish a true catalogue of technical attitudes. We merely want 
to indicate several possible directions that have proven successful. 
- Franc;:ois Tosquelles, Education et Psychotherapie Institutionelle1 
1: Research and methodology 
This present study will defme the historical and conceptual grounds upon which the psychiatric 
movement known as Institutional Psychotherapy stood, and still stands, as a significant therapeutic 
enterprise. 'Institutional Psychotherapy' is a psychiatric and anthropological project, one that is 
synonymous with four names: Franc;:ois Tosquelles (1912-1994); La Borde Clinic (1951-), it's founder and 
director Dr. Jean Oury (1924-), and his protege, the philosopher Felix Guattari (1930-1992). The term 
Institutional Psychotherapy was proposed in 1952 by the psychiatrist Georges Daumezon (1912-1979) in an 
essay entitled La psychotherapie institutionnelle fram;aise, and it appeared in the Portuguese Journal, Anais 
Portugueses de Psiquiatricl. This naming came one year before Dr. Oury established the clinic of La Borde 
within an old, noble, chateau in the picturesque region of Cour-Chevemy- the very year a young Guattari 
of sixteen years found himself at the clinic under Oury's guidance and philosophical orientation. 
A great age of renovation followed the end of the Second World War and the Liberation within 
which philosophical and clinical questions were re-assessed in the light of lived historical experience. 
Much of the theoretical activity that hallmarked La Borde clinic was in fact developed at the wartime of 
Saint-Alban: Institutional Psychotherapy was not only born from an age of socio-cultural renewal in the 
wake of Occupation, but from a great philanthropic and scientific effort during the Occupation. Both these 
stages mark a "psychiatric revolution" and the base to Institutional Psychotherapy. 
A chronological history of Institutional Psychotherapy is yet to be written. In French 
historiography, this history exists through the wealth of intermittent writings not only by the founders of the 
movement, notably, Tosquelles and Jean Oury, but also by the present day clinicians, patients, and 
researchers associated with La Borde clinic. Notably, the foremost narrative of Institutional Psychotherapy 
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is penned by Dr. Oury's long-term cohort Dr. Jean Ayme (1924-) entitled Essai sur l'histoire de Ia 
psychotherapie institutionelle3• Such texts have been widely published and disseminated, and particularly 
during the 1980's and 1990's Jean Oury's publications attracted a global allure. Oury's acclaimed Creation 
et Schizophrenie of 1989 and L 'Alienation of 1992, remain the most widely circulated collection of published 
seminars4 • Other texts and correspondences by Oury, Tosquelles, Guattari and Jacques Lacan remain 
unpublished and the very great number of essays, interventions and jointly held seminars are archived in 
the library of La Borde. Our study, in turn, will draw upon a selection of published and unpublished 
generational material that is pertinent to seizing the fundamental aspects to Oury's and Tosquelles' 
Thought, and concomitantly, to understanding the sense, intention and value oflnstitutional Psychotherapy, 
its wartime seeding at the clinic of Saint-Alban, its post-war formation in the wake of Occupation, and the 
philosophical and psycho-pathological questions working the machinery of Institutional Psychotherapy. 
Yet it is important to remember, that a concise history of Institutional Psychotherapy is impossible, simply 
because it is always being redefined, with each and every clinician-patient encounter- with each and every 
concrete metapsychological encounter. Institutional Psychotherapy, as with psychiatry and psychoanalysis 
(the difference of which merely exists within the mind's of the practitioner), is always in the making, is 
never concluded and never firmly delimited. Like the phenomenon of humankind itself, it is far from being 
a conclusive monograph, but merely attempts to tum within a good direction. 
The thesis will explore the Thought of Oury and Tosquelles by also drawing upon the writing of 
Lucien Boannfe (1912-2003), Jacques Schotte (1928-), Henri Maldiney (1917-) and Horace Torrubia 
(1917-1999). Rather than providing a chronological exegesis of these writings, we seek to harness their 
phenomenological and anthropological essence with the minimum of intellectualisation. These authors each 
equally necessitate a historico-conceptual examination beyond the limits and demands of our present study, 
and the thesis does not provide a hermeneutic reading of their work. Rather, we aim to show the fraternal 
sentiment for a medical philanthropy and anthropological medicine shared by a post-war group of 
clinicians, and thereby seek to understand how this informs the enterprise of Institutional Psychotherapy. 
To further support the guiding idea of a medical philanthropy to the post-war ethic, phenomenology and 
diagnostic of French psychiatry (Institutional Psychotherapy), we will also draw upon the 
phenomenological philosophy of Kimura Bin (1931-), Eugene Minkowski (1885-1972), Erwin Straus 
(1891-1975), Hubertus Tellenbach (1914-1994), and Viktor Von Weizsacker (1886-1957). In doing so, we 
provide an unwritten history, or even a secret history, of phenomenology and psychiatry on the Continent 
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and move towards a deeper understanding of the psycho-pathology of schizophrenia and the historical 
conditions and philosophical questions pertinent to its advance. 
In English medical historiography and practice, there is yet to be an attempt to engage with the 
question of Institutional Psychotherapy and to pen this unwritten history. Indeed, we are without an 
introduction to this rich landscape of historical, psychiatric and philosophical enquiry. It is the objective of 
the thesis, therefore, that our study, although neither a comprehensive chronology of the personages and 
developments of Institutional Psychotherapy, nor a direct exposition and documentation of its clinical 
practices, nor a hermeneutic undertaking into the texts and doctoral theses furnished by such a psychiatric 
and historical movement, will nevertheless provide an accurate account of the historical urgencies and 
philosophical questions unique to what we can call a post-war French psychiatry. Moreover, the thesis will 
work towards understanding post-war French psychiatry as a phenomenological enquiry, an 
anthropological medicine, or more commonly, an Institutional Psychotherapy that moves beyond the 
anthropological confmes of natural history and the nosological confines of natural scientific medicine. 
The thesis is also fuelled by a contemporary urgency. Namely, that in an age where research on 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari proliferates, or where a 'DeleuzoGuattarianism' or a 'Deleuzianism' 
seemingly solicit the common currency of our contemporary research economy 5 , a historical and 
philosophical consciousness of the post-war sentiment from which such epistemologies emerged remains a 
hitherto unwritten history6. Indeed, today, the name Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) has come to distinguish the 
direction of contemporary research. In much the same way as we saw the Freud-ian, the Lacan-ian and the 
Foucauld-ian (to name but a few) assert a programmatic identity in their time, the 'Deleuz-ian' and the 
'Deleuzian-ism' from which it derives, seemingly assert the condition and direction of research in our own 
time. As Dr. Jean Oury, noted in 2003: "we know well that the Marxists were not Marx, the Freud-ians not 
Freud and the Lacan-ians not Lacan." The same could possibly be said for the Deleuzian, and Oury's 
position, borne from his experience of the War, and his lifelong friendship with Lacan and Tosuqelles, 
provides an interesting counter to Foucault's widely-cited assertion, that the twentieth century (for better or 
worse) would, 'one day become known as Deleuzian'. Indeed, the history of psychiatry is other than that 
which is commonly perceived through Michel Foucault and the social historian of medicine, for either 
often fails to take into account the important role played by Experience within the epistemology of medical 
knowledge, as a counterpart to Observation. 
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This said, the intention of our research is not to mimic the intellectual salutation to the legacy of 
Deleuze and his generation, nor to follow the readings of social historians, nor to adhere to the current 
paradigm of Deleuzo-Guattarian "geophilosophy7" and its descriptive (and in fact prescriptive) language, 
but rather to engage with the specific formation of therapeutic and philosophical questions communicating 
the zeitgeist of post-war France, which in turn orientate the direction oflnstitutional Psychotherapy, and the 
general philosophy of psychiatry and medicine itself, that is, of a psychiatry and medicine that is not 
independent of the subject it seeks to assist. 
Yet more specifically, it is the foremost intention of our study to introduce and engage with the 
psychiatric and phenomenological Thought of Dr. Jean Oury himself through which we can situate the 
conceptual framing of Institutional Psychotherapy, both in terms of its history and its contemporary 
employment. It is further hoped, that a greater knowledge of the foremost architect of post-war therapeutic 
and - to an extent - philosophical reform, will provide a new direction through which we may better 
navigate the waters of continental post-war philosophy and psychiatry, and better test and explore their 
depth. 
I came to the almost limitless field of Institutional Psychotherapy through the study of 
contemporary continental philosophy, psychoanalysis and metapsychology - the latter itself remains a 
scandalously underdeveloped territory upon our shores. It is at times both an impressionable and disturbing 
fact as to how much has been overlooked, and one has to at times wonder as to how modem scholarship 
accords itself an almost indisputable confidence in the world concept to which it collectively and 
progressively appeals. More specifically, it was the work of Felix Guattari and as to how it attempted to 
conceptually advance these contexts that invited a deeper research beyond the limits of contemporary 
Deleuze/Guattari studies through which the modem scholarly identity in the humanities defines itself. 
Guattari's work is known to us, the English speaking audience, primarily through his co-authoured 
publications with Gilles Deleuze: Anti-Oedipus of 1972 and A Thousand Planteaus of 19858. Both these 
works, as well as those of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), notably Maladie Mentale et Psychologie 9 and The 
Birth of the Clinic 10 , have steadily steered and arguably overshadowed, the direction of research in 
contemporary continental philosophy, the History of Ideas and to an extent, the history and practice of 
psychoanalysis itself. 
It was not until reading an essay by Felix Guattari entitled, Existential Affect, that a far deeper 
clinical and phenomenological scholarship was found to be at work within his writing 11 . The essay 
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appeared in his seldom mentioned, and little understood, Cartographies Schizoanalytiques of 1989, which 
can be considered to be an assiduous homage to his mentors, Oury and Tosquelles. To understand the 
conceptual machinery of Guattari' s magnum opus of 1989, it is in fact necessary to have a familiarity with 
the philosophical and ethical landscape oflnstitutional Psychotherapy, and of Jean Oury himself. Arguably, 
this is why Cartographies Schizoanalytiques remains a puzzle for the modem scholar, one that can only be 
solved by first engaging with the work and Thought of Oury and Tosquelles, and understanding how 
certain technical concepts have a phenomenological and ethical base. 
After carefully studying Guattari's footnotes and tracing his life efforts as a post-war Sartrean 
youth, I came to the conclusion- and starting point- that it is impossible if we attempt to situate the debate 
of schizophrenia, and even Deleuze and Guattari, or even continental philosophy itself, without properly 
assessing the work of Dr. Jean Oury, and the post-war psychiatric and philosophical reform of which he is 
the last living exponent. If Institutional Psychotherapy is not introduced to English research, then we will 
be progressively faced with a philosophy and psychiatry lacking in humanitarian impulse, where the notion 
of the Other will remain an intellectual one, and where the role of 'experience' will not be accorded the 
attention it deserves within philosophy and psychiatry as a whole. We are now within an age where the 
moral has once again eclipsed the ethical, and where research has rapidly distanced itself from 
metaphysical and transcendental concerns. As Kostas Axelos poignantly writes: "we are within an age 
which seeks to surpass humanism and the human. But a question nevertheless remains: what is to become 
of the human12?" 
Our study will show that schizophrenia for the French became something far more than a category 
of mental illness, it became a model, a field of possibilities, a vast field of enquiry within which the 
institution, the ethic and the diagnostic could be developed, whilst always keeping the role of human 
dignity and transcendence firmly within the sights of medical enquiry. In short, the question of 
phenomenology and psychiatry initiated and inaugurated during the ambivalent - lest catastrophic - years 
of post-war France, is a world that is yet to be explored, and more precisely, a world, an unwritten history 
that needs to be explored and documented in order to enrich our consciousness of French Thought and its 
enterprise. 
There was however a missing foundation to the scholarly undertakings of the modem continental 
Thinker, and they could not merely be treated as doctrines and social commentaries in-themselves. Our 
contemporary knowledge of Pinel for example, comes to us through the work of Foucault, and more 
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specifically through his critiques of Pinel's "moral therapy". The genius of Foucault's scholarship cannot 
be denied, yet, arguably, in examining the "rational space of disease" and the science of "nosographic 
classifications13" he overlooked the notions of "dignity" and "nobility" which predominantly occupied the 
Thought, writing and philanthropy of Pinel. Indeed, through such an enquiry Foucault situated Pinel as 
representing an humanism and a positivistic trend of science, and as, "not having undone the preceding 
forms of treatment and housing.14" Our thesis is not a counter to Foucault's visionary exposition, but rather 
an untold story, one paralleling it. We would firstly do well to remember, for example, that the positivist 
direction of science, and more precisely psychiatry, need to be distinguished and understood both in terms 
of Pinel's work, and with the proceeding anatomico-pathologies of the 19th century which sought to surpass 
Pinel's semiology of the human passions. Secondly, that the punishing isolation of the mentally ill 
continued despite Pinel's reformist efforts, was not owing to the fallibility of his moral therapy, but the 
moral order of the newfound French Republic. He was, after all, within an age straddling the rule of 
monarchy and the Republican state. For Pinel, the French republic was borne through the guillotine- its 
proper symbol. The Republican stood upon a ground inaugurated by the ritualistic execution of Louis 
Capet, an event Pinel would never forget, an event fuelling his efforts to rebuild human dignity not merely 
within the mentally ill, but within man himself. That is why in an age of supposed illuminism and light, 
Pinel urges us that, "something better has to be done!" As we will see, for things to tum in a better 
direction, Pinel encourages us to retake the metaphysical ground of medicine, and address the ethical at the 
same time as the physiological. 
Somewhat prophetically, it was upon seeing the bloodlust of the crowds witnessing the execution 
of the King that Pinel warned of the dangers to human dignity to come: the Republic was not the 
emancipation it was conceived to be, and the Rights of Man upon which the Paris Commune were built, 
were but a discourse of power. With the dethronement of monarchy, human dignity had lost its principality 
within man. As we have it from Paul Bruin his Histoire de Bicetre: 
By the end of 1792 ... Pinel had already, on numerous occasions, sought the authorisation to prohibit the use 
of irons in the treatment of the insane (les forieux). These attempts were unsuccessful, and he took his case to 
the Paris Commune. It was here- with even more fervency and passion than before -that he repeated his call 
for such monstrous methods of treatment to be reformed. "Citizen!" said one member of the Commune, 
"Tomorrow I will travel to Bicetre, but be it to your detriment if you fool us with your claims, and if you are 
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in fact seeking to increase the enemy of the people with your insane." ... The citizen [Pinel] replied, "I am of 
the conviction that the alienated are not untreatable. We deprive them of air and liberty, and I will make it my 
work to introduce wholly different methods of treatment." "So be it- have them all!" Came the reply, "But I 
fear that you will be the victim of your own presumption!"15 
Indeed, in a post-Revolutionary France, Bru further tells us that "death" was "the only logic that reigns at 
this moment," that is, the logic of the Guillotine. Pinel, however, is the representative of an almost silent 
metaphysical equilibrium within this age. It was not merely a clinical vision that he developed, but a 
clinical enterprise keeping the role of human dignity within all human concerns, that is, maintaining the 
right of humanity and its inherent nobleness, one that was spitefully misconceived by the Paris Commune. 
Interestingly enough, to speak of the nobleness of enquiry (as did Nietzsche himself urge for a noble 
philosophy) and the perseverance of human dignity, necessitates a medical ethic that accords itself to the 
notion of dignity- and this, in fact, is the essence of Dr. Oury's work and a necessary aspect to keep in 
mind when reading through the historical and phenomenological analyses of our study. 
From the vantage point of Institutional Psychotherapy, and one that I have debated with Dr. Oury 
many times, is that what Foucault perceived as Pinel's Moral Therapy, was in fact, an Ethical Therapy, and 
that when we speak of the ethic, we imply the notion of transcendence. This is something that our study 
addresses, the role of transcendence and of what Oury calls a non-thematisable faith. In truth, we intend to 
demonstrate that the ethic, the phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry, are said in a 
singular and same (philanthropic) sense. We maintain, therefore, that psychiatry is a philanthropic 
enterprise within which phenomenology finds its proper ethical articulation, firstly borne through the 
reformist efforts of Pinel and Tuke, and secondly advanced by the reformist efforts of those who would 
inaugurate an institutional psychotherapy, on grounds of their experiences of assisting war-weakened man. 
It is also worth remembering that Oury is startlingly close to the sentiments of Pinel who was 
urged by charitable call to free the insane from the 18th century enchainment. As Oury has stated himself, 
when asked as to the history oflnstitutional Psychotherapy: 
First of all it concerns a long process of theorisation, which still continues today, of a psychiatric 
practice that goes back to the Second World War. It is not strictly possible to allot an origin to 
Institutional Psychotherapy, because it has gradually had different articulations over the 
years ... we could even go back to Philippe Pinel16. 
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There is a certain nobility at work in Oury's Thought, his references and his clinic, and we can go 
as far as to say that, even if the man himself riley smiles at such suggestions, he is more of a noble thinker 
than a thinker of the Republic, he is closer to Pinel, to the ethic and the question of transcendence, than to 
contemporary lines of Foucault, transgression and cognitive neuroscience. This requires much development 
and it invites further studies, but it is nevertheless a useful thought to keep in mind when composing the 
picture ofOury, the man. To say that Oury is close to Pinel, is to say that the dignity of the patient is at the 
forefront of medical enquiry, where the task is not only reconstructing the personality but of rebuilding the 
dignity of the patient, of reaffirming the person. This is the veritable hallmark to .the Hippocratic vision, yet 
it is one that has surpassed historical conditions of Hippocrates himself, one that has deepened with the 
bloody benchmarks of history, and one that has become ever more necessary with the increase of 
bureaucratic protocols edifying our age of technocratic alienation. 
It is not easy to approach the work of Dr. Jean Oury and the conceptual apparatus of Institutional 
Psychotherapy. Firstly, we need to be aware of the historical sentiment informing the project. Secondly, we 
need to carefully observe the role of phenomenology within Institutional Psychotherapy so as to properly 
understand the therapeutic mindset and anthropological vision informing its centrality within the history of 
psychiatry, and philosophy. The research task was great, immense even, for only by exploring these two 
questions, without succumbing to the apparent comfort of the contemporary "DeleuzoGuattarian" paradigm 
and its descriptive style, could future avenues be opened up and further, more detailed and specific studies 
invited beyond the remit and conceptual boundaries of our present study. 
I had spent nine months researching at La Borde clinic where I had the possibility of coming 
closer to the words and Thought of Dr. Jean Oury - all of which cannot possibly be faithfully articulated 
within the space of our introductory study. With Oury's work, phenomenology has no dealings with the 
ivory towers of intellectualism because phenomenology is of and by humanity, it is anthropological, it has 
its dealings with anthropos: "we work not for status, but for Others" he has often said, "it is the absolute 
minimum we can possibly do". I was a newcomer to the clinic and I did not know, save for Oury, who were 
patients, who were trainees and who were clinicians: everybody ate together, everybody took part in the 
various clubs and events. This is the unique signature of La Borde, the notion not merely of integration, but 
of what Oury often calls a "shared co-efficiency." 
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In many conversations, one of which was recorded for publication and appears as the appendix to 
our study, Oury constantly stressed the role of human dignity, the responsibility of the analyst, the subtle 
and complex science of transference, the economy of desire and gesture, and the role of atmosphere to the 
therapeutic project. "We heal through a science of feeling and words, we lift walls with words" he 
expressed on one occasion, "look at how Lacan situates the word .. .it's a science of man with which we 
deal. .. yet how can we understand this science without developing not only an understanding, but a science 
of transcendence ... this is phenomenology ... of and for beings .. .it is concrete" at another time, with the 
charitable warmth for which he has become known. I often spoke to Oury walking through the grounds of 
the clinic, and more often than not Oury would pause and remind me of the importance of atmosphere: 
"you see this, the subtle breeze which passes across the grass and through the trees, in Japan they call this 
'Ki', atmosphere, it is poetic, it is so very subtle, the breeze gracefully dancing across the grass and through 
the trees ... without it we are distanced from ourselves ... and we cannot count this within a standard 
temporal logic because it is not a thermodynamic energy." I had returned from a period of research in 
Seoul, South Korea, Oury had returned from a series of guest lectures in Tokyo and Okinawa, and on this 
day of our meetings, East-Asian philosophy had much been on our minds. Yet it was not surprising to hear 
Oury speak of the Japanese notions of atmosphere, and they had not been precipitated by his recent 
invitation to the Far East, nor by his long-standing friendship with the foremost Japanese philosopher Bin 
Kimura. Having worked through Oury's seminar notes on Lacan earlier that year, twelve volumes in all, 
hinagata symbols appeared carefully penned on several occasions throughout the years, and seemingly, 
Lacan had often alluded to the Japanese culture and its philosophy - despite the fact that such references 
are hard to find in the published and translated literature of Lacan. Indeed, in terms of phenomenological 
philosophy, the orient and the occident have a long-standing sympathetic and paralleled development. 
Our study, therefore, is not only an introduction to Institutional Psychotherapy, its historical 
emergence, its ethic and its phenomenology, but it is also an invitation for others to go further with 
questions of schizophrenia, to venture deeper as a philosopher, a psychiatrist, or a historian, to delve further 
into this vast unwritten history, to hermeneutically study the texts documenting the growth of Institutional 
Psychotherapy, and to encourage a contemporary research identity into psychiatry and medicine without 
forgoing the question of humanity, dignity, transcendence and ethics. We can all but only attempt to pen an 
introduction to the living exponent of this psychiatric and philosophical movement - Dr. Jean Oury- and 
encourage a research enterprise into Institutional Psychotherapy. 
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The central mm of our study is to address the historical and phenomenological factors 
underpinning Institutional Psychotherapy's development and to understand its ethic. We hope to 
communicate the importance of Institutional Psychotherapy as a defining chapter within the history of 
psychiatry, only second to that of Philippe Pinel's (1745-1826) and Daniel Hack Tuke's (1827-1895) 
reformist efforts of the nineteenth century. In doing so, we seek to provide the possibility for further 
clinical and philosophical enquiries into Institutional Psychotherapy, and into the work of Jean Oury most 
notably. 
The methodology of our study is not a hermeneutic one. Rather, we seek to introduce the reader to 
a phenomenological enquiry spanning the work of Tosquelles, Oury and the phenomenologist Henri 
Maldiney. Of our day, our knowledge of Foucault is at its most prolific, yet our knowledge of Oury remains 
in its nascent, fledgling state. We seek not to approach the question of mental illness and its history through 
the eyes of Michel Foucault therefore, but through the work of Oury that we have deemed 'the ethic, 
phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry'. 
2: Psychiatric Questions of the time 
The eminent Twentieth Century neurologist and clinical director of the Salpetriere, Professor J. 
Lhermitte, would for Dr. Henri Ey necessitate reverent accord in bringing the notions of "aphasia," 
"hallucinations and troubles of the corporeal schema," "pain and hypochondria" to the forefront of 
neurological and psychiatric debate of schizophrenia in France. 17 For Lhermitte, schizophrenia - or 
dementia praecox as it was commonly termed in the wake of Eugen Bleuler's (1847-1940) Dementia 
Praecox Oder Gruppe der Schizophrenen of 1911 18 - was an enigmatic mode of existence demonstrating a 
"negation of the world and body, of life and death" where "such a lesion strikes the acoustico-kinesthetic 
mechanisms and perturbs the instinctual modes of the personality.19" With these perturbations and the upset 
of the instinctual mode, delirium was understood as a disintegration of neurological function. For Ey, 
delirium and the order of functional disintegration to which it belonged, specified neurology and psychiatry 
as nothing other than "two species of the same genre". With both neurology and psychiatry addressing the 
negation and reintegration of function in the wake of disintegration, a compensatory logic became 
demonstrable neurologically (in terms of nervous system function) and psychiatrically (in terms of the 
personality). 
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In the words of Eugen Bleuler, this compensatory movement of lapse and restitution was where 
the person of schizophrenia became "totally Other,20" where he would leave one established world-logic, 
and enter a new world: The Self became an Other. In this new world, language and the body undergo a 
metamorphosis and a profound change, where delirium compensates factual evidence and logic (Weltlogik) 
with the phantasm of the totally other. The facti city of the world is replaced by a new referential system, 
one, throughout the history of twentieth century psychiatry, seen as either disintegration or renewal. As 
Oury once said in observing a schizophrenic reading the Bible, "he sat there, opened the Bible, and stared 
at one word for a great length of time, everyday, he would sit in the same seat, and stare at this word ... this 
was part of his world ... one word was good for the laws of this world and his finger was always pressed on 
the word ... we have to take care when we enter into this landscape because it is extremely complex and 
precarious ... we do not want to upset the security of this world and body." This transposition of worlds, the 
metamorphosis of the body and language, is a psychopathological fact. The spatia-temporal laws of 
schizophrenia are different to that of the habitually perceived factual world to which we accord a common 
reality. 
Psychopathological enquiry, is at once philanthropic and scientific, of addressing, in the words of 
Ey, "a human person, his being-in-the-world2h' at the same time as addressing the "architectonic of the 
nervous system. 22 " This is one example of cerebral pathology and psychology marrying under the 
philanthropic auspices of medical assistance. As Oury constantly reminds us, "it is a person we are 
concerned with and for whom we are responsible." Seemingly, the question of the architectonic of the 
personality is not to be divorced from the architectonic of the nervous system, man's existential life not 
divorced from organismic life. Indeed, the question of nervous pathology and its deficit is not raised 
independently of the lawful connection between Self and World (being-in-the-world). Phenomenological 
enquiry thus becomes a consequence of clinical enquiry, indistinguishable even, for it is not enough to 
understand schizophrenia in terms of "functional disintegration" alone, but also in terms of a reconstruction 
and creative work. Where Pinel had seen metaphysics as a "natural auxiliary" to the science of mental 
alienation, so too is phenomenology for twentieth century psychiatry a natural support: the question of 
madness is not raised without the question of man himself, that is, without the question of the ethic. 
Ey's assertions hallmark a particular attitude because he did not seek to reduce man to the mere 
anatamo-pathological aggregate of our day, nor was he content with isolating mental illness to discussions 
of cerebral lesions. Rather, he demonstrated that clinical enquiry could be of the corporeal, biological, 
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pathological and psychical. Later, doctors Jean Claude Polack and Paul Sivadon urged clinical enquiry to 
address an "intimate utopia,2h that ever so secret world of the schizophrenic world, a rare place into which 
the select few are initiated because "the schizophrenic knows full well who cares." The phenomena of 
delirious episodes thus provide the clinician with a path into this "intimate utopia", one that can so easily be 
missed and overlooked were it not for a phenomenological sentiment, or in Oury's words, "a 
phenomenological sincerity" maintained by the clinician. 
The enigma of schizophrenia and its very peculiar narrative of language, the body, the personality 
and the world, its aphasias and morphologies of language, found, for the Catalan militant psychiatrist 
Francois Tosquelles, an ultimate declaration through the phantasm of the end of the world experience- the 
Erlibnis of the end of the world- a mock-biblical delirium of catastrophe and revelation. In his 1948 
doctoral thesis, Le Vecu de Ia fin du Monde dans Ia Folie, written within a France previously ravaged by 
Occupation and deeply torn by the thorny ironies of the 'free' Vichy South, the end-of-the-world-complex 
announces the creative, industrial and revelatory capacities of schizophrenia - the capacity of man-in-the-
world's restitution. What the end-of-the-world phantasm declared, was a new world, a new logic, of man 
having become totally Other (Bleuler). With its upset of the corporeal schema within the architectonic of 
the nervous system (Lhermitte ), its perturbation of instrumental functions and the logic of the world, its 
negation of life and death (Ey), the delirious function of schizophrenia demonstrated the active and 
affirmative principle to madness, namely the otology of birth and rebirth, of resurrection and 
reconstruction24. Delirium was an affirmation of life affirming the industrial capacities of man, and in the 
words of Rumke penned in 1950, "schizophrenia is not necessarily permanent destruction" because there 
are episodes of reconstruction: the apocalyptical visions of St. John announced a passing of the earth of the 
coming of the new world, catastrophe announced a possibility of rebirth and renewal. 
Tosquelles- a resistant fighter against Franco, who had escaped from the Setfonds detention camp 
in an Occupied France of 1940- stood for a "new orientation" of psychiatric enquiry, of a "new renaissance 
age" of clinico-philosophical enquiry. He brought the reconstructive, affirmative and revelatory auspices of 
psychosis to he forefront of clinical enquiry. This particular reorientation of psychiatry would remain 
faithful to the erudition of neurology and biology, but expand them through its embrace with the 
"phenomenological attitude" and its questions of transcendence, essence and primordial reality. Such an 
attitude was presented by the works of Eugene Minkowski most notably, and Ludwig Binswanger also, yet 
one equally mirrored within the psychopathology of Monakow and Mourgue25, the gestalt neurology of 
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Viktor von Weizsacker 26 and Kurt Goldstein27, paralleled by the philosophy of the Gestapo-hunted disciple 
of Max Scheler, Paul Louis Landsberg28• 
This optic of the neurological and the phenomenological, was formed in a France imbued with an 
apocalyptic lived thematic of Occupation, a generation of an uprooted nation, a people who had 
experienced a disintegration and reintegration of their world, a post-war people resurrected from an 
existential catastrophe as something Other to what it had been, "the space of metamorphosis ... the aesthetic 
work ... the oeuvre that manifests through the melting away of the world. 29 " Against this backdrop, 
schizophrenia would find its affirmative and active footing within clinical enquiry, necessitated by the 
historical events of Occupation (death) and Liberation (rebirth), lived by a populous, declared by the 
phantasm. 
The fledgling writings of a young Gilles Deleuze underlined this generational appeal to the 
psychopathological law of disintegration and reintegration, death and rebirth, destruction and 
reconstruction. In doing so, he heralded a post-apocalyptical mock-biblical age of Nietzschean Man re-
creating a world through a double movement of birth and rebirth30 . Themes of divergence, detraction, 
impermanence and evanescence became the key concepts in the ordaining of a brave new social reality of 
post-war Contemporary Thought. The Hegelian study of Jean Hyppolite, for example, explored the relation 
between the constitution of consciousness 31 and history. In doing so, he prepared a Heidegerrian 
groundwork (in the wake of his reintroduction of 1946 by Jean Beaufret)32 for a speculative ontology of 
difference. This was not only further extended by the scholarship of Marcel Dechoux on Leon Brunschvicq 
expounding a post-Kantian irrational system 33 , but also by the Neo-Catholic posthumous writings of 
Simone Weil finding receptive base in their displaying an apocalyptic vision and a coming of a New 
Earth34. Henri Ey would pen the preface to Michel Foucault's translation of Viktor von Weizsacker's Le 
Cycle de Ia structure (der Gestaltkreis), a work examining the transcendental crises necessitating the 
renewal of the human organism35 where the precariousness of man's existence was said of a transcendental 
maintenance of form. A more established Gilles Deleuze as a Lyonais under the glare of an ever-
permeating Nietzschean reasoning, would later assert that " all this clearly supposes that the formation of 
the world is of two times, two levels, birth and rebirth, where the second is just as necessary and essential 
as the first, and where the first is necessarily compromised, born for a reprise and already reborn within a 
catastrophe. There is not a second birth because there is catastrophe, but the inverse, there is catastrophe 
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after the origin because there needs to be a second birth.36" Such appeals invoked Nietzsche's revelatory 
Ubermensch37 as mock-biblical social, psycho-pathological divinity and creator of new values. 
Prior to these philosophical announcements of a mock-Biblical Genesis of Man's new dawn in the 
wake of Liberation, the 1948 doctoral thesis ofTosquelles asserted that schizophrenic experience itselfwas 
essentially catastrophic, industrial and reconstructive in its movements: "The crucial phenomenon explodes 
to give birth to a new beginning.38" Karl Jaspers in his General Psychopathology of 1913 highlighted 
"rupture", break and "seizure" within schizophrenic process39 ; Monakow and Morgue worked with the 
Stoic notion of syneidesis (originally developed within Pauline and patrisitic Thought) as an automatic 
compensatory mode of reconstruction and integration for a workable level ofbiological functioning; Eugen 
Bleuler identified the dementia praecox (schizophrenia) to give birth to a "new personality" as something 
"totally Other. 40" Sigmund Freud had highlighted the post-traumatic return to equilibrium in the wake of 
torment- a reestablishment under delirium, a paranoiac reconstruction of the personality41 ; Jacques Lacan 
in his doctoral thesis of 1932 presented us with the "fecund moment42" of psychosis; Kurt Goldstein wrote 
of the "catastrophic reaction" necessitating the continual maintenance of the organism43 , von Weizsacker 
asserted the "crisis" necessitating a new centre of gravity within the organism44, and Henri Ey, in following 
the British neurologist Hughlings Jackson, spoke of the evolution and dissolution within the hierarchy of 
the nervous system 45 • The address was an architectonic one, of the functional disintegration and 
reintegration of man, his body and his world, of the life of man-in-the-world and the "bio-psycho-socio 
gestalt. 46" 
Fran<;ois Tosquelles, writing in the shadow of Kurt Goldstein's organismic biology and 
neurological scholarship 47 remained true to the neuro-physiological dialectic of integration and 
disintegration as mutually reconstructive movements within the punctuated schizophrenic processes of 
death and re-birth 48 . The double movement of integration and disintegration grounded enquiry into 
schizophrenic phenomena with the industrial birth of the new personality in the wake of torment, as he was 
to write in 1948, "a new existence will be reconstructed.49" Similarly, the doctoral thesis of a Dr. Jean Oury 
of 1950 further underscored an apocalyptic dimension to a double movement of creative furtherance and 
renewal in writing of the, "destruction of the Self containing a salutation, a reconstruction, and - as 
exemplified by Saint-John - the death of death and the coming of a new world. 50 " Apocalypse and 
revelation, catastrophe and rebirth, thus mark the particular sentiment of a particular time, one within the 
writings of the philosopher, the neurologist and the psychiatrist. 
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This mock-Biblical tale - the architectonic of birth and rebirth, catastrophe and revelation, crisis 
and renewal, disintegration and reintegration - pertained to a particular lived experience of the world, an 
existential experience that proved the industrious motor of both philosophical and the institutional practice 
of psychiatry, an age that called for a profundity of diagnosis faithful to man's phenomenological existence, 
and a resistance to unfavorable segregating clinical prejudgments seeking to thwart such philanthropic and 
philosophical attempts. Indeed, it was a time anticipating the coming of Nietzsche's Greatest Health, 
" ... we premature births of an as yet unproven future ... we have now confronted an as yet undiscovered 
country whose boundaries nobody has surveyed yet, something beyond all the lands and nooks of the ideal 
so far. .. with such a burning hunger in our conscience and science."51 For psychiatry, the potential for 
Man's re-alignment under a pluralist auspice of new values was said of the multihued and catastrophic 
seizures within schizophrenic processes, "fecund moments" that could bring into play a more dynamic 
geography of psychoses and its diagnostic. As Oury would further have it: "there are potentialities that 
would have remained hitherto unexploited if it were not for schizophrenic catastrophe,"52permitting the 
continual reanimation and development of the psyche said of integrated and interrelated schema marking a 
quintessence of man and nature, man, body and world. 
3: The post..:war age 
The post-war age in the wake of Liberation was an age concerned with form (gestalt). More 
precisely, it was defined by a generational concern with the emergence of new form (Gestalt-ung) and the 
ontology of disintegration and re-integration, an ontology applicable to man's psychical, biological, 
spiritual and worldly life. The adage supporting the enquiries of the time, was one developed by the 
neurological scholarship of Herni Ey, namely that, "integration is being, 53" the being of- in Nitzsche's 
words - "an as yet unproven future," the being of rebirth. This proved the rudimentary idiom for 
philosopher and clinician equally, bypassing dualisms and monisms through the questions of hierarchies of 
functions and processes of emergence ( Gestaltung) 54 , of corporeal and incorporeal schemas, of the 
metaphysical within the material and cerebral 55 . This age of generational attempt fraternised within 
philosophy and psychiatry, was one of the architectonic question, of structures and processes of 
construction and reconstruction, of the art of systems (architectonic). 
A post-war psychiatry was of a new rationality. Dr. Sven Follin's Rationalisme Moderne et 
Psychiatrie, appeared alongside the landmark essay by a young Dr. Lucien Bonnafe, Le Personnage du 
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Psychiatre, both appearing in the 1948 edition of L 'evolution Psychiatrique1 under the editorship of the 
medical erudite Henri Ey. In the wake of Liberation, a Marxist humanist spirit positioned the 
methodological question of psychiatry and its object by way of a strategy of desegregation and 
"disalienation." It was in opening the question of Madness to historical lived experience that psychiatry 
was defmed by its philanthropic role of assistance. Bonnafe's realigning of the psychiatrist and his object, 
Follin's punctuation of a post-war historically materialist venture marking a new rationality, provide the 
very epochal background against which Henri Ey ventured to harmonise neurology and psychiatry. Ey's 
collaborative gesture of 1947 with neuropsychiatrist Julien de Ajuriaguerra and neurologist Henri Hecaen 
appeared under the title Neurologie et Psychiatrie56. Deployed upon a terrain attempting to rearticulate the 
architectonic concerns of Man, Ey, a metaphysically sympathetic psychiatrist, sought to unify a precise 
cartography of cerebral geography with the essence of Man and the equilibrium of his forces. It was Man, 
for Ey, who stood as the principle of integration. The organic (neurological) and dynamic (psychiatric) 
epistemology of this industrial and creative ontology of integration would punctuate, "the dialectical 
movement through which the liberty of man and his organisation open onto the infinite,57" and in doing so 
support the generational Nietzschean calls for the as yet unproven foture, for a reformation of the medico-
philosophical milieu appealing to a majestic synthesis of contemporary Man in the wake of post-war 
Liberation. 
Such a majestic appeal to analogical and dialectical reasoning, was displayed by a young Gilles 
Deleuze of twenty-one years, who in 1946 prefaced Jean Malfatti de Montereggio's hermetic 19th C. work 
of romantic medicine, La Mathese ou anarchie et hierarchie de la science58. Produced under a 19th Century 
Neo-Platonic sky, upon a ground laid by the likes of an Agrippa, a Jacob Bohme, and a Francis Bacon, 
Malfatti presented the supreme architectonic of Man said of cosmological, geographic, pathological and 
mathematical processes. For Malfatti, the study of the "architectonic of architectonics, 59" of the living unity 
of philosophy and science within man, punctuated the universal necessity of process of form (gestaltung) 
rather than form (gestalt) -of process rather than product. 
Between Follin, Bonnafe, Ey and Deleuze we observe the nuanced threads stitching together a 
seemingly Nietzschean project heralding the Ubermensch of new values, where for the psychiatrist 
madness becomes a Nietzschean world of strange new things and unannounced possibilities60 . As Deleuze 
would write in his introduction to Malfatti, the epoch of this revelatory and post-catastrophic sentiment was 
one of a mathesis, of, "incessantly establishing a system of increasingly intimate correspondences, where 
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closely knit individual realities are to be found.61 " Such an age bears the markings of Zarathustra's Incipit 
Tragoedea62, of death and rebirth, of a mock-biblical genesis marking a ravaged nation rebuilding, who, 
like the schizophrenic emerges to a new, previously unforeseen scheme of the world, as "totally Other" 
(Blueler). 
It was the Catalan resistant psychiatrist Fran<;:ois Tosquelles, who asserted the post-war psycho-
socio analogy between man and society through the phenomenological notion of Erlebnis, the lived 
encounter, the moment of historical signature mirrored within the psychical and biological, set against a 
post-war world of revelatory renewal. The 1948 doctoral thesis of Tosquelles appearing under the title La 
Vecu de /a fin du monde dans Ia Folii3 was eventually published in 1984, only to be deleted several years 
later. The study, imbued with a post-war geist of a particular historical materialism championing the Vecu 
(the lived), assessed the concrete dimensions of man's most intimate (schizophrenic) yet very shared 
(historical) drama through a clinically meditative embrace of phenomenology. This identified the end of the 
world experience unique and privileged to a 194 7 nation ravaged by the bitter upheavals and violent 
uprooting of war. Of particular importance to the study of Tosquelles, was the very phenomenological 
description of delirious states in line with the demands of a new post-war world. 
The dialectic of construction and reconstruction, of integration and reintegration drawn upon by 
Tosquelles from the neurological studies of Monakow and Morgue 64 , highlighted the possibilities for 
inaugurating a phenomenology within the rubric of the question of psychotic process and subjectivity. The 
catastrophic reaction to the world as entertained by the clinical cases drawn upon by Tosquelles 
demonstrated a faithfulness to the Freudian thesis of a post-catastrophic reconstruction of morbid 
construction in the wake of torment65 • This is turn paved the way for the industrious Heideggerian notion of 
building tied to a post-war mediation upon the reconstructive, creative potential of schizophrenia66 . The 
positioning of schizophrenia as a creative, industrious resource becomes the central thematic steering the 
development of an Institutional Psychotherapy (Psychotherapie lnstitutionelle) and the Bonnafe-
Tosquelles-Oury fraternity fuelling the fires of post-war clinical revision. 
Tosquelles, Bonnafe, Oury and Follin had, as foremost representatives of the rural clinic of Saint-
Albain, already jointly published alongside Dr. Pierre Fouquet in the Annales Medico-Psychologiques of 
December 1944. Note sur Ia solidarite des problemes doctrinaux et des problemes d'assistance en 
psychiatrie and La direction medicale, condition essentielle de /'assistance psychiatrique was followed in 
1945 by Note sur /'originalite du pathologique, L 'inconscient et /es instinct dans une structurale de 
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/'evenement psycho-pathologique in 1946. These, in tum would be mirrored by the essays by Bonnafe, 
Follin and Tosquelles in Evolution Psychiatriqui7 of 1947 pertaining to a "diagnostic of sympathy" as the 
psychiatric approach proportional to the lived capacities of the mentally ill and post-war man. Here, the 
study of the catastrophic complex by Tosquelles addressed an architectonic concern for creative renewal, 
one necessitated through the clinical milieu of an Occupied France having witnessed the systematic 
starvation of 40,000 mentally ill under the then Vichy-appointed Minister of Health Alexis Carrel. 
4: What is post-war French psychiatry? 
To speak of post-war French psychiatry, is to speak of an Institutional Psychotherapy, the name of 
which was proposed by Dr. Georges Daumezon in 1952, himself an exponent of what had previously been 
deemed by Dr. Lucien Bonnafe as a, "sector psychiatry" and an "art of sympathy.68" 
During the French Occupation, the psychiatric hospitals of the allegedly 'free South' had 
undergone a systematic starvation at the hands of the Vichy Minister of Health Alexis Carrel, himself 
impassioned by what was held to be the prophetic direction of Eugenics. This Eugenic grip within which 
the psychiatric milieu suffocated, did however prove the necessary condition for rearticulating the apostolic 
vocation of medicine, of resisting the homogenising logic of concentration camps, of attending to the ill 
individually, respecting each and every person in his singularity and struggle, and of addressing the 
imperial need of man by addressing the subjective suffering of the individual. Psychiatry, would be, under 
conditions of Occupation, a psychiatry of "extension" where the role of the psychiatrist was to be found 
within a resistance to Eugenic ideals and an assistance to the diminished brothers, sisters and children of 
humanity. 
Institutional Psychotherapy, thus fmds its footing upon a ground laid by lived historical experience 
and the horrors of occupation, a psychiatric movement inaugurated in 1942 by a Dr. Paul Balvet, who, at a 
"congress of French neurologists and psychiatrists" in Montpellier, publicly denounced the lived genocide 
experienced by the medical milieu under Carrel, the suffering of the mentally ill and handicapped, and the 
urgent need for a new "humane" psychiatry69 and a new psychiatric personage, one attending to the 
imperial need of weakened man. 
Indeed, if there is to exist a term within the lexicon of psychiatry, designating the marriage of 
philanthropy and medical enquiry as well as accentuating the apostolic ground of medical enquiry, it would 
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firstly find its most fitting articulation with Philippe Pinel's "moral therapy" of the 18th Century, and 
secondly it would find its extension, and subsequent reversal, in the 20th Century with Institutional 
Therapy. For the former, the names Etienne Esquirol, William Tuke and Jean-Pierre Farlet mark the 
foremost personages of a medical fraternity spanning the 18th and 19th Century. For the latter, the names 
Julien De Ajuriaguerra, Paul Bernard, Lucien Bonnafe, Georges Daumezon, Henri Duchene, Henri Ey, 
Pierre Fouquet, Sven Follin, Jacques Lacan, Louis le Guillant, Paul Sivadon, Fran<;ois Tosquelles, Jean 
Oury, Felix Guattari, Franz Fanon, Robert Millon, Femand Oury, mark the foremost of a movement 
spanning nigh on sixty years, from the call of Balvet in 1942 to the present day activities of Jean Oury at 
the clinic of La Borde. 
This movement to which Drs. Jean Oury, Lucien Bonnafe, and Fran<;ois Tosquelles will prove the 
primary focus of our study, is a page within the history of medicine and philosophy that is yet to be 
introduced, and yet to be written. On British shores, the term "institutional psychotherapy" was 
communicated through the works of Felix Guattari 70 , most notably Psychanalyse et Transversalite of 
197 4 71 , La Revolution Moleculaire of 1980 72, and Cartographies Schizoanalytiques of 1984 73 . As with 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, the conditions nurturing Guattari's thought were not merely said of 
1968 where philosophy was all but too easily seen to depart from a new post-revolutionary dawn, a dawn 
whose rays were captured by widely-thumbed publications such as Difference and Repetition 74 , Anti-
Oedipus75 and Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard's Discours, Figure76. Rather, it was a post-war France where the 
lived experience (Erlibnis) of social rebuilding in the wake of Liberation and psychiatric and philosophical 
renaissance, as well as the reconstruction of human dignity, displayed a particular new way of thinking man 
and his world, and of articulating this thinking by way of psychiatric practice within the institution. 
5: Overview of chapters 
Institutional Psychotherapy is a project of the ethical, the phenomenological and the diagnostic. It raises the 
question of the neurological and the psychiatric at the same time as the existential. We begin the study of 
these three pillars of post-war psychiatric enquiry - the ethic, the phenomenological and the diagnostic -
with our first chapter, Soft Extermination Hard Times where we seek to highlight the historical repetition of 
ethical renewal marked by the marriage between philanthropy and science. This bi-focal methodology 
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firstly observes the project of Philippe Pinel in a post-Revolutionary France, a project seeking to 
resensibilise the man of mental illness through a softer, more humane therapy, a therapy of "words". This 
will act as a comparative narrative to the emergence of a sentiment of sympathy within the psychiatric 
milieu of an occupied France and the inauguration of a post-war medical sectorisation similar to the 
Hippocratic and Apostolic philanthropic intentions of Pinel and Tuke, yet different in its appeals to a 
strategy of "disalienation." For Lucien Bonnafe, in following the assertions of Jacques Lacan, madness was 
a drama within which both the clinician and patient were included. The personage of the psychiatrist was to 
be found within "a shared dialogue" and the post-war development of psychiatry- or more precisely of an 
Institutional Psychotherapy - would be in the direction of a "strategy of disalienation" and an "art of 
sympathy," where clinician and patient would walk the "paths of sympathy." In this chapter, we will 
establish as to what exactly the ethic is, we will observe the announcement of a more charitable direction to 
psychiatric enquiry, called forth by historical trauma. 
Our second chapter, The Psychiatric Vision of Tosquelles and Oury, seeks to extend the study of 
the ethic by selectively exploring how the doctoral thesis of Franyois Tosquelles marked a defmitive 
attempt to develop an analogical way of thinking the psychopathological announcements of schizophrenia 
through phenomenological notions of renewal and revelation that were unique to the neurology of Kurt 
Goldstein, Viktor Von Weizsacker and the psychopathology of von Monakow and Mourgue. What 
Tosquelles underlined in his thesis of 1948, was the "polydimensional" approach of Institutional 
Psychotherapy, where a clinico-philosophical paradigm of the psychoanalytical, the biological, the 
theological, the neurological and the phenomenological, did not seek to reinforce the classical nosographies 
of mental illness, but rather appeal to the positive, constructive, aesthetic and industrial announcements of 
psychosis. 
The ethical and phenomenological study of the preceding chapters will lead us to the topic of the 
diagnostic, and will see how the ethical and phenomenological hallmark a clinical approach unique to 
Institutional Psychotherapy - the praecox gefuhl. Here, in our third chapter entitled, Psychiatry and 
Phenomenology: an introduction to the empirico-phenomenological attitude, we will explore the specific 
phenomenological and ethical landscape within which the diagnostic is deployed by observing the works of 
Dr. Jean Oury, Jacques Schotte, Viktor von Weizsacker and Henri Maldiney. We will demonstrate how the 
empirico-phenomenological attitude of Institutional Psychotherapy pertains to a "pathic" diagnostic of 
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schizophrenia, and see how it is a diagnostic working through the felt rather than the thought, a diagnostic 
that is at once ethical and phenomenological, empirical and transcendental, clinical and phenomenological. 
Through studying the three topics of the ethic, the phenomenology and the diagnostic of Institutional 
Psychotherapy, we will follow the lead of Lucien Bonnafe for an understanding of a post-war ethical 
renewal, Tosquelles for the phenomenological expansion of the ethic, and Oury for a diagnostic that works 
transcendentally. In following Bonnafe, Tosquelles and Oury through a post-war world of renewal and 
restitution, we are witness to the philanthropic, philosophical and scientific sentiment infusing the project 
of a post-war generation where "there is not a pre-existing fragment of the world, but its emergence,77" 
where, "the simplest of experiences evaluate the global role of the situation,78"where mentally ill man and 
nursing man are themselves founded and forged within the psychiatric situation, within the ethical, 
phenomenological and diagnostic "drama" of a "verbal psychiatry of action?9" 
The thesis, in acting as a humble introduction to an unwritten history will contribute to existing studies on 
the history of phenomenological psychiatry, namely, Arthur Tatossian's La Phenomenologie des Psychoses 
(1979), H. Spielgelberg's Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry (1972) and Georges Lanteri-
Laura's La Psychiatrie Phenomenologique (1957). The thesis further aims to contribute to the history of 
philosophy, the history of Ideas and the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic disciplines as a whole, as 
well as encouraging future research within these respective domains to confidently work in the direction of 
a "good intention." 
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Chapter 1: Soft Extermination, Hard times 
Something better has to be done in this era of Light! 
~ Philippe Pind 
To speak of psychiatry, is to speak of liberty 
~ Lucien Bonnafez 
Introduction: Post-revolutionary France and Post-war France 
In this chapter we will address the philanthropic imperative defming two historical episodes of reformist 
psychiatric enquiry. We will demonstrate how the lived historical conditions of post-revolutionary 18th 
and 191h century France, and Post-War 20th century France, urged a charitable reform and a redefinition of 
the medic's personage. To understand as to what exactly a psychiatric philanthropy is, we will first look at 
the work of Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), and assess its significance in light of the Hippocratic and 
metaphysical ground of medicine to which it directly appealed. This will enable us to better understand 
what Pinel deemed a "moral therapy", it's rooting in the medical vision of high-antiquity, and to also see 
its pertinence as an "ethical therapy". To further support the idea of a medical philanthropy underpinning 
the notion of the ethic, we will draw upon William Hack Tuke's (1827-1895) pioneering reform of the 
English asylum system of the 18th century. In doing so, we will identify the charitable sentiment urging 
such men of medicine to singularly affect a profound, creative change in the rationality of medical 
treatment, contrary to the common popular reason of their day. 
By analysing the historical and theoretical significance of Pinel and Tuke, we will be able to 
approach the psychiatric reform of war-time and post-war France, for it is only by understanding the 
charitable significance of the 18th century reformist, that we can properly begin to understand the 
humanitarian impulse underpinning the 20th century post-war French psychiatric reform spearheaded by 
Jean Oury, Franc;ois Tosquelles, Lucien Bonnafe and Paul Balvet. 
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We will use a comparative and bi-focal methodology in order to ascertain: (1) how a 
philanthropic imperative is shared by the reformers of the 19th and 201h century establishment; (2) how an 
ethical renewal of psychiatry is necessitated by historical lived experience, and (3) as to how these 
reformers differed in their architectural visions of the therapeutic institution. It is important to keep in 
mind that we do not seek to provide hermeneutic readings of the chosen historical material, but rather to 
demonstrate a particular ethical sensibility pertinent to psychiatric enquiry and, in fact, to medical enquiry 
as a whole. Returning a dignity to mentally ill man is the hallmark of two great therapeutic projects, 
however, where the charitable psychiatric mind of the 18th and 19th century proposed alienation and 
isolation as the worthy measures of a "moral therapy", the post-war pioneers of the rural French clinic, on 
grounds of their wartime experiences, proposed a "disalienation" (desalienation) to be the proper ethical 
and apostolic address of psychiatry3. For the former, psychiatry was a specialised science of mental 
alienation, and it was to be considered the art of arts. For the latter, psychiatry was a vocation definable as 
an art of sympathy~ the art of man. 
In approaching a post-revolutionary "moral therapy" from the vantage point of a post-war "art 
of sympathy", we will be able to demonstrate the ethicality inherent within psychiatry. This will enable us 
to eventually deem Institutional Psychotherapy an ethical undertaking. We will also see how this ethical 
project was inaugurated in the late 18th and early 19th century by Pinel at Bicetre, how it was mirrored by 
Tuke at his York Retreat, and how it was deep within the thoughts of (and historically urged by) Dr. Paul 
Balvet, Jean Oury and Franc;:ois Tosquelles in the 20th century with the wartime clinic of Saint-Alban, and 
later, La Borde. In beginning with, and analysing, the resistance of Pinel and Tuke to the psychological 
archaism of their day, we will better learn that the 20th century incarnation of the philanthropic effort was 
in the form of Balvet, Tosquelles, Oury and Bonnafe. This will further support a distinction between the 
moral and the ethical, and demonstrate that the moral therapy of Pinel and the historical urgencies 
underpinning its application defined psychiatry as an ethical undertaking. 
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The very humanitarian imperative urging Pinel and Tuke to institutional reform will similarly 
be seen to urge the psychiatrist of wartime France working under the threat of Eugenic science. This will 
be demonstrated by drawing upon the assertions of a hitherto unmentioned 20th century personage within 
British medical historiography, the eminent neuropsychiatrist, Henri Baruk (1897-1999) and the Talmudic 
reading of charitability and justice to which his medical vision adhered. We aim to show that it is indeed 
by approaching the Eugenic question of the 20th century and investigating the wartime and post-war 
psychiatric resistance to its ideals, that we can better understand the ethic of psychiatry and its 
philanthropy, and better comprehend the notion of human dignity communicated to us by Pinel, and the 
necessary principality it occupies. 
1: Pinel and the noble art 
There are two defming instances, two architectural phases, significant to the history of psychiatry, 
simultaneously shaping and transforming the role of the psychiatrist, the ethic of his science and the 
object of his specialisation. The first is a feted moment to the narrative of European psychiatry occurring 
within a 19th Century France. It is within this time of a newfound French Republican order - where a 
nation is seen to celebrate a life free of monarchy - that the development of the medical idea adopts a 
double character, where it is at once philanthropic and scientific, where scientific enquiry is advanced at 
the same time as attending to the imperial need of suffering man, and where the psychiatrist is at once 
man of science and man of altruistic principle. 
This altruistic drive, was incarnated deep within the efforts and sympathies of the 
ecclesiastically rooted Philippe Pinel - chief medic for the division of the alienated at Bicetre hospital in 
the picturesque French department of La Seine. Pinel was unequalled in his medical sympathies pushing 
him to pioneer a reform of the housing and treatment of the mentally ill. Similar analogous, ruthful 
developments occurred in transitu throughout a Europe imbued with the Sensualist philosophies of Locke 
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and Condillac that were typified by the efforts of Chiarugi in Italy, Langerman, Reil and Hayner, in 
Germany, and most notably William Hack Tuke in England4• Yet it was Pinel who would remain of pre-
eminence for the history of psychiatry, unparalleled in his marrying the metaphysical and anatomical 
pathology, unequalled in his call for a legislated psychiatric reform within an 18th and 19th Europe ~ a 
Europe that had remained steadfastly true to a medieval belief, one seeing the mad as humanity's object 
of repulsion to be enchained. 
For Pinel, the asylum clinician had to be true to the Hippocratic principle of medicine, its origin 
and the metaphysical imperatives of the apostolic Greek medic. Accordingly, Pinel wrote of the clinician 
to be someone who was a "rare" and "gifted individual," not just a man of "human spirit" possessing "the 
talent of observation," but an architect of the new, "bringing novel systems and the fruit of brilliant 
qualities" to the forefront of scientific enquuy. The medic was a creative personage, with a responsibility 
to advance enquiry in accordance with the Hippocratic doctrine. 
The faithfulness to high-antiquity was sober and Metaphysics was not to be freely mixed with 
the "ideology of the science of facts, 6" but rather considered an "accessory" science from which the least 
contested ideas could be, in Pinel's words, "soberly borrowed.7" Furthermore, the medic specialising in 
the field of mental illness, was a man of "mental alienation" emulating the prognostic talent of 
Hippocrates and Galen, yet urged to creative advance through the historical conditions and urgencies of 
his day. In discovering the pathological symptomatology of mental alienation, the clinician, gifted in 
observation, would also qualify the sensualist philosophy of the passions to be ever more important to 
medical enquiry, and indeed, to man himself. 
Important for this "sober" system, a factually balanced metaphysical enquiry, was the external 
signs of the malady and the physical variations corresponding to the intellectual and affective lesions of 
mental illness. Pinel sought to equate the science of passions with the science of anatomical pathology, 
metaphysics with physical facts, and the metaphysical with the material. He, with this sober methodology, 
in tum sought to develop a semiology of facial traits, gestures, movements and rhythm, as well as the 
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affective expression of the patient's physiognomy. As Pinel wrote in his landmark Traite of 1801, this 
semiology of mental illness marrying the passions with physiognomy, became the very "object of his 
particular research.9" More specifically, the task Pinel allotted himself as an eminent pathologist, was to 
identify the external sign of a malady as an isolatable symptom (within a pathological causal chain) and to 
consequently recognise it as belonging to an affective and intellectual disorder. With this, the question of 
physis was raised at the same time as the question of psyche- the physical disturbance at the same time as 
the intellectual disturbance, the physiological at the same time as the psychological. 
In Pinel's century, one spanning the latter 18th to the mid 19th, works on mental illness were a 
highly valued intellectual currency, and most notably from English and German shores. The former saw 
the publication of William Battie's (1703-1776) Treatise on Madness of 175810, Andrew Harper's A 
Treatise on the Real Cause of Insanity of 178911, and Sir Alexander Crichton's (1763-1856) Inquiry into 
the Nature and Origin of Metal Derangement of 179812• All three publications received an equal measure 
of eminence and controversy because they equated the varieties of madness with the history of the 
passions and their effects to which general methods of caustics and rough cathartics were but useless 
treatments. In Germany, Johann Ernst Greding (1718-177 5) published Medical Aphorisms on Melancholy 
as an appendix to the second volume of Crichton's Inquiry13 and Johann Georg von. Zimmermann (1728-
1795) penned An Examination of the Advantages of Solitude and of its Operations on the Heart and Mind 
in 180614. Such publications stood strong alongside one another, and by similar appeal they underlined the 
necessity to employ rational scientific advancement. Pinal saw these works as the pillars of 
Scholastically-led modem medical scholarship on mental pathology and the passions, and he went as far 
as to accord Crichton's work a, "certain brilliancy" with its "profundity ... and display of new 
observations.15" These studies were envisaged to both establish the intention, sense and value of the "art" 
of mental alienation, and at the same time provide a modem anatomical pathological rubric for the brain 
sciences pioneered by the likes of Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) and Johann Gaspar Spurzheim (1776-
1832) in 181216. Philanthropy and science, could indeed be one and the same state of affairs. 
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The need to understand the development and influence of the passions within the "animal 
economy" as the most ordinary of causes disturbing "the moral faculty17" in turn became the Idea 
directing clinical enquiry, and, in fact, it became the sensus communis of the medical discipline. The 
passions were considered as the most primordial and simple of phenomena within the animal economy 
and were fundamental to the maintenance to the species as a whole. As Pinel wrote, such was an enquiry 
into the "simple relations" weaving together the "constitutive principles of being, 18" without which the 
"perpetuity of the species19" would come to an end. The passions were not static, but mobile, fluid and 
always in movement, working and circulating within the complex design and hierarchy of the animal 
economy. Threefold in their significance, they were thought responsible for the conservation of man's 
existence, the reproduction of the species, and the protection of the race "in a tender. .. [post-
revolutionary] ... age. 20" The passions thus became the historical theology of the physiologist. 
As an example in his, Traite Medico-Philosophique sur l 'Alienation Mentale ou Ia Manie, Pinel 
argued for this dynamic system of primary phenomena by drawing upon his semiology. He tells us that 
we can observe the passions at work with the "more or less energetic anxiety" following a fault in the 
renewal of air within the respiratory action; the intensity of heat or cold necessitating salubrious dwellings 
or clothes; the inconvenient sensation leading to the experience of retention and rejection of specific 
matter; the sentiment of fatigue leading one to seeking rest; the state of suffering produced by an internal 
or external malady. We therefore see Pinel reason on grounds of careful observation, that the passions are 
a primary mechanism ensuring the ontic-ontological development of the species, urging man to shelter, to 
eat, to reproduce, and to adapt to his lived conditions. Indeed, the passions were both an empirical proof 
and a fact of nature making the "conservation of our existence21 " possible. The natural history of man was 
founded upon these simple impulsions and driving necessities of nature within the human organism and 
its milieu (Umwelt). Were the passions were of a force that could urge man to perseverance, the passions 
were likewise of a power that could motivate the alienation of the human mind with a parallel set of 
physiological significations. The symptomatology of what Pinel deemed "profound grief' for example, 
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carried the physiology of "languidness," a loss of appetite, a "tightening of the skin," the "paleness of the 
face," and on a more pathological level, "extreme chills," the subtle and gradual diminishing of "vital 
force," ensuing "anxieties," and "laboured respiration," all resulting in a "comatic state" or a catalepsy of 
the patienf2• At the lesser advanced stages of grief, which Pinel described as a "form of ennui," the 
patient was seen to greatly distance himself from any form of physical activity, there is intense gastric 
discomfort, a weakened circulation within the capillaries of the liver and the stomach, whilst the patient's 
general worldview is one of"a savage misanthropy," "a confusion of ideas," and even "stupor.23" Patients 
experiencing extreme fear and terror in turn demonstrated what Pinel observed to be "contractions of the 
heart," blood accumulating within the larger capillaries; fevers and cold chills alternating; "an excessive 
leaking of urine"; diarrheao; spasmodic contraction of the arteries and a paleness of the surface of the 
body. In more severe cases, we are told of "violent spasms," convulsions and epileptic seizures, mania 
and even death24. 
Pinel was above all a physiologist. The study of physiological phenomena led him to defining a 
physiology of the mental faculties and their upsets. He was, therefore, an alienist who specialised in the 
science of mental alienation, but more precisely a clinician weaving together an observational discipline 
of the anatomico-pathological at the same time as the passions, a system assessing subtle primordial 
causes and their gross anatomical signification. This was to ally the principles of modem physiology with 
the effect affections and passions had upon the organism, of understanding the affective and dynamic at 
the same time as the organic. If the study of the passions was to have a medical semiology, it was the 
physiological phenomena to which they gave rise that would provide the empirical base for their 
categorisation. Pinel in turn called this, in appealing to those clinicians and philosophers overseas penning 
the most influential works on mental alienation - and indeed to the ideals of high antiquity - a, "rational 
symptomatology." We also learn, that this semiology was to be true to the ancient scholastic order of 
causes, the diagnostic, and the prognostic25 - notions that had been wrongly employed by the "sterile 
language" of the schools set up by Sennart, Riviere, and Plater, notions perturbed by those who had 
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sought to "profit from their professorial status ... seeking admiration from their disciples,"26 of those who 
had abandoned the tenets of the Hippocratic clinician. We have it from Pinel that despite the increasingly 
championed works of Sennart and Riviere, and notwithstanding their contemporary "celebrity" among 
students of medicine, the "alienated continued to be confmed ... and isolated.27" Pinel indeed harboured a 
fear for the future of the noble art of medicine and the ethic of its research, for the dignity of man had 
suffered, and would no doubt continue to do so in an age where the metaphysical equation of medicine 
and its ethical demand was increasingly becoming overshadowed by the contemporary fervency for 
cerebral pathology and autopsy. Indeed, to draw upon an adage of Pinel, within an era of light something 
better had to be done! That is, that a more creative and philanthropic direction of medical assistance had 
to be found. 
Pinel's illumined effort, therefore, in addressing the economy of the passions at the same time 
as the economy of human anatomico-pathology, was to ensure that the phenomena of the body would not 
be divorced from the phenomena of psychology, and man not divorced from the apostolic mission of 
medicine. This mission was borne from the unequalled hand of Hippocrates for whom medicine was an 
art of man addressing the troubles of the understanding, affective disposition and organic disfunction 
(psycho-pathology proper). In Pinel's words this art was, "an art of counterbalancing the human 
passions,28" an art "re-establishing reason within the human subject,29" an art of medicine, which, in the 
words of Hippocrates, was "the most noble.30" 
There were certain demands qualifying this art. With mental alienation (what we commonly 
call today mental illness) there existed "diverse circumstances," "varied forms" and "varied phenomena" 
requiring careful observation and an observational strategy of the clinician-patient relation. The clinician 
had to act in accordance to the variation that he observed, and he had to experience the world of the 
patient, "To live within their presence" as Pinel wrote in his Traite, to "study their diverse characters," to 
note the objects of"their desire and their abhorrence," to "observe them over days, nights, and the diverse 
seasons of the year," and to only "subjugate in the softest possible way." This characterised the ethical 
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responsibility of the alienist who worked with the, "continual spectacle of all the phenomena of mental 
alienation.3h' This noble art of surveillance and observation was therefore only to be taught to those of 
a "particular zeal," to those who possessed an experienced and "detailed view of what was lacking within 
medicine" and to those who had a sincere willingness beyond personal and social gain to undertake a 
lifetime's work within a world less habitual and far more precarious, that is, within the spectacle of all the 
phenomena. True to the vision of Hippocrates, Pinel further tells us that sound judgement is to equally 
reign within medicine, physics, chemistry and botany, as is a "natural sagacity and an inventive mind.32" 
Consequently, Pinel underlined that clinical practice seeks is not defined by the "dogmatic tones of the 
doctor" but rather through a patient-clinician relation, that is, through frequent contact with the alienated. 
This was an appeal to an inter-subjective paradigm of the clinician-patient dynamic, and for Pinel, it was 
to be developed and deepened even with the "most violent of maniacs" because a "varied questioning of 
the same objecf3" was always to be indefatigably maintained. We see that this noble art of observation is 
the most complex and demanding of arts, requiring, above all, the "patience" and tolerance of observation, 
and a precise documenting of the intellectual and anatomico-pathological affections occurring with each 
variation of a given malady. 
2 : Pinel's semiology vis-a-vis psychology 
Pinel regarded mental illness to be the result of excessive exposure to social and psychological 
stresses, and in some measure, of heredity and physiological damage34. For his illustrious student, Jean 
Pierre Falret (1794-1870), the importance of Pinel and his disciple-come-cohort Etienne Esquirol (1772-
1840) would lie in their faithfulness to the medical tradition inaugurated by the Greeks- Hippocrates (c. 
460 B.C), Galen (129-200 A.D), Caelius Aurelianus (c. 3rd or 4th century A.D). The scientific divisions, 
descriptions and classifications of Pinel took, as we have indicated, high antiquity as a founding gesture 
for the methodology of medical classification35 • Through the system of "rational pathology", the insane 
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were no longer to be considered as the possessed and darrmed, but as the affected and curable, as those, to 
draw upon Griesinger's (1817-1868) Pathologie und Therapie der psychischen Krankheiten, 
demonstrating a "perturbed moral sensibility," where the trouble of the faculties of intelligence are a 
causal principle for the "varying" forms of madness36• A tendency reigned however, and the medical 
student of the 19th Century increasingly favoured the raw pathology of mental illness over the sensualist 
and metaphysically sympathetic enquiries of PineL As Falret remembered, "attention was given to the 
discovery of lesions through autopsies performed on the alienated, of lesions found on the brain and the 
membranes.37" This purely anatomical direction of scientific enquiry was conceptually far from Pinel's 
"moral therapy" and the "rational pathology" inspired by the sensualist philosophies of John Locke 
(1632-1704) and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780). 
Pinel's physiology was a metaphysically oriented one complimenting addressing the 
anatomical economy of the human organism and the animal economy of the species. But autopsy was 
becoming the new currency of medical exchange, and the more surgically hands-on approach to the 
pathology of mental illness, as Falret further recounts, "proved the veritable base ofmedicine.38" Suicide, 
hypochondria and non-delirious mania were subjects of medical fascination, yet pathological anatomy 
was believed to demonstrate the "primary reason" for the phenomena of "mental alienation." The 
common popular reason of medicine, therefore, was fast becoming one of identifYing causes within an 
isolatable organ, rather than the categories of stoic psychology and the holism to which the passions 
appealed. The locating of a primary cause within an isolated organ defined a medical materialism with its 
logic in autopsy and not necessarily a "rational pathology" with its logic in sensualism. According to 
Falret, the former proved the "dominant idea39" of the time and the opening up of the body of the 
alienated was enough to qualifY the diagnostic, prognostic and treatment of an affective disorder for the 
younger generation of doctors. 
Yet the speed of this rapid currency was not without an serious scholarship, one debatably 
introduced by Gall who had undertaken a lengthy and committed study of cerebral physiology in 1819 
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entitled The Anatomy and Physiognomy of the Nervous System in General and of the Brain in Particular40• 
He proposed that all the forms and variations of madness were seated in the brain and the nervous system 
with parallel phenomena occurring in the psychological faculty. The brain, therefore, was an organ to be 
considered as functioning independently of all other organs. Similar arguments were propounded by the 
likes of Louis Calmeil (1798-1895), Antoine Bayle (1799-1858) and Falret's dear colleague, Felix Voisin 
( 1794-1872), yet it was Gall who remained of greatest historical importance, and he later proved a 
decisive presence within the Thought of the 19th century British neurologist, John Hughlings Jackson 
(1835-1911) who similarly appealed to a psycho-physico parallelism. Indeed, for Falret, the 
increasingly material epoch, was one of the "anatomical and the cerebral4), and the firm belief without 
exception, was that an alienationatory cause could be located within the brain, that it could be 
encountered in the membranes, and that the intellectual and affective troubles of madness, were 
identifiable in their entirety by the localised cerebral lesion which was becoming the pathological sign of 
malady par excellence. 
Yet as Falret asserted, the many years of enquiry and investigation that ensued under the 
pathological and surgically demonstrative auspices of the time (in attempting to ground mental pathology 
within the isolated organ of the brain) furnished but a further necessity for the enquiries of psychology: 
These lesions are not enough to scientifically explain the great diversity and delicate nuances of the 
psychical phenomena displayed by the alienated. We thus begin to seek within psychology the means of 
supplanting the insufficiencies of pathological anatomy.42 
This was by no means to downplay the role of the brain for all moral and intellectual phenomena 
supposed the cooperation of the brain as an indispensable fact to nature- man was to feel and to think. As 
Falret was to write, "to exert an action upon this organ is at once to exert action upon ideas and 
sentiments 43 ": the exertion of ideas and sentiments, of feeling and thinking, are immediately 
reciprocated within the brain, and within the nervous system as a whole- the change in psychological and 
physiological state are reciprocated within the brain. Further, the "cerebral function" had as its particular 
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"essential character" the ability to observe its own exercise and it possessed, across diverse temporalities 
and actions, a "control of direction." The brain was of importance in as much to the discourse of the 
passions as it was to the discourse of cerebral pathology. And Pinel had never discredited the role of 
cerebral pathology just as long as it would remain true to the rationalist discourse of the passions and the 
metaphysical fundament of the Greek medic. Yet it was the alienation of the brain itself, of isolating it as 
the supreme organ that for Falret would not yield sufficient advancement and specialisation of the science 
of mental alienation, that is, of psychiatry. 
Psychology was considered a possible value to the investigation of mental pathology for it 
could extend and clarify knowledge of the psychical lesion within the diverse forms of mental illness, 
from hallucination to suicide. The goal was to arrive at a rational theory of madness and to, in Falret's 
words, "scientifically systematise the diverse areas of mental medicine. 44" The alienated were a 
veritable scientific pursuit, and in terms of mental pathology, the smallest of lesions were sought for 
memory, for the association of ideas, for judgment and even for abstraction: "all the faculties of the 
normal state recognised by the psychologists, and to find the isolated or complex lesions at the state of 
malady.45" The logic governing was a seemingly analogous one: if physiology was to clarify medicine in 
terms of normal pathology, then normal psychology would clarify mental medicine (mMecine mentale). 
Through studying the complex manifestations of intelligence and sentiment and in drawing upon the 
divisions and subdivisions of faculties, a rational symptomatology of mental illness could be achieved, 
one of the metaphysical and the pathological, one unachievable by mere isolation of the brain. As Pinel 
sought to ask in the introduction to his Traite, the task became one of wanting to "trace and describe the 
phenomena of mental alienation, that is to say, of a lesion within the intellectual and affective faculties. 46" 
For Falret, however, the role of psychology to this encyclopaedic undertaking had its shortcoming. 
Localising a lesion of the faculty proved, an "all too artificial47" pursuit of scientific enquiry. Such 
phrasing was true to the sentiments of his mentor, Pinel, who himself saw psychology as, "only leading to 
confusion and disorder.48" Psychology, in wanting to parallel the altered lesional state with the normal 
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state furnished nothing but "thunderous instances" for the development of a rational pathology grounded 
in the passions. 
It is with these indications by Pinel and Falret that we can propose medicine to enter a "clinical 
phase" of its history for the first time qualifying a "specialist49" of mental alienation. The clinical and 
direct study of the alienated was where the clinician would find the foundations of his "special science," 
and indeed, of mental pathology itselt0• Normal pathological anatomy and psychology would be of 
importance within the consideration of mental alienation, but only as an "auxiliary to the speciality. 51, It 
was clinical observation alone, of monitoring the physiognomic expressions of the passions and the 
physiological signatures of a maladay that would "advance the exact knowledge of affections" and 
furnish the "necessary documents" of description, classification, prognosis and treatment true to the 
Scholastic imperative52 . To observe and to penetrate the innermost workings of the alienated was the task 
and the surgical intervention was different to that of the anatomists. Rather than cutting through the 
membrane and penetrating the material workings of the patient's brain, the alienist was, in Falret's words, 
to "penetrate the secret of their thoughts by the diverse questions of their being. 53" This is where we can 
begin to consider the rational pathology of Pinel to indicate a phenomenological enquiry of the organism .. 
Penetrating the secret of the patient's Thought was a therapeutic precursor to the rudimentary 
practice of Freudian psychoanalysis, and transference most notably. Pinel's noble art was a spoken art and 
an observational art. The patient was an enigma to be respected, a limitless field of psychological and 
physiological nuances, of momentary and "unnoticed change." As Pinel reflected there were subtle 
"variations of atmosphere," the alienist was initiated into a world different to that of common popular 
reason, different to that of the cerebral pathologists and the slicing of the membranes, a world where 
subtle (psychological) and coarse (physiological) phenomena abounded, phenomena even "confusing the 
eyes of the most clairvoyant. 54" Indeed, Pinel would later recall that the alienist- the "specialist"- gifted 
in observation was to note these subtle "variations" of body, speech and mind, and in turn speak. If he 
were not versed in the ethical demands of his practice then he could speak with a melancholic at great 
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length and gravely fail to notice the smallest of lesions within the understanding of the patient and the 
pathological signs of his maladl5. It appears then, that the rationality and its methodology to which Pinel 
appealed, was of a different temporal logic to that of the cerebro pathologists (cerebra-materialists). Pinel 
insisted upon the temporal parameters of patience and tolerance to a treatment engaging with the diverse 
questions of being in order to grasp the emergence and genesis of psychopathological phenomena. 
3: Philanthropic reform 
Pinel was an individual of sensitive enquiry well disposed to the apostolic sentiment of the 
Greek medic. He articulated a medical humanitarian project in a Republic birthed by the execution of 
monarchy, within a Republican Order inaugurated by the guillotine. The change of power from monarch 
to republican was as swift as the action of the guillotine itself. Execution by guillotine was a public 
measure that would ever remain a deep-rooted motive for Pinel's reformist vision of the asylum, and one 
that characterises him as a noble rather than a Republican. Formally required to attend the execution of 
King Louis Capet on 21st January 1793, Pinel would recount in a letter to a close friend, as to how the 
execution of the King was meet with a widespread and celebratory aura popularis. For the young 
clinician of a growing reputation, this crowd intoxication was not how a France free of monarchy would 
nurture a dignified Republic. Most of all, what was executed with monarchy, was man's dignity itself 
I doubt not that the King's death will be described in different ways, as the partisan spirit dictates, and that 
garbled versions ofthis great event will appear in newspapers and be noised abroad in such a manner as to 
distort the truth .. .I greatly regret that I was obliged to attend the execution bearing arms with the 
citizens ... I write to you now my heart filled with grief and my whole being stunned ... Louis who fortified 
the principles of religion, seemed completely resigned to meet death. 56 
This, a sentiment equally shared by a Dr. Paul Bru describing such a time as being one of, "massacre" of, 
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"carnage" and of"fictions.57" Marked by the death of a Catholic King, Pinel's altruistic sympathies would 
eventually be realised within a medical practice rehabilitating those condemned on grounds of insanity. 
Pinel, as a man of medicine specialising in the treatment of the insane (the insenses as they were called), 
was to personally rescue the enchained from their historical punition in favour of a therapy of observation 
and a shared, close contact between the clinician and patient. In the introduction to his Traite he wrote of, 
"the at times savage misanthropy of the alienated," of the aggressive and disrhythmic gestures of the body, 
all of which required a clinical approach of"an extreme simplicity and affectionate manner,58" sometimes 
requiring "intimidation" but only with the "softness of speech and tone.59" Driving Pinel, was an 
anthropological politic of extreme simplicity, a noble politic, a metaphysical politic associated with 
nobility, a hope of returning human dignity, of returning a certain "nobleness" to its necessary principality 
within the life of man, ill or fit, sane or insane, a nobleness that had violently died with Louis Capet and 
violently suffered within the prisons and sectors for the insane. For Pinel, the approach was to be one, 
"assuring the greatest of exactitude of facts gathered over many years of research and practice. 60" 
Pinel introduced, midway through his Traite, the Maxims of Care and Philanthropy to be 
Adopted in Hospices 61 as his seldom-studied direct appeal against what he called the reigning 
"oppressive systems of servitude." Silently, this was a charge against the Republican State and a 
concerted hope for the metaphysical recuperation of a noble philosophical view of man. Intimidation was 
at times necessary on the alienist's part to counterbalance the violent fury of a delirious maniac, but this 
was without "recourse to violence" and relied on "the art of language," of counterbalancing with "the 
softest forms of repression" conforming to the character of the patient, a proportionate force, to the 
"degree of the resistance," one without hostility and sadistic impulse but rather with a "sincere impulse of 
restoring amiability. 62" Such a maxim, however, was not employed within the general treatment of those 
suffering with mental alienation, it was however to "reign" and "preside over" the alienated of Bicetre 
where "not one violent hand" was "to be raised" but rather "soft voices" and a "stratagem" of sympathy 
employed63 • Pinel had observed, that the alienated transferred to the hospice were extremely dangerous 
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owing to the physical punishment and "bad treatment" they had undergone64. The violent treatment of the 
alienated, was something at once "completely opposed" to medicine and nature, and would only 
guarantee the propagation of man's "destructive instinct,65" an instinct epitomised by the execution of the 
King. There were nurses, Pinel recounts, who exerted a "brutal force" upon the "calmest" of patients, who 
would in turn, "lapse into states of fury" and the entirety of their convalescence undone66. In contrast to 
such methods, "an art consoling the alienated" was needed, an art of addressing the ill with "benevolence 
and kindness," at times speaking with them in an "evasive fashion" so as to avoid "their agitation." Even 
in cases of what Pinel characterised as "inflexible obstinacy," therapeutic "triumph" was without "violent 
act.67" For Pinel, without the philanthropic pretext informing such therapeutic strategies, without the 
"continual application of the purest philanthropy,68" the creative nature of medicine as a science of man 
would fail to be realised and the ethic of medical practice divorced from its Hippocratic origin69 . 
Prior to the efforts of Pinel, which began at Bicetre in 1792 and more confidently realised in 
1797 (but four years after the King's execution), no legislative protection existed for the alienated who 
had been sentenced to a tortuous, fated existence since the Europe of the Middle Ages, itself a ceremonial 
and astrological era of the "curious compound of pharmacy, superstition and castigation,70" an era to 
which Pinel would accord a "barbaric ignorance." As a Dr. Leon Dayras tells us in a short yet informed 
work of 1838: 
The Middle Ages considered the mad to be possessed by demons. Exorcism was to prove the only remedy 
available, and religious prejudgment brought cruel consequences upon them. Pinel, in his medico-
philosophical treaty of mental alienation, draws upon some famous examples of exorcism from Besancon, 
to Castel-Sarrazin. For Pinel, however, they all belong to the barbaric ignorance of the epoch.71 
Yet this ignorance did not disappear with the passing of the superstitions of the Middle Ages. Similarly to 
Dayras, in 1856 on British shores, a Dr. John Conolly (1794-1866), the consulting physician at Middlesex 
Lunatic Asylum and Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, published a courageous attack against the 
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corrective measures forced upon the insane entitled, The Treatment of the Insane without Mechanical 
Restraints. It was within the preliminary pages of this masterfully bold, eloquent and lengthy work, that 
Conolly introduced an ethical need in bringing the 18th and 19th century scenes of this "barbaric 
ignorance" to a medical and learned readership, scenes not merely reserved for the heretic notions of the 
Middle Ages, but actively played out within the 18th Century medical establishment itself: 
Harmless maniacs, or those supposed to be so, were allowed to wander over the country, beggars and 
vagabonds affording sport and mockery. If they became troublesome, they were imprisoned in dungeons; 
whipped, as the phrase was, out of their madness - at all events subdued; and then secluded in darkness, in 
the heat of summer, and in the cold and dampness of winter; and forgotten, always half famished, often 
starved to death. 72 
According to Conolly's study, despite the energies of the medical few the coming of the 19th century, of 
which Pinel was the most prominent and pronounced, a medical archaism was still widespread where the 
starvation and suffering seclusion continued silently within the reasoning of State legislation, and notably 
within the French Republic. Conolly recounts a number of the French establishments for the insane, 
writing of them as, "massive and gloomy mansions," or as, "prisons of the worst description," where 
unglazed walls were guarded with iron bars. These ominous "houses" for the insane had narrow corridors, 
dark cells and desolate courts devoid of vegetation. The attendants, of whom numerous, were armed with 
whips and clubs, and in France these weapon-bearing guards were accompanied by dogs bred for the very 
purpose of attack - scenes of mauled and beaten men and women were thus not unusual for these places 
of internment. The attendants with or without barking dogs, were the only point of human contact for the 
insane, free to impose chains and manacles at their own, in Conolly's words, "brutal will." This was not 
all, however, for Conolly further describes in detail that the, "uncleanliness, semi-starvation, the garrotte 
and unpunished murders" were the characteristics of such establishments throughout Europe at the tum of 
the 19th Century73 • Visitors to these grim houses of sufferance were of a rare small number and were either 
the occasional official or those with the boldness of charity and the mission of religious solace. The latter, 
46 
as if a Pinel leaving the public execution, would return to their clergy, monastery or convent with 
memories and impressions never to be effaced. Conolly cites a poem written by a cleric shortly after his 
visit to one of the hospitals: 
Fast they found, fast shut, 
The dismal gates, and barricaded strong; 
But, long ere their approaching, heard within 
Noise, other than the sound of dance or song; 
Torment and loud lament, and furious rage. 74 
The poem delivers us to a world sooner created by the pen of Poe, of a descriptive capacity even 
delivering us to the hopeless lost souls of Dante's Inferno to which Rodin would depict the cries and 
eternally tortured bodies upon his celebrated 'Gate' of 1880. Yet it was not the theological expression of 
art to which Conolly appealed in his vivid depictions, but the very real and lived problem of human 
misery within the governmental establishment. These houses for the insane were spaces of condenmation 
and abuse, and despite the overbearing gloom of their physical gates and the desolate barren grounds 
upon which no vegetation was to grow, they however boast a national and clerical architecture, patterned 
by the symbolic finesse of classical motifs. By day, Conolly tells us, people gazed in "awe" at the 
aesthetic crafting of these great establishments of lament, punitive measure and "brutal free will," but by 
night the 19th Century aesthete "would walk far round to avoid hearing the cries and yells which made 
night hideous.75" 
With similar sentiment to Conolly, in their co-authored work of 1889 entitled A Manual of 
Psychological Medicine, Doctors John Bucknill and Daniel Tuke, would add to the catalogued accounts 
of the gross impiety by citing the graphic sketches of a Dr. W.A.F. Browne: 
The building was gloomy, placed in some low confined situation; without windows to the front, every 
chink barred and grated - a perfect gaol. As you enter, a creak of bolts and the crank of chains are 
scarcely distinguishable amid the wild chorus of shrieks and sobs that issue from every department. The 
passages, narrow, dark, damp, exhale a noxious effluvia ... your conductor carries a whip and a bunch of 
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keys, and speaks in harsh monosyllables ... ten females, with no other covering than a rug round the waist, 
are chained to the wall ... In shame or sorrow one of them perhaps mutters a cry; a blow, which brings 
blood from the temple, the tear from the eye, an additional chain, a gag, and indecent, contemptuous 
expression, produces silence76. 
This was the condition of treatment at St. Luke's hospital in an England of 1792, an establishment even 
without the decorative, imperial fa9ade of the French "asylum" across the water that captured Conolly's 
attention in the run-up to his 1856 publication. For the insane of 1792, Europe was nothing but a hopeless, 
infernal landscape. The Quaker William Hack Tuke, English reformist of the asylum system who died in 
1822, would however propose in the spring season of 1792, the Retreat of York. This was a visionary 
appeal not for an "asylum" but a "hospice," an "institution" without human suffering. More than a 
proposition, this was a Tuke's call for the humanisation of the medical treatment of the insane, one 
foretelling Pinel's concerted actions within a Bicetre of 1797 where he would unchain the insane. 
Like a Conolly writing in 1856, Tuke of 18th Century England had been urged by his 
experiences to assert a more humane treatment of the mentally ill in suggesting a place of patient-oriented 
therapy, one which would depend as much on the spaces of the institution as well as the approach of the 
clinician. For Tuke, what was needed in the treatment of the insane was "an airy institution" with "acres 
of land." Indeed, it was a visit to St. Luke's hospital neighbouring London that would particularly move 
him to such a project. As Bucknill and Tuke later recounted: 
He saw the patients miserably coerced - not entirely from intentional cruelty, but from the conviction of 
the superiority of such a course of treatment over any other. Among them, was a woman whose condition 
especially arrested his attention and excited his compassion. She was without clothing, and lay in some 
loose, dirty straw, chained to the wall. The form of this unhappy patient haunted him afterwards, and 
redoubled his assertions until his plans were carried into practical effect.77 
As we learn from Daniel Tuke, William Tuke's great grandson, in his work of 1892 entitled, Reform in the 
Treatment of the Insane, previous "honourable endeavours" and good intentions had in fact existed. 
Doctors Mason and Burgh of Old York Asylum were two prominent clinicians who had attempted reform, 
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yet their efforts had been constantly blocked and "thwarted78" not only by Officials of the health 
ministry but also by the Governors of asylums. One notable example is given: in 1789, at Old York 
Hospital prior to William Tuke's call of 1792 for therapeutic reform, doctors Mason and Burgh 
established a Lupton Fund for impoverished patients and their families. The charitable fund, set up to aid 
treatment costs, was however not only "corrupted" by the "unworthy motives" of opposing asylum 
physicians, but also by the Governors of Old York who saw fit to unanimously pass a resolution in 1791 
that prohibited contributions to the fund by concerned wealthy parties. If anyone were to contribute to the 
fund, any possibility of joining the Governing body of the establishment would be immediately nullified79. 
We also learn that later in 1813, Mr. Rose, an outspoken Member of Parliament belonging to a London 
Constituency, sympathetic to the altruistic energies and urgencies of Tuke, proposed a "Bill for the Better 
Regulation of Madhouses." The Bill was confronted by an unwavering authoritative opposition and 
subsequently withdrawn. Mr. Rose, whom we are told by Daniel Tuke was a man of great determination, 
was not to be deterred by those belonging to the upper echelons of parliamentary life, and again proposed 
the Bill on 28th April 1815 where before a parliamentary assembly he recounted how, "a young woman 
who, although requiring some restraint, was perfectly harmless. She was found chained to the ground by 
both legs and arms, a degree of cruelty which in no respect was justified.80" Rose, an outspoken public 
figure admired for his "spirited questioning" swayed the second vote, and a committee of the House of 
Commons for the purpose of Inquiry was appointed. Such change was not easy, for as Tuke tells us "the 
victory of the reformers was not obtained without strong opposition81 " and the struggle for reform often 
entailed much personal sacrifice and hardship. This, a situation as attributable to England as to France, for 
we have it from Dr. Paul Bruin his authoritative History ofBicetre, that Pinel, in the final months of 1792, 
following the execution of the King, had repeatedly sought and failed to obtain the authorisation for the 
alienated of Bicetre to be unchained from their shackles with the aim of "reforming a monstrous 
treatment82" and its sites of "misery. 83" Pinel however undeterred by such refusals. 
Daniel Tuke accorded his great-grandfather the same salutary prominence as the eminent 
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French clinician Jean Pierre Flaret later allotted to his mentor Pinel. We are told that William Tuke, was a 
"philanthropic citizen of York," of great "enthusiasm without fanaticism" of immeasurable "sympathy 
without intrusiveness. 84" Indeed, these were the qualities behind call for reform of 1792: Tuke's reformist 
proposition was put forward at the close to a conference organised by the Society of Friends held at York. 
Somewhat unusually, no official record of the meeting was made85 . Daniel Tuke recounts as to how the 
proposition of his great-grandfather was "one of wisdom" but that, "a wet blanket was thrown on the 
scheme" by those in attendance. Tuke was no doubt perturbed by the air of staunch doubt surrounding his 
attempt, so much so that in the summer of 1795 he would write in a memoir: "all men seem to desert me 
on matters essential 86"- this, the anxiety which must have filled the breast of its projector as to whether 
his scheme for a therapeutic institution would be crushed or accepted87• Yet the philanthropic mission 
aiding the diminished brothers and sisters of humanity did not desert Tuke, and so resolute was his vision 
of human charity and the vocational call of medicine, that he even saw fit to do away with the word 
"asylum," and instead have "retreat" as the name for the proposed establishment of York. William Tuke's 
descendent, faithful to the philanthropic principles bonding the charitable ideology of this Quaker family 
ofYork, retells the very moment of the establishment's naming: 
"What name shall we adopt for the new establishment?" The daughter-in-law, Mary Maria Tuke, quickly 
responded, "the Retreat," - a name, be it remembered, which at that time had never been applied to an 
asylum for the insane; in fact, in a vulgar tongue, the name asylum was, as I have said, a madhouse - this 
and nothing more. 88 
"Retreat" was by no means an opportune term for the Tuke family, but the most fitting illustration of a 
philanthropic motive. Tuke's great-grandson later recounted that, "the word humanity was uppermost in 
the minds of the friends of the movement- their leading idea," and that, "the charity and love of friends 
executed this work in the cause of humanity. 89" So zealously did William Tuke steadfastly adhere to the 
charitable Quaker principle of the human cause that he hand planted every tree within the grounds of the 
Retreat itsekf, as if a prophetically symbolic act foretelling the growth of the philanthropic ground of 
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medicine. Indeed, it was Tuke's iron observance to the task of directing medical treatment in the direction 
of a good intention that saw his retreat have the desired humanitarian effect. As a Sydney Smith, 
journalist to the Edinburgh Review of 1817 would relate: 
The new establishment began the great revolution ... Which we trust the provisions of parliament will 
complete. In the course of a few years the Institution had done so much by gentle methods ... achieving 
what all the talents and public spirit of Mason and his friends had failed to accomplish ... The success of 
the Retreat demonstrated, by experiment, that all the apparatus of gloom and confmement was injurious, 
and the necessity for improvement became daily more apparent.90 
This, charity raised to the edifice in the demonstration of humanity, a demonstration of equal weight and measure 
given by a Pinel ofBicetre. 
In 1790, two years prior to Tuke's proposal, an imperfect legislation had been passed across the 
water in France on 161h and 24th March to enforce the seclusion and imprisonment of the "deranged" and 
"dangerous." Legislation, not just in France but also throughout Europe, saw the alienated to be nothing 
but a peril to society, a human number deemed dangerous all but to be thrown into cramped cells deprived 
of standing room, air, food and light, and subjected to regular abuse and humiliation91 . Medical 
philanthropy was thus a project with much opposition. For Pinel, as for Tuke, the humanitarian call was 
clear: a therapeutic space for the rehabilitation of the alienated was urgently required, an organisation of 
therapeutic space difficult to find elsewhere, a specialised space, where isolation and housing would 
prove the sovereign remedy to the State-shackled men and women of madness. For Pinel, such a 
philanthropic motive would even lay the ground for what he deemed in a moment of impassioned 
ecclesiastical appeal, a therapeutic "miracle work,92" a moral undertaking other to the sentiments of 
exorcism and religious prejudgment carried over to an 18th and 19th Century Europe from the shaded 
credulous reasoning of the Middle Ages. 
Pinel, concerted by humanitarian sentiment, pressed for the urgent address of the neglected and 
suffering body of the insane within the State establishment on a national and governmental level. Jean 
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Pierre Falret, the once-student of a later aged Pinel and who himself would become Pinel's successor as 
the prominent and valued chief clinician of the Paris Pitie Salpetriere hospital in 1841, remembered Pinel 
to be a man of true human exercise, "wholly absorbed by the philanthropic side to his mission ... of a 
generous heart.93" Indeed, Pinel's mission was deliciae humani generis, and similar to the Tuke family the 
"human cause" was foremost in his Thought. His scientific and philanthropic labour, in heeding the 
ignored plight of an excluded and condemned human number, was to free the insane and lunatic from the 
confining, thorny stereotype of "an object of repulsion" rejected from society94• As Falret was to write 
with similar observant and adjectival pen to Conolly, Bucknill and Tuke: 
The alienated ... placed within the most detestable conditions, relegated to the most unmaintained areas of 
the hospital. . .imprisoned within cramped and humid cells, deprived of air and light, old straw to sleep on, 
naked regardless of gender. . .living in the most complete abandonment. .. not only in France, but 
throughout Europe.95 
With Conolly, we have similar specifics. He tells us that the cells at the hospital ofBicetre: 
Were only six feet square, air and light were admitted by the door alone. Food was introduced through a 
sort of wicket. The only furniture consisted of a few narrow planks fastened into the moist walls, and 
covered with straw.96 
Whilst at the Paris Salpetriere, we are told that the cells were: 
Below the surface, at the level with the drains. Large rats found their way into them, often attacking and 
severely wounding the unhappy lunatics, and sometimes occasioning their death.97 
Such accounts by those of respectable clinical authority sensitive to injustice were to be numerous. As one 
Dr. Desportes had it in a presentation to the Council of Hospitals in 1822, the alienated were not only 
starved but enchained, shackled and muzzled alongside the indignant and criminal. Murders in the caged, 
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dampened dwellings were frequent and hushed, assault endless and regular. The attendants themselves 
were themselves handpicked from the prisons, violent and aggressive. Added to this, were the incessant 
cries and yells of the condemned resounding day and night98. 
In England, the barbarism was present as late as 1815, continuing through to 1827. The patients 
were without means of warmth, medical treatment for injuries and infections was not resorted to, and the 
rooms were cramped and unventilated. Conolly once again proves his historical worth with his 
observations: 
Feeble patients were left without drink or attendance, a few potatoes being given to them now and then in 
a wooden bowL In a large private asylum near London, pauper women were chained to their bedsteads, 
naked ... and this, in the month of December. From Saturday night till Monday morning, patients were 
chained to their cribs ... in these cribs they laid naked upon straw ... there were no baths, but some patients 
were occasionally mopped with ice-cold water in the severest ofweather.99 
In reading the accounts of Falret, Conolly, Bucknill and Tuke, "starved" and "naked" are the most 
frequented adjectives within their descriptions of a veritable tormented existence where malnutrition, 
humiliation and torture proved the primary means of legislated social measure throughout Europe. Thus 
Pinel, in his Traitri medico-philosophique sur !'alienation mentale ou la manie of 1801 100, a work 
enshrouded by the sympathetic spirit of its authour, not merely delivered us to accounts of scenes of decay, 
fated consequence and human debasement, but sooner set forth to carefully tum a castigatory medical 
gaze away from the punitive treatment of the insane towards the idea of re-sensibilising the mentally ill 
through therapeutic and institutional measure. It was Pinel, who, for the first time in the history of 
European Medicine, walked from the upper floors of Bicetre to the unlit, rat-infested quarters of the 
wicket-fed naked and enchained, bringing light to the unlit, sullied and moistened corridors with the 
"luminary ... scope of his heart. 10h' Yet Pinel was not merely led by personal sentiment of charitability and 
servitude, but also by the spirit of post-Revolutionary social reform in a bid to re-establish the rights of 
man, rights that had been hitherto grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted, rights incorrectly 
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symbolised by the execution of the King: 
Human dignity had been so violently realised by the French Revolution. It had been trampled on at all 
levels of society. It was however, to be rebuilt by Pinel within alienated man. 102 
Falret's pen faithfully identified Pinel's reconstructive and reformist project of a therapeutic institution to 
rebuild the human dignity of the alienated, to restore a "nobleness." More importantly, what Falret 
indicates is the change in the role of mentally ill man and the spaces of his treatment pioneered by PineL 
What Pinel did, was to move the madman from the role of a lunatic predestined for a "humid cell," to the 
possibility of being a re-socialisable individual treated within an establishment working towards the 
therapeutic purpose of recovery and rehabilitation. 
The era of Pinel was not to deem the mentally ill the "possessed" as was the case with the 
Middle Ages, but rather the "insane," the "lunatic" and the "idiot" - the "insenses" as they were called. 
But the sentiment of the Middle Ages, what Pinel deemed an epoch of "barbaric ignorance" was also 
present, as we have seen, through the descriptions ofFalret, Conolly, Bucknill and Tuke within 18th and 
19th century France and England. In short, both professional and lay opinion saw madness to be a threat 
and a bane to society, an "object of repulsion" proper whose condemnation would be legislated, and 
whose cries would fall on the strategically deafened ears of Asylum Governors. Yet for Pinel, the mentally 
ill of society could be returned to a sensible capacity by what he envisaged to be a "moral treatment. 103" 
The institution for this moral treatment was to be of a "specialised" functioning, working to a 
principle of isolation, refuge and housing. The name for this specialised institution of re-sensibilisation 
and rehabilitation derived from the Greek word for refuge (Asylon)- 'Asylum.' What the "naked" and 
"starving" sufferers of late 18th century and early 19th century France above all needed, was refuge and 
housing, a place of safety and retreat, a sanctuary of treatment, and before all else a place to be fed and 
bathed. Unlike William Tuke, Pinel sought not to banish the word 'Asylum' from clinical vocabulary, but 
rather return it to the very signification of its original meaning. What Tuke would characterise as the 
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"Retreat" would indeed be the very description, synonym even, for Pinel's wording of 'Asylum.' As 
William Tuke reflected: 
It was intended to convey by this designation, their idea of what such an establishment should be, namely, 
a place in which the unhappy might obtain a refuge: a quiet haven in which the shattered bark might find a 
means of reparation or safety. 104 
This politic of sanctuary and refuge, in tum carried the practical truth of identifying mental illness to be a 
curable disease, as a malady of the passions: the insane suffered from a treatable malady requiring a 
period of treatment and therapy within the asylum. Internment would thus become synonymous with 
treatment, and philanthropy synonymous with science. 
Against the backdrop of a post-Revolutionary France, Pinel - who bore witness to the 
execution of Louis XVI - would personally, in 1792, with a nursing hand at once bold and confident, 
unchain the insane crouched within the darkened alcoves and squalid recesses. Latter commentators 
documented: 
1792, the celebrated year in which the celebrated Pinel commenced the amelioration of the treatment of 
the insane in France, by the truly courageous act of unchaining fifty supposed incurable and dangerous 
lunatics at the Bicetre. 105 
It was with the turning of the key, with the unlocking of the physical shackles of social damnation, that 
Pinel simultaneously put the wheels in motion for a system of therapeutic rehabilitation through the 
methodological organisation of institutional space. The asylum was to be a micro-political organisation on 
the fringes of society, where the insane would be distanced, treated and protected. For Pinel, internment 
and protection would marry under the philanthropic auspice of the institution, and therapy be said of the 
isolated space of rehabilitation. 
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This humanitarian-cemented medical auspice, found an unwavering support and extension with 
Pinel's student, Jean-Etienne Esquirol. Together they would mentor a young Falret who later bestowed the 
most salutary of vocabulary to his teachers and deem them "luminaries" possessing "the fmesse of 
observation106"- for the gift of observation figured chiefly in the diagnostic and prognostic of a "rational 
pathology." To enable Esquirol to take up the intensive study of insanity in an appropriate setting, Pinel 
reportedly provided funds for a house and garden on rue de Buffon where Esquirol established a maison 
de sante (a private asylum) in 1801. Esquirol's maison was met with success, being ranked, in 1810, as 
one of the three best such institutions in Paris. As we have it from a Paris newspaper in 1827: 
Who has not heard about the excellent treatment that the doctor gives to lunatics, the care and attention 
of which they are the object? But who does not also know that it is impossible to be admitted [to 
Esquirol's maison] on the rue de Buffon for less than 10 or 15 francs a day? ... To see madhouses risen to 
such extraordinary prices, one would be tempted to believe that insanity is a privilege and that, without 
being a bureaucrat or a capitalist, it is inadvisable to rave. However, the janitor, the bricklayer, and the 
errand-boy are allowed to go crazy just like the others for, if equality is anywhere, it is assuredly in human 
misery. Ah well, what I should now wish for is a low-cost asylum and an inexpensive Esquiro1. 107 
In 1805, the inexpensive Esquirol published his thesis entitled Des Passions considerees comme causes, 
symptomes et moyens curatifs de !'alienation mentale (The passions considered as causes, symptoms and 
means of cure in cases of insanity ). 108 As with Pinel, he believed that the origin of mental illness lay in 
the passions of the soul and was convinced that madness did not fully and irremediably affect a patient's 
reason. Des Passions, sought to provide a speculative hypothesis on the nature of psychiatric disorders, 
and in 1819, Esquirol proposed that the term 'asylum' be acknowledged as part of the general medical 
lexicon so that the "hospital of the alienated" could be widely recognised as an "instrument ofhealing.109" 
Like his mentor, Esquirol remained faithful to the notion of a charitable function informing the physical 
geography of the institution, as belonging to an expressive condition of treatment. What urged Esquirol to 
push for the recognition of this "humanising function," was the social condition within which the insane 
existed. As he was to observe, with similar descriptive strength to a Falret and a Conolly: 
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I have seen them naked, clad in rags, having but straw to shield them from the cold humidity of the 
pavement where they lie. I have seen them coarsely fed, lacking air to breathe, water to quench their thirst, 
wanting the basic necessities of life. I have seen them at the mercy of veritable jailers, victims of their 
brutal supervision. I have seen them in narrow dirty, infested dungeons without air or light, chained in 
caverns where one would fear to lock up the wild beasts that luxury-loving governments keep at great 
expense in their capitals.uo 
The rhetoric of this description suggested that someone was needed to rescue the mentally ill, and 
Esquirol like Pinel, soon stepped forward to do just that. In 1822 he was appointed inspector general of 
medical faculties, and in 1825 director of Charenton Hospice. 
It was in the year of 1832 that Esquirol called for a law to be introduced legislating the 
dependency between the alienated and the municipal state to be acknowledged, and departmental asylums 
for all needy French mental patients to be established with the "specialisation of function." Pinel, together 
with Esquirol, under the tutelage of a moral service and duty to the socially excluded and misjudged, 
proposed a strategy of isolation not merely medica1ising but also institutionalising mental illness, calling 
for roles of assistance and treatment to become recognised functions of the State Medical System. 
Through their efforts, the law of 1838 was introduced, drafted by Pinel and Esquirol not on grounds of 
punitive or coercive measures, but on grounds of therapeutic measure with the "progress" of rehabilitation 
as its impetus111where the alienated, after a duration of treatment could re-enter society as a re-sensiblised 
individual, "within a perspective borne directly from Condillac which consisted of placing the alienated in 
a perfectly reasonable world. 112 " This paradigm of isolation, rehabilitation and reinsertion into a 
reasonable world proved ground for a new clinical cognition of mentally ill man and his lived conditions. 
With Pinel and Esquirol, the perception of madness had gone from the daemon of state to be enchained to 
a resocialisable sufferer of a curable malady, the housing of the insane had gone from the darkened alcove 
and squalid quarter to the institution of alienation and therapeutic isolation. This, the first dramatic stage 
in the history of psychiatric treatment and the first stone laid in the history of the therapeutic measure 
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where a "good intention" informed the activities and pursuit of the alienist113. 
The objectivity of the institution housing the insane found its guarantee in human motivation 
with an aim to re-socialise. Until Pinel's undertaking, the insane had existed as the suffered exiles of State, 
relegated to a life of neglect and abuse. With Pinel's asylum, this place of refuge and moral treatment, 
insane man would be able to regain sensible social faculty through the creation of institutional functions, 
ateliers and refectories, where even the convalesced would assist in the nursing of the ill, so as to, 
"accelerate the progress of convalescence itself. ll4" With this spirit of humanisation informing the 
conceptual and practical architecture of institutional roles, the long-popular equation of mental illness as 
the symptom of demoniacal possession was to fmd its dismissal. 
4: Psychiatry and the Imperial need of man 
The second architectural moment to psychiatric reform characterised by a philanthropy occurs 
in June of 1940, some one hundred years after the law of 1838 was decreed, with Henri-Philippe Petain, 
the then vice premier of France, signing the Armistice with Germany. It is with this signing that Petain is 
appointed chief of the Vichy State, and at the same time, the Rockefeller nurtured Frenchman Dr. Alexis 
Carrel is appointed its Minister of Health. It is here that a morbid tale of the mentally ill as "object of 
repulsion" re-emerges by with the science of Eugenics. 
Through the eugenic ideal of the "well-born" - the very defmition of its term- the mentally ill 
of Vichy France would be systematically starved, and the French post-revolutionary philanthropic triad of 
Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite, a paradigm epitomised by the efforts of Pinel, Esquirol and Tuke in England, 
would be inverted to its fatal antithesis, to resound in many minds as Determinism, Inequality and 
Selection. This was a fatal inversion undoing the achievements of the 19th Century philanthropists yet one 
equally calling for the apostolic mission of medicine to reaffirm itself within 20th century psychiatry 
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through the post-war efforts ofFranc;:ois Tosquelles, Lucien Bonnafe and Jean Oury. 
The direction of Eugenic Science was given on May 16th 1904, when Sir Francis Galton, the 
Victorian polymath and eminent cousin of Charles Darwin, delivered a lecture to the Sociological Society 
at the London School of Economics 115 • The title of the keynote presentation to an assembly of 
distinguished persons was, Eugenics: its definition, scope and aims. For Galton, eugenics was a scientific 
tool for the improvement, engineering and crafting of the race, the "multiplication of the best variable" as 
he had it, as something to be, in his words, "introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion." 
Indeed, eugenics was to be the new scientific orthodoxy, an unparalleled "tenet of the future" carried by 
the very heart of a nation. Galton's presentation both bewildered and enchanted those in attendance with 
its majestic, lest we say, aristocratic vision of the future, and as G Bernard Shaw voiced in reply, "I agree 
with the paper, and go so far as to say that there is now no reasonable excuse for refusing to face the fact 
that nothing but a eugenic religion can save our civilization from the fate that has overtaken all previous 
civilizations." This eugenic religion, as if a prophetic science engineering the successes of civilization 
and saving it from its previous historical impasses, was for Galton the very guarantee not merely of man's 
biological and cultural optimisation, but also of his optimism: "EUGENICS is the science which deals 
with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the 
utmost advantage. 116" 
Galton's learned and admired command of the English language enabled him to navigate the 
eugenic question with both boldness and balletic grace. The three pillars of Galton's eugenic vision -
"the multiplication of the best variable," the "tenet of the future" and the development of the "utmost 
advantage" - stood upon a landscape where eugenics would co-operate with the workings of nature, 
where "the fittest races" could be the most fitting representation of the species. Eugenic religion would 
not take the divine as the blueprint for man's image, but rather the eugenicist would be the engineer to 
what Bernard Shaw deemed, under the sway of Galton's millennia! scholarship, a foture free of fate. But 
Galton went one step further in proposing this engineering of the future, by virtue of the measures and 
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techniques of science, to in fact rise above nature itself: "What nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, 
man may do providently, quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to work 
in that direction.117" The ruthlessness and blindness of nature would be surpassed by the man of the 
eugenic religion with his providence and speed. The crudeness of nature would be corrected by scientific 
craftsmanship. Yet beyond the adjectival prowess of Galton's presentation, and his grammatical fortuity 
urging G Bernard Shaw to a vision of a strong unburdened future free of ills, a deeper if not somewhat 
more sinister politic was to be found in Galton's memoirs where the end defined the means. As he was to 
write: 
This is precisely the aim of Eugenics. Its first object is to check the birth-rate of the Unfit, instead of 
allowing them to come into being, though doomed in large numbers to perish prematurely. The second 
object is the improvement of the race by furthering the productivity of the Fit by early marriages and 
healthful rearing of their children. Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale 
destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and 
those only of the best stock. 118 
This is of a language somewhat hardened to that of his lecture at the London School of Economics, yet it 
is his most personal, autobiographical reflection, written upon a confessional page within the solace of the 
memoir. This eugenic religion, one of "bringing no more individuals into the world," is where production 
and multiplication of the "best variable" became synonymous with the culling and subtraction of the 
"unfit." The politic of the proliferation and decline of human number is declared with Galton's somewhat 
brute analogy: "Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale destruction" this, the 
apparent natural justification to eugenics as being a science of the future "bringing no more individuals 
into the world," a science with the subtraction and multiplication of the race as its ideal. 
The Eugenics Society was founded by Galton in 1908 and it was located in Grosvenor Gardens, 
London S.W.l. Galton held presidency of the society until Major Leonard Darwin, the fourth son of 
Charles Darwin, took seat in 1913. We are told by the French Historian, Marie-Therese Nisot, in her 
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historically invaluable publication of 1927 entitled, La Question Eugenique dans les Divers Pays, that the 
goals of the society were: (1) to educate the population to eugenics and to the responsibility of paternity 
and maternity; (2) to work towards eliminating the elements stopping those of a superior type from 
reproducing and those of an inferior type from multiplying; (3) to insist upon the necessity of stopping the 
necessity and degenerate from multiplying; (4) to examine eugenic legislation and research within other 
countries119• These were in fact the liturgical tenets to be practiced within Galton's "new religion," and 
they found their way into a wealth of works published by the Society. Five such works were: Eugenics 
and Patriotism, by Professor John Edgar, Heredity of Feeblemindedness by H. Goddard, The Habitual 
Criminal, by Major Leonard Darwin, and The Eugenic Principle in Social Reconstruction by Mrs. Gotto, 
O.B.E, and, The Elimination of Mental Defect, by R. A. Fisher.120 Later, in 1926, and with the growing 
confidence of an expanding and distinguished member body and congregation of this "new religion", the 
Society saw fit to lay down a "eugenic program" with the "multiplication of superior stock" and the 
"reduction of inferior stock" as guiding reformist legislature121 • 
A decade after Galton's presentation of 1904 to the Sociological Society of London, and one 
year after Major Leonard Darwin's appointment as president of the Eugenics Society of London, a less 
eminent and somewhat more provincial Dr. Harry Laughlin published his Model Eugenical Sterilisation 
Law of 1914. It is here that the politic of "multiplication" and "subtraction" of the human number grows 
to the very national level that Galton had hoped for, namely, to be at "the heart of the nation." It is indeed 
with Laughlin that we can see eugenics as a religion paving the way for a future free of fate envisaged by 
Shaw to be nothing other than an ill-fated present for those deemed "unfit" for the purposes of the species. 
Laughlin, no doubt with the anticipations of the Society of London across the Atlantic, proposed the 
widespread and legal employment of sterilisation methods. The wording of Laughlin's Law was clear, 
explicit, and did not resort to the decorative, foliated language of Galton's learned, polyglot hand. For 
Laughlin, a sterlisation program was a preventative measure, one, "to prevent the procreation of persons 
socially inadequate from defective inheritance.122" This very phrasing, at root crude and violent, was 
61 
nothing less than a trans-Atlantic parallel to Galton's assertion of eugenics as the science of, "bringing no 
more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock." 
Laughlin's Model Law was the legal, legislated condemnation of all those supposed to hinder the 
optimisation of the species. According to the pen of Laughlin (one which appears at time irritated), those 
who were "feebleminded," the "insane, the criminalistic, epileptic, inebriate, diseased, blind, deaf, 
deformed, and dependent," as well as, "orphans, ne'er-do-wells, tramps, the homeless and paupers" were 
all to fall within the homogenised category of the "unfit," and nothing other than a burden to a civilization 
anticipating an earth, in Shaw's words, "free offate." 
Twelve states adopted Laughlin's Model Law, and by 1924, nigh on three thousand people had 
been sterilised in America against their will, the vast majority of 2,500 residing in California alone. That 
very year Virginia passed a Eugenical Sterilisation Act based on Laughlin's Law, which was adopted as 
part of a cost-saving strategy to relieve the tax burden in a state where public facilities for the "insane" 
and "feebleminded" had experienced rapid growth. The law was also written to protect physicians who 
performed sterilising operations from malpractice lawsuits. Virginia's law asserted that, "heredity plays an 
important part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and crime ... " It focused on 
"defective persons" whose reproduction represented "a menace to society." Laughlin, whose terminology 
was often far from the scholarly and diplomatic footing of Galton's public language, deemed the solution 
to the problem of inadequacy, "Eugenical Sterilisation" and as Section 'J' to his Law read: 
Eugenical Sterilisation is a surgical operation upon or the medical treatment of the reproductive organs of 
the human male or female, in consequence of which the power to procreate offspring is surely and 
permanently nullified; provided, that as used in this Act the term eugenical sterilization shall imply skillful, 
safe and humane medical and surgical treatment of the least radical nature necessary to achieve permanent 
sexual sterility and the highest possible therapeutic benefits depending upon the exigencies of each 
particular case. 123 
A fact to be highlighted is that Laughlin himself was a candidate for his own legally mandated 
sterilisation program. He had been a long-term sufferer of epilepsy, a disorder that in fact fell into Section 
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B of his law entitled, "The Socially Inadequate Classes." Despite the apparent hypocrisy of Laughlin 
escaping his own sterlisation program, he sat one the executive committee of the Eugenics Research 
Association, which was founded in 1915. The Association, as Marie-Therese Nisot invaluably tells us, 
was nothing but a, "vulgar center" that was primarily concerned with gathering all those who were 
interested in eugenics, of "doctors and lawyers," who, "by virtue of their professions could provide the 
Society with useful and prudent advice. 124" Eugenics was a religion, attracting the most formidable of 
professionals to its trans-Atlantic congregation. 
No more than sixteen years after the legislated sterilisation project of California, the eminent 
American eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard, upon returning to the United States from a visit to Nazi Germany 
in 1940 asserted with fervent tone that: 
Without attempting to appraise the highly controversial racial doctrine, it is fair to say tat Nazi Germany's 
eugenic program is the most ambitious and far-reaching experiment in eugenics ever attempted by any 
nation. 125 
Just five years earlier, in a letter dated January 12, 1935, C. M Goethe, founder of the Eugenic Society of Northern 
California and a corporate presence to the Human Betterment Foundation, wrote: 
However much one abhors dictatorship, one is also impressed that Germany, by sterilisation, and by 
stimulating birth-rates among the eugenically high-powered, is gaining an advantage over us as to future 
leadership 126. 
Similarly, Stoddard's mentor, the eminent American lawyer and eugenicist, Madison Grant (who was also 
a member of the Eugenic Association's executive panel alongside Laughlin), had previously penned an 
extensively ideological work on racial hygiene in 1916 entitled, The Passing of the Great Race. Grant 
would later sit on the advisory board of the American Eugenics Society that was established in 1922 
under the name of The Eugenics Committee of the United State of America, of which The Race 
Betterment Foundation and the Galton Society of the United States were active centres of research. And 
as we are again told by Marie-Therese Nisot, the great number of physically and mentally retarded in the 
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U.S.A and Britain, "constituted the most important motif for determining eugenics127", and indeed, its 
research hallmark. 
In his work of 1916, one that would win the praise of Adolph Hitler and subsequently find 
republication and wide dissemination within a Nazi Germany, Madison Grant's vision would be true to 
the liturgical tenets of the eugenic religion of which Galton had been the London-based high-priest, and in 
extending the sentiments of a Galton and a Laughlin, the politic of human addition and subtraction was 
clear. In Grant's eyes what was needed was: 
A rigid system of selection through the elimination of those who are weak or unfit -- in other words social 
failures -- would solve the whole question in one hundred years, as well as enable us to get rid of the 
undesirables who crowd our jails, hospitals, and insane asylums. The individual himself can be nourished, 
educated and protected by the community during his lifetime, but the state through sterilization must see to 
it that his line stops with him, or else future generations will be cursed with an ever increasing load of 
misguided sentimentalism. This is a practical, merciful, and inevitable solution of the whole problem, and 
can be applied to an ever widening circle of social discards, beginning always with the criminal, the 
diseased, and the insane, and extending gradually to types which may be called weaklings rather than 
defectives, and perhaps ultimately to worthless race types. 128 
For Hitler, the strongest were given to fulfill the mission of eugenics, and in his work of 1925, Mein 
Kampf, he penned a passage appealing to an evolutionary "higher stage of being," mirroring the eugenic 
sentiments of Grant and the Eugenic trans-Atlantic concern as a whole: 
History furnishes us with irmumerable instances that prove this law. It shows, with a startling clarity, that 
whenever Aryans have mingled their blood with that of an inferior race the result has been the downfall of 
the people who were the standard-bearers of a higher culture. In North America, where the population is 
prevalently Teutonic, and where those elements intermingled with the inferior race only to a very small 
degree, we have a quality of mankind and a civilization which are different from those of Central and 
South America. In these latter countries the immigrants - who mainly belonged to the Latin races - mated 
with the aborigines, sometimes to a very large extent indeed. In this case we have a clear and decisive 
example of the effect produced by the mixture of races. But in North America the Teutonic element, which 
has kept its racial stock pure and did not mix it with any other racial stock, has come to dominate the 
American Continent and will remain master of it as long as that element does not fall a victim to the habit 
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of adulterating its blood. 129 
Where Galton declared the "multiplication of the best variable" to be the central tenet of the eugenic 
religion, Grant declared a "rigid selection" and Hitler a, "corrective measure in favour of the better 
quality" to "intervene.130" Such tenets composed the apocalyptical hymn of the new religion, one that had 
been sung in Britain, the United States, Germany and France by a distinguished congregation of corporate 
and academic personages. 
5: Mental illness and Eugenics 
Eugenics had long been a primary scientific concern for Britain, the U.S and Germany - a 
concern that was bolstered by corporate philanthropies and bold fmancial backing. One such instance of 
binding corporate philanthropy occurred in 1928 with the Rockefeller Foundation of New York donating 
325,000 dollars for a new building in Munich linked to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin131 • It is not 
surprising therefore, that as one leading historian of the field tells us, the foremost representatives of 
American eugenics socialised with the foremost representatives of the Nazi agenda: 
Even after the beginning of World War II, American eugenicists continued to visit Germany ... Ellinger 
visited Germany apparently undeterred by recent displays of Nazi aggression. He met with Hans 
Nachtsheim, a geneticist at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Hereditary and 
Genetics ... Ellinger was also introduced to Wolfgang Abel who wore the black uniform of the S.S. 132 
Stoddard, the once-Harvard graduate of History and the eventual founding director of the American Birth 
Control League, had always been well received within a National Socialist Germany. Along with the 
prominent geneticist Ellinger, on grounds of his far-reaching reputation, Stoddard was a hail fellow well 
met with the most chilling of the Nazi hierarchy: S.S Gestapo chief Heinrich Rimmler, racial hygienists 
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Fritz Lenz and Eugen Fischer, and most importantly, Hitler himself- all of whom marked a new, decisive 
stage of the eugenic religion. 
Stoddard was often referenced within the propaganda-weighted pages of German school 
textbooks for his publications, championing a bi-racial politic, were a sympathetic gesture to Nazi 
ideology and carried the ideals of the Eugenic Association and its international fraternity. His acceptance 
by the Nazi regime was confirmation of the international strength of the eugenic 'religion'. In 1920, 
Stoddard published, The Rising Tide of Colour Against White Supremac/33 , four years later saw the 
publication of Racial Realities into Europe134 . In 1940, after all but a brief meditative silence of 
publications, Stoddard added to the unsettling eugenic cadenza of his previous texts with Into the 
Darkness: Nazi Germany Today135• This latter publication found strategic cushioning with Ellinger's 
essay of 1942 appearing in The Journal of Hereditary entitled, On the Breeding of Aryans and Other 
Genetic Problems of Wartime German/36• Not too ironically, in the same Journal of Hereditary some 
twenty years earlier in 1924, Fritz Lenz, who held the chair of eugenics at the University of Munich since 
1921, went one step further than sterilisation and proposed euthanasia to be the soundest method of the 
racial hygiene plan of the Nazis. Three years earlier in 1921, Lenz, with Erwin Baur and Eugen Fischer 
co-authored a textbook on human heredity bearing the title, Grundriss der menschlichen Erblichkeitslehre 
und Rassenhygiene137 (Outline of Human Genetics and Racial Hygiene). It was in this widely circulated 
publication that Lenz, like Laughlin, architect of the Eugenical Sterlisation Law of 1914, would propose 
the "sterilisation of all the unfit and inferior. 138" For Lenz, true to the multiplication and subtraction 
politic of eugenics presented by Galton, those of unsound hereditary traits were to have no right to 
reproduce. To recall the words of Galton, this eugenic politic of flourishing and culling, was to bring "no 
more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.139" How 
tragic the realisation of this ideal would be with Hitler's personal "escort physician" Karl Brandt, who 
masterminded the eugenic master plan of the Nazis, AKTION T -4, named after the address of Brandt's 
office - Tiergartenstrasse 4, Berlin. AKTIONT-4, with the superiority of the Aryan race as its governing 
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principle (echoing the Eugenic research of Britian and the United States) brought mentally ill and 
physically handicapped children and adults, those of the "defective" category, to a brutal end. This in turn 
led to 93,000 "free" beds at the close of 1941, a eugenic statistic. 
The Reich committee directed the operation of gassing in accordance to the necessity and 
measures of the Nazi State. Adults and children alike were reduced to the brutalized human category 
reminiscent of the 18th century asylum. As one source recounts: 
They visited the child there on his fourth birthday ... he was malnourished and covered in bruises. The 
doctor forbade them [the parents] to remove the boy ... they were told to return in a month ... After two 
weeks the father wrote to the asylum. The answer was that their 'little son Friedrich was already 
dead' ... The director, Schmidt, replied on the 291h of that month claiming that 'idiotic little children' 
frequently die of measles, and that the mother 'had behaved uncontrollably' when she had visited the 
asylum to take her boy home with her. In many instances we are dealing with small children who could not 
talk ... Anna Maria R. was born on30th January 1935 in Cassel. She died of bronchial asthma and heart 
failure, a case of idiocy.140 
As is the macabre habit of such historical episodes, it is childhood that suffers the most, tearing young 
and innocent life from the world in the name of governance and a future "free of fate". We also have it 
from Dr. Franvois Bayle in his monumental work of 1951, Croix Gammee contre Caducee, that between 
1940 and 1941, those of non-German and Jewish origin were taken in their masses to euthanasia camps. 
He writes: 
Children with disabilities also qualified for extermination. This aspect to the euthanasia 
programme was overseen by The Committee for Hereditary and Constitutional Illnesses, and 
specifically, by Dr. Linden. Questionnaires were put together by different departments within 
the Health Ministry: directors of children's hospitals, doctors ... 141 
G.Bemard Shaw upon hearing Galton's words championed a "future free of fate." Not so for the child 
deemed "idiotic" in a war against the weak. 
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Yet the Eugenic project of the Nazis and the foreign sympathies of Stoddard, were also 
intellectually and geographically extended with a sophisticated body of study belonging to that of a 
prestigious Frenchman, Dr. Alexis Carrel. More than a Stoddard fmding his way into the textbooks of the 
young, and with greater voluntary destructive ignorance, it was Carrel who would begin to turn the 
wheels of the killing machine for the mentally and physically handicapped of France, a machine whose 
engineering grew from the ideological blueprint of Galton and Laughlin. Yet as with the racial hygienists 
of Nazi Germany, things went one chilling step further than the sterilisation of Laughlin. In proposing 
eugenics as the scientific tool crafting a future of a, "hereditary aristocratic biology/42" Carrel set the 
French pretext for the envisaged inception of euthanasia and the anticipated pan-European growth of 
Brandt's brainchild, T4. 
Dr. Alexis Carrel had won the Nobel Prize in 1912 for the first successful radial-popliteal 
transfusion. Man~chal Phillipe Petain, the figurehead of the Vichy State, had appointed him to oversee the 
Vichy Ministry of Health. Carrel's appointment was not an unusual move for the Nazi gripped 'free' 
Vichy state, for his eugenic vision of the future fitted the pan-Germanic ideals of the Occupation most 
notably. Carrel envisioned, much like Shaw indicated some years earlier in London, a world "free of fate", 
governed by an intellectual elite, a world transformed by a "scientific enlightenment." Carrel believed, 
that the age of this Enlightenment had not fmished because it was yet to even begin. Carrel saw himself, 
as the architect to this Age of knowledge, and eugenics was the inaugurating science, the founding path 
leading to a new horizon of the species. True to the eugenic mindset, civilisation could be free of disease 
and the criminal, by propagating the best elements of the species, and culling the worst. 
Carrel was reputed as a scientific genius. His early publication of 1936, L'Homme cet 
Inconnu143, was where he expressed his hopes for a scientific future with euthanasia as the just tool to 
building the new enlightened world of man. Carrel would even venture to borrow the phrasing of Sir 
Francis Bacon, the enigmatic Elizabethan scholar, philosopher, scientist and unparalleled courtly authority, 
namely that, "knowledge is power." Yet he was also known for a fervent interest in Christian prayer and 
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spiritual miracles. Carrel's later publications, notably La Priere and Le Voyages De Lourdes/Fragments 
De Journal/Meditations, showed a man who was seemingly touched by prayer - profoundly so even - a 
man of Christian meditation, fascinated by the mystical experiences by the many visitors to Lourdes144, 
and the ancient foundations to religion itsel£ As he recounted in L 'Homme cet Inconnu of 1936, "I live at 
once in the New World and the Ancient." For this man of science and prayer, a champion of eugenics on 
the one hand and the miracles of divine revelation on the other, a man who had made his mark on the 
scientific world in 1912, eugenics was to prove the most powerful form of knowledge available to the 
species, empowering it beyond the fateful limits history had dealt it. As he wrote, almost in the guise of a 
Galton speaking of the "multiplication of the best element": "Eugenics .. .is indispensable for the 
perpetuation of the strong ... A great race must propagate its best elements.145" What for G Bernard 
Shaw was a prophetic engineering for a civilisation "free of fate", for Carrel, was the means for spiritual 
and intellectual advancement carrying man to his eventual enlightenment- and many to their deaths. 
Previously, the summer of 1938 had marked a deepening of discussions between Carrel and the 
pioneering American aviator Charles Lindbergh, who himself had accepted the German medal of honour 
from the hands Hermann Goring, the mastermind of the Gestapo ( Geheime Staatspolizei). What Carrel 
and Lindbergh both shared was a mutual concern for the betterment of the white race: 
We must not forget that the most highly civilised races - the Scandanavians for example - are 
white, and have lived for many generations in a country where the atmospheric luminosity is 
weak during a great part of the year. In France, the population of the North is far superior to 
those of the Mediterranean shores.146 
This bi-racial politic strongly leaning towards the Nordic Theory put forward by Madison Grant in his 
work of 1916, proved the ideological cement bonding the walls of the Foundation for the Study of Human 
Problems (La Fondation pour !'etude des Problemes Humains) which was established in 1941, with 
Carrel as its director. The chief purpose of the Foundation was the study of scientific nutrition and public 
hygiene- research fields which Carrel saw to be, "indispensable to the life of an elite," and 
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correspondingly necessary for a scientific enlightenment that would raise the intellectual activity of the 
race beyond its accustomed "industrialised" stagnancy147. The Foundation's research activity was thus 
conducive to the demands of an imminent enlightenment and the eugenic politic paving its way. As is 
well documented by the Cahiers of the French Foundation, Carrel openly spoke out against the immigrant 
population of France: 
As we know, many immigrants have been admitted into France. Some are desirable others are 
not. From the biological vantage point, the presence of an undesirable foreign group is a danger 
for the French population. The Foundation proposes to specify the modalities of assimilating 
immigrants so as to enable the possibility of placing them in conditions appropriate to their 
ethnic spirit. The Foundation is currently undertaking a consensus and localisation of categories 
shared by the immigrants, above all, the North Africans, Armenians and the Polish. In Particular, 
the Foundation is studying the Armenian population of Issy-le-Moulineaux.148 
Immigration had indeed been a reigning theme to the discourses of international eugenicists. An example 
of this is given by observing a hand written resolution drafted by the American Breeders Association at 
their 8th convention. It reads: 
Resolved: That the Eugenics section organise a permanent committee on immigration, with 
authority to cooperate with similar committees of other organisations in securing laws which 
will be more effective in securing emigrants which bring good health and only normal and 
superior hereditary to this country. 
Resolved: That the Eugenics section request the Association to appoint a committee to report on 
the possibilities of securing data and useful eugenics legislation through the United States 
Census Bureau, the Bureau of Health and other Societies and Institutions.149 
Seemingly, Carrel's hopes for the psycho-social advancement, was one not only closely allied to 
the ideologies of the Nazi State, but to the scientific eugenic tradition established by Britain and the 
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United States. The latter, for Carrel, was a country whose science Carrel openly declared to be the 
blueprint for a greater future: "It is certain, that most countries follow the direction of North America ... 
its psychological and spiritual processes.150" And we again recall Galton's legacy: namely that, Eugenic 
institutions and elite congregations of this "new religion" were first established in London with eminent 
members of the Darwin family at its helm. 
Carrel had always found sponsorship by the immensely powerful. Under the patronage and 
inspiration of Vichy, he would be inaugurated as the Minister of Health in 1941. Under the patronage and 
inspiration of the New York-based Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, he had penned his most 
compelling and chilling thoughts on the new scientific age of man marrying the spiritual and the 
eugenic 151 . Indeed, Carrel, like Lothrop Stoddard and other members of the international eugenic 
fraternity (if we may call it such on historical grounds) was well known and well connected. He walked 
with those of the everyday - laymen; traders; those within the upper echelons of the American Catholic 
community, and those who walked the corridors of power. As he tells us, in the third person: 
He has frequented farmers, proletarians, employees, workmen, jewellers, politicians, soldiers, 
professors, school masters, priests, the bourgeoisie ... sometimes geniuses, heroes, saints. At the 
same time, he has seen the secret mechanisms that are the substratum of all organic and mental 
phenomena - at the base oftissues and in the dizzy immensity of the brain.152 
It is this 1936 work that Carrel dedicates to his friends - "mes amies" as he wrote. These friends were in 
fact Frederic Coudert, delegate to the Republican National Convention, the Catholic scholar Cornelius 
Clifford153 and the eminent Russian engineer and scientist turned Republican, Boris Bakhmeteff- three 
friends who reflected the professional network and financial environs within which Carrel moved. 
Carrel's philosophical take on the world was one that, for him, was religiously rooted. The 
mystical union of man presided over the moral in the name of scientific advancement (eugenics): "the 
mystical sense is exceptional, far more exceptional than that of the moral. 154" It was this mystical 
dimension to Carrel's Thought that brought him to think of Man schematically, as being constructed by 
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the techniques of the human sciences. This was a schema shared by the likes of Galton, Lenz and Carrel, 
and the concern of the eugenic fraternity with a more romantic and philosophical prose was 
communicated by Carrel's pen. Through eugenics and the study of human nutrition, man would find his 
most fitting representation of a supreme "architectonic155" much like, we recall, Galton had asserted that 
Man would fmd his most fitting representation of the species. What Eugenics could guarantee was the 
longevity and increased superiority of this representation, without organic decline, without the "loss" of 
"moral and intellectual treasure" through the degeneration of senility. 
The task Carrel set himself was to grasp the "innermost secrets" of the "physiological and 
mental conditions" necessary for determining the "superiority of organic and mental forms. 156" To this, he 
draw upon a simple analogy - transform man as the bee transforms larvae. This was an analogy not too 
distanced from Galton's of 1908, "Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale 
destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and 
those only of the best stock.157" 
Carrel's hopes for discovering these innermost secrets and the theoretically excellent conditions 
of an ideal human union of the scientific and spiritual were to be allied with the want to position the 
influence of dominant physiological and mental factors, freeing man from his veritable vegetation within 
the offices and factories of an industrial world: 
One day, a scholar may discover the means to producing great men with the help of ordinary 
children, as the bees transform a common larvae into a queen through the nutrition they prepare 
for her. 158 
The prosperity of civilisation and its eugenic enlightenment, would be within a mental atmosphere 
untouched and unobstructed by mental illness, deviancy and physical disability. Once these were cleared 
from the fabric of civilisation then a "considerable deepening of our knowledge of the body and soul159" 
could follow, furnishing the necessary conditions for a future of psycho-biological excellence, free from 
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hereditary problems. 
In L'Homme cet Inconnu, a text written amidst a frenetic developing New York of the 1930's, 
Carrel appealed to a greater age of man yet to be lived, a union yet to be experienced, where man would 
fmd his enlightenment beyond the crude mental currency of the Industrial State, where he would be fully 
realised in all his perfection: the, "reversal of industrial civilisation and the advent of another conception 
of human progress. 160" This reconstitution of man, freeing him from the confmes of the office and factory 
was all but a seemingly Marxist gesture, freeing him from the staunch time constraints and mechanical 
routines of the factory floor. However, the attempt to usher in this world free of fate was at the price of 
the young, old and newly born who were deemed "unfit." Beneath the mystically hypnotic prose 
positioning Modem Man deep, "within the storm of an obscure night" where he, "begins to enter into 
illuminative existence, 16 ~, lurked a frustrated stigmatic categorisation of the mentally ill. What Carrel 
wanted, was the programmatic management of social man through the advancements and discoveries of 
science. This in tum provided justification for a eugenic future of racial control appealing to a scheme of 
civilisation freed from the psycho-socio-biological plagues not just of disability and deviancy, but most of 
all of madness. Indeed, for Carrel, there was no greater crime than mental illness. Mentally ill man was 
the most major threat to man's future of spiritual and scientific union. As Carrel further expressed in 
L'Homme cet Inconnu: 
Too Many inferior individuals have been kept alive by virtue of the efforts of hygiene and 
medicine ... yet no criminal has caused greater sadness than the introduction of madness within a 
race ... their multiplication is a very negation of the race. 162 
The fate had thus been sealed for the mentally ill in 1936 with Carrel's Rockefeller-backed publication-
five years prior to his appointment as the Vichy Minister of Health. His appeals to the ancient and 
mystical auspices of psychological and mental attainment reintroduced the daemon of madness that had 
been exorcised by Pinel, and the madman was once again to be found locked within the chains which had 
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been removed by Pinel. Mental illness was to regain its status as a public and social threat: 
The illnesses of the mind are a menace. They are a greater danger than tuberculosis, cancer, than disorders 
of the heart and kidney, and even typhus, the plague and cholera. The danger is not only that illnesses of 
the mind augment the number of criminal cases, but above all because these illnesses increasingly 
deteriorate the white race. There is no greater evil of mind among the criminals in the rest of the nation 
than the mad. It is true that we see a great number of abnormal cases in prisons, but as we have already 
mentioned, it is only a weak proportion of criminals that are imprisoned. Those who allow themselves to 
be caught by the police and condemned by the tribunals are stupid. The frequency of mental illnesses 
indicates a grave flaw of modem civilisation, and it is not to be doubted that our way of life encourages 
such disorders of the mind. 163 
Madness was more than an evolutionary accident for Carrel. It was an irritating blemish to modern 
civilisation thwarting man's enlightenment, a blemish to be removed within a baleful scheme of medico-
socio sanitisation. An interesting yet bitter historical irony, is that while Carrel formulated the eugenic 
future of man within the pages of L'Homme cet Inconnu, a work patterned with salutary gestures to the 
furtherance of Rockefeller research into, "the enormous constitution of molecules of proteinic 
substance ... of prestigious means ... from physiology to metaphysics," across the Atlantic, no more than 
three years later in 1939, under the command of the Reich Commission for the Scientific Study of 
Hereditary Affectations and Grave Constitution, children would be "killed by euthanasia in centres 
established by the Reich Commission.164" Three years prior to the extermination of children by euthanasia, 
Carrel had spoken of a new direction for man, of, "a new way to which we must all advance. 165" Yet this 
new way, one freeing man from his industrial stupor at the same time as guaranteeing his majestic 
transformation (as if a larvae into a Queen bee) was nothing other than, in Carrel's words, providing, "the 
establishment of euthanasia and appropriate gases. 166" 
This new way, which had been built up on the research energies of Britain and the United States, 
was to lead to the "supreme goal" of civilisation167, one set upon the horizon of the medical milieu of an 
Occupied France. Carrel's inauguration as Minister of Health in 1941 saw him put into motion the, 
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"hereditary aristocratic biology168" the eugenicists had longed for and at once mirror the systematic 
cultural cleansing ofNazism. 
6: The occupation of France and the plight of psychiatry 
The German occupying forces marched into Paris on June 14th 1940. On the eve of the fall of 
Europe's artistic capital, Sophie Morgenstern, one of the first child analysts of France, herself of Polish 
Jewish origin, took her life as if ritualistically marking the immanent oppressive mobilisation of the 
psychoanalytic community. In May 1940, under pressures of impending invasion, the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis was forced to close it doors. The psychoanalytic community, much like the common 
populous of the Vichy South, became homeless, orphaned, and suspended from the arena of human and 
cultural affairs. The widely disseminated pre-war journals, Evolution Psychiatrique and the Revue 
Francaise de Psychanalyse consequently ceased publication. Professor Laingnel-Lavastine attempted a 
compensatory move by allocating Dr. Georges Parcheminey the task of restructuring the Parisian 
psychoanalytic community of H6pital Saint-Anne in the wake of its deluge. The attempt proved futile. 
Holding the weakened psychoanalytic body aloft within the shadow of occupying forces, as if in reluctant 
sacrificial poise, Parchimeny's opening lecture at Saint-Anne was weighed by the presence of German 
officers. Pressured by the watchful glare of those in attendance and fearful for his future, Parchimeny 
spoke of his master, Sigmund Freud and the longevity of biological psychiatry. The armorial, indomitable 
spirit nurtured through France's victory of 1918, seemed extinguished along with the culturally rooted 
speculative enquiry of psychoanalysis. The medical community was crippled beneath the ideology of 
Occupation. 
In his later published memoirs, the eminent French Jewish neuro-psychiatrist, Dr. Henri Baruk, 
described the situation well in deeming it "a violent blow to the profound attachments to ways of life.169" 
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Nowhere more so would the medical community from the Occupied North to the 'free' Vichy South be 
shaken by this forceful rupture of a nation's homely attachment to the land, and nowhere more so would 
the fabric of mental illness mirror the damnation of the embroidered Yellow Star worn by Jewish men, 
women and children, from the newly born to the elderly and frail. 
The Armistice of June 1940 - almost one year after the German-Soviet agreement of August 
1939 - and the inauguration of the Vichy State by the Assemblee Nationale in July of that year, saw 
Marshal Henri-Philippe Petain enter the role of father figure for a French populous orphaned from its 
"ways oflife". With Petain's appointment came the thorny, insoluble problems of what was believed to be 
a 'free' zone. In the North, the situation was one of being, in Baruk's words, "crushed. 170" Indeed, for the 
French, the war was a "strange war" with a "strange peace," and (if we may permit ourselves to create an 
idiom) a "strange freedom." Added to this admixture of national ambivalence, was also "noise and social 
upheaval. 17 ~, These were the common adages of the time on the lips of a populous both physically and 
psychologically separated from its homeland. The Northern territories of France witnessed the explicit 
force of Occupation while the Southern territories witnessed an implicitly constrained autonomy under 
the Vichy State. France was a country split between the "occupied" and the "free", yet as Jean Lacroix 
recounted in his preface to the Gestapo hunted philosopher Paul Louis Landsberg, the free territory was 
known nothing other than, "questionably free" 172• 
The occupied areas had witnessed the mordacious and crippling declaration of 'The Status of 
Jews' on 27th September 1940, a status that had been previously announced to be "only attributable to the 
occupied zone." In the wake of Petain's signature of June 1940 accepting Hitler's proposals for a 
Southern 'autonomy', the 'free' South itself bore witness to an announcement on 30th October decreeing 
the 'Status of Jews' to be a reality within the 'unoccupied' zone itself. Occupation was, therefore, an 
active and supple presence throughout France. The declaration segregating the Jewish people of the 
Occupied North, found its vociferous echo merely one month later in the Vichy republic. Lists of Jewish 
clinicians were published in the French popular press denouncing their medicallegitimacy173• The Jewish 
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doctor of both occupied and Vichy zones became a victim of restricting clauses brought into effect in 
August 1940 by the Council of the Order of Medics. As a Petainist newspaper entitled Au Pilori had it, 
"the hunt" for the Jewish doctors was "underway.174" This was a nationally 'Status,' and like a penetrative 
mercurial liquid it seeped its way deep into the clinical milieu. Jewish clinicians were in turn segregated 
from their French colleagues under the watchful eye of the Council of the Order of Medics - an order 
with which all doctors in France today have to be registered in order to work. 
Dr. Baruk was one such Jewish doctor washed within the angry waters of this National Status. 
He would later note in his memoirs that, "Owing to" his "military service of 1914-1918" he "had the right 
to maintain my medical function on the condition that" he "displayed the yellow star." But he "laboured 
under no delusion, there was a mortal danger circling above our heads. 175" The situation, as worded by 
Baruk, beneath this circling mortal danger liable to swoop and rob him of his life at any time, was one of 
"surviving and working" within a vice of seclusion in a bitter struggle for survival. Despite these dangers, 
Baruk remained in Paris to attend to those in need. Contrary to the advice of his friends and medical 
fellows, he remained to "visit patients ... and walk the parks of Paris ... carrying the yellow star," for the 
benefit of others in need. The apostolic ground of medicine was once again affirmed. "Surviving and 
working" was the common adage for the Jewish doctors of France. Baruk later reflected that the "hunt" 
for the Jews rendered him on constant alert, intensified by an internal voice- "it's my tum"- or by the 
displaying of public signs "prohibiting dogs and Jews from entering. 176" 
Yet it was not only the Jewish medic who worked beneath the ominous shadow of imminent 
dangers rooted in the new eugenic religion, but also the ill and the handicapped, and more particularly, the 
mentally ill, both young and old. Eugenics indeed took no prisoners as prisoners are a living number, 
rather this religion culled life from the living flower of humanity in order to multiply the "best variable" 
(Galton). Mental illness, just as the embroidered yellow star of the Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and 
immigrants, was a target for a baleful eugenic scheme, an obstacle to quickly surpassed. The Jewish 
medic and his patient thus became victim to a punishing alienation with progressive elimination of the 
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inferior and multiplication of the best variable, as the end defming the means. 
It is here however, under the conditions of occupation and swooping 'mortal dangers,' that a 
particular resistance emerges within the rural psychiatric milieu, one that is characterised by those medics 
experiencing what one resistant psychiatrist of the time deemed the, "lived horror of slaughter.177" More 
significantly, a call to humane and sympathetic measures emulative of the efforts of the 18th century 
philanthropist occurs as a counterbalance to the "new religion," its high priests and their "barbaric will" 
(Pinel). The counterforce to a medical milieu pervaded by Carrel's ideals was to be found within the 
wartime fraternity of rural, militant French psychiatry, where both the psychiatrist and the mentally ill 
were included within a bitter struggle for life - a tense narrative where an altruistic spirit returns to attend 
to the imperial need of condenmed men and women deemed worthless by a will not of the attendants, 
asylum governors and legislators as was the case in the 18th century, but a will epitomised by the ideals of 
20th century eugenics. 
The psychiatrist, under the shadow of the German occupation, would work within a therapeutic 
space of treatment reduced to the victual conditions of the 18th century, where starvation was to permeate 
the establishment, where the mentally ill would be weakened and put to death by the chains and shackles 
of Nazi ideology. Under the Occupation and its hypocricy of freedom, the psychiatrist's role is once again 
put into question as one of science and philanthropy because he is forced to not only attend to madness, 
the object of his vocation proper, but also to the pervading symptoms and consequences of mass, 
systematic starvation within a milieu brought under the control of Carrel by Vichy. It is here that the 
resistant psychiatrist combats the vast uncontrollable wave of feverish pleurisy, hypothermia, and 
pulmonary oedema - a wave within which the mentally ill of Vichy France drowned in numbers 
exceeding 40,000. 
This particular epoch of "lived horror" is where a resistance to the inhumanity subsequently 
experienced in the wake of the Armistice emerges, and more specifically, a psychiatry that would 
challenge, "the menace of exclusion.178". Indeed, for the second time within the history of the medicine, 
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the scientific and philanthropic marry under the auspice of lived historical necessity, realigning the role of 
the psychiatrist and the ethic of his science. Such conditions of necessity, would urge Jacques Lacan to 
later retrospectively assert, in a 1946 that, "madness changes its nature with the knowledge of 
psychiatry.179" Indeed, it is within a wartime France that we see historical conditions manifest a clinical 
and philosophical reform that defmed a new psychiatry that was later to become known as 'Institutional 
Psychotherapy' 180, established by those sympathetic to the needs of those targeted by the ideals of the 
eugenicist. As with an Esquirol and Tuke of the 191h Century, the rural French psychiatrist found the 
defmition of his role within a socio-historical condition, where he was to both reflect and act upon the 
conditions into which mentally ill man was thrown, where he was to further defme the direction, intention 
and value of the specialisation of his science and the conditions of housing. Yet where for Pinel and Tuke, 
exclusion and isolation had proven the therapeutic means of sheltering the insane from the dampened 
prisons and cramped cell, for those of the Occupation alienation and isolation had become a harsh 
measure of social cleansing lived out within the castigating homogenisation and concentration of groups 
within detention centres and camps throughout Europe. Post-war Institutional psychotherapy would not 
propose exclusion and isolation to be the crowning principle for the re-sensibilisation of the mentally ill, 
because exclusion, for those experiencing the lived horror under Carrel, had been all but a "menace" to 
existence. Rather, the walls of the asylum were a false dialectic of the "inside" and "outside", an "illusory 
barrier" that had to be lifted. 181 
The psychiatrist and his patient found themselves awash within a hungry wave carrying - as we 
have seen - the plan for what was believed by not only the Nazi State but also by the trans-Atlantic and 
Pan European Eugenic movement, to be man's grand restoration of physiological and mental attainment. 
Under Carrel, the struggle of the psychiatrist and his patient was both national and clandestine, shut away 
within the decaying, moisture-laden walls of the rural psychiatric hospital in the silent clamour of the 
Gualist-fuelled provinces. Yet in facing the uncontrollable malnutrition of the mentally ill, the psychiatrist 
would be taken to a new plane of rationality and methodology where he reasserted and reformed his 
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vocation. Thrown into a mission, heeding a call for salvation and rescue, the psychiatrist was, 
"accompanied by atrocious physical suffering and repeated inhuman fears. 182" It was Henri Baruk, 
working "within this atmosphere of occupation," within a Paris, "seemingly crushed by the 
Occupation, 183"who found deep within the pages of the Talmud, a notion uniting charity and justice 
within the Law of Moses ~ Tsedek, the intimate marriage of aid and rightfulness, epitomising the vocation 
of psychiatry. 
True to Jacques Lacan's wording of 1932, madness was a, "drama of man, 184" but the lived, 
historical drama was arguably more fully realised than what Lacan had had alluded to from within the 
doctrine of psychoanalysis. The rural psychiatric hospital of the Vichy South became a synonymous 
extension to the Gaulist Resistance. Where Charles de Gaul, on June 14th 1940 announced from the head 
office of the BBC that "the flame of resistance must not die and will not die," a young psychiatrist and 
member of the communist resistance, Lucien Bonnafe, wrote of, "a resistance to all that tended to 
separate human subjects.185" Baruk voiced similar resistance, a fraternal one at that, in writing of the 
"inextinguishable" flame of Mount Sinai kept alight by the Jewish Fraternity who gathered in secret, 
under cover of darkness, in the Rue Amelot in Paris, to arrange aid, shelter and counsel for Jewish 
families. 186 Further echo to de Gaul's resistant plea to his orphaned nation, was heard in 1942, the very 
year the eugenicist Ellinger published On the Breeding of Aryans and Other Genetic Problems of Wartime 
Germany in the journal of hereditary. Dr. Paul Balvet, at a congress for French neurologists and 
psychiatrists held at Montpellier, proposed that a "new psychiatry," a "humane psychiatry," was needed, 
one necessitated by the humanitarian urgencies of the time/87where madness was "above all else said of 
human presence and expression. It is true that madness announces a malady, but madness also expresses a 
man and a fact188" ~ this, one hundred and forty years after William Tuke's resilient call for a humane 
reform of the treatment of the mentally ill. 
Psychiatry, under its philanthropic war-time auspice, was, for Lucien Bonnafe, to become the 
living "art of sympathy, 189" a science of "disalienation" not an "intellectual" science, but rather what 
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Lacan deemed - in echoing the Hippocratic sentiments of Pinel - a psychiatry, "fmding its true position 
as a human art," a psychiatry, as Bonnafe asserted, "accompanying the victim.190" With similar gesture to 
Bonnafe, emulating the likes of Tuke and Pinel, Henri Baruk drawn by the Talmudic notion of Tsedek, 
saw the psychiatrist's role defmed by moving the alienated from their culpable role (once again 
positioned by the Vichy State as the "object of repulsion" so characteristic of the 18th Century and the 
Medieval Ages) to being "an object of the manifestation of sympathy. 191" This, an art of sympathy or 
better, an art of accompaniment taking Baruk's Tsedek as its noticeable bolster, an art first indicated by 
the likes of Pinel and Tuke, where roles were to be assimilated, where the psychiatrist and the patient 
inhabited a historical landscape, a landscape within which both the medic and the patient were to 
accompany one another, a compassionate landscape within which the psychodrama of man was to be 
enacted and deployed. 
This art, sensitive in its attentiveness and description, sympathetic in its function, would take, 
in Bonnafe's words, "the drama which we live192" as its palette, where the psychiatrist as the "man of 
science" would not only "survive and work" under the circling and swooping dangers of occupation, but 
also attend to a humanitarian "need" marking the ethical imperative of his vocation. The rudiment to this 
second great instance of psychiatric and institutional reform, is one that is not of a great difference to the 
first historical defming moment. Inter-war conditions of the medical milieu give rise to a new rationality 
and personage to psychiatric practice, where philanthropy and science marry in attendance to the needs of 
diminished man. The "drama of man," is a bitter privilege, punctuating the altruistic disposition of the 
psychiatric vocation and the conscious assertion of roles and functions. As with a late 181h Century France 
and England, we are presented with a therapeutic vocation where a humanitarian impetus informs its 
methodology: to think man as much as psychiatry, and psychiatry as much as man in a resistant struggle 
against a tide oflegislated condemnation. 
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7: Psychiatric Resistance 
Dr. Paul Balvet, director of the psychiatric clinic of Saint-Alban, had once been an early 
supporter of Henri Phillipe Petain. Yet upon the Vichy South decreeing the "Status of Jews" in 1940 and 
in giving Carrel a free hand with the medical community, he promptly thought otherwise about the once-
honoured veteran of 1918. What Balvet began to bear witness to, was what he called a "hypocritical 
genocide.193" The hypocrisy: the centre for Human Problems established under Vichy, a centre concerning 
itself with nutritional research, a centre of which Carrel was the director. The Genocide: the systematic 
starvation of the mentally ill and the proliferation of tuberculosis and pleurisy throughout the psychiatric 
hospitals. Indeed, it was in 1942, that a colleague of Balvet and chief psychiatrist at Vinatier psychiatric 
hospital neighbouring Lyon, Dr. Andre Requet, alerted an assembly of medics and psychiatrists to the 
conditions of this genocide: 
Death is being caused by malnutrition .. .in winter, the phenomena of malnutrition rapidly become 
irreversible and at a certain stage of degradation there is no hope of saving the patient, not even by 
warming him, he is just too far gone.194 
To which we can parallel with an Etienne Esquirol recalling the sight of the enchained mentally ill of 
France over one hundred years earlier: 
I saw them covered with blisters ... greatly malnourished ... cold .... robbed of the most necessary things for 
human life ... enchained in alcoves and cages where we wouldn't even dare to put ferocious animals. This 
is what I have seen everywhere in France. 195 
The observation of Dr. Requet bears a disturbing similarity to that of Esquirol. The words of Esquirol, in 
fact, are very much fitting to what befell the psychiatric community under Vichy (for whom mental illness 
was the gravest of crimes against civilisation, the greatest of evils). For Bonnafe, the situation was 
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nothing short of a living hell in writing of a, "historical abomination ... all we have to do is think of the 
traditional images of Hell, of demons and a damned population together, in a torturous relation of 
culpability, death and madness. 196" How well such a situation equates with Article VXII of the Armistice 
signed on June of 1940: 
The French Government obliges itself to prevent the transfer of economic valuables and 
provisions form the territory to be occupied by the German troops into unoccupied territory or 
abroad. These valuables and provisions in occupied territory are to be disposed of only in 
agreement with the German Government. In that connection, the German Government will 
consider the necessities of life of the population in unoccupied territory. 
The chief overseer for these necessities of life in unoccupied territory was the Minister of Health, Alexis 
Carrel. In the psychiatric hospitals of the Vichy South, malnutrition became a harsh and unliveable reality 
where those of the psychiatric hospitals faced with a wave of pulmonary tuberculosis encouraged by 
starvation. As Dr. Escoffier-Lambiotte working within the many hospitals of the provinces remembered: 
The patients had nothing to eat! The patients ate their fingers, the bark of trees, their faeces and 
they even drank their urine. They lived as animals, sleeping on old damp straw instead of 
linen.197 
To which we parallel another psychiatrist recounting the harsh reality at a hospital in Ville-Evrard: 
It is at Ville-Evrard that a pathology presented itself.. .like that of the survivors of the Nazi 
concentration camps ... the immense loss of weight, with or without the onset of latent 
tuberculosis ... or of contamination setting off violent processes of galloping 
consumption ... enormous oedemas, where we saw skeletal bodies fill themselves with water 
and empty themselves by impossible diarrhoeas ... on the morning rounds, the corridors would 
smell of cadavers ... 198 
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Owing to these degrading conditions of the human number deemed, by the Science of Eugenics "unfit" 
and a "menace," that numerous seminars began to be given by the S.M.P (la Societe Medico 
Psychologique) in an attempt to tackle with the syndromes of starvation and the Nazi-weighted ideology 
of the Vichy-Carrel medical milieu. Notable sessions were held on 27th October 1941 where Dr. Lucien 
Bonnafe presented, "asylum research into the conditions of the appearance of oedema in a period of 
restricted provisions;" on 24th November 1941, "a contribution to the study of the hypothermia-oedema-
diarrhoea syndrome caused by restricted provisions" was presented by doctors Bessiere, Brisson and 
Talairach; to the medical society of Lyon, doctors Vie, Bourgeois, Dessin and Armand presented, "acute 
pulmonary tuberculosis in the psychiatric hospitals during a period of restricted provisions;" doctors 
Lepage, Caron, Daumezon and Leculier presented, "actual aspects of the tuberculosis of psychiatric 
patients;" and on 2nd November 1944 Dr. Charpentier presented, "death by the restriction of provisions in 
psychiatric hospitals." These seminars documented the weakened situation of the psychiatric community 
within the Vichy-Carrel medical milieu, where the psychiatrist by historical necessity extended his role 
and reasserted his humanitarian function. 
With the S.M.P (la Societe Medico Psychologique) faced with fmancial and victual destitution 
under a Vichy regime seemingly propagating a systematic starvation of the mentally ill by the minimising 
of rations, the psychiatrist had to tackle the veritable "torturous relation of culpability, death and 
madness. 199" Not only was he to be concerned with mental illness but also to the pathological signs of 
starvation, the emerging phenomena of gastro-intestinal infections with their feverish diarrhoea, gastric 
dilations with the modification of the abdomen and the digestive tract, syndromes of malnutrition with the 
inception of oedema, primary signs of intestinal haemorrhaging, phases of muscular and nervous stupors, 
failing respiration, ensuing pulmonary tuberculosis and the "death-like appearance of the patient." As 
Bonnafe would recount: "the 28th December 1941 - we begin to note the symptoms of malnutrition of a 
concentrationist pathology.200" This violent wave of malnutrition and tuberculosis sweeping across the 
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psychiatric community was carried by a tide of destructive indifference, for as Dr Requet would later 
recall, "Nothing was being done! There was always an indifference. The view of the mentally ill was not 
a favourable one, people didn't care?01 " Thus we hear Jean Lacroix once more, in his deeming the Vichy 
South "questionably free." 
8: Generational Call for Reform 
It was on lOth June 1987, that Le Monde Science et Medecine published the first ever essay on 
these victims of malnutrition. The report carried the title, "Forty Thousand Victims in the Psychiatric 
Hospitals during the Occupation," and it asserted that: 
In Germany, where eugenics was at the core ofNazi ideology, extermination was systematic. In France, 
those of "social non-value" were left to perish. There was a quasi-general indifference of a medical 
community that only saw the magnificent subject of scientific study. 202 
The number of deaths stands at 40,000, and it goes by the name of a soft extermination- L 'extermination 
douce. The absolute minimum daily ration required by a grown working man to survive was set at 3000 
calories, for the ill, inactive and bed-ridden, it was 2,500 calories. The mentally ill however, were to 
receive a ration of 1,400 calories20\ almost half of the recommended daily ration. To draw upon Dr. 
Requet once more in writing of the conditions at the psychiatric hospital ofVinatier: 
Here, the patients ate all the grass, they ate the weeds, hay, anything they could salvage from between the 
stones and paths ... arguments would flare up over egg shells and nut shells ... patients would attack one 
another savagely over a meagre meal of 1 ,400 calories. 204 
We also have it form the doctors Vie, Bourgeois, Armand and Messin, that nearly half of the cases of 
acute tuberculosis where also sufferers of dementia praecox (schizophrenia): 
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We were not surprised to see that among twenty-five of the cases of acute tuberculosis, twelve were 
dementia praecox patients ... the sufferers of dementia praecox were defavourised in the struggle for 
life ... their circulation began to slow down and the insufficiency of pulmonary ventilation accentuated the 
gravity of illness ... 205 
Dr. Jean Oury further added that: 
During the French Occupation, psychiatric hospitals experienced a grave misery where 40% of the ill died 
of starvation. This created a terrain upon which not only the individual but the collective could assert a 
necessity to change something.206 
This, emulating the concerted assertions of Pinel in his Traite in his writing against the castigation of the 
alienated, namely that, "Something better" had "to be done" in an "era ofLighf07." 
The existential and scientific inter-war experience of the psychiatrist had a decisive influence 
upon the post-war psychiatry. What occupation presented at the same time as unparalleled suffering 
within a "historical abomination" of "tortuous relations,208" was a "phenomenon overturning all existing 
prejudgements within medicine and psychiatry/09" a phenomenon giving rise to a medico-philosophical 
collectiv. As was later be expressed in 1947, psychiatry would be defmed through the clinician's, 
"participation and solidarity with the alienated,210" and as Lucien Bonnafe presented to the Societe 
Medico Psychologique in 1944, what had urged this new reform, was the "maximum deepening within a 
situation" where the psychiatrist was "thrown into a new situation,211 " into an art of sympathy. The 
humanitarian and charitable questioning of the medic, was as with the Biblical Leviticus asking: "what 
would I do ifl were in the situation of the Other?212" Indeed, on grounds of sympathy, of accompaniment, 
of being-with-the-other, the observer and the observed are included within the same narrative by virtue of 
the historical event. The alienist and the alienated both live the "drama of man".Confronted with the 
suffering of the mentally ill, the vocational experiences of the Saint, personifYing agent of religion, are 
seemingly synonymous with the practical experiences of the war-time psychiatrist, personifYing agent of 
science: both intervene and act as therapeutic agency to the suffering; both reunite charity and justice 
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(Tsedek) paying heed to the plight of man, "of deepening the contact with his exiled brother, the patient, 
and of deepening his sympathy for him213" - both are engaged within a sympathetic art. This is where the 
experience of lived horror and historical trauma, urge a generation to recognise a philanthropic defence of 
man as the authentic defmition of psychiatry in its concern for survival, rightfulness and charitable 
servitude in an epoch of destructive indifference, systematic starvation and "brutal free will." To a Lucien 
Bonnafe writing of a "deepened contact with his exiled brother" we can add the Law of Moses which 
underpinned the psychiatric vocation for the condemned Jewish clinician Henri Baruk: "you must treat 
the immigrant with equity and perform loving acts towards your neighbour and the stranger, both of 
whom are like you.214" Both the psychiatrist and Saint, have, behind their enterprise of fraternal 
consolation an inexorable drive towards the restoration of human dignity and protection. As Bonnafe 
would assert much like Pinel, Conolly and Tuke, psychiatry was "an affection for the mentally ill who had 
been maltreated, enchained, brutalised and who complained in pathetic weakened tones.215" Psychiatry, 
was not to alienate, but to liberate. 
For Bonnafe, psychiatry was a "strategy of disalienation" and the psychiatrist was not an 
alienist in the traditional sense, but a disalienist marked by the change in attitude toward the mentally ill 
through the considerable extension his role had undergone during Occupation216. As we see Bonnafe write 
in 1944: "Isolation is the fundamental characteristic of alienation. The essential task of psychiatry is to 
contradict the isolation of the patient, to disalienate the patient. 217" 
9: The Group of Saint-Alban 
1940 can be defmed as the fated inauguration of Carrel as Vichy Minister of Health. 1942 can 
be defined as the year of Dr. Paul Balvet's generational call for humanisation, a year when a weakened 
psychiatric voice within an indifferent medical community increases its tone at a Congress of 
Psychiatrists and Neurologists in Montpellier. The call was for a more humane psychiatry where both 
clinician and patient were to be implicated within a drama. In Balvet's words, what was needed was a 
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psychiatry that would "enter into contact with the specifically human aspects of the alienated.218" One 
year after voicing the urgent need for psychiatry to extend its role, Paul Balvet encountered a psychiatrist 
of Lyon, a young clinician hunted by the Vichy State Police for his dealings with the Gaulist Resistance. 
For Balvet, the encounter with Dr. Lucien Bonnafe, this young militant, was a, "confrontation with a 
world of thought and action very different that previously known.219" and the beginning of a psychiatry 
that would, immediately in the wake of the French Liberation of 1945, accord Bonnafe's "disalienation" 
as its vocational noun and philanthropic politic. 
Balvet and Bonnafe would meet one another at the clinic of Saint-Alban within the tree-
patterned landscape of the Lozere region, a clinic of a collegial reality, and nothing short of a concrete 
synonym for the very principles of the French Resistance. It is at this very clinic, that the post-war 
reformists of French psychiatry and its institutions, Lucien Bonnafe, Jean Oury and Fran"ois Tosquelles, 
would gather, work, create, and form an "active" collective. Paul Balvet was a progressive Christian, 
and had become director of Saint-Alban in 1936, establishing a cinema club and a vast library for the 
patients in 1939. In 1941 a young militant Catalan psychiatrist of Catholic leaning, would arrive having 
escaped from the Setfonds detention camp in the French department of Tarn-et-Garonne. He would be of 
communist tendency and steeped in the scholarship of German psychiatry and phenomenological 
philosophy, his name was Fran"ois Tosquelles, a name that would hallmark post-war French psychiatry. 
Dr. Jean Oury, the youngest of the three reformists, joined Saint-Alban as a trainee psychiatrist in 1947, 
whereupon he began his life-long work and friendship with Tosquelles, Bonnafe and Lacan, shaping the 
psychiatric institution, redefining practice, realigning its ethic. As Oury later recalled, Saint-Alban was: 
... A matrix ... there was certainly a conjuncture: the war, isolation, the fact of being cut off from the 
state ... We should not forget that at Saint-Alban we didn't really suffer as much as other hospitals did. It 
was a crucible, a melting pot, because the fact was that we had to survive: the patients, the nurses, the fight 
against starvation. It was necessary to go out form the hospital, to go to the farmers and get some 
butter. .. and to hide the Resistance. Such a training is extremely didactic. It is an ultra-privileged history 
within which there was a mixture of communists, surrealists, progressive Christians, and Tosquelles, who 
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was a refugee ... He joined this group of Saint-Alban, and rethought all the concepts ofpsychiatry.220 
Lucien Bonnafe would recount with similar sentiment to Oury: 
There was a collective at Saint-Alban .. .It is important to situate all this within the course of history, it is 
absolutely capital, this profound insertion within the movement ofhistory ... Saint-Alban could only be its 
utmost function ofResistance.221 
Saint-Alban was the clandestine shelter for the Resistance, the refugee, the mentally ill, artists and 
communists. And in being so it became nothing short of a school for the psychiatrist. A wealth of names 
were to pattern the not just the physical register of the clinic, but also its conceptual register: the poet, 
Communist and surrealist Paul Eluard would arrive at Saint-Alban in 1942 accompanied by his wife, 
followed by fellow Surrealist Tristan Tzara. The father of pre-war French psychiatry, Henri Ey, known for 
his scholarship on the British neurologist Hughlings Jackson and his "organo-dynamic" theory of 
psychiatry, would begin to frequent the grounds of the clinic, as would a Jacques Lacan, the eminent 
philosopher Georges Canguilhem, and Julien de Ajuriaguerra, the latter, a distinguished Spanish 
neurologist who would pioneer work on the phantom limb and the cerebral cortex with fellow Saint-
Albanian, Dr. Henri Hecaen. It is with this broad yet affiliated church of medical, philosophical and 
artistic specialisation, that a renewal of psychiatry begins and indeed reasserts itself as a vocation, where 
"psychiatry was to be said ofman.222" 
Lucien Bonnafe decided to name the group of Saint-Alban the Society of Gevaudan, and it 
would engage with a wide range of concerned scholarship by virtue of its members: phenomenology, 
neurology, biology, theology, gestalt, psychoanalysis. As Oury remembered: 
At Saint-Alban we worked, we discussed endlessly, with Eluard, Tristan Tzara , the philosopher Georges 
Canguilhem also, and of course, the master of the field, Francois Tosquelles, the refugee psychiatrist. .. 223 
Yet the clinic was not only a safe house for the condemned patient and hunted intellectual, but also a wire 
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and refuge for the Resistance. As Tosquelles later recalled: 
At Saint-Alban, the meetings of doctors and others, was almost a permanent occurrence. One had to attend 
regularly because, for example, we had to keep informed about the parachuting of arms for the resistance, 
or a clandestine visitor, so we did in fact speak about psychiatry.224 
Saint-Alban, as with the Resistance, was of a national exercise and importance. The resistance fighter 
Henri Cordesse, who later oversaw the Liberation of the French department of Lozere and remain its 
prefect until 1947, later recounted the important role the clinic played. As he had it in an interview of 
1999: 
We [the Resistance] knew of Bonnafe and Tosquelles ... The Resistance of Loezere, as with Bonnafe, did 
not want the hospital to enter into the structures oflocal Resistance .... Bonnafe and his colleagues were 
upon a national terrain concerning the problem of the reorientation of psychiatry ... they condemned the 
natural selection that was killing the mentally ill and it was a professional soldier who carried out their 
work ... if the Vichy regime would have known that the clinic was a key Resistance locale, it would have 
compromised both the men and the establishment. .. The hospital was officially part of the Resistance, but 
very few people knew ... the clan destiny and discretion of the establishment was a guarantee for hunted 
refugees, as was the case with Paul Eluard ... The doctors ofSaint-Alban were united in their defending the 
Rights of the mentally ill and therefore the Rights of Man ... This was a system unique to France .. .It had 
taken over forty years for people to fmd out that the hospital was a key Resistance location ... 225 
For these psychiatrists, this multihued clinic was the most privileged of training grounds. Saint Alban was 
nothing short of a school, or better, a conceptual brewing pot, creating and resisting. Tosquelles, who had 
already completed his psychiatric studies at the Institute Para Mata in Reus, arrived at the clinic with two 
works, one by Hermann Simon, the other by Jacques Lacan. From Simon, Tosquelles would borrow the 
notion of nursing the institution at the same time as nursing man. From Lacan, he would borrow an 
understanding of the world of psychosis that was without its definitive conclusion, one that would declare 
an ever present profundity to the phantasms of psychosis. Psychiatry, the institution and the patient, were 
to be said in a singular, creative sense of constructive "renewal." These works were relatively unknown 
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and inconspicuous within pre-war France, Lacan was all but overshadowed by the monumental figuration 
of Henri Ey's organo-dynamic psychiatry, and Herman Simon was a name seldom mentioned within the 
ambit of clinical debate. These two works, however, were to be published in the form of clandestine 
edition through the Society of Gevaudan and form two parts of a psychiatric manifesto paying heed to the 
plight of man and to the plight of psychiatry itself. It is with this collective of Gevaudan, that a 
redefmition of the role of the psychiatrist would hallmark what Lucien Bonnafe deemed, "a strategy of 
dis-alientation" carrying a resistance to the eugenic imperative of the time, that is, against the 
psychological archaism of CarreL 
Saint-Alban, was the site where philosophy and psychiatry were to marry on grounds of 
"sympathy" and "shared drama," to draw upon two terms commonly employed at the time, the former a 
term employed by Baruk and Bonnafe, the latter a picturesque notion introduced to the psychiatric 
community by Lacan's thesis of 1932. A particular psychiatry thus presents itself, one that takes 
"sympathy" as the impetus for a strategy of "dis-alienation," one, that under the pressures of financial 
destitution and rationing gives rise to a creative, fraternal enterprise. As Lucien Bonnafe wrote in the 
wake of French Liberation: 
I have said, and I will continue to say, that our generation is urged by history, that as a response to the 
heights of an unliveable horror, the psychiatrist attains new heights, with his reflection upon the 
anthropological status of madness. I have thus named disalientation the mission that we have been 
accorded226. 
The movement of disalienating the mentally ill was developed by the doctors and nurses of Saint-Alban. 
Oury later noted : 
During the war, many nurses were prisoners, and several had been in the concentration camps. When they 
returned to medicine, they had a vision of a very different world: they came with an experience of the 
concentration camps.227 
The concern of the militant psychiatrist, be it equated with Baruk's Talmudic notion of Tsedek, or the 
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strategy of disalienation pertaining to Bonnafe's art of sympathy, was called for by the wartime 
augmentation and intensification of the vocation of psychiatry and its workers in the face of a "soft 
extermination" of the mentally ill. Yet if 1942 would prove the year of Balvet's generational call to 
humane psychiatric reform, 1947 would prove the publication of the generation's manifesto itself. It's title, 
The personage of the Psychiatrist -la personage du psychiatre, it's author, a war-marked Lucien Bonnafe, 
it's politic, a de--alienation. As Bonnafe with Dr. Fouquet would voice in 1944 to the Societe Medico-
Psychologique, "we have lived an era where a great movement of medical reform dawns. In a larger sense, 
we are experiencing the reform of the country's health system in its entirety.228" Indeed, against the 
dramatic backdrop of occupation, the figure of the radical personage emerges. 
1947 was an important year for the definition of post-war French psychiatry. Jean Oury would 
arrive at the clinic of Saint Alban, and Lucien Bonnafe would decree the fraternal concern of psychiatry 
as being one of man himself. As Oury would later note, it was a year displaying, "the deepest roots of all 
that had gone on within the occupation.229" For Bonnafe, a name that had topped the wanted lists of the 
Vichy State Police for his involvement in the Resistance, the personage of the psychiatrist had undergone 
radical change, even more so than the methodological psychiatric shift spumed by the likes of Pinel, 
Esquirol and Tuke. On 251h March 1947, Bonnafe presented a penned meditation to the circle of Evolution 
Psychiatrique chaired by Henri Ey. The title of his essay was Le Personnage du Psychiatri30 and it 
would define, if nothing short of craft, the sentiment of a post-war psychiatry founded upon the 
humanitarian imperative. In attendance to hear the 'red' radical present his thoughts, were the most 
notable of French psychiatry: Eugene Minkowski, Madame Minkowska, Louis Le Guillant and Jacques 
Lacan -the latter with whom Bonnafe formed a friendship unparalleled by others. 
Speaking in 1946, Bonnafe reasoned the apostolic equation of psychiatry to be a simple and 
necessary one, punctuated by the events of Occupation and the systematic starvation of the mentally ill: 
"psychiatry was man231 " and ultimately the interminable analysis of man. Writing one year later in 1947, 
this was the equation of "solidarity,232" borne from the harshest of wartime circumstances, and it was to 
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furnish an enquiry in as to how the role of the psychiatrist was contingent upon the dramas of lived 
historical experience, and as to how the psychiatrist's role was destined to be defmed as one of a 
"harmonious point of diverse points of view lived out within an activit)l33": 
The role of the psychiatrist is to be found in that drama within which he is included. When the conditions 
of the drama change, the personage in tum changes. The historical evolution of the psychiatrist works with 
the historical evolution of his object.234 
For Bonnafe, psychiatry had hitherto been menaced by an imperfect knowledge of its personage where 
the fundamental error had been to defme it in terms of alienation235 . An ideological monolith existed, one 
to be pulled down. Since the law of 301h June 1838, despite the efforts of Pinel, mental alienation had 
become an autonomous pathology and defined symptomatology, patented clauses and codified therapeutic 
indications seeing madness as a problem of elementary instincts, or as a lesion of psychical functions. The 
problem that existed was that the psychiatric institution had not maintained the philanthropic and 
humanitarian character through which it had been created236 . The role of the psychiatrist, having 
undergone a veritable "extension," and with his science having become a "sympathetic art" marking the 
quintessence of man and nature, the possibility for reform had presented itself Bonnafe's study, 
however, sought to differentiate the war-marked psychiatrist from the Revolutionary-marked alienist- the 
alienist was to be a man of alienation, the psychiatrist a man of drama, a dramatic personage. As Balvet 
would later reflect, "until Bonnafe came along we were alienists, Bonnafe, however was a 
psychiatrist.237" The personage of the psychiatrist had undergone a radical historical change, and his duty, 
in heeding the call of suffering man, was to be one of accompanying the victim. The key notion, was, as 
Bonnafe wrote, "a consideration of the psychiatrist's role within the drama," and that within this drama a 
therapeutic strategy would be inaugurated on grounds of sympathy and fraternal assimilation (Tsedek for 
Baruk), where, in the words of a Jacques Lacan of 1947, the psychiatrist was "to reflect upon his reactions 
before a dramatic situation.238" For the phenomenological psychiatrist J. H Van den Berg, this marked, "a 
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new orientation of psychiatry" where the intertwining of analytical technique with lived historical 
experience defmed the ultimate address of man239. The drama was not merely one of "knowledge" but of 
"life" itself40• 
The prime concern for this new orientation had been seeded by the 1942 humanitarian call of 
Balvet for a more "humane psychiatry." This at once carried the possibility for modes and space of 
therapeutic treatment, yet it also punctuated a spirit for renovation and a taste for adventure, for as 
Bonnafe penned, "adventure marks the personality of the psychiatrist.241 " This "adventurous" personage, 
what for Pinel had been one of "invention," would still maintain his historical role of ethically 
rehabilitating the mentally ill, but his science was one of disalienating the mentally ill. Where Pinel and 
his apprentice Falret had written of the specific science of "mental alienation," Bonnafe wrote of a 
specific "vocation" of "la folie," a science of a "different psychiatry,242" defining a new era within the 
history of a specialised psychopathological pursuit. What this "new orientation," this "new psychiatry" 
marked, was a "new rationality" of an "open psychiatry,243" or rather, of an "open work.244" Psychiatry, 
above all, was to be a science of "creative capacities245" borne from the generational experiences of a 
previously "uprooted" nation exposed to the ideals of eugenics 
Under such auspices the psychiatrist was an "adjectival" personage246 engaging with an 
"ensemble of methods destined to resist everything of a concentrational logic (logique 
concentrationaire ). 247 " Psychiatry was an "act" that was only possible through, "a profound lived 
participation" with the "drama of madness, 248 " a "co-efficient lived drama. 249 " For Bonnafe, the 
exactitude and specificity of the psychiatric vocation was developed with the psychiatrist being of a less 
"hermetic," and "less alienated250" role. As Jean Oury asserted, the psychiatrist would approach madness 
as, "an intimate event of a person's life251 " in the hope of neutralising the pathogenic effects of hierarchy 
and alienation so starkly witnessed under Carrel. As Lacan himself further highlighted, the psychiatric 
vocation was defined by an, "adaptive and fecund attitude.252" Elsewhere, such an attitude would be 
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characterised as, "a multidimensional perception253" and the investiture of new clinical approach of an 
architectural and conceptual armature 254 • Omy describes such a project well, as being "a form of 
permanent analysis crossing living systems of organisation, structures and complementary relations ... of 
creating systems of distinctiveness. 255" Yet it was with the doctoral thesis of Fran((ois Tosquelles, that 
such a project would be brought to the fore and display its very own uniqueness of clinical questioning, 
where the role of the psychiatrist would become relational and relative in function within a more 
sympathetic and sensitive art of diagnosis. As Bonnafe, further declared in 1944, psychiatry in being true 
to the apostolic and Hippocratic imperative, is "obligated to a realist politic, to an incessant examination 
of concrete, individual cases.256" 
The very object of psychiatry, was to be the situation within which the psychiatrist found 
himself, and by virtue of the contact with the Other, with the patient, he would contradict the his own 
proper isolation, and that through his actions he would affirm a disalienation and art of sympathy where 
the problematic was one of a human relation. This marks the shift from the alienist to the psychiatrist. As 
we have it from Bonnafe: 
The word "psychiatry" was attested in France since 1842. The asylums for the alienated eventually 
became the psychiatric hospitals of the 20th century, and the extremely official "congress for alienists" 
became the "congress of psychiatrists" in 1958.257 
Fuelling this shift of the psychiatric personage, were not only the experiences of suffering under the 
occupation, but also the air of renewal and revelation marking a post-liberated France. Pinel, had 
experienced the untimely end of monarchy, and Bonnafe, in his own words, had experienced the "the end 
ofthe world." Bonnafe would even ask a younger generation of medics, "how many have experienced the 
end of the world?258" Such a question, would prove the veritable study of Tosquelle's doctoral thesis 
which carried as its title, La Vecu de la Fin du Monde dans la Folie, Lived Experience of the End of the 
World within Madness259. This was an enquiry that penetrated deep into the question of sympathy, the 
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ethical stance of the art of sympathy proper, an enquiry that engaging with the philosophical, the 
biological, the psychical and the neurological in the name of historical construction and renewal. 
Conclusion: from the noble art to the art of sympathy 
In this chapter we explored the ethic by observing the conditions of historical necessity and the 
redefmition of the medic's role. We specifically selected our historical literature to substantiate our claim 
that ethical renewal is demanded by lived historical experience and the urgencies of the time. Pinel and 
Tuke were urged to institutional reform from having witnessed the degrading conditions within which 
men and women of all ages were enchained on account of their madness. Likewise, Balvet, Baruk and 
Bonnafe responded to the pressures of Eugenics, and the virulent spread of systematic starvation of the 
mentally ill throughout the 'free' Vichy south. We have shown these two historical moments to be that of 
philanthropic reform and a generational call for medical change. With Pinel, we saw that the Hippocratic 
ground had to be maintained, and that the medic had to be a creative persona gifted in the art of 
observation. In this way, medicine remained the noblest of arts. With the harsh conditions of occupied 
France, we saw how this noble art was reaffirmed through Baruk drawing upon the Talmudic notion of 
Tsedek. We saw how this notion was reflected in the efforts and observations of the group of Saint-Alban, 
and how it can be understood as an art of sympathy. 
Through the two historical moments that have proved the focus of our comparative study, we 
have witnessed how the ethic fmds a generational pronouncement, and more precisely, how historical 
conditions necessitate its continual address and the redefinition of the role of the psychiatrist. Through 
such notions of Tsedek (Baruk) and Disalienation (Bonnafe) the patient is understood as an object of 
sympathy, as being a co-partner of sympathetic exchange, and for Bonnafe, this redefmed the personage 
96 
of the psychiatrist as being a less alienatory persona and more a fraternal apostolic presence of assistance. 
Indeed, it was only by closely analysing these two historical moments, their similarities and their 
differences, that we could properly grasp the true notion of the ethic, and begin to work towards the 
question as to what a phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry is, and more precisely, 
how it is typified by the work ofTosquelles and Oury. 
In our following chapter we will situate this phenomenology by drawing upon the insights of 
Oury and Tosquelles. We will observe how a post-war phenomenology pertains to a particular psycho-
pathology of schizophrenia, one that is historically inaugurated, and one that hallmarks the ethic of 
Institutional Psychotherapy. We will pay particular attention to the phenomenological assertions of 
Tosquelles' doctoral thesis, and how it highlighted the analogous law bonding the neurological, biological, 
sociological and psychiatric in the name of psychiatric assistance. This will enable us to further 
understand that a phenomenological enquiry cannot be raised independently of the ethical and charitable 
concern, and in tum, further understand the work of Dr. Oury. We will see how the ethical imperative, is 
in fact a phenomenological imperative. 
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Chapter 2: The end of the world experience 
I am eternally made man. 
- Franvois Tosquelles, La Vecu de Ia Fin du Monde dans Ia Folie1 
The clinician who being specialised in "mental illnesses" has the urge to elaborate 
new therapeutic norms, and is capable of realising that which, from near or far, brings 
about a structural modification of the bio-psycho-social gestalt. 
-Henri Ey, A Propos D 'Une Realisation D 'Assistance Psychiatriqui 
Introduction: the ethical and the phenomenological 
In our last chapter, we examined the ethical renewal of psychiatry, and we observed as to how 
two great instances of psychiatric reformation were characterised by the marriage of philanthropy and 
science- the ethical foundation to the noble art of medicine proper. This union was by way of heeding 
the call of an "imperial need". The first instance was that of Pinel and Esquirol in a post-revolutionary 
France, mirrored by the efforts ofTuke in England. The second, that ofBonnafe, Tosquelles and Oury 
in a post-war France as the figureheads to the effervescent group of Saint-Alban, spurred to therapeutic 
renewal and advance by the conditions of an occupied France, conditions that were brought to their 
ruthlessness by the visions of Alexis Carrel, a dream of a new world true to the ideals of Eugenics. Yet 
we also observed a distinct difference between the therapeutic politic of Pinel and his 20th Century 
descendents, for where the former took alienation and isolation as the guiding politic for the ethical 
rehabilitation of the insane, the latter took a disalienation as hallmark to the psychiatric vocation. This 
historical bi-focal approach saw the psychiatrist as a therapeutic and scientific answer to injustice. For 
Pinel, the insane were curable because the malady of the mind was a malady of the passions. For 
Bonnafe, madness, Ia folie, was a drama realigning roles and the methodologies of psychiatry. 
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In our second chapter, we will approach the 1948 doctoral thesis of Dr. Fran9ois Tosquelles 
and seek to highlight its phenomenological significance in terms of the psycho-pathology of 
schizophrenia it puts forward, whilst keeping with the ethical ground of medicine and the historical 
necessity urging such doctrinal advance. In doing this, we will identifY a particular thematic of creation 
and recreation which comes to communicate a particular topic of phenomenology and we will see how 
this topic is not only unique to the reformist demands of a post-war generation, but also to 
neurobiology. More precisely, we will demonstrate as to how the phenomenological principles of 
Tosquelles' thesis inform the phenomenological outlook of Dr. Jean Oury and his resistance to the 
increasing pressures of the modern-day bureaucratic machinery infiltrating the clinic - what he calls a 
"Simplism", complex schemes which simplifY psycho-pathological phenomena and the therapeutic 
enterprise of clinical work. 
Our reading of Tosquelles' doctoral thesis will therefore not be a hermeneutic one, but one 
that will highlight specific aspects pertinent to advancing our understanding of the ethic, 
phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry, at the same time as a psycho-pathology 
of schizophrenia. Furthermore, we will seek to introduce hitherto un-referenced theorists to British 
medical historiography and philosophy. Namely, the neurobiology ofErwin Straus (1891-1975), Viktor 
von Weizsacker (1886-1957), Constantine von Monakow (1853-1930), Raoul Mourgue (1886-1950), 
Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965), and the neo-Catholic phenomenology of the Gestapo hunted philosopher, 
Paul-Louis Landsberg (1901-1944), who took his own life in the concentration camp ofOranienburg. 
This will enable us to raise the question of phenomenology and psychiatry beyond the remit of Ludwig 
Binswanger ( 1881-1966), into a broader institutional pretext. 
We will also see that Tosquelles' thesis was a generational document, an enquiry marrying the 
theological, the phenomenological, the biological and the neurological in the name of psychiatric 
assistance and medical reform. We will specifically focus our study on the phenomenological topic of 
catastrophe and revelation, and situate the thesis as ultimately figuring madness to be an industrious 
condition of possibility and renewal, where delirium declares a world of revelation in the wake of 
catastrophe, and where the phantasm of schizophrenia declares a revelatory politic to a post-war 
generation. By doing this we will be able to highlight as to what exactly a "multidimensional 
perception" and "polydimensionality" constitutes for the therapeutic doctrine of Institutional 
Psychotherapy, for these two terms are constantly encountered within the vast library of its literature. 
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This chapter will mark an advance of our understanding of the ethic and show that a phenomenology 
cannot exist independently of the human cause: the ethic and the phenomenological are said in a 
singular and same sense. 
1: The veiled world into which the psychiatrist is initiated 
We have previously witnessed the wartime conditions within which a resistant psychiatry laid the 
ground for a post-war reassertion of the philanthropic necessity of science ~ psychiatry as the address 
of an imperial need, psychiatry as assistance, psychiatry as an ethical undertaking, as an art of 
accompaniment. Through such study, we saw Philippe Pinel deem the science of mental alienation an 
"art," an absolute craft, with which only the most experienced, and only those possessing the "fmesse 
of observation" could engage (Falret). Dr. Lucien Bonnafe, would much later, in the wake of World 
War II and the German Occupation of France, characterise the vocation of psychiatry as an "art of 
sympathy" historically paralleling Pinel who ~ in following Hippocrates ~ deemed the "specialised 
science of mental alienation," "the noblest of arts." The assertions of Pinel and Bonnafe are ethically 
recuperative. Pinel redefmes medical assistance by approaching "mental alienation" through a "moral 
therapy" of the passions (Pinel). Bonnafe mirrors this by asserting a shift in psychiatric methodology 
through a "disalienation" (Bonnafe). We understood this art to be the art of accompaniment, and the 
psychiatrist as an apostolic persona heeding the call of war-weakened ~ and indeed 
Revolutionary-weakened ~ man. Medical assistance under the urgencies of history is constantly 
redefined as a "specialisiation" (Pinel) neighbouring the vocation and fraternal servitude of the Saintly 
persona found in religious texts~ this is where philanthropy and science marry under the auspices of 
historical need. Henri Baruk, in drawing upon the Talmudic notion of Tsedek, underlined this apostolic 
analogy of the persona most authentically ~ what for Pinel was the art of mental alienation, for 
Bonnafe became the art of sympathy, and for Baruk, this dutiful consciousness was exemplified within 
the Law of Moses, deep within the pages of the Talmud. 
In this second chapter, three luminaries highlight this vocation of Institutional Psychotherapy 
seeded by the wartime sentiments of rural psychiatric practice. Namely, Jean Oury, Fran9ois 
Tosquelles and Lucien Bonnafe. Jean Oury in particular, now aged eighty-three, is the last living figure 
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of what Bonnafe characterised as "a golden age" of psychiatry - an age that was to find its eventual 
home at La Borde clinic under the direction of Oury and Tosquelles. La Borde, at its outset (September 
1953) was became a clinic appealing to the breadth of philosophical youth: Michel Foucault, Franz 
Fanon, Julia Kristeva, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari most notably. Indeed, deep within the vast, 
almost limitless landscape of La Loire Valley, La Borde clinic would be nothing short of a new home 
for Guattari, a young post-war Sartrean of sixteen years, who found in Oury an ultimate influence -
paternal even. Both Deleuze and Guattari, continually frequented the presence ofOury, both enraptured 
by the philanthropic spirit of a post-war clinical fraternity marked by the bloody benchmarks of history. 
Oury's work and reflections presented to us, the public, in the form of published seminars, 
scattered interviews and a wealth of conferences throughout the world, have constantly been driven by 
an impassioned stance of developing a permanent analysis of man and his institutions rather than 
developing clinical tools in the name of traditional psychiatric nosography: "psychiatry is far from 
being defined and neatly delimited" is a phrase he often repeats to the students and researchers who 
partly compose the community of .La Borde True, concepts are tools through which to build new 
therapeutic systems, but they shouldn't be used to strengthen bureaucratic measures, and should 
themselves not become so. For Oury, psychiatry fmds its very value in always being at its very outset, 
it is never firmly delimited because its object (madness I !a folie) is always repositioned, man is an 
"inconclusive monograph" and therefore requires a "permanent analysis"3. 
Yet as Oury constantly acknowledges through his seminars and writings, the main impetus 
and the complimentary genius to Lacan, the gelling agent of a post-war generation of gestation, was his 
Catalan colleague Fran<;ois Tosquelles - the catalyst and persona of a post-war clinical and 
philosophical renaissance. Most notably for Oury, the 1948 doctoral thesis of Tosquelles pointed to a 
"new way" and "method" of thinking. Tosquelles' thesis was of a "different" technical approach 
conducive to the needs of war-weakened man, attentive to a philosophical system that married the 
theological, the clinical, the neurological and the phenomenological. 
The vocation of what was known as "sector psychiatry" (later termed an "Institutional 
Psychotherapy" in 1952, and an "Institutional Pedagogy" in the 1960s yet institutional psychotherapy 
was the favoured term) was neither to develop "professionals of ideas" nor to establish "ideological 
constructions.4" It's premise, was one of lived historical experience: experiential knowledge rather than 
intellectual knowledge. The project of an Institutional Psychotherapy was first seeded Pinel's 
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geopolitical vision of the clinical establishment, but more precisely it gained historical identity with the 
generational declaration of Paul Balvet in 1942 for a more "humane psychiatry". In truth, it is Balvet 
who lays the first stone of a path upon which a new post-war clinical rationality could emerge. 
Bonnafe in 1946 then announces a "disalienation" to defme the "personage of the psychiatrist" (he lays 
the second stone to the path), and it is Tosquelles who rests the third stone with his thesis of 1948 
positioning madness as a productive and industrial affirmation and not, in fact, as a negation normality 
and reality. These are the three decisive moments for Institutional Psychotherapy, with Pinel as its 
grandfather. As Oury once said, "for an understanding of Institutional Psychotherapy we could even go 
back to Pinel..." 
Tosquelles' thesis marked psychiatry as an anthropological science of possibility. In being so 
he simultaneously renewed the concern for the ethic of psychiatry. Psychiatry, for Tosquelles, was a 
vocation of "renewal," and it was to be thought of under "creative" and "revelatory" auspices at the 
same time as the "curative". Indeed the "curative" and the "creative," the "aesthetic" and the "ethic" go 
hand in hand. This is what is thesis demonstrates in its entirety. As Jean Oury later penned in 1979, true 
to the sentiments of his post-war generation, the concern was not proposing the defining truth of 
humanity, it was not to define grand intellectual schemes which could be learnt and recited in text 
books in the universities. Rather, it was to further understand and work with "man-in-the-world" in the 
wake of his simple lived experiences, and as to how psychotherapy and the strategy of 
institutionalisation could be enriched from engaging with them: 
I spend my time seeing people of all categories, at the most simple of levels ... That which obliges me to 
take immediate decisions - not just any decisions - is the attempt to better follow virtual traces. It is a 
fonn of "partition" that inclines me to follow these unannounced paths, within the solitude, within the 
screams and the silence ... 5 
This is strikingly emulative, although not intentionally so, of Pinel in writing that the clinician had to 
"live" within the "presence of the patient." The personage of the psychiatrist is within these "virtual 
traces," within the screams, silences, sighs, upon the unannounced, undetermined paths of existence, 
within a psycho-pathology cleaving itself away from clinically determined illnesses towards a 
psycho-pathology of what Lacan deemed, "the Real" (as opposed to reality), a dimension inaccessible 
to most, ever present yet ever so distanced from man's habitual psychological gearing towards what 
Oury describes as "the banality of the everyday.6" 
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The "Real" of Lacan, is the privileged space, impossible even, Oury calls it, "the impossible 
Real,7" rarely touched upon by the schizophrenic, if as Oury asserts, "schizophrenia exists at all.8" Do 
we then position the doctoral thesis of Tosquelles as an enquiry into this impossible Real? As a 
document of a precarious journey upon the unlawwn waters of the Unconscious where we encounter 
divinities and demons of all sorts and of all temperaments? Is it an enquiry into this rarely disclosed 
dimension? Such indications of this undisclosed dimension were notably given by an early Nietzsche, 
who in charging against the barriers between man and man erected by, "impudent convention," 
similarly sought out a hidden realm beyond the commonalities of experience in writing of the "primal 
Oneness" of all things. He saw this enigmatic Oneness as a primordial brewing pot of humanity within 
which a "gospel of world harmony" reigned. This dimension was not for the eyes of habitually 
perceived reality because it was beyond the "cognitive forms of appearance," it went deeper, into 
transcendental life and experiential knowledge, as opposed to the intellectual knowledge bartered and 
played as a deck of cards within the universities of his time. It is no wonder then that Nietzsche would 
wander within the altitudes of a mountainous landscape and often return with a new manuscript. 
Nietzsche further penned that this Oneness was in fact beyond the veil of Maya - a veil of illusion 
masking primordial truth, a veil covering our consciousness and restricting a more profound perception 
and sympathy of the world. Occasionally, this veil was tom by a consciousness sharper, clearer and less 
clouded by the obscurations of our ego-clinging empirical Self. It is Dionysian Greek culture for 
Nietzsche, however, that lives within the constant glimpse of this primal world harmony through their 
art and hymnal recitations, and it was Nietzsche who reminded us of its importance for understanding 
the world which lies behind appearances9. Does the psychiatrist, if we take Lacan's "Real" as 
Nietzsche's "primal Oneness" of the Dionysian Greek (and indeed as Freud's unconscious), then 
penetrate this veil to which Nietzsche accorded a primordial authority, as something beyond the given 
empirical world of appearances composing what we habitually call "reality?" Does the psychiatrist, this 
dramatic personage who accompanies mentally ill man into the innermost sanctities of his 
psychological and pathological narratives, venture beyond the cognitive forms of appearance and 
penetrate the most evasive of primordial categories? Is Lacan's "Real," one deemed "impossible" by 
Oury, beyond that veil of Maya, inaccessible to most and rarely accessible even to the man of 
schizophrenia who, in the words of Professor Lhermitte, not merely negates but affirms "the world and 
body .. .life and death?" Does this schizophrenic negation of the world and body in fact affirm another 
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world, a new life, a new form? Is schizophrenia an unveiling of this rarely accessible, "impossible" 
dimension? Do these unveiled announcements of the Real surpass the limits of determined illnesses 
as phenomena signifying a profound primordial conflict and in fact primordial truth? And in doing so 
do these psycho-pathological announcements manifesting themselves somewhere between the world, 
the body, life and death even point to a "cosmic conflict" as the psychiatrist Eugene Minkowski boldly 
asserted against the certainties of the psychoanalytic currents of his time, in 1934.10 
It is therefore interesting to remember that the protestant mystic Jakob Bohme presented us 
with the universal "Ungrounding" (the unknowable transcendent)11 ; the phenomenology of Hegel 
appealed to the Neo-Platonic "Absolute"12; the psychoanalysis of Freud the "Unconscious"; Lacan the 
"Real"; Nietzsche the "Primal Oneness"; Heidegger the ontic-ontological "Withdrawal"13; and Kurt 
Schneider the "Untergrund"14• Such appeals, some stronger and more explicit than others, highlighted 
the ever present yet ever distanced constitutive transcendental frame of reality into which the 
psychiatrist is initiated- the "Real" and not "reality". It is where we see Fran<;:ois Tosquelles write in 
elaborating the sentiment ofLacan, Heidegger and Nietzsche before him: 
The real is that which is here before us, most of the time, in front of us, and that which remains outside 
of us. We will never be able to grasp it in its totality. It is placed upon the horizon to which each person 
walks towards, yet it is a horizon that withdraws, even to the rhythm of each walking man.15 
Several years later, in 1954, Heidegger would write with similar pen: 
When man is pointing into what withdraws, he points into what withdraws. As we are drawing that way 
we are a sign, a pointer. But we are pointing then at something that has not, not yet, been transposed into 
the language that we speak. It remains un-comprehended. We are an un-interpreted sign. 16 
Later still, in 1968, Gilles Deleuze would follow this seemingly phenomenological fascination for the 
transcendental and primordial dimension in writing of a movement where: 
We are party to a universal ungrounding. By 'ungrounding' we should understand the freedom of the 
non-mediated ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground ... A world precipitated into 
universal ungrounding. 17 
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Where the philosopher, as Deleuze suggests, engages with the question of the universal ungrounding, 
the psychiatrist, as Tosquelles indicates, engages with the question of madness. From this, we 
understand that the 'un-grounding' and 'transcendence' are one and the same state of affairs shared by 
both the clinician and philosopher prepared to surpass the epistemological limits, and confines, of their 
discipline. The psychiatrist seeks to work with this universal ungrounding because the object of his 
vocation ~ psychosis ~ is an evasive phenomenon ~ a constantly displaced horizon. Psychosis is 
likewise a constantly displaced horizon for the phenomenologist Henri Maldiney, who much later than 
Tosquelles writes that, "psychosis does not give itself over in its entirety18" because it is "irreducible 
within man.19" To say that psychosis is irreducible, suggests that there is something always one step 
ahead of us, evading us, yet urging us to continue, to live, to think, to act and to feel. To retake 
Heidegger, it is the un-interperated that leads us to ascertaining a knowledge of the Self, albeit one that 
is secondary to the source which it references. The Un-grounding, the Un-conscious, the Real, 
Psychosis, Transcendence (like a divinity at play) are irreducible agencies to which reality can only be 
secondary or illusory (not beyond the veil but in front of it). All these terms indicate that there is a 
frame, or rather an activity of things, supporting man, one steering the life of man, yet one that 
maintains an un-knowableness and anonymity, one that is occasionally disclosed. In terms of the clinic, 
psychosis is a mode of revealing rather than a clinically determined illness. This points to an 
understanding of psychiatry that sees it less as a socially measured practice, and more as a therapeutic 
measure, as a transcendental work. And to arrive at this understanding, we have to understand that 
phenomenology and psychiatry are in fact inseparable enquiries, grounded in both transcendental and 
clinical experience, oscillating between the two. 
It is the doctoral thesis of Tosquelles that proves important for seeing psychiatry as a 
phenomenological undertaking. His thesis, not surprisingly dedicated to the Romantic and Revelatory 
poetry of Gerard de Nervae0, is a record of clinical encounters and phenomenological reflections where 
the "Real" and the question of this withdrawing Horizon are pronounced through a psychological 
complex particular to a post-war people. Like flashes of lightening upon a clouded Mount Sinai 
(permitting ourselves to borrow the pen of Lacan), Tosquelles documents a mock-biblical delirium of 
lived time at the end of the world~ a "phantasm" surfacing from an, "unknowable material." For Freud 
this unknowable realm was the Unconscious, that "inextricable resource" structuring the lifeworld of 
man. Later, for Oury, it is from this inextricable resource, from the "Real", that the "avatars" upon the 
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"paths" of existence emerge. 
This said, Tosquelles' thesis becomes a unique philosophical account that doesn't age, a 
clinical investigation solicited not only by post-war man but also by people of every age. It is to this 
study that our second chapter turns. 
2: The arrival of Tosguelles at Saint-Alban 
The doctoral thesis of the Catalan-bom psychiatrist Fran9ois Tosquelles, written for the University of 
Paris, carried the title Essai sur le Sens du Vecu en Psychopathologie21 (The Psychopathology of 
Llived Experience) and had been composed under a somewhat individual urgency pertaining to his 
post-war French naturalisation22 . The thesis was written amid a generation echoing Paul Balvet's 1942 
fraternal call for a more "humane psychiatry" whilst mirroring Lucien Bonnaf6's 1946 war-marked 
appeal which positioned the vocation of psychiatry to be an "art of sympathy" - what we previously 
deemed an "art of accompaniment."23 Such a call echoed within the threaded social fabric of the 
post-war France of 1947, knitting itself together, rebuilding and searching for new "paths" of thinking 
Man and his lived condition. 
The direction in which the thesis of Tosquelles turned, was one of a "good intention/4" one 
that did not seek to rest upon the classificatory predestination mental illness was historically allotted. 
Psychiatry's object as with its ethic, in mirroring the reconstructive geneses of psychoses, the 
personality, and the reconstructive ontology of the living human organism25, would be as Lucien 
Bonnafe noted, "that which it became" and the psychiatrist's originality would be the "consciousness 
of his role" within an, "adaptive and fecund attitude26." This was an attitude built up from lived 
encounters, a, "psychiatry ofthe present" as Tosquelles came to write. 
It is important to remember that Institutional Psychotherapy, was, and is, an analysis of 
psycho-pathological and institutional processes, an analysis destined for constant renewal, never 
fmding its end27, but as something always working with, as we have seen Deleuze describe, "the 
freedom of the unmediated ground.28" Psychiatry, under these auspices becomes an art of discovery, an 
art of"possibility", documenting the unveiling of the unmediated ground (Deleuze) which is, to retake 
the words ofMaldiney, "irreducible within man". 
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Lacan outlined in 1946, that the essence of psychiatry resided within the universal and 
universalising function of the psychiatrist's engagement with a language of man. This language, it must 
be noted, was not one of mere speech but of parole. As with the Word of Biblical Genesis declared by 
Jehovah, parole for Lacan was a language of constant reconstruction, a language of the irreducible. 
Indeed, Lacan saw that, "a therapeutic by parole is as ancient as humanity itself. 29 "The 
phenomenologist Henri Maldiney went one step further, where in following Freud, he asserted this 
language of psychoanalysis to transcend consciousness itself. Yet for Maldiney, this language was not 
the property of psychoanalysis, but of man's earthly existence proper throughout the ages.30 He writes 
that the "language of transference is where all moments are articulated within varying planes of 
signification masking one another, where the task is to uncover and disclose these varying planes of 
signification as the avatars of existence 31 ." Transference for Maldiney, is, as Tosquelles often 
highlighted, disclosure, a surgical procedure, where the task is to gradually remove the "masks" of 
varying planes to access the trouble, and even the source of all things human32. 
As Lucien Bonnafe observed in the same year Lacan's pointed to an almost Nietzschean 
primordial ground accessed by a language as old as humanity itself- and similar to Maldiney seeing 
transference to be a transcendental language (a language of the Real and not Reality), accessed through 
the psychiatric encounter "within the endless terrain of the psyche/3"- such generational pleas were 
not for "the vain games of mind" but a collective attempt to defme the object and method of psychiatry 
extended through the human cause34. With this, Lacan's assertion of 1947,that, "Madness changes its 
nature with the knowledge of psychiatry" harmoniously complimented Bonnaf6' s announcement of 
the, "modifying value of knowledge upon psychiatry's object.35" It is through such historically urged 
reflection, that the traditional medical idea undergoes a dramatic change - a change brought about 
through experiential knowledge. 
When Tosquelles had arrived at the war-time clinic of Saint-Alban in 1940, he brought with 
him an unparalleled energy for change borne through his experience at the Setfonds detention camp in 
the French department of Tam-et-Garonne in the north of Toulouse for Spanish refugees. Tosquelles 
later remarked that he had felt at home within the Lozere region. Here he was both warmly received by 
his colleagues at the clinic of Saint-Alban and the general population of the Baroque city. Tosquelles' 
therapeutic vision was not to build what he saw to be "ivory towers" of intellectual achievement, but to 
expand the horizon of psychiatry in the name of lived experience, the Vecu, the Erlebnii6• It was 
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experience that furnished knowledge, and more particularly, medical knowledge. This was the 
autobiographical signature Tosquelles grafted upon the Lozere clinic. He was, after all, a Catalan 
antifascist militant who had escaped the imperialist grasp of the Castile region: 
... The antifascist fight thus inscribed itself within my gestures .... Catalan was often a marginalised 
country, "our manhandled culture" resisted and survived without enclosing itself within an ivory tower, 
yet without also wanting it to be an imposing culture ... This is what punctuated, from very far off, the 
fundamentalism I displayed at Saint-Alban. I was a catalyst rather than a man of combat, a carrier of a 
rigid, personal ideology. 37 
It is with the resistant Catalan Spirit of Tosquelles, and the vast medical and philosophical scholarship 
he had undergone at the Institute Para Mata in Barcelona, that Institutional Psychotherapy truly finds 
its birth, and the call ofBalvet matures into a resistant, clinical enterprise. 
Tosquelles arrived in a country that was experiencing the rigid, alienating medical structures 
of Occupation, and his Thesis would seek to resist these structures in the name of man's creative, 
expressive capacities by developing a paradigm that dovetailed the biological, neurological, 
anthropological, philosophical, and psychiatric. Madness, was a window onto humanity. This was the 
"effervescent," palimpsest optic of the bio-psycho-socio gestalt through which the psychiatrist 
perceived the post-war world. The ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry 
begin therefore, with Tosquelles. His rigid personal ideology could not have been more flexible 
because the antifascist gestures were for the de-segregation of marginalised communities, and they 
appealed to "open" systems of thinking the social community as a whole. 
Upon his arrival to the clinic of Saint-Alban, housed within a once-noble chateau deep within 
the wooded terrain patterning the landscape ofLozere, Tosquelles had asked Dr. Paul Balvet- the then 
joint director of Saint-Alban with Lucien Bonnafe - for fifteen days leave to spend in the markets of 
the enigmatic Rococo town. Tosquelles wanted to be immersed within the 'paysage,' to experience the 
cultural 'landscape' surrounding the clinic, "to know the people of the area ... what they said, what they 
did and above all how they did it ... to breathe its air,38" to smoke and share wine with the locals. These 
are the simple concrete experiences to which Tosquelles, Oury and Bonnafe would always appeal -
simple human experiences within which enormous therapeutic possibilities could be found. This was 
not a mere ideology, but a clinical model built upon a vast biological and neurological complexity, an 
"enormous complexity" as Tosquelles often said, for psychiatry is a science of man, and one that 
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should not be ignorant to the most simple of man's simple experiences of the world. For Oury these 
were experiences to which the phenomenologist turned, the phenomenologist-in-the-world who "notes 
his observations down on scraps ofpaper. .. all concrete.39" These, the simple experiences so important 
for the communitarian sympathy of Bonnafe and as we have seen to be so important for Baruk's 
Talmudic law of Tsedek appealing to the apostolic nature of medical assistance. These: "simple 
experiences" underpinning the philanthropy of psychiatry and its politic of the "common relations"40 
bonding man and his neighbour, clinician and patient. Thus, as we have noted, psychiatry becomes 
known, through the efforts of this particular time, as an art of accompaniment because it is the 
psychiatrist who accompanies the patient through the screams and silences of his intimate utopia. 
Heterogeneity and Institutional Psychotherapy, became the two mirroring terms of what 
Bonnafe called an, "extended psychiatry41 " or the more actively 1944-phrased, "psychiatry of 
extension.42" The practice of Institutional Psychotherapy and the notion of Heterogeneity informed the 
vocational rubric of psychiatry. This marked a collective effort to maintain the diversities of therapeutic 
experience, structured upon the simple yet diverse, concrete experiences of Man within the world. This 
would in tum see a generation form the paradigm of what Balvet had previously deemed (in the guise 
of a Pinel unchaining the demonised madman and in illuminating a medical milieu darkened by the 
shadow of Alexis Carrel), a "psychiatry of man,43"a psychiatry Tosquelles and Oury would constantly 
counterpoint and strive to develop in their years together without succumbing to the pressures of 
bureaucratic restrictions. Institutional Psychotherapy, was to maintain what is known as "spaces of 
heterogeneity," to have lived spaces where gestures and encounters can circulate, and to constantly 
pose the question of the "simple encounter" and its underlining complexity notwithstanding the weight 
of what Oury later deemed to be, "Technocratic Simplism.44" 
"Technocratic Simplism" for Oury, takes the form of increasing bureaucratic requirements 
and "administrative measures" which he sees as "the insidious death of spirit upon the path." These are 
overbearing measures of "heavy consequences" that are carried under- and in fact disguised by - the 
"mask of progress" or rather, by what he elsewhere describes as "pseudo-scientific progress.45" It is 
thus of no surprise that Oury, in 1994, positioned the contemporary concerns of man, as being "far 
from the productive disputes of Goethe and Schiller46" and in fact, far from transcendence. With this 
distance, which others would call a distance from a "creative and vital elan, "Oury highlights the very 
real danger ofloosing sight of man and humanity amid complex rhetoric: the lessening of heterogeneity 
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and possibilities for man's creative renewal constantly called for by man's proper existence and its 
unannounced avatars47 • Similarly, of the same year, Tosquelles upon the eve of his death wrote of, "the 
confusion and pessimism engaging the ensembles of men.48" To this we recall Kostas Axelos who 
warns philosophy (and in fact psychiatry and medicine as a whole) of a detrimental shortcoming: "we 
are within an age which seeks to surpass humanism and the human. But a question nevertheless 
remains: what is to become of the human49?" Tosquelles, aged in years, tired in health, yet ever active 
in a gestured Catalan anti-fascist vigor, remained faithful to the idea that as long as man was upon the 
face of the earth, a resurgence of new forms could actualise and reveal themselves within an "art of 
living." For Tosquelles, this art of living required an art of sympathy, where philanthropy and science 
are married, where psychiatry and man are said in a singular and same sense, where, "Institutional 
Psychotherapy is present wherever man appears.50" Likewise, as Oury would comment in September of 
2004 - ten years after the death of Tosquelles, one year after the death of Bonnafe - an Institutional 
Psychiatry, "is and was always a question of maintaining openness, of opening a space for 
heterogeneity, in the most concrete of senses.5 ~, 
This is a resistant line, and at the same time it is a phenomenological one taking its lead from 
a post-war psychiatric research and the Catalan spirit of Tosquelles. This sentiment was also displayed 
by Horace Torrubia, a psychiatrist of Saint-Alban and La Borde Clinic who always fraternally 
paralleled the fervency of Tosquelles, Bonnafe and Oury for the idea of a permanent analysis of man. 
In his 1994 publication, to which Jean Oury penned a salutary preface, La Psychotherapie 
Institutionelle par Gras Temps, Torrubia charged against (as if a youthful Nietzsche breaking the 
barriers of "impudent convention") the "logico-positivist," deterministic direction of modem science 
and its humanitarian shortcomings. This direction of modem science was later described by Oury as a 
"pseudo-scientific progress52" far from the "good intentions" of philosophical and clinical enquiries 
that had once existed. Torrubia writes: 
In all cases, the more science develops, the more it colonises, the more its paradigm becomes the 
colonial, the more the concept of objectivity occupies the most axial ofplaces ... within the objectivity of 
psychiatric "observation" ... the question is thus to not let oneselfbe colonised, nor to colonise. 53 
For the Saint-Alban psychiatrist Torrubia, a post-civil war marked Spaniard of the same generational 
anti-fascist Catalan armour as Tosquelles, when asked as to his "specialisation" he would speak of the 
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"constant decentering" by the difficulty of context within "undecided limits," where one had to "open" 
the doors of the hospital not to the outside but from within54• For Torrubia, the psychiatrist was a 
personage that found his definition within every encounter. 
Oury saw Torrubia as an "artisan of the concrete" and a, "builder who listens." The artisan 
and the builder compose this adventurous personage of responsibility, working with an "existential 
complexity" of simple situations beyond any "reassuring" homogeneicy55. The "builder who listens" 
and the "artisan of the concrete", thus find their role within the project of an institutional 
psychotherapy, within "undecided limits" where psychiatry and its institution take man as their 
blueprint- undecided, limitless, unbounded, irreducible even- it works with the impossible. 
There is within the contemporary spirit of Institutional Psychotherapy, an urgency infusing a 
modem day La Borde with its diversity of interns, from graduate analysts to philosophers, nationalities 
ranging from the Ivorian to the Japanese. The urgency, is not merely to be translated as a maintenance 
of a post-war sensibility for heterogeneity as the mosaic law binding the psychical, the somatic and the 
social in the face of "Technocratic Simplism" (Oury) exceeding the homogenous "reassurances" of a 
colonising science (Torrubia), or a "bureaucratisation of thought" (Tosquelles), but as a need to 
continually re-elaborate the creative capacities of mental illness. In its engagement with the "complex" 
and "heterogeneous" through the "simple" encounters of man, La Borde announces the timeless import 
ofTosquelles, Lacan and Bonnafe. Institutional Psychotherapy has a shared coefficiency, which as we 
saw, was first indicated by Pinel, where the psychiatrist is both artisan and listening builder, the 
dramatis personae within a landscape of a constantly displaced horizon marking a critical renewal of 
the epistemological foundations of psychiatry and the institutions of psychiatric assistance. We can 
thus retake Lacan's 1947 assertion that, "madness changes its nature with the knowledge of 
psychiatry," and invert it to: "psychiatry changes its knowledge with the nature of madness"- it is the 
horizon that dictates man's epistemology, and not the reverse. It is, to retake a Nietzschean stance, 
where the barriers erected between men by impudent convention are lowered, be it by a Nietzschean 
Greek Dionysian consciousness beyond the veil, a Lacanian Real, or just simply, a site within which 
barriers and limits do not exist, and where gestures and simple phenomena can circulate freely. The 
architecture of man thus becomes the architecture of the institution, and Tosquelles, in writing of man 
as "the living art," was to see the institution as the most artistic, industrious and unrestricting of sites56. 
These concerns for a shared coefficiency, as we have previously noted in our first chapter, 
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were borne through the vocational exposure to suffering and death under the overbearing weight of 
occupation. Oury's latter-written words voicing an active concern for the "distance" of contemporary 
Man from "productive disputes" extend the sentiment of resistance to the dangers ofwhat Tosquelles 
saw, in 1948, to be a "bureaucratisation. 57" To maintain the psychotherapeutic address of an "ancient 
language" (Lacan) and the "concrete" (Oury, Tosquelles) is to maintain the liberty of Thought, of 
movement, of speech, of gesture. To maintain an "opening" within transference, or rather to "graft an 
opening 58 " as Giselda Pankow said, works through what Oury would later call a, "liberty of 
circulation59" within the community of the institution. Transference, therefore, can be neither timed nor 
measured within the clinical seance, for it continues far beyond the consultation: "one cannot measure 
transference with our normal notion of time and space". 
Oury often draws upon a phrase in Marx's Manuscripts of 1844 to underscore a nature, or a 
constitutive agency, unable to be capitalised upon by what he calls, in fraternal accordance to 
Tosquelles, "administrative and bureaucratic formulae.60". We thus see a nature, very close to the Real 
of Lacan, as the ever-present evasive phenomenon of constitution rarely accessed save for those rare 
moments of psychoses, where such processes are observed upon a descriptive and aesthetic level, as 
ciphers for possibility and productive, constructive, concrete dialogue within the institution, built by 
builders who listen and artisans of the concrete. As Marx himself was to write: 
Man is for man the existence of nature, and nature is for man the existence ofman.61 
And to this, we parallel Bonnafe's double proclamation: 
Mentally ill man is man, man is mentally ill man. 62 
These double proclamations fmd a bitter declaration in a provincial wartime France, of having to 
manage in the most unpremeditated of circumstances, "to manage face to face with that which 
emerges.63" For Oury, such assertions pertain to a "concrete dialectic" of lived encounters, a dialectic 
most notably addressed by Tosquelles' thesis of 1948. 
How well placed Tosquelles had been to write his thesis under the direction of Balvet, chief 
inaugurator of the 1942 call to "humane" methods and who had wanted to see substantial changes 
come into effect for Saint-Alban, and the psychiatric milieu as a whole, in its emergence from what we 
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previously deemed to be a questionably free Vichy France. Yet substantial financial support had failed 
to be found within a stretched convalescing economy and such changes had proven difficult for the 
wartime father of rural psychiatry to effectuate concretely. 
What Balvet bestowed upon a generation was a resilient 1942 revolutionary call to rehumanise 
psychiatry. This was a call not to arms, but to a psychiatric counter-evidence of Man positioned against 
the Vichy-Carrel medical milieu and the censured role of mental illness such a milieu carried towards 
the Eugenic Ideal. The post-war gelling agent of the concretion of this call, extending the sentiments of 
the war-time counter-evidence notwithstanding financial restraints, was Tosquelles, the catalyst, a 
psychiatrist, a "thinker," who Oury later remembered to be, upon first hearing his seminars delivered at 
Saint-Alban in the late summer of 1947, "of the dialectic ... enigmatic ... full of gestures ... full of 
energy ... of a rare intelligence.64" Indeed, Tosquelles as well as Lacan, would for Oury, be nothing 
short of a genius of a method of thinking, a thinker close to "productive disputes," close to a Goethe or 
a Schiller, an engineer of post-war psychiatry finding its concrete extension through man's lived 
historical experience and the technical possibilities for renewal without, to draw upon the word of 
Nietzsche once more, succumbing to "impudent convention." Psychiatry, through Tosquelles, was to 
be an art of "possibilisation. 65" 
3: The end-of-the-world catastrophic complex 
1947, was the year of a particular complex. It was the year where within which the pronouncement of 
Man and Madness would define the uniqueness of a sector psychiatry. In 1948 Tosquelles deemed this 
complex, the catastrophic complex of the end of the world experience within madness. Of course, the 
catastrophic complex had long existed, within the writings of the Romantics, within the thoughts of 
Nerval, and as a phenomenon of schizophrenia. But in a post-war France, it would find its social 
reality. 
Jean Oury, then in his fourth year of medicine, had arrived at the Psychiatric Hospital of 
Saint-Alban in September of 1947, a hospital where both the mentally ill and the Resistance had been 
housed under the Occupation, a place of post-war psychiatry days and a Lacanian fervency where, 
"everyone spoke of the thesis ofLacan.66" It was here that Oury first met Fran9ois Tosquelles, within a 
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clinic that had survived the systematic starvation of the mentally ill by Alexis Carrel and the mercurial 
flow of Nazi ideology through the 'free' Vichy State. Saint-Alban was where the mentally ill had found 
refuge alongside the fighters of the Resistance, and had not suffered the untimely fate at the hands of a 
ravaging Tuberculosis like their hospitalised fellows systematically starved elsewhere in both Occupied 
and Vichy territory. As Oury later recalled: 
Saint-Alban ... a collective production ... men like Ajuriaguerra, Lacan, Bonnafe, Tosquelles ... There were 
no deaths at Saint-Alban as compared with the rest of France which saw 40,000 mentally ill die of 
starvation. At Saint-Alban, the patients went into the mountains, there were activities of interesting 
groups ... Saint-Alban was a good preparation for the sector.67 
For Oury, it was a time, "where rich things had happened.68" These fraternal energies sparmed the 
neurospcyhiatric concerns of the cerebral cortex (Julien de Ajuriaguerra), concerns of the organic and 
dynamic within neurology and psychiatry (Henri Ey), a Marxist inspired clinical communitarianism 
(Bonnafe) and readings of the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Paul-Louis Landsberg 
(Tosquelles, Oury, Lacan). As Oury noted, it was a time of "dignified thinkers," of "those who 
reflected a little before they died within the minds of others. 69 " Lacan, Bonnafe, the leading 
neuropsychiatrist of the time Julien de Ajuriaguerra in the depth of his meditation upon the phantom 
limb syndrome and the cerebral cortex70, Tosquelles and his Catalan energy, as well as the psychiatric 
clubs, patient reunions, seminars by the vigorous trio (Lacan, Bonnafe, Tosquelles) and an emergent 
recuperation of the writings of Heidegger' s poetic phenomenology of Being with the creative and 
theatrical "Club Paul Balvet," marked a time and an environment within which, "Tosquelles was to 
write his thesis on the end of the world" - within this "group of theoretical effervescence.71" Oury 
later reflected upon his early days with Tosquelles in his preface to the latter-published 1948 thesis of 
the Catalan militant: 
I felt very close to what Fran<;:ois Tosquelles was formulating with his extraordinary erudition. Catalan, 
the group of Saint-Alban, psychoanalysis, sociotherapies, biology, neurology, economics etc ... his thesis 
... served more as a method of thinking, of observing, of living mutually, it was more than a mere tool72 
Such a method of thinking, would again be referenced in 1994 by Oury in his preface to Ugo Amati's 
L 'Uomo e le Sue Pulsioni, this time explicitly seeing such a method as freeing Man from his social 
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latency, or as we are to understand in following Oury and Torrubia, addressing man from an angle 
other than that of a "technocratic simplism" and "pseudo-scientific progress": 
Under the cover of humanisation ... To speak of psychoanalysis, of phenomenology, of biology, of 
alienation, is not to reinforce the incarcerating universe of "hospitals" and prisons. It is very much the 
contrary .. .lt is a question of keeping with existence ... of different avatars.73 
1947, was an age where tools were not enough to build a post-war psychiatric machine of "different 
avatars." It was concrete experience itself that sanctioned the strength of the conceptual tool. "You 
need to have your feet on the ground74", il faut avoir les pieds par terre, an adage echoing the 
sentiments of a post-war fraternity over fifty years later, where indeed, for Oury, the project of an 
Institutional Psychotherapy was "a long path," a path not "for a grand scheme of the future," but a path 
"always walked within the present", a path "of a good intention," a path where psychiatry inseparable 
to a psychoanalysis is "always in the making, always at its outset,75"- "toujours en demarche" as he 
said in September 2004, fifty-seven years to the very month of his arrival at Saint-Alban and his 
encounter with Tosquelles. 
Having one's feet on the ground is a simple adage that addresses the communal relations of 
man, where his simple experiences enrich the development of a "sector" corpus. These experiences are 
simple, but they are of the order of therapeutic possibilities. By encountering people of "all 
categories ... at the most simple of levels" (Oury) or by familiarising oneself with the markets and 
customs of a town {Tosquelles), these experiences and encounters turn in the direction of affirmating 
mental illness, not in the name of "intellectualisation" as Tosquelles continually underlined, nor in the 
direction of "technocratic simplism" (Oury), but in the name of man and the conditions of his 
existence, the art of existence {Tosquelles). This is where Oury would later assert the role of the 
phenomenologist in the world, who jots his observations down on small bits of paper in the name of a, 
"concrete phenomenology.76" Similarly, it is where Tosquelles writes that: 
When one has an intellectual conception of man, one starts to believe that by dissecting the thought of 
man and his becoming, he thinks only to think, forgetting that one thinks in order to live and because one 
lives. In existential thought, the true lived experience is situated in the interior of being or becoming 
mad.77 
The ethic and the object of psychiatry are within this becoming, not projecting into the future, 
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but always of the present, realigning and repositioning concretely within the present. The role of the 
psychiatrist, upon this path twisting and stretching into these different avatars of existence is as its very 
object, to retake the words of a 1947 Lacan, "adaptive and fecund78" within a living art (Tosquelles). 
It was from Saint-Alban, in the years of 1948 and 1949, that Oury together with Tosquelles, 
went "into the mountains" to search for "complicated" cases79. For Oury, this was already a sector 
politics, a "psychiatry of the sector" characterised by concrete experiences and lived encounters, "of 
being stuck in the snow", "of finding food for the hungry at midnight in the forest," "of being before a 
man enclosed within a house with a gun, tormented, where you had to speak to lift the walls. 80" Indeed, 
the thesis by Tosquelles, is washed within the waters of this "concrete" sentiment, of lived experience 
(Erlebnis), of encounters at the most simple of levels, of speaking, of what Oury described as an, 
"opening upon the space of conversation,81" of lifting visible and invisible barriers. To this we can 
recall Lucien Bonnafe's words of 1947, namely that the psychiatric personage, "is within the drama, a 
drama within which we participate ... where the simplest of experiences evaluate the global role of the 
situation.82" Madness, seen by Lacan as a "human drama,83" was thus figured to extend the role of the 
psychiatrist, "a psychiatry of extension", punctuated by its humanist function in an address of the 
simple encounter, of "lifting the walls" with what Lacan deemed to be, as we have noted, "a language 
as ancient as humanity itself." 
In May 1947, Bonnafe had presented to the circle of Evolution Psychiatrique his essay 
appealing to the alienation experienced by both the mentally ill and the psychiatrist during occupation. 
This experience had resulted in him proposing a "disalienation" realigning the role and methodology of 
post-war psychiatry. For Bonnafe this was an, "adjectival psychiatry,84" and for Tosquelles it was a, 
"verbal psychiatry of action.85" Henri Ey, chair of Evolution Psychiatrique, then member of the 
Commission for Qualifications 86 , respected for his erudite pre-war scholarship on the British 
neurologist John Hughlings Jackson, (a scholarship both applauded and criticised by neurologists and 
psychiatrists alike) replied to Bonnafe's announcement of this "active" psychiatry of shared roles. Ey 
highlighted that the psychiatric personage is, first and foremost, characterised by the man of medicine 
attending to the plight of weakened Man: 
The psychiatrist is increasingly a medic who comes to the aid of his diminished brothers of humanity, 
and less a personage to which Society delegates its powers of social defense. 87 
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For Ey, this defined the "Actualite Psychiatrique," the then present state of psychiatry to be one of 
works, of projects, and most importantly to be of an Oeuvre "requiring particular attention. 88" It was in 
his short, sympathetic essay of 1947 appearing in Evolution Psychiatrique entitled A Propos d'une 
Realisation D 'Assistance Psychiatrique a Saint-A/ban, that he would see such a clinic - with its 
effervescence of research fueled by the crisis of war- as a, "marvelous organ of assistance." This 
marvelous organ would not find its virtues, for Ey, in the intellectual activities oflaboratory psychiatry 
-what Oury would later call "the white overalls of Paris" (les blouses blanches de Paris)- but from a 
vocational effort unique to the bitter privilege of a rural psychiatry: 
But scientific activity does not limit itself, in terms of medicine, to works of the laboratory ... This is the 
case with the psychiatric 'work' (oeuvre) realised by a group in the shade, silence and isolation, finding 
themselves at Saint-Alban ... Marvelous, from the psychiatric point of view ... The clinician who being 
specialised in "mental illnesses" has the urge to elaborate new therapeutic norms, is capable of realising 
that which, from near or far, brings about a structural modification of the bio-psycho-social gestalt ... 89 
Henri Ey saw Saint-Alban to be the center of "extraordinary activity" to which he accorded Tosquelles 
the role of an "animator" within a "common oeuvre," within a "sanctuary of pilgrimage," or better, a 
"center of learning. 90" Indeed, the clinic of Saint-Alban, this Sanctuary of pilgrimage, this marvelous 
organ of the medical milieu was known as "a place where the human spirit breathes,91 " where its 
ventilation and oxygen was to be found within a method of thinking and the elaboration of therapeutic 
techniques conducive to the needs of war weakened man. Metaphors of air and breathing are common, 
but with Saint-Albain they carry a particular significance, as vital aspects to the clinic and its practice, 
for as Tosquelles would later write: "Within all psychotherapeutic processes, one must not forget that 
life is directly supported by respiration .. .in the combinatory game of oxygen within the living and 
sensible mass.92" Indeed, organic life and institutional life require oxygen and a liberty of circulation 
for the organ to remain functional and healthy. If the oxygen cannot freely circulate the organism 
will degenerate. The capacity of the organ to remain marvelous depends upon the organism's capacities 
to breath, and most importantly, the liberty of circulation. A basic physiological analogy, yet it is of 
paramount importance to the maintenance of a sector politic of man and madness within a vocation of-
to retake Torrubia's wording - "undecided limits." To breathe institutionally and to breathe 
individually, become one and the same state of affairs, for man, as we have previously noted in 
following Tosquelles, is both the living art and the institutionalising agency. Man and the institution 
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are said in a singular and same sense. 
Erwin Straus was an eminent Louvain-based neuro-phenomenologist reputed for his lengthy 
critiques of the Cartesian dualist tendencies reigning within psychology. His works were keenly read 
by Oury and Tosquelles93 , and he came to them well. He noted that, "The experience of respiration is 
as ancient as humanity itself. It is universal and immediate, unique to each and every man, an 
experience as indisputable as respiration itself.%' Let us also parallel this with our early citation of 
Lacan outlining a psychotherapy engaging with "a language as ancient as man." Indeed, for Straus, as 
for Tosquelles, respiration was an expression of the individual and in being so it was an indispensable 
aspect to a clinical understanding of man, for the neurologist and psychiatrist as much as for the 
physiologist. For Straus, the respiratory phenomenon of the "sigh" evaded the optic of the physiologist 
for it had confounded such luminaries as William Harvey owing to the fact that internal studies of 
circulation showed it to be exempt from voluntary and anticipatory modulations95• Straus asserts, in an 
appeal to a theory of expression founded upon the "sigh," that such a respiratory phenomenon exceeds 
the scope of the physiological observation of respiration itself: 
The sigh did not reduce the deficit of oxygen ... We were unable to fmd a single case within which a 
respiratory irregularity announced the sigh. Invariably, the sigh, a simple respiratory act (a profound 
inhalation couple with a profound exhalation)interrupting the series of regular inhalation-exhalation, 
their rhythm as much as their volume ... with the sigh there is the absence of a strictly physiological 
objective ... The sigh is not determined physiologically.96 
The Strausian thesis positions the sigh as a variation of respiration, in that respiration is a physiological 
experience of the self and world within which the sigh is an expressive modification evading the 
physiological observation of respiration97• The respiratory phenomenon of the sigh, is also important 
for Tosquelles because it relates to an expressive institutional pathology. The sigh exceeds the scope of 
physiological observation because it is an expressive modulation of respiration. For Straus it is a 
signification of "a perturbed equilibrium between self and world,98" where respiration becomes less of 
a mechanical routine, and more of an expressive dimension of contact with the world: 
In breathing, we experience our vital existence in its dependence and its unique character, in its endless 
contact and exchange with the world.99 
To arrive at this understanding Straus asserted that the approach needs to be one not only of, "a patient 
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observation of manifesting phenomena, 100" but a mode of analysis "respecting the phenomena in their 
emergence101"- a phenomenological attitude proper. We can parallel this in retaking Torrubia, who, in 
complimenting the sentiments of Tosquelles and Oury, urges the psychiatrist, "to be always alert to 
details, to nothing even, to that which appears as anodyne ... to this grain of sand or this drop of 
oil. .. within a logic that permits us to leave nai:ve evidences and preconstituted ideas.102" The sigh, is an 
expressive interruption within the flux of uniform respiration: it is unique, different in duration to 
regulated breathing, and unlike regulated respiration it is not dependent upon the physiological capacity 
to maintain air: 
Be it the patient who breathes with difficulty and obstruction, or the athlete who breathes to 
full, unobstructed volume, both cannot offer the luxury of the sigh.103 
The sigh is thus not a sign of a determined cardiac or pulmonary illness but an asymmetrical 
"expressive" occurrence within the symmetry of "physiologically" regulated respiration. The sigh is 
not a symptomatic expression of the utilitarian ends within the pathological functioning of the 
organism, but an irregular, expressive phenomenon devoid of physiological signification (exchanges of 
gas, dissolution of C02 and 02 within the blood). 
Similarly to Straus, Tosquelles portends to the same scientific thesis of respiration, yet he 
extends the study of the sigh in terms of the Pathos of the Other. Tosquelles writes, in neighbouring 
Straus: 
Rather than speaking of the vital necessities of the inhalation of air, I would underline the exhalation of 
air and the importance this has upon the development of the human person. It is not a mere mechanical 
release ... There are, within exhalation, numerous paths upon which it is easy to understand how the 
concrete manifestation of the human person is constituted. I do not merely speak of the emission of 
words ... but of another phenomenon within exhalation ... This access to the formation of the human 
person ... as with the practice of Sufism, the "sigh of compassion" is in the address "of' ... The passion of 
compassion constitutes the indicative of a pathos that we live ... 104 
We therefore better understand the characterisation of Saint-Alban: as a place where the human spirit 
could breathe. This, is now a philanthropic idiom, of "undecided limits" (Torrubia) and undetermined 
illnesses (Tosquelles, Oury): a clinic where the spirit breathes, but most importantly, exhales and sighs 
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to a compassionate law of pathos fmding its root within the writings of the Sufis. How well one could 
deem the clinic of Saint-Alban the Sighing Sufi of Lozere. 
If, as Tosquelles indicated, psychopathology had evolved as a symptomatic expression of 
determined illness, then at Saint-Alban, psychopathology was announced within a sympathetic 
enterprise of what he called an "unknown pathos105" fuelling a "creative imagination/06" where illness 
was not determined by virtue of a "reassuring homogeneity" but "irresolute" by virtue of an expanding 
heterogeneity107. For Tosquelles, as with Straus, to sigh was more than mere mechanical respiration: to 
sigh was to uncover a world requiring a mode of analysis respecting "phenomena in their emergence" 
(Straus), a mode of analysis sensitive to the grain of sand even (Torrubia). Again we retake Straus in a 
wording that mirrors the fraternal sentiments of Saint-Alban and its Institutional project: 
In everyday life, experience is considered as an acquired fact, one is never urged to render possible 
interpersonal relations and communications. Yet experience, not as an abstract entity but as the capacity 
of man and animal, is estimated as an incomparable endowment ... a formidable reality. 108 
What else could psychotherapy be under such a rubric other than the concrete engagement and 
recognition of the incomparable endowment of man, an ancient endowment (Straus, Lacan) surpassing 
determinations (Tosquelles) and impudent conventions (Nietzsche)? The marvelous organ of a sector 
psychiatry, the marvelous organism of Saint-Alban even, a clinic of expressive sighs and an 
institutional exhaling of ideas and techniques, found its institutional strategy of softly subverting the 
marginalising and colonising (Torrubia) "bureaucratic" tendencies of "logico-positivist science" 
(Torrubia, Oury, Tosquelles). "With the sigh," as Tosquelles wrote, "exhalation gradually flows 
towards the exterior. 109" The expressive modality of the sigh therefore becomes a metaphor for 
institutional strategy, which is in fact a phenomenological strategy. Again we retake our previous 
assertion, namely that, Saint-A/ban, would not be of an intellectualisation, but a voice for mentally ill 
man within the institution, a voicing from within, a soft subversion of rigid structures in the name of 
man's creative and expressive capacities. It is on these grounds that the psychotherapeutic of man, is 
the psychotherapeutic of the institution. As with the sigh, oxygen (used as both metaphor and noun) 
gradually flows from the inside out in the most undetermined and expressive of means. Saint-Alban 
breathed, but most importantly exhaled and sighed, man thus sighed, to become, like Nietzsche's epic 
persona of Zarathustra, a creator unto himself110: "I am eternally made man111 " as one patient had it to 
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Tosquelles in 1947. Builders who listen, artisans of the concrete (Oury), Sufis who sigh (Tosquelles). 
Saint-Alban - an institution of the breathing human spirit, the sigh of human of experience 
(Erleben )112. 
A clinic that sighs is a clinic of a revealing Pathos. Saint-Alban was this clinic, established 
within one of the many dilapidated castles patterning a Baroque landscape of Lozere. The region had 
seen, in the words of Ey, the likes "of clairvoyants and sages,113" and was considered a landscape as 
enigmatic as the illimitable "paths" ofthe unconscious itself (the "unknown material"). It was here that 
the father of twentieth century French psychiatry, Henry Ey, would visit and always see patients 
administer their own society, to be their own rooting for a "real" society and not a mere "simulacra.114" 
Ey saw Saint-Alban to be a "rare" place, where the patients had a quasi-autonomy and a functional role 
within the "Oeuvre" of Institutional Psychotherapy, where everyone could find their own proper 
"elaboration". The patients shared the responsibility of maintaining, elaborating and extending the 
marvelous organism (the institution) within which they would find their valorisation and 
personalisation. For Ey, Saint-Alban stood for "solidarity," a place of activity and valorisation, a 
"catharsis of instances" made possible by a "profound psychotherapy" and not a, "psychotherapeutic 
simulacra. 115" Yet as he noted, the "profound psychotherapy" emerging from the clinic of Saint-Alban 
would be incomplete without the contribution of the biological therapies, and insulin in particular. It 
was Insulin therapy that proved the biological therapy through which the human spirit could breath and 
through which psychiatry would mature from philanthropy to anthropology. 
4:Insulin Therapy and the sighing sufi of Lozere 
Dr. Paul Bernard author of the 1947 clinical manual, Psychiatrie pratique and co-author, along with the 
doctors Henri Ey and Charles Brisset of the widely-published 1960, Manuel de Psychiatriel16, would 
write, in a later publication and somewhat retrospectively, of the therapeutic effects of insulin therapy 
upon both patients and the hospital, seeing it to, "render medics and nurses more optimistic ... even 
transforming the very life of the establishment. 117" Insulin therapy was eventually replaced by 
neuroleptic medicines in the 1950's. Until this time it was had become progressively utilised as a sister 
'shock' treatment to electroconvulsive therapy and was one of the most productive treatments of 
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psychoses, and schizophrenia in particular. 
The founder of this specific use of insulin as a psychotic therapy was Dr. Manfred Sakel. In 
1927 whilst working as a young doctor in Vienna, he observed that an induced hypoglycemic coma 
provoked what he called a, "dissolution" of consciousness. This "dissolution of consciousness" was a 
"psychic dissolution" and in the words of Oury and Tosquelles it was understood as the, "dissolution of 
the personality. 118" Sakel further documented that there was a "beneficial" phase to the waking state of 
the coma that was analogous to the parent child bond - a maternage. Intervention, observation, 
relation, dosage, and variability were paramount clinical parameters to the treatment. The success of 
the therapy rested with these numerous key clinical parameters and most of all with the relational and 
technical competence of the nursing staff. In addition to this, the therapy required the "comfort" and 
"attention" of the clinician and the nursing team. 
A hypoglycemic coma was induced by injecting (or intravenously) glucose- the nutritional 
element to neurological brain function. 0.2 grams of glucose per liter of blood was sufficient to put 
the patient into a deep coma, requiring a close observation of vital functions. The dosage was variable: 
one could induce "mild shocks" or "heavy shocks", deep comas or a general sedation of the patient. 
Tosquelles, and Oury in particular, continually stressed the therapeutic benefits of insulin at 
Saint-Alban because it had proven an indispensable chemical therapy, a chemical tool, to psychiatric 
assistance. 
Sakel discovered that an insulin coma was successful in the psychosis of schizophrenics and it 
was the doctoral thesis of Madame Germaine Balvet (the wife of Paul Balvet who delivered the 1942 
call of Montpellier) that explored its practical usage for hospitals and asylums. Her 1941 thesis was 
entitled De /'Organisation d'un service d'insulinotherapie et de narcotherapie dans un hopital 
psychiatrique rural and with it she insisted upon the necessity of a "specific team" that could work 
with insulin throughout the day so as not to lead to the abuse of treatment and the corruption of the 
very important therapeutic parameters it required119. 
An officially recognised insulin "collective" working within the hospital was justified for in 
the most extreme of psychotic cases insulin brought about a therapeutic effect, and even a cure120. To 
obtain the successful therapeutic effect much lengthy preparation and institutional organisation was 
needed because it was a specialised treatment. For Oury, the Insulin Therapy practiced within the 
hospitals, in the wake of its 1937 introduction at the H6pital de Blois, was not merely a therapeutic for 
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the ill but for the hospital also. Indeed Sakel himself said that insulin treatment was a simultaneous 
therapy for both patients and the hospital121 . Oury later remembered that he had induced forty to fifty 
comas a week, all successful - the patients were in a state of "reassurance" and "tranquility.122" Most 
importantly, the hypoglycemic coma provoked by a variable dose of insulin required an "atmosphere" 
within which the patient would find this placation and reassurance. Without this atmosphere of 
"sensible qualities" (the tone of lights, the sounds entering the room etc) the session would fail. To 
arrive at the hypoglycemic coma, a sensitive preparation was required where lighting, sound and tone 
within and outside of the designated "insulin room" had to be adjusted to encourage a placated and 
peaceful state. These sensible factors came to "play an important role," because they composed the 
atmospheric fields within which the patient could sleep - factors that would later be discarded by the 
medical milieu en masse in considering insulin as a cure in-itself and as neither requiring specific 
institutional preparation nor a specific medical collective. 
As Oury remembered, an "atmospheric sensitivity" was required where, as he noted, "if 
people were shouting the seance, or there was noisy distraction and anxiety, the session would fail." 
The insulin team had to monitor and control the sensible factors maintaining the atmosphere. They had 
to decide the most suitable time to intervene and awaken the patient. As Oury recalls: 
One has to note the details of the body, of the reconstruction of consciousness. This is a biological 
surveillance.123 
The hypoglycemic coma lasted up to three hours, and the vital functions (the pulse, arterial tension, 
temperature) were constantly observed. The coma would bring on a hyper-sudation requiring the 
patient's clothing, sheets and towels to be changed when required. As one nurse later remembered: "we 
were five nurses permanently active within this collective treatment. 124" Behind the variable dosage 
of insulin, which was in fact dependant upon the sensible parameters of a controlled atmosphere, there 
was a system of precise medical indications. Namely, the team had to undertake a "biological 
surveillance," where they had to be alert to "peripheral phenomena." This suggests insulin therapy to 
be both medical and biological. Oury once more: 
Without negating a certain required specificity, there are peripheral actions at the hepato-intestinallevel 
for example, but above all at the level of the hypothalamus, in the metabolism of the catecholamines.125 
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Insulin was a borderline medication, because there parallel phenomena emerged at the level of 
the psychical (the personality) and the chemical (the biological). More descriptively, insulin therapy 
was an "initiation" into what Oury saw to be an altogether, "different dimension. 126" This initiation into 
an altogether different world, another scene, a world of dissolution and reconstruction, was ably termed 
a "syncretic" domain where we have the union of diversity and a union of heterogeneous elements: 
I anJ persuaded that it is an initiation, that which in practice replaces tradition. This is to say that with the 
dances of possession or the traditional cures of Algeria, these forms of provoked coma .. .it is an entrance 
into another dimension, a syncretic world where we enter into the space of psychoses. 127 
The space of psychoses, syncretic, undetermined, is the space of possibilisation. From the sighing Sufi 
of Tosquelles, we have a primordial, mystical world of the coma within which a maternal dynamic 
emerges (Sakel) - what Tosquelles would later call the maternal therapeutic (Le maternage 
thtirapeutique)128• Doses of insulin, atmosphere, access to an altogether different dimension, best 
displayed by these instances of "clairvoyance" and "dances of possession," fitted well with the 
landscape of the Baroque Lozere region within which the old chateau of Saint-Alban is found. Insulin 
treatment was a method, yet one that for Oury was wrongly condemned by the "ridiculous cries of 
psychologists who had no understanding of electroshock treatment or insulin.129" Indeed, Oury was the 
most vigilant and sincere of insulin therapists within a clinic that continually strove to highlight the 
necessity of atmosphere, compassion, sympathy and observation. This therapeutic treatment 
demonstrated not only an access, "to the body, delirium, reconstruction, the importance of doses," but 
more importantly it required a "vigilance of the reconstruction of the personality.130" For Oury, 
Saint-Alban and the insulin therapy that was developed, and where treatments of electroshock therapy 
were also performed, marked an epoch where things developed in the direction of a "good 
I was close to thinking that there was almost absolute recovery. The treatment lasted three months, and 
the patients were cured.132 
Saint-Alban, deep within the landscape of Lozere, a landscape within which the Baroque mystics of 
rural France epitomised the alchemical tradition, would see the first insulin group, a specialized 
medical collective, composed of people formed in "the most extraordinary of fashions. 133" What more 
could compliment the Baroque and expressive landscape of Lozere which so captivated Henry Ey's 
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salutary and enraptured three-page meditation of 1947? Saint-Alban, a site of"sanctuary," "resistance," 
"learning" and "effervescent" research into the "science of observation" (Pinel). 
Insulin was a "real cure" in the sense that it was not automatic, and unlike the neuroleptic medicine that 
eventually replaced it, insulin therapy required preparation and "initiation," atmosphere and 
sensibilisation. Indeed, Sackel's assertion of 1937 was that, "there is not just insulin, but that which 
surrounds it. 134" Insulin was not a cure in-itself, but a creative and collective undertaking, a true 
therapeutic treatment. 
As Oury recounts, however, insulin was removed from this "creative" and "collective" 
domain of therapy, removed from sympathetic and compassionate institutional parameters necessary 
for the cure. In being so, it became conceived as a cure in-itself, and it deteriorated rapidly into a 
treatment without therapy: 
After, as with everywhere, there was a grave deterioration. At Saint-Anne it was considered as 
something extraordinary ... the chief clinician even came out of his office. But after a year or so the 
treatment started to worsen, it became automatic. They began to think that insulin itself was the cause of 
the cure, and this form of mechanisation even happened, later, at La Borde. 135 
This decline of treatment was noted by Andre Roumieux who was a psychiatric nurse working within 
the psychiatric hospitals during and after the war: 
The patients were spasmodic and perspired enormously. The saliva, in the comer of their mouths, 
became a white mouse, they were forcibly suffering and contorted violently. 136 
Others similarly recounted that: 
It was terrible, imagine, the patients thought they were dying, there was a terrible suffering. 137 
This was the what happened with the "mechanization" of insulin therapy, when it began to be used as a 
cure in-itself, used in the quickest possible way as an instant application with the minimum of 
preparation, in the minimum of time, removed from the sympathetic clinical parameters necessary for 
therapeutic success. Yet at Saint-Alban ~ the oxygenated clinic, the sighing suji, a clinic resisting 
external "bureaucratic" pressures ~ insulin therapy was performed according to the creative, 
atmospheric necessity its curative effects demanded. The eventual fate of insulin within the institutions 
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infuriated Oury, "how can one pretend to cure the mind by merely injecting insulin, it's diabolical!" he 
would write. Elsewhere, he asserted the shortcomings of neuroleptic medicine without complete denial 
of their mark of progress, "If there is something other than insulin, even better, and it is certain that the 
breadth of neuroleptics have succeeded, but not completely: the disadvantage of medicines is that they 
do not create atmosphere ... When neuroleptics didn't exist, we were obliged to manage. This enters 
into the institutional project. The troubled were treated long before neuroleptics modified and cured 
them. 138" 
Insulin had entered into the institutional language of an art of symapthy. In 1954-55 Oury and 
Tosquelles debated, with Bonnafe and fellow Lozerian Louis Le guillant139, the organisation of an 
insulin service and its administrative architecture. A designated room for collective insulin therapy was 
needed, as well as several isolated rooms for more particular, acute, specialised cases. This collective 
insulin therapy proved successful often resulting in, "remarkable conversation from one bed to the 
other: one replied, the other spoke, as if a construction of the body, a field of the interchanging of 
words. 140" Communal insulin therapy played a key role at Saint-Alban for it was a communal system of 
reconstruction where the biological was inseparable to an analysis, where words were inseparable to 
the body. The cure of insulin required specific institutional parameters, yet more than this, neuroleptic 
medicine would fall short of inaugurating a curative atmosphere and a communal system of 
reconstruction. The maternal phase bonding the clinician and patient in the waking state of coma, the 
syncretic scene hallmarked the therapy of insuline. Indeed, Insulin was administered at Saint-Alban 
within a time and landscape where "people were not too hurried nor pushed ... where things were not 
yet chronified141" 
The patient, taking thirty minutes to awaken from the coma, permitted a progressive 
reconstruction of consciousness begun by deep nasal exhalation. Again, exhalation extends from the 
institutional to the pathological: "Within all psychotherapeutic processes, one must not forget that life 
is directly supported by respiration ... in the combinatory game of oxygen within the living and sensible 
mass.142" Recall also that exhalation held a great importance for the development of the human person 
both for Straus and Tosquelles as a non-mechanical, undetermined, expressive agency of man's 
pathology where the sigh was seen as nothing other than access to the formation of the human person. 
For Oury, the hypoglycemic coma, and the practice of insulin therapy itself, brought into play 
a quasi-analytic function for those participating in the seance, of questions of approach, of intervention 
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with the reconstruction of consciousness, and of how to maintain an analytical relation to the patient's 
emergence from the coma. Maintaining an analytic relation to the patient of the hypoglycemic coma, 
was a maintenance of a space of phenomena into which both the clinician and clinic were initiated, a 
syncretic heterogeneous psychopathology of man and his institution. This the double-treatment of both 
illness and clinic, initiation into a 'syncretic dimension' of not just the institution, but the biological 
also: 
This apprenticeship into an altogether different dimension ... the reaction 'X' ofbiology ... we cannot 
possibly approach such biological complexities with the Cartesian categories of old, it is not the mind on 
one side, the body on the other.143 
As with its Latin form, syncrentismus (a union of communities), Oury used the term 
'syncretic' as a direct appeal to a heterogeneous politic within the union of the seance, a heterogeneous 
unitary synthesis: 
It is striking to see someone awaken from a coma: you talk to them, you go for a walk with them, there is 
a participation, a form of body to body. 144 
This maternal dialectic (Tosquelles) is an initiation with others, a maternally shared dimension, /'avec 
as Oury words it (the-being-with-the-other). The benefits of insulin explored at Saint-Alban, are where 
we see Henry Ey write, "the cure is the alpha and omega of the enterprise," yet the enterprise as we 
have seen, was one where Ey would write of a, "superior therapeutic result to be obtained at 
Saint-Alban.145" More than an experience in the conjectural and tentative sense of the word, Ey 
described the Saint-Alban experience as one being a "majestic lesson. 146 " The authenticity of 
Saint-Alban, that "effervescent" "sanctuary" of "majestic" lessons and "learning" would for Ey, be 
displayed by its "true" face, a face not of a delegated "social defense" but of an assistance to the 
"diminished brothers of humanity" and an assistance attentive to the biological treatments beneficial to 
the reconstruction of man. Again, we recall our deeming the vocation an "art of accompaniment" this 
time, extending the coining with the shared parameters of the administering of insulin, to see it is a 
syncretic art of maternal accompaniment, a pathology of being-with, an institutionalising pathology 
even. Tosquelles later underlined the importance of this sentiment in the revised version of his doctoral 
thesis of 1948: 
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It is almost classic to say that one should not use electroshock, insulin, or any other form of physical 
therapeutic mechanically but accompanied by an active psychotherapy. Yet which one? ... It would 
appear, that without the knowledge of our general schema [the schema of institutional psychotherapy 
seeing man as the living art and madness as an ethical, aesthetic, constructive paradigm] as 
corresponding to the dynamism of the end of the world experience, medical psychotherapeutic attitudes 
can easily go in the wrong direction. This is something particularly important to remember. 147 
5: Tosguelles , Oury and Lacan's flight from Egypt 
One can effortlessly draw a line from the 1942 call of Balvet to the 1947 assertions by Ey, not as a 
polarity, but as a developing lineage of generational pronouncement and concerns, a line, not ending in 
the triangulation of a third paternal figurehead with a Bonnafe of the time, nor a Tosquelles, nor a 
Lacan even, but of a web of evolving research by a group having lived and living the "drama", an 
"effervescent group," of a clinical research made symmetrical by generational recognition and intent. 
Bonnafe strove to underpin the psychiatrist's "solidarity with the alienated148" in moving away from 
what he saw to be "asylum psychiatry/49" an agency of social defense, where the phenomenon of 
isolation characterised the personage of the psychiatrist within society as hermetic seal to the mad. 
Rather, as he was to write in 1946, through the dramatic privilege of having experienced anguish, of 
having lived through anguish, and having treated the victim of mental illness and tuberculosis under the 
most restricting of Eugenic human conditions, "the psychiatrist could transpose such experiences onto 
the clinical plane of clinician-patient relations. 150" It is of the same year, that Paul Balvet, inaugurator 
of the "institutional call" for a psychiatric humanism, announced the dramatically integrated persona of 
the psychiatrist as one of "solidarity", as support to the alienated where, "the psychiatrist lives 
madness ... where madness has a direction, an intention, a value. 151" 
It is within such an environment of generational echoes and calls, of a "harmonious unity of 
diverse points of view lived by the psychiatrist/52" that Fran.;:ois Tosquelles, in his thesis, sought to 
punctuate this humanist, role extending politic of shared drama, of sympathy, of accompaniment, 
bringing psychiatrist and patient to the existential terrain in drawing upon the role of a "lived 
experience," the intimate yet shared narrative of what he termed the Vecu. He did this whilst 
simultaneously asserting the religiously themed, aesthetic, constructive stages to the post-war 
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reconstructive experience of the world displayed within the 1947 complex of !a fin du monde and how 
it pointed to an emerging and advanced psychopathology of schizophrenia. 
Tosquelles was to constantly underline, through his many publications finding their ultimate 
blueprint within his penned observations of 1948, that psychopathology as the elementary and 
constitutive character of every human being, had evolved as a symptomatic expression of a determined 
illness within professional medicine. The "art of sympathy," the art of accompaniment, as practiced by 
the "effervescent" fraternity of Saint-Alban, was where a non-determined mental illness informed a 
psychopathology of man under the tutelage of shared, syncretic, lived experience: 
That which awakens our sensibility, our presentiments - that which pushes us to engage, through 
sympathy, the manifestations within the pathos of the other. Or rather, it is that which pushes us to reject 
the symptomatic expression of a determined illness. 153 
For Tosquelles, the end of the world catastrophic complex was hallmarked by a world beyond that of 
determined illness, a syncretic world of a "creative imagination," a world beyond professionally 
determined illnesses where its phantasm of a mock-Bibical Revelation would be a psychopathological 
statement of man and his world154, a new world, one of possibilities and creation. 
The Erlebnis, was lived as an "existential catastrophe" touching the profound mechanics of 
man was, and in the eyes of Tosquelles this catastrophic complex proved, "the affirmation of Man's 
human condition, 155" a creative affirmation within which the manifestations of the pathos of the other, 
a pathos "not knowable in advance. 156" Bonnafe would extend such sentiments ten years later in 1958, 
as if precipitating Lacan's seminars on the ethic of psychoanalysis the following year157, in writing, "I 
have always been astounded by the dramatic extension of the lived (le vecu) ... that vertigo inspiring the 
alienist...follow me upon such a terrain if you dare! 158" To this we recall Torrubia, who did not write 
of the inspiring "vertigo" of the vocation, but of a psychotherapy within "undecided limits. "This can 
be equated with Oury's assertion of a pathology of being-with under the tutelage of a syncretic 
synthesis within post-comatic recovery, a synthesis equally attributable to psychosis. 
In his introduction to the doctoral thesis of Tosquelles, Oury would prefer the geographic 
metaphor for a height inspiring vocational vertigo. He would call this a landscape of catastrophe, a 
limitless field, an undecided terrain an, "existential landscape" within which clinical traits and 
symptomatology would remain in ambiguity and in permanent arrest, where the diagnostic -
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inseparable to a psychotherapy - would have its practical rooting within a "concrete" description, "of a 
deciphering of a clearing within a jungle, a clearing very often victim to the bulldozers of a gross and 
classifYing nosography. 159 " Where Oury proclaimed a descriptive resistance to nosographic 
classification by virtue of transposing lived encounters to the clinical plane, Bonnafe proclaimed a 
realigning of the psychiatric personage and its object. This therapeutic perspective borne from "lived 
experience" and the "simple," concrete encounters of men, had previously found voice in a clinical 
encounter of 1947 where Oury was to meet a man by the name of Jayet. Oury's reflections were later 
presented in the form of a brief narrative entitled L 'Aimable Jayet appearing in 1964 where he would 
announce a particular way of thinking clinical approach160• 
The encounter with Jayet, one year after Bonnafe's appeal for a methodological revision 
structured upon patient-clinician developmental relations (disalienation), one year before the seizing of 
an apocalyptically revealed geist by Tosquelles (the-end-of-the-world-experience), Oury tells us of a 
patient seemingly "within a vast, endless desert within which we can loose ourselves.161" Confronted 
by this endless desert of Jayet's mind, that illimitable expanse to which Freud, as if in submitting to the 
vastness of the enigmatic landscape of the psyche could only ascribe an, "unknown material" upon 
which the structural function of the Unconscious (Ucs.) was deployed162, Oury proposes a "path" 
leading to a "landscape" where Jayet is, "seen to reign. 163" The proposed "path" from the surfaces of 
consciousness to a depth of"unknowable material," a "path" we have noted to be- in following Lacan 
-"adaptive and fecund," was that of Jayet's presence, where as Oury was to write, "Jayet is space, and 
his presence is sensible. 164" It was Ludwig Binswanger who had previously, in the Case of Susan 
Urban, asserted the therapist to be before a primordial being-in-the-world, before the enigmatic 
categories of presence and not an objectivity where, "presence is itself apprehended as its original 
world. 165" Indeed, such apprehension is at work in Oury's observations of Jayet. Jayet's reigning space 
is the space of psychoses, the space of possibilisation, and to maintain such a direction, to keep within 
this "reigning space" upon this "path," Oury asserts, in a tone at once appealing to a clinically and 
historically lived disarmament, the need to, "drop the weapons to continue along the path, to abandon 
nosographic auspices166": the apprehension of presence, is not said of nosographic astuteness. 
The dropping of weapons, is what Oury would later describe as a "clearing of the ground" 
("de netoiyer le terrain"), a cleared ground suspending clinical prejudgment to allow phenomena to 
emerge unobstructed from within the depths of the "jungle", from within the depths of an "imaginary 
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consciousness" (Tosquelles). To this we retake the contemporary of Oury and Tosquelles, Torrubia in 
noting: 
We are always within the void of a future-present that exerts task to remove programations, a priori's, 
prejudgments, readily formed ideas, the already seen, the already known, that are just as much obstacles 
and blockades as they are a resistance to emergence and singular discourse, flattened by the normative 
discourse of social codes.167 
A moment of anticipation sees the announcement of a space. This anticipation resonates within the 
perennial question of clinical enquiry posed by Oury at the outset of his essay: "how am I to approach 
him?168" This, for Torrubia, pertained to the essential question of a dual relation announcing the 
progressive transformation of the notion of assistance, "who has healed me, who heals me?" This 
question, was the unbroken seal of a continual de-centering of the "unconscious subject" (Torrubia, 
Lacan) the institution (Torrubia, Bonnafe, Oury, Tosquelles) and the vocational personage and object 
(Bonnafe) taking the subject of the unconscious to be of greater endowment (Straus) than the status of 
nosography. 
To encounter a patient, is not to "program the future" but to "anticipate" a presence and an 
opening, "to graft an opening.169" Where Freud posited the "property of being conscious" as the "one 
beacon-light in the darkness of depth psychology, 170" Oury would posit the property of "presence" as 
the key property to a war-marked psychiatric terrain: 
This anticipatory dimension, is not a pure intentionality. It is that which corresponds, in terms of the 
grammatical plane, to the future anterior. True presence, is of the future anterior. It is not something 
encased in the speaking subject of the past or the future, because this, would already be too late. True 
presence is something that is in relation with that which opens, with the opening171 . 
And we parallel T orrubia: 
This plane cannot be perceived by mere geography, it is articulated in other areas, with sometimes 
invisible fields, in a presence that is not always manifested yet active, as if a trace ofhistory. 172 
For Oury, in his observation of Jayet, upon the "open" terrain of presence, a terrain not of 
chronological time but of future anterior time)173, the psychiatrist approaches "the desert, the jungle," 
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the "opening" upon the "path" that the patient- Jayet - himself had lain, "his space", "his presence" 
within what Oury deemed, "a mirage of the quotidienne. 174" Opening and presence are favored over the 
traditional nosographical concept of mental illness. We again draw upon Torrubia: 
Clinical nosography has a function of closure given that the observer -clinician is outside of the 
semiological plain ... Yet the function of openness is where the observer is always included in the 
observation ... The classic observer masks visibility.175 
Presence and temporality are as if a mirage, anticipated and revealed. Marking the dissolution of the 
distanced observer and inaugurating a semiology of clinician-patient relations 176 this is an 
announcement of Lacan's Real. To anticipate, is to be before the announcements of the Real, 
"impossible", yet pronounced: 
In a movement of anticipation carrying rigour ... as a precession to itself ... a difficult path, full of stones 
of every nature, towards this impossible ReaL 177 
Indeed, many years later Oury would see the work of institutionalisation to be a pursuit of these open 
spaces of future anterior time - presence proper178. The very presence of the patient is announced and 
ventilated within a "space" cleared within the vast 'jungle" of the psyche, not by "weapons" or "tools" 
but by the patient's proper verbal, gestural, enunciative phenomena. The greatest definition of presence 
was to be found in the wording ofLacan, "the present, is when I Speak." Oury reasoned the importance 
of such a statement to be in presence announcing the present, declaring the opening, to be of the 
instant, the "clearing." Oury later penned that, "The present, is not encased within a temporality" and in 
doing he characterised psychiatry as a clinical work of future anterior time, a work of those syncretic 
spaces, a work of the withdrawing horizon, a work of the ReaL 179 
The stressing of a future anterior time is for Oury, to announce a spatial politics of the 
encounter. As with the reconstructive phenomena of the comatosed patient, psychiatry addresses a 
syncretic, spatial dimension, a "dance of possession" even180• Tosquelles would later describe such a 
state of affairs as the pronouncement of a "constellation" of unannounced "relations." From this, Oury 
proposed a "psychopathology of presence," where phenomena of this evasive category "of presence" 
would carry a diagnostic intention and value. Indeed, what better way than describe a psychotherapy of 
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"undecided limits" than a clinical pursuit of the "unannounced relations" of man? What better way than 
suggest a psychopathology of man's "undetermined" and "undecided" agency? The psychopathological 
looses its symptomatic expression of determined illness when the normal becomes the undetermined 
and unannounced, an identity played out, as Tosquelles asserted many years later, "beneath the hidden 
or occult even.181" The normal indeed changes its nature with the sense of the pathological ordained 
through the question of Presence. The normal thus becomes the normal of psychotic man. We draw 
upon an Oury of 1984 to cap this assertion: 
Freud said, in somewhat of a banal manner, that it is through the study of pathology that one can begin to 
understand the normal. This can be scandalous to the traditional mind, and it was for its epoch - to study 
mental disequilibrium in order to understand equilibrium! The same thing happened with institutional 
pedagogy.I82 
What such writing underlined, from a therapeutic perspective, in opening clinical 
epistemology to a rigorous vocabulary of description of psychopathological ontology, a description at 
once inspiring a "vertigo" (Bonnafe) yet with its feet firmly on the ground (Oury), was the ambiguity of 
role of the nursing and the nursed, the mutuality of clinician-patient relations, and the introduction of 
less rigid, flexible dimensions to psychiatry through such questions of presence, question not of a 
temporality stricto sensu, but questions of the spaces of psychoses. 
For Bonnafe, the assimilation and positive ambiguity of the nursing and nursed was in a 
direction of "a research of a perpetual end towards the realisation of the convergence of two objectives 
where interdependence is the first lesson assimilating the clinician.183" This convergence was in the 
address of the "path" of presence, where, as we retake, the tools of nosography "were not enough." 
The perennial question opening Oury's essay recalling 1947, "How am I to approach him?" 
neighbours a question by Martin Heidegger raised in an essay of 1955, namely: "What really is 
happening in our age? And how is it characterised?184" Both these questions are "simple". They are 
questions of transcendental change and creation, industrial questions. Both questions anticipate the 
emergence of an unobstructed "path" that is not predestined, a future anterior time that is not 
immediately traversable - they address a spatiality rather than a temporality. Man and his Age 
announce themselves through a presence announcing a philanthropic space of psychosis. To draw upon 
the phenomenological words of Henri Maldiney, "man is situated within psychiatry if psychiatry is 
situated within man. 185" The psychiatric question thus becomes a question of man and his age and of 
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the age within man186. 
In his preface to le Vecu de la Fin du Monde, Oury appealed to an existential landscape 
(paysage existentiel) of interdependence, a sympathetic landscape where the pathos of the other lent 
itself to the re-elaboration of roles187• Within this landscape of interdependence and co-implication of 
roles (Bonnafe), Oury asserted that a "shared sympathy was not enough" to acknowledge "presence." 
Rather, Oury envisaged the clinical state of affairs to enter into a resonance, an "existential resonance" 
with clinical traits where symptomatology would have a "fluidity" as opposed to a "fixity." As Oury 
wrote, "symptomatology remains ambiguous ... neither schizophrenic, nor manico-depressive, nor 
schizomanic.188" In this way, with this fluidity and ambiguity of symptomatology, with this "mirage," 
there would be the possibility of approaching what Oury and Tosquelles asserted to be "phantasmic 
structures" within a "fog of approximations, 189 " to which Bonnafe accorded the, "sympathetic 
mysteries 190" of psychiatric practice. 
As we have observed with By's description of 1946, the personage of psychiatry is not one of 
a delegated social defense but of a duty to his weakened neighbour. Such a direction was outlined well 
by Bonnafe in his appeal of practical progress founded upon a semiology of interdependent 
psychiatrist-patient relations borne through a pathos challenging a clinically interrogative stance, or for 
Ey, challenging that "social defense": 
With this point of view, a semiological exploration would be increasingly closer to the real drama and of 
a total therapeutic comportment necessary for the development of a knowledge and understanding of 
fields of varying signification surrounding the clinician-patient relations. 191 
What Bonnafe eventually called a "therapeutic intention192"- at once philanthropic and scientific- was 
identified by Oury in his preface to Tosquelles' thesis, as a psychiatry alert to presence. This was to 
place the patient upon a "descriptive level." Horace Torrubia later described this approach as being a 
psychiatry, "always alert to detail within a field where a provisionary point would not be possible, nor 
would repeating the same experimental path.193" It is where, as we have noted with Tosquelles, Oury 
and Torrubia, "intellectualisation," "bureaucratisation" and "simplism" are not for the Institutional 
Psychotherapist, where it is not the chronic question of mental illness, but the spatial question (a future 
anterior time) that counts, of, "nuances, of the clear-obscure, of spatial delimitations - dimensions 
wrongly recognised by traditional clinical practice.194" Such a vocational sentiment would later find its 
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articulation not just within the generic term of an Institutional Psychotherapy coined in 1952, but also 
in Oury continually citing Paul Klee's Bauhaus aesthetic adage "Werk ist Weg" (the work is the path). 
As with Heidegger's path of thinking, the path of psychiatry is said of a permanent 
construction and creation, a path that is fragile, a path necessitating renewal and constant elaboration. 
Lacan, in the wake of such phenomenological assertion would himself announce, "creation to be 
co-substantial to Thought. 195" Projection into the future was not the imperative of this descriptive 
psychiatry. Rather, the concern was of the present in the name of presence. Oury would later, in his 
1989 lecture series on the creative processes of schizophrenia entitled Creation et Schizophrenie, assert 
the psychiatric concern to be with "spaces", with constructive "sites" and "zones of emergence ... where 
something happens, 196" where a "creative imagination" is seen to be at work (Tosquelles). 
For Oury, the sentiment displayed by Tosquelles' thesis was one of discovery. Of"uncovering 
a world197", a syncretic world, of these structuralising principles understood as characteristics of the 
phantasm with its delirious fixations. This zone was of an "imaginary consicousness", and with a 
wording mirrored in his own doctoral thesis of 1950, Oury drew upon the apocalyptic words of Saint 
John to declare the delirium, within this "existential landscape" and upon these routes of presence, 
within these "spaces" and "clearings" accessed descriptively by way of a "syntax" of "extraordinary 
words and monsters oflanguage198": "the death of death and the coming of the new world. 199" Indeed, 
for such a generation the Biblical reference was always within close proximity200• 
We are reminded ofLacan, who, in his seminars on the ethic of psychoanalysis (1959-60) was 
keen to point to the practical import of Biblical material from Judeo-Christian history as a reflective 
weight to clinical practice, and as to how such material could lend itself to a greater understanding of 
psychoanalysis, its ethic and its enigmatic object of madness. 
In a seminar entitled, Das Ding, Lacan understood the Object, the thing, to be a "strange 
feature" around which, "the whole adaptive development revolves, a development that is so specific to 
man?0~, This resounds well with Lacan's previously cited statement of 1946, of a, "language that is as 
old as humanity itself' announced through the vocation of a sector psychiatry with Balvet' s call to 
"weakened man". Yet more than this, the object of psychiatry would be this very strange feature 
around which the vocation itself revolved, a point precipitated, as we have seen, by Bonnafe's essay 
twelve years earlier in 1947. This therapeutic language, finds its root, or its condition, within this 
"strange feature" as "a ruling principle" for its object and for its ethic also. It is where, the ethic and the 
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object are one and the same thing (Tosquelles, Oury, Lacan, Bonnafe), ungraspable yet constitutive of a 
state of affairs. Lacan continues, extending the enigmatic salute to the profundity of the Biblical word: 
I thus took down the text of the Decalogue that God dictated before Moses on the third day of the third 
month after my flight from Egypt, in the dark cloud of Mount Sinai, accompanied by flashes of 
lightening and the command to the people not to come near me.202 
Lacan views the commandments not as speech, as literal verbal commands, but as discourse. No mere 
anecdote, the passage is of two levels, the literal and the cryptographic, like a Nietzschean rhyme, it is 
riddled with symbolism, "the imaginary" (Oury), the "phantasmic" (Tosquelles), and considered as a 
phantasm, it is Lacan's entrance to a clouded, little understood zone touched upon by the 
schizophrenic, a zone constituting civilization and Man, the "point of entry into the Real,203" (Lacan) or 
the "impossible Reae04" (Oury). Lacan's symbolic pronouncement of an engagement with the Biblical 
Word, the mystery of Mount Sinai with its flashes of illumination, is his declaration of the ancient 
foundations of the Object and the ethic. The practice of psychoanalysis, entry into the Real, as with the 
Biblical Word, engages with "a language as ancient as humanity itself' (Lacan) addressing, "Man's 
solidarity with the alienated" (Balvet/Bonnafe), the "vecu" (Tosquelles), the, "drama" 
(Lacan!Bonnafe/Tosquelles). Lacan upon a clouded mount Sinai, is a Tosquelles before the end ofthe 
world complex, which becomes the Sinai of the psychiatric vocation. 
In the same series of seminars Lacan would continued that, "on the third day of the third 
month" after his "flight from Egypt." In speaking of Heidegger, Lacan sought to underline the almost 
mystical nature to the object, "uniting celestial and terrestrial powers around it in an essential human 
process?05" Thus we see, that the "ancient language," the "ruling principle", is something essential to 
human process and constitution. Lacan calls it the object of psychiatry, Heidegger, the object of 
Thought, yet it is one and the same agency of "initiation" and "renewal." And we therefore find 
Lacan's rhetorical question as not pertaining to a moral law, within speech, to the verbal command, but 
as that pertaining to discourse, to Thought, to the profound mechanics of man seen in those Heraclitean 
instances of the flash of lightning, signature of the Real, to the ethic. Man, for Lacan, is the discourse 
of an ancient language, expression of a ruling principle, expression of a divinity even, and it is such a 
language addressed and engaged by the psychiatric vocation, by the listening builder or the artisan of 
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the concrete. As with Heraclitus before the Logos announcing , "listen not to me but the Logos," the 
psychiatrist listens to the Real ~ builders who listen. Lacan thus asks, in the true spirit of Saint-Alban's 
artisans of the concrete: 
Couldn't we try to interpret the Ten Commandments as something very close to that which effectively 
goes on in repression and the unconscious.206 
It is not the Ten Commandments however, that feature with Tosquelles and Oury ten years prior to 
Lacan's seminars on the ethic and object of psychoanalysis, seminars drenched in a Heideggerian 
phenomenology sensitive to man and his objects, a "poetic Thinking." Rather, it is the words of Saint 
John, seer of the Apocalypse, "the most Greek of writers of Jesus,207" that for Tosquelles fmd their 
greatest import for the vocation of psychiatry and a phantasmic pronouncement of the end of the world 
complex. Tosquelles, would later write of Saint John's logos, with the sentiments of Heraclitus, to be 
constitutive of life and the manifestations of spirit, and in being so Saint John's Logos, as with the 
Delphic Greek Logos, as with Lacan's Real, was not reducible to "historical dictum" nor to the 
"discoveries of Reason208". The gestured Catalan psychiatrist, would position the Logos of Saint John 
as that which constitutes the subject and his identity, the subject of enunciation, and in being so it was 
of a permanent fabric of "the very presence of he who speaks ~ whether or not we call this presence 
God ... 209" The Logos as presence of a constitutive principle sees the formation of discourse and the 
creation of new spaces. This, as we have previously highlighted, is Lacan's Real, namely, the 
constantly displaced horizon furnishing man and world with its attributes and phenomena. It is here 
that Tosquelles thus asserts that, "the person produces the voice and speaks, whether far away or 
hidden, like God himself.210" 
It is upon this Lacanian-Christian-Delphic ground of the Logos, that a revelatory nature is 
accorded to mental illness, as principle of an existential catastrophe (catastrophie existentiel) where for 
Tosquelles such a principle was to be understood as the "Erlebnis of the end of the world," appealing to 
that 1932 Lacanian "fecund moment" declaring the "drama of man." Yet as Tosquelles further asserted, 
this access, this approach, this method, was "always attentive to concrete reality, permanently 
realigning the clinical hypothesis necessary for translating that which occurs upon the clinical 
plane.m" Here, we now position the insulin sessions of Saint-Alban, disclosing the syncretic and 
maternal, as events of a revealing. The Apocalyptic vision of Saint John thus finds position within a 
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concrete realignment of the clinical plane through post-war sector psychiatry. 
The clinical plane is exposed by virtue of an initiation into the syncretic, a plane open to what 
Gisela Pankow, psychiatrist of La Borde clinic in the 1960's, would later deem "structuralising 
phantasms", phantasms and hallucinatory phenomena that structure the Self. Lacan himself later 
asserted the important role played by the phantasm in noting that, there is only entrance to the Real by 
way of the phantasm212• To such a sentiment is where Oury points in his introduction to Tosquelles. An 
open clinical systematic by virtue of a privileging of the phenomenon is put forward as hallmark to the 
politics of sector psychiatry, a psychiatry within the "screams," the "silences," traversing categories at 
the most simple and concrete oflevels. 
In his introduction toLe Vecu de Ia Fin Du Monde Oury wrote that the "subtle reflections of 
Tosquelles ... would later, for better or worst, define Institutional Psychotherapy.213" Again, we retake 
that the end of the world complex was the "Sinai of the vocation." In doing so Oury saw Institutional 
Psychotherapy, branded within the end of the world complex, as being stamped by the term Erlebnis. 
What Tosquelles sought to identify in his thesis were the emerging forms of a "new world" within a 
"clearing," "a field ... a dimension ... as an extremely original construction of existence.214" This, so 
close to an Oury of Saint-Alban accompanying the patient of the hypoglycaemic coma, entering the 
syncretic dimension of a reconstructive space, a site of emerging forms, of a syncretic synthesis as the 
reconstruction of consciousness. 
Tosquelles, in his 1948 thesis, asserted the ethical and the aesthetic stages within an 
"existential landscape" (Oury) of Pathos was in the hope of surpassing a, "psychiatric classification 
inexorably oriented towards a bureaucratisation ofThought,215" or as we have noted with Tosquelles, in 
surpassing psychopathology as symptomatic expression of a determined illness. This simultaneously 
ethical and aesthetical dimension, fmding its resistance to bureaucracy, intellectualisation and with an 
aesthetically reasoned ethic, was one of a "concrete" psychosis, where the end of the world experience 
termed Erlebnis would punctuate, in echoing Bonnafe, both a "change in existence" and the "very 
delimitation of the psychiatrist's activities.216" This was the post-war extension of Balvet' s 1942 call 
for a more "humane psychiatry" and Bonnaf6's 1946 assertions of psychiatry as an "art of sympathy," 
as a vocation of a "poetic research" into the "common experience of men,217" a vocation, in the 1948 
words ofTosquelles, as an "extension oflived experience," as a terrain of human encounters. 
Such a terrain of the common relations of men is where the diagnostic is not one of empathy, 
144 
but one of sympathetic communication. Oury makes clear, that this diagnostic by sympathy, is not an 
"etiquette" but a mode of being-with-the-other where "something happens.218" This psychotherapeutic 
terrain of sympathy is a terrain disengaging prejudices, of uncovering, in Oury's later penned words, 
"zones masked by prejudgement,219" and it is to such a terrain that Bonnafe invites us:: 
"Follow me upon such a terrain if you dare! 220" 
6: Catastrophe and Revelation: the universal law 
The uniqueness to the complex known as the the end ofthe world was the religiosity of revelatory tone 
it carried. More specifically, the end of the world was a phantasmic complex of a psychotic reality 
analogically addressing a post-war world straddling the torments of occupation, an old tom world, and 
the landscape of liberation, a new world, to which Oury, in following Tosquelles, accorded Saint 
John's prophetic vision of a New Jerusalem borne from the ravages of a tormented earth: 
And before me was a new sky and a new earth, where the first sky and the first world had 
disappeared ... and I saw descending from the sky ... a New Jerusalem.221 
In the same passage where Oury draws upon the Apocalypse of John, there is a mentioning of 
Nietzche's Zarathustra supporting the theological apocalyptic studies of Bartman (also referenced by 
Tosquelles two years earlier) to underscore what he identifies as a certain projection of the self 
pertaining to an, "imaginary consciousness.222" This, "imaginary consciousness" presented as optic to 
the ghost-like structuralising phantasms of the psyche revealed within the pronouncements of folie, was 
for Oury, "a projection lived as one's own alienation.223" The projection of the self is where there is a 
new structuring of the personality. For Oury, the experience of this projection, was at the root of human 
civilisation as a "delirious function"~ Wahnsfunktion ~a term he borrowed from the schizophrenic 
studies of Griihle, and also referenced by Tosquelles in 1948. Similarly, Tosquelles in pointing to a 
consecutive process of depersonalisation in the wake of catastrophe highlighted the "Biblical readings" 
undertaken by patients as not being foreign to, or "estranged from the delirium.224" The delirious 
function was understood by Oury as, "the path of entry into the imaginary world," where the Self is 
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exhibited in its processes of evolution and dissolution. Lacan's path "of entry into the Real" by way of 
the phantasm, is a path understood by Oury as the patient's presence. As with L 'Aimable Jayet, it is a 
path upon which Bonnafe "dares" us to "accompany" him, a path revealed catastrophically, through an 
apocalyptic dimension, where- analogically to the Biblical New Jerusalem- the destruction of the Self 
carries a reconstructive principle as divine inevitability within psychopathological ontology. 
Apocalypse marks Revelation and the coming of a new world. The psychiatric wording is a 
phantasmic restructuring of a new personality disclosed within a shared experience (much like the 
atmospheric experience of insulin). A reconstructive ontology found its most punctuated Biblical 
pronouncement through Saint John and an observation of two patients by Tosquelles in his thesis 
underpins this relevance of Johanian prophecy: 
One of our patients said: "since the end of the world I am eternally made Man. This is why I have 
become a spiritual person." Another patient defmed himself as a disincamated being, many patients say 
they are dead, others living as Saints in Paradise. Let us not forget those patients who also exist in 
purgatory or Hell .. .it is thus a form of second birth that the patient searches for. 225 
Freud himself, in his lectures on psychoanalysis asserted the reconstructive dynamic of delirium - the 
Wahsnfunktion for Gruhle- to be a process of healing, productive and active. For Freud, in the wake of 
torment, the delirious function represented a tentative return of an existential equilibrium. This was 
where, as Oury notes, a new existence is announced through a mystical delirium, or an expansive 
delirium where there is a utilisation of previously unused elements226• This is a post-catastrophic 
delirium, an affective, constructive state-of-affairs marking the reconstruction of the personality in the 
wake of deluge (trauma). We parallel Tosquelles with Freud's assertion in his Five Lectures of 
Psychoanalysis of 1910: 
The paranoiac rebuilds the universe ... not to the most splendid oftruths ... but to a new level oflife ... his 
delirious effort is a means to rebuilding. We take it for a morbid production, the formation of a delirium, 
and in reality a means of healing, a reconstruction.227 
It was on such grounds that Tosquelles declared, in a symposium of 1950, delirium to be a normal 
reaction at work within the biological and psychical existence of man. Oury, in his own doctoral thesis 
of 1950, would declare this delirious space of construction, a "space of metamorphoses," as being 
something of the "eye of Shiva" or the "eye of Medusa" announcing an "imaginary consciousness228" 
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lived out biologically and existentiall/29. 
Saint John, and an almost prophetic dimension to the mock-biblical phantasm, were nothing of 
the unusual for a psychiatrist whose gestures were tinged with Arabic-hermetic history of Catalan often 
invoking "the invisible forms of the Universe often the object of diverse theorisations.230" Indeed, 
Tosquelles would eventually come to speak of Catholic medieval neo-platonic angelology and its 
symbolic cosmology. Tosquelles saw such traditions to carry a prophetic thematic within which a 
"creative imagination" would construct reality. For Tosquelles, the ancient Prophet was of a new, 
unannounced world231 • Most notably, he had seen such a dynamic within the writings of Ibn Arabi and 
the cosmology of Averroes. Tosquelles saw this, to be a founding of the concrete reality of man by a 
"creative imagination,232" or rather as we position, the phantasmic announcement of man's determined 
and variable concrete reality disclosing possibilities for what Tosquelles would later pen to be, "a 
reelaboration of man and his spaces of existence. 233" 
Oury saw this reelaboration to be founded upon "existential oscillations" punctuating a 
"delirious function" within which an ontology of catastrophe (trauma) and revelation (post-catastrophic 
reconstruction) surfaced, thus underlying the importance of Tosquelles in thinking the "erlebnis of the 
end of the world" and in pointing to the diagnostic value of existential notions: "a concrete value 
directed towards the comprehension of the patient which, in tum, opens up perspectives from the point 
of view of treatment as well as catharsis.234" For Tosquelles, the existential oscillation, this lived, 
affective surfacing of a post-traumatic, post-catastrophic reconstruction of the personality, the 
mock-biblical signature to a particular apocalyptic psychological complex emerging in the wake of 
Liberation was where, "Madness, before all else, is human presence and expression. It is true that 
madness announces the malady, but madness also expresses and creates a man235". The end of the 
world - Ia fin du monde - thus communicated an existential change in existence as if the theophanic 
pronouncement of a "creative imagination" (Tosquelles) or an "imaginary consciousness" (Oury). As 
one patient declared, in suffering with a terminal cancer, the catastrophic complex was experienced as 
"another world, not of the world of this earth ... another existence .. .I am soon to die ... I am the All-
Knowing." Tosquelles saw this evolution to be marked by a phantasmic announcement traced by the 
patient herself, Mme Baub, where the phantasm of death and resurrection within spiritual life 
manifests, where "the Self is created by Thought.236" This is a therapeutic taking into account of 
practical value in the psychiatrists experience of the everyday, "of a fecund relation borne through a 
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capacity to better understand these resonances ... these paths of sympathy ... to assimilate the lessons 
carried by history.237" For Bonnafe, this was the task of integrating sympathetic (not empathetic) 
experience within a "permanent" and "relative" psychotherapeutic intention, of weaving "aesthetic 
curiosity" with the "common relations" of man, of advancing "upon these paths" where the evolution is 
"not one of the cure, but of the approach.238" Again, to recall Oury's reflection, it was not an age of 
"mere tools" but of "a method of thinking" and this was mirrored by Bonnafe's post-war call for a 
"new research" into "these sympathetic mysteries, 239 " mysteries extended and elaborated by 
Tosquelles' thesis. 
7: Tosguelles and neurobiology 
There are three important aspects within the history of neurology to bear in mind in approaching the 
Johanian appeal by Tosquelles to a new, novel "unitary life" borne from catastrophe. The first, is Kurt 
Goldstein and his Organismic principle, the second Monakow and Mourgue and their notion of 
Syneidesis, the third Victor Von Weizsacker and his notion of the circle of form, the Gestaltkreiss: 
(1) The 'catastrophic' was not the original terminology of Tosquelles. "Catastrophe", that punctuating 
pulse to Biblical revelation finding its ultimate philosophical exposition in Nietzsche's mock-Biblical 
epic of Zarathustra, would also find place in a constructivist, gestalt paradigm previously outlined in 
Kurt Goldstein's 1936 holistic biological study entitled The Structure of the Organism240• In his 
keynote work, Goldstein identified "catastrophic reactions" within the biological workings of the 
human organism. With Goldstein, the catastrophic is not at the level of the existential as with the 
schizophrenic experience of the end of the world, but at the level of the organism. It is from 
Goldstein's lead that Tosquelles asserts a structural change to the personality through a specific form of 
lived experience, elevating it to existential status: 
The catastrophic reaction, if it appears at the level of the lived with characteristics of sorrow and if it 
opens concrete man to the possibilities of becoming a person, places itself as a complete "emotion" 
within the fecund moment of the passage from biological structures to psychological structures. If we 
want to seize its "essence", it shouldn't be isolated beforehand and its characteristics speculated after, 
but on the contrary, it should be placed within the organism, understood as an 'All' to rediscover its 
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antecedents and developments.241 
Here, upon the plane of Man's behaviour within society, the catastrophic appears at the level of the 
personality and of an organism considered as a whole. The catastrophic reaction, fmding a post-war 
psychiatric pronouncement through the manifestation of the mock-biblical phantasm, elsewhere 
described by Tosquelles as "affective phenomena, affective phantasms not of an intellectual order,242" 
was particularly attributable, as a unique mechanism to the evolution of psychoses, to the then widely 
studied neuro-physiological dialectic of integration-disintegration243 . For Goldstein, the conception of 
the catastrophic reaction was of a biological level underpinned by this dialectic of evolution and 
dissolution (integration-disintegration) within the organism and the personality. So too was it for 
Tosquelles in his pointing toward a psychopathology of an end of the world complex uniquely 
emerging in a France having experienced occupation and liberation. Yet for Tosquelles, a mere social 
analogy was not enough, for such a psychopathology was to fmd its ultimate address in an internal 
dialectic of the personality oscillating between the biological and the psychical: 
Lived experience manifests and expresses a new existence and in this manifestation is the created. The 
manifestation and creation of the Self is a single act of personality, not as the effect of a magical thought, 
but of an internal dialectic.244 
The internal dialectic to which Tosquelles referred, was the dialectic of the evolution and dissolution 
within the organism. Here, catastrophe finds its pronouncement in it being inscribed upon the body as 
well as a traumatic collapse within the psyche. Goldstein, who deemed his approach an "organismic 
theory245", positioned the organism as a whole, as a totality where the ontological genesis of dissolution 
and disintegration upon the biological level was to be in respect to the Wholeness and complete 
functionality of the organism itself ensuring a unitary synthesis. With this, in the maintenance of a 
Whole, fragmentation could not be permitted but the constancy of unification ensured. The global 
comportment of the patient was thus not to be understood by the juxtaposition of isolated signs but 
through observing phenomena against the unitary assembly of the organism. 
In his 1939 study, Goldstein asserted that the processes of the nervous system and psychic 
phenomena were to be understood in terms of physical laws246• In drawing upon Gestalt Theory he 
established the identity of structure to the changes effected within material and psychic phenomena and 
from here he proposed that in all cases of material and psychical modification, there would always 
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remain a question of the global reaction of the organism, be it in relation with something of the 
physical or the psychicae47. For Goldstein, the local symptom or the isolation of the symptom had a 
modifying effect upon global processes where the qualitative nuance of a given symptom could carry a 
local factor. But, the specificity of the symptom depended upon the reaction of the organism in its 
ensemble, as a whole, in its totality. Of concern to Goldstein, was a psychopathology of the whole and 
the unification of the ensemble248• In other words, the value of disintegration (and the concordant 
ontological movement of reintegration) only keeps its value in relation to a whole and contributes to 
the repositioning of the organism in its totality. Thus the "fecund moment" to which Tosquelles refers, 
a moment which we have noted to be first worded by Lacan in communicating rupture, is presented as 
a necessary global moment appearing upon the path from the biological to the psychological. The 
"catastrophic reaction" brought to the psychiatric plane by Tosquelles, in an analogical stroke, in the 
address of an "existential catastrophe" deemed the Erlebnis, was for Goldstein, some twenty years 
earlier, a particular case to the integration-disintegration couplet. What was a biological catastrophic 
reaction for Goldstein, is presented as the existential catastrophe for the schizophrenic by Tosquelles. 
The integration-disintegration couplet is an interdependent co-evolutive couplet, and it enables 
Tosquelles to underscore the precariousness of psychic equilibrium yet at the same time its 
inexhaustible possibilities for the reconstruction of the personality. Thus the double proclamation: 
"There is no disintegration without integration, nor integration without disintegration/49" holds well 
for the biologist as much as the psychiatrist. 
The key concept at the root of gestalt therapy, as explicitly displayed by Goldsetin's holistic 
study of the organism, was the notion of the whole, where, as Clarkson, one of the more contemporary 
exponents of Gestalt Therapy notes, "the whole is always more and different from the sum of its 
parts.250" The whole is for Goldstein the keystone to the "organismic" approach finding its virtues 
within a unified field theory, or rather a "unified experience of fields." Moving in the general direction 
of "organismic integration" Goldstein saw the person as a totality of function where the aim was to 
focus the awareness on the various modalities of experience, to address holes in the phenomenological 
experience of the patient. Further, he conceived the living organism as a multilevel organism, of sets 
and subsets functioning as a whole, where an organismic self-regulation pertained to a self-realisation 
as the basic motive of the organism, where the self-realisation of the individual, as if analogous to 
psychical laws governing the organism, would be the coming to terms with the world, 'wholly' and the 
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experiences of that world integrated into the adaptive ontology of the organism. The unification of 
the field is where wholeness thus contains the implicate order of the personality corresponding to an 
"organismic" reasoning of the Self. From this, a pattern of organisation and structural cohesion as the 
integration of experience into the whole proves the goal of Goldstein's holistic approach. Recall that 
for Goldstein, the symptom was the preservation of the organism whereby the patient would enter into 
a self-realisation of his body, and this, under the ordinal law of "organismic integration". A 
figure-ground relation was further proposed, to highlight the gestalt formation in the foreground as a 
functional integrative measure to the organismic background. With this, the existential problem of 
continuous change, required a multi-level adaptation of the thinking organism: 
For Gestalt therapy, homoeostasis and creativity go hand-in-hand. I need to come to some kind of 
balance with my environment (homoeostasis ), but this cannot be a conservative act of returning to the 
previous balance, since the field is changing, and what worked before will often not work now. I must 
then invent new ways of balancing my needs and interests with environmental possibilities (creativity). 
At the same time, my environment will be responding creatively to my actions, so that homoeostasis, 
often seen as a conservative force, is actually seen here as the driving force behind creativity, 
and creativity makes homoeostasis possible in a changing world. 251 
Under this generic imperative of integration to a law of wholeness, figures do not exist in isolation 
(fragmented), but always stand out against a background of the organism. The succession of 
figure/ground is continually changing over time and the experience of this change is integrated both 
upon the biological level and the psychical level. What is now figure becomes ground for the next 
figure. This, is the relationship between the succession of figures and grounds in the phenomenal field 
that constituted for Goldstein, "the meaning of the situation" marked by the logic of an organismic 
unity:l52_ It was upon such a ground, that the catastrophic for Tosquelles, was presented as a rupture, the 
fecund moment of the figure-ground relation necessitating a function of delirious reconstruction of the 
personality restoring a tentative existential equilibrium. 
For Tosquelles, the integration-disintegration couplet pronounced through the catastrophic 
complex, a couplet of the biologically and psychically lived and elsewhere deemed the "dialectic of 
events," was not to be confused with the antithetical phenomena of formal logic. Of importance for 
Tosquelles, was the ontology of dissolution and the constructive, creative, industrial possibilities this 
dialectic carried for the personality, where phenomena would give way to a new emergence of a unitary 
form, "always upon the path" in the wake of deluge. Indeed, with reference to the organism and the 
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psyche Tosquelles noted that, "the crucial phenomenon explodes to give birth to a new beginning." The 
fecund moment thus furnishes the affirmative in its activity of reconstitution. The New Jerusalem of 
John, phantasm of possibilities and new forms, mock-biblical delirium, thus resonates as an analogical 
register addressing the level of the body as well as at the level of the psyche, where both constitute the 
lived experience of the Erlebnis and, it is upon such a ground, that Tosquelles announces, the "living 
reality of psychical life" understood as the living unity of psychical life, a reality resonating psychically 
and biologically in the direction of the integrative capacities ofthe organism towards a new unity. 
(2) This importance accorded to the regenerative experience of the world was not merely an appeal to 
Goldstein by Tosquelles. Revelation of the biological and the psychical was further underscored in his 
referencing Von Monakow and Mourgue's landmark neurological work of 1928, Introduction 
Biologique a !'Etude de Ia Neurologie et de Ia Psychopathologie: Integration et Desintegration de la 
Fonction253• The dynamic, teleological neurology ofMonakow and Mourgue emphasized, as Goldstein 
would later do in the wake of such study, the holistic, regenerative capacities of the brain and 
ultimately its innate spiritual impulses for unity and ensembles. This, highlighted, at the level of 
neurological lesions and hemorrhages, the tendency to construct somethine. Indeed, such a study 
precipitated the "organismic" neuropsychiatry of Kurt Goldstein who himself concluded from studies 
of brain-damaged soldiers that the brain was set up in such a way as to strive always for a holistic "fit" 
in the world, and in fact suffered a "catastrophic reaction" in its striving for a unitary synthesis if a fit 
was not automatically achieved254. Thus we see Tosquelles, in his thesis, write of the phantasmic 
announcement of the end of the world experience (the erlebnis of the end of the world) to be, in a 
Goldsteinian sense, a figure momentarily detached from its vital ground, in crisis, necessitating a 
reaction to maintain wholeness, not to original states but to a form of new-found correspondences: 
"The lived, as if a figure detached upon the ground oflife. 255" 
For Monakow and Mourgue, the term of importance, pertaining to the 
integration-disintegration couplet to punctuate a paradigm of cerebral reconstruction and organismic 
unification, was the Stoic term syneidesis ( cruv£f5r]OI<;). The term had most notably found full voice 
within Pauline and Patrisitic Thought, most notably being employed in Paul's Letters to the Romans of 
the New Testament. The significance of Bible declaration informing pathological epistemology 
becomes increasingly apparent with such a direction of research. The word syneidesis finding its root in 
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the Greek syneidenai meaning to bear witness to one's self was otherwise commonly translated as a 
'self-consciousness'. Philo of Alexandria, under the influence of the Old Testament, stressed the 
ethical self-observation in syneidesis, this as expressed in Paul's letters, and attributed to it the function 
of elenchos, that is, of accusation and conviction. For Monakow and Mourgue in lifting the term from 
its religious corpus yet keeping its role of self-observation or self-consciousness, they communicated 
an instinctual conception of integration and disintegration, of the organism's and more particularly, of 
the brain's auto-movement, or rather, of the self-consciousness of the organism to regenerate itself as 
appeal in a maintenance of a unitary synthesis. This was, as Monakow and Mourgue asserted, the 
"dynamic scheme" addressing a, "kinetic melody:" Syneidesis, was an energy of integration 
re-establishing a sufficient level of organic function, even surpassing the original levd56. Julien de 
Ajuriaguerra and Victor Hecaen, neurologists of Henry Ey's clinic of Saint-Anne and warmed 
members of the Saint-Alban 1947 "effervescent" group, outlined in 1947, that in the case ofMonakow 
and Mourgue, "we fmd at the base of all vital activity an active force, the matrix of instincts.257" We 
parallel this with an assertion by Freud in the most neurological of psychoanalytic texts. He writes: 
It seems then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of 
things that the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external 
disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or to put it another way, the 
expression of inertia inherent in organic life. 258 
The conservative law of the living substance for Freud, marking the rudiment of the sexual instinct 
hypothesis, is understood as a formative instinct restoring earlier states, the, "need to restore an earlier 
state ofthings259" as Freud had it. This is a complimentary parallel to the post-traumatic reconstructive 
delirium, announced by Tosquelles to be the most "normal" of reactions, grounded upon the 
conservative signature of the organism to maintain the global character of man. The phantasm, thus 
addresses the imaginary within the conservative and in doing so announces the psychical body and not 
merely the physical body. The compulsion of the organism to reconstruct itself is a self-consciousness 
of the organism. Monakow and Mourgue attribute the term syneidesis to reconstructive neurobiological 
phenomena in seeing the organism of elenchelos, a scholastically spiritual Pauline organism even. 
Monakow and Mourgue present a primary formative instinct spiritually termed the Horme, paralleling 
the conservation and constructive, industrious recuperation of previous states, placing it under the 
auspice of creation, where in carrying the role of the "first instinct of all instincts," the Alpha of the 
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body, such an instinct is to be found at work with the ovum and the embryo. The neurologist Pierre 
Janet, similarly highlighted the continual instinctual formation of the organism, and in following 
Monakow and Mourgue, he asserted that, "a primary psychology does not develop after birth as some 
of the most advanced psychologists would have us believe, but with the fecundity of the embryo ... the 
instinct which creates man, is the formative instinct.260" Janet had seen with this Horme of Monakow 
and Mourgue, an argument that could scientifically advance embryonic psychology. In addressing the 
instinctual, auto-movement of the organism (syneidesis), Janet had found it possible to develop a 
psychology ofthe personality in the direction of the holistic-'organismic' ofGoldestein: 
The embryo works to distinguish. Skin is created - this is already something - to separate itself from the 
mother. So well does it manage to separate itself that it develops a cardiac rhythm and an elementary 
composition that is not the same. Such work, is what we call the work of the personality ... The lamp is 
spatially distinguished upon the table. The embryo is corporeally distinguished from the mother. But is 
such a point of view considered when we speak of the personality?261 
We can indeed place Janet alongside Monakow and Mourgue in his search for the key to the 
structurisation of the organ. From his own studies of the brain, the nervous system, its functioning and 
its upsets, its fecund moments, he himself would conclude that: 
The brain does not function like the heart which fmds its end in working a previously constructed organ. 
The brain continually forms itself. Up until the fmal day of life the brain continues the embryonic 
evolution and the consciousness manifested from this evolution.262 
This 'organismic' direction was set by Monakow and Mourgue, and provided ground for Tosquelles' 
psychiatric elaborations. Along with Janet, we can align Henri Ey who, in his organic-dynamic studies 
of Hughlings Jackson saw neurology and psychiatry under the general rubric of cerebral pathology in 
presenting them, in 1947 as "two species of the same genre." These two species for Ey, were united 
in their research of the architecture/architectonic of the nervous system263 . What concerned Ey was not 
so much John Hughlings Jackson's 19th Century expansion of Herbert Spencer's natural philosophy, 
but important role played by disintegration within the architectonic of nervous system function. For 
Jackson, when a superior level of cerebral evolution is disrupted alternative, primitive structures come 
into play to compensate and function for the damaged superior level. This is the announcement of the 
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harmonious kinetic typology of the nervous system which Monakow and Mourgue continually 
addressed with their notion of Syneidesis. 
Ey would see this dynamic scheme announce the specialisations of neurology and psychiatry: 
where neurology sought to identify the primary symptom of schizophrenia as the "disorganisation of 
the function of language"(psychiatry), psychiatry would assert that, "such a lesion has an effect upon 
the acoustico-kinesthetic perturbing the instinctual modes of the personality?64" It was Henri Ey, in 
drawing upon the teleologically pathological studies of Hughlings Jackson and Sherrington, that had 
proposed to Ajuriaguerra and Hecean (post-war French incarnations of Monakow and Mourgue) that 
neurology was the science of localisable instrumental disintegrations and that psychiatry was the 
science of superior, global dissolutions. Ey ventured to outline a non-dualistic organo-dynamic 
direction for psychiatry: For localisable instrumental disintegrations, the focus of neurology, Ey 
outlined three characteristics: 1) Of partial disintegration marking a deficit of certain functions in 
contrast with the integrity of other functions, 2) Of basal disintegrations characterised by Ey as 
"primitive, elementary functions" leaving the global, superior cerebral edifice intact, 3) Of localised 
functions identified as those having the greatest of value, as those expressing the trouble, the explicit 
and most significant functional disintegrations. For the psychiatric and its accorded concern of 
dissolution, benefiting from the focus of neurology, Ey proposed a pathological plane of energetic 
functions, of "global dissolutions" and "energetic functions". The three principle characteristics to this 
plane were: 1) Global dissolutions troubling the general behaviour of the subject: delirium, 
"schizophasic language" (the disorganisation of language), 2) Dissolutions upsetting the functional 
architectonic of a subject such as disruption to spatio-temporal syntheses, to a, in Jackson's words, 
"composed order" - an upset to the architectonic understood as a disruption within the pathology of 
psychoses, 3) that such dissolutions could not be localised despite an engendering lesion. This said, 
Ajuriaguerra and Hecaen would assert neurology to be the study of motor functions in the maintenance 
of the organism's essential structures of organisation. Psychiatry, presented as the study of the 
functions of comprehension of the Self and World. Both, rather than a separation, meet one another 
upon the grounds of schizophrenia. In the case of the hallucinatory phantasm, or the veritable 
hallucinatory Erlebnis of the ed of the world, a consciousness that is at once enunciative and 
revelatory, constructive in its delirium, fecund, is announced at the level of the organism, the self and 
the world. It is Ey's bio-psycho-social-gestalt paradigm, a status of interest he accords Saint-Alban, as 
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the crux of his own Nee-Jacksonian organo-dynamic psychiatry under the rubric of the psychic body 
and its architectonic announcement within the integrative and disintegrative strategies of the nervous 
system. 
This was a resistant gesture by Ey to an oversimplification that would position neurology as a 
mere study of illnesses of the brain, and psychiatry as the study of pure mental illnesses. Furthermore, 
this oversimplification had previously been levelled at Ey's conception of a neo-Jaksonian 
organic-dynamic model of psychiatry where he was seen by some to have "neurologised" psychiatry, 
whilst others had seen him to "psychiatricise" neurology65 . For Ey, the chemical and the anatomical 
were a necessity for psychiatry which, in order to mature into a science of mental illness, needed to 
incorporate the cerebral and generative processes of psychoses within its developing corpus. His 1947 
salute to the effervescent group of Saint-Alban, and to Tosquelles in particular as, "the animatoi66" 
thus carries a recognition of a sentiment close to that of the organo-dynamic, albeit a sentiment 
announced through a mock-biblical phantasm. Ey's approach was an organo-dynamic one pointing to 
the concordance between symptoms and functional cerebral lesions inscribed within a certain area of 
the brain, and, the necessary energetic processes deploying psychic functions and psychoses which 
would not necessarily depend upon the cerebral lesion engendering them. With this, we better 
understand T osquelles in asserting: 
There is thus in each patient, beyond the processes that condition the dissolution of the personality, an 
effort, as vital need (lebensnotendigkeit), an impulsion to arrive at a new form of unitary life. 
Sometimes, this effort presents itself as automatic, sometimes, as a veritable act of Will or even of faith. 
At this moment, the influence of the psychotherapist can be decisive for the future of the patient.267 
This statement is reflective of the entirety of Tosquelles' thesis which is a veritable palimpsest of 
Goldstein, Monakow and Mourgue, Janet, and Ey fused through his Catalan gestures inviting an 
extension of Biblical principles translated through the theoretical speculations of neurology, 
speculations, which give psychotherapy a concrete sobriety in its "adjectival" approach to mental 
illness and the "simple" experiences of man!men268 . Such a method was in the name of what 
Tosquelles saw to be, in the wake of his analogical readings of Goldstein and Monakow and Mourgue, 
a "spontaneous poetic production of men where a poetic reformulation sees the pronouncement of a 
putting into form. 269" 
Through the palimpsest appeal to unity where the organism stands within a post-war world, 
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within visible and invisible ontologies of reintegration and regeneration, the thesis of Tosquelles thus 
stands within the trauma of society, the research of the neurologist, the language of the psychiatrist, 
where the privilege of the vocation, one historically bittered by war-time events, finds an architectonic 
announcement270 • Thus we recall Ey in his celebratory exposition of Saint-Alban accord the 
announcement the concern of bio-psycho-social-gestalt. The psychotherapist thus placed at the vital 
level of the patient, as with an Oury within the insulin seance initiated into the syncretic space, 
positions him near to the frequency of catastrophic reactions and the dramatic character attributed to 
them both psychically and biologically. Indeed, the biological conception of catastrophic reactions 
proposed by Goldstein opened a new perspective for Tosquelles, revealing human presence more than 
ever before within psychiatry in an appeal to madness, la folie, as a creation and not, as Tosquelles was 
to write, a "passivity?71 " In considering the organism genetically and in not refusing the increasing 
momentum of study into neuro-psychic phenomena Tosquelles would be seen to assert that such 
phenomena themselves would not contain the emotion of "distress" or "anguish" but have a concordant 
relation to such emotional states where he would assert that, "current observations and clinical 
reflections show well certain cases where these phenomena seem to support such emotion.272" Sleep, is 
one such group of phenomena appealing to a psychopathological reflection upon the 
integration/disintegration couplet to which Tosquelles turns: 
Sleep (in that the dream is tentative of integration, is the mechanism which permits us, in the waking 
state, to centre our interests upon another state, to go from one series of actions to another, from one 
point of view to another, from one technical system to another. These two types of phenomena place 
themselves within the organism at a crossroads between biological structure and psychological 
structure. 273 
(3) Such a crossroads, had been most notably displayed by the neurological study of Viktor Von 
Weizsi:icker, who, in his work entitled Der GestaltKries did not draw upon the term 'catastrophe' but 
'crisis' to assert a new birth within the organism, as he had it, "a new center of gravity found within the 
modified organism.274" For Weizsi:icker, this new center of gravity within the organism was to be 
understood as a subjectivity, a modal pronouncement of a Vital ground where each modification of the 
organism was marked by a 'crisis'. These modifications to the organism understood as 'crises' were 
nothing of the negative, but of the constructive in their marking the "acquisition of a new principle" 
within the unity and coherence of the organism (Kohiirenz). Crisis, for Weizsi:icker, was to be 
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understood as a "rupture" ofrelation nearing the veritable biological disappearance of the subject. Thus 
we position 'crisis,' alongside the, 'catastrophic' and the 'fecund'. Yet from this dissolution, from this 
rupture of relations, a new relation would instill itself automatically within the organism giving birth to 
a new subject, and thus prolonging life: 
It is when the subject is menaced to disappear in a crisis that we can most notably see his existence. We 
begin to recognize the existence of certain things when we have lost them ... The unity of the subject is 
coupled with the object...the events of our milieu form a unity by virtue of functional changes ... the 
unity of the subject is only constituted within a incessant restoration in the wake of crises.275 
We compare this with Tosquelles, under the rubric of the St. John's New Jerusalem276, and the 
Goldtseinian-Monakovian principle of integration and reconstruction (not forgetting the assertions by 
Janet (the formation of the personality by way of the Monakovian Horme) and Ey (non-localisable 
energetic renewal of the non-dualistic organism): 
The crucial phenomenon explodes to give birth to a new beginning277 
Here, Tosquelles presents to us the rule governing the dynamics of the Biblical, the Neurophysiological 
and the psychiatric/psychoanalytic - it is a simple, yet weighted, beautiful phrase, one later faithfully 
paralleled by the pen a young Gilles Deleuze in writing that: 
All this clearly supposes that the formation of the world is of two times, two levels, birth and 
rebirth, where the second is just as necessary and essential as the first, and where the first is 
necessarily compromised, born for a reprise and already reborn within a catastrophe. There is 
not a second birth because there is catastrophe, but the inverse, there is catastrophe after the 
origin because there needs to be a second birth.278 
We have here the rule working Genesis and Revelation, the lightening bolt illuminating Lacan upon a 
"clouded Mount Sinai" on the third day of the third month, the principle of the phantasmic projection 
of the self as Apocalyptic root to civilisation announced by the end of the world complex (Oury). The 
"fecund moment" (Lacan), the "crisis" (Weizsacker), the moment of not being able to "fit" 
necessitating the "catastrophic reaction" of reforming to an "organismic principle" maintaining 
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wholeness (Goldstein), "syneidesis" that cerebral auto-reconstruction (Monakow and Mourgue), a 
"vital need" (Tosquelles), Freud's instinctual compulsion, is where the organism thus marks a 
qualitative modification of the whole necessary to maintain the encounter between the organism and its 
milieu in the wake of deluge or the very near complete dissolution. 
For Goldstein and Weizsacker, the catastrophe, the crisis, was implicit within the 
neurophysiological existence of the organism. The "drama of man" at the level of neurophysiology is 
pronounced at a non-dualistic level of the psyche and the body (Ey's organo-dynamic principle). With 
this, we are reminded of Saint John's apocalyptic vision drawn upon by Oury and Tosquelles for the 
first time in psychiatric history, a vision now considered as a lived neurophysiological narrative, 
socially, biologically and psychically (the bio-psycho-socio-gestalt of Ey) 279 • It is where the 
psychiatrist finds himself at the crossroads between the psychological and the biological, at the "fecund 
moment," and it is here, that the phantasm, as "projection of the self', is a pronouncement of 
civilisation (Oury), the psyche, as well as the body, where Lacan's "drama of man", as with Saint 
John's Vision of the Apocalypse and the New Earth, is a statement addressing the vital level of the 
species. As Oury would note fifty years later, "it is something at the level of the genes, inscribed, upon 
the body.280" Tosquelles positions the Vecu, the Erlebnis at this very level of the biological, where the 
subject is within an incessant rebirth with each modification marked by a crisis (Weiszacker), a 
catastrophe (Goldstein), a trauma (Freud). A vital level is marked by rebirth and the revelatory 
possibilities of the organism in the direction of a unified subject (Tosquelles, Goldstein,) announced 
within a syncretic space (Oury). For Wieszacker, this unitary synthesis was to be termed the "circle of 
form", the gestalkreis. Bin Kimura, the foremost contemporary exponent of Weizsacker's philosophy 
elucidates such a term well: 
The continuity of an ensemble is constituted by the organism and the milieu, beyond the provoked 
ruptures of successive crises. That which guarantees continuity within discontinuity is the interweaving 
of the organism's perception and movement. Weizsacker names this interweaving Gestaltkreis. Gestalt 
does not signify the form of an objectified thing, but the principle of that which constitutes the form. The 
coherence of the organism is maintained by "circular interweaving" of perception and movement, a 
structure of the ensembles, the "circle ofform."281 
Tosquelles, and the seminars of Oury in particular, would not directly draw upon the term Gestaltkreis, 
although their references to Weizsacker would be many, particularly because the befriended 
159 
phenomenologist Henri Maldiney would extensively draw upon the Weizsacker-inspired 
phenomenological scholarship of Erwin Straus. Rather, Tosquelles and Oury, would opt for a term 
introduced by the Gestalt study of Hanz Prinzhom, the Gestaltung, to describe the process of a 
non-objective emergence of form, a process of putting something into form, a principle, very close, 
almost analogous to Weiszacker's circle of form. To Kimura's explanation of the Gestaktkreis we add 
Oury's assertion of the Gestaltung: 
There is a field, a "site" that one can define as a field of emergence of that which manifests. This field is 
not of the objective. It is a certain field where something "happens."282 
And we parallel with Paul Klee's assertion: 
The theory of the Gestaltung is of the paths directing form. It is the theory ofform ... Genesis in as much as 
the movement of form, constitutes the essentiality of the oeuvre.283 
We now better understand our previous usage of the term Gestaltung. Recall our previous assertion: 
"The catastrophic signature would be the hallmark of a revelatory drive within the enigmatic evolution 
of psychoses punctuated by phases of reconstruction and emerging forms of a new world 
(Gestaltung)." Now we can understand that it is thus not the emergence of something that can be 
readily objectified by existing apparatus of scientific or psychiatric observation, but the emergence of a 
principle of a Genesis. For Weizsacker, as Kimura shows well in his psychopathological study of 
schizophrenia, this principle is the "circle of form" as background against which, and beyond which, 
the occurrence of the provoked ruptures (the crises) within the organism occur. Goldstein's 
"organismic principle" also, as we have seen, guarantees the coherence of the whole beyond the 
catastrophic reactions, amplifying Freud's conservative, instinctual organism yet an organism not 
returning to the previous state of affairs (Wiezsacker). There is a self-conscious duty, a vital necessity, 
of the organism to maintain wholeness and coherence beyond crises, rupture, catastrophe and with this 
we are once more before the syneidesis of Monakow and Mourgue. Again, we retake Tosquelles, this 
time advancing the depth of his writing in understanding the scholarship that grounds his assertion: 
There is thus in each patient, beyond the processes conditioning the disillusion of the personality, an 
effort, a "vital need" (lebensnotendigkeit), an impulsion to arrive at a new form of unitary life. 
Sometimes, this effort presents itself as automatic; at other times, it represents a veritable act of Will or 
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even of faith. At this moment, the influence of the psychotherapist can be decisive for the future of the 
patient. 284 
Our earlier assertion of, "the sentiment displayed by Tosquelles would be one of"uncovering a world" 
of these structuralising phantasms, these happenings within this zone of an "imaginary consicousness", 
a space of structuralising phenomena ... "is what we can now advance and understand as the "site" of 
the Gestaltung, of the emergence of form to a principle of revelation and renewal marking a vital effort 
(lebensnotendigkeit) to maintain unity (organismic unity). Weizsacker, as we have seen, describes this 
movement towards a unitary synthesis as, "a new center of gravity within the organism.285" With this, 
the privilege of the psychiatrist is now announced with even greater weight, for the psychiatrist has a 
key role within the "drama", a drama not just played out on the socio-historical plane, but upon the 
plane of the organism and upon the plane ofWill and faith. The world of"mystery" into which we saw 
Bonnafe dare us to follow him, is one where the psychiatrist/psychotherapist has a decisive influence 
and engagement, for it is a point of contact with Lacan's discourse, "a language as ancient as man 
himself', and such a discourse is of the organismic with its implicit processes and the psychicial with 
its explicit announcements, identification and descriptions - the phantasm. The phantasm, as we have 
said, thus becomes an organa-dynamic announcement within which it incessantly strives for a unitary 
synthesis, and it is a striving pronounced at the level of the personality and the organism, both, 
extending the amplification of a vital need (lebensnotendigkeit), yet we also recall that it is in the 
direction of the syncretic and the heterogeneous. Here, we can understand Tosquelles in writing: 
Madness is before all else human presence and expression. It is true that madness announces a malady, 
but madness also expresses a man and afact.286 
Indeed, it is the Erlebnis of the end of the world that expresses a man and fact: the figure becomes 
momentarily detached from its ground, the fecund moment. We thus fmd support with an assertion 
appearing at a later stage within his thesis: 
Upon the clinical plane, it is easy to see how the patient lives the pathological event: existential 
catastrophe that fmds its most fitting expression within the end of the world phantasm.287 
This, is the decisive moment, the delirium, the psycho-pathological event of figure-ground detachment. 
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To this, is coupled the sentiment of a psychopathology loosened from its base of clinically determined 
illness where we see Tosquelles head an institutional charge against "the biological and social 
conditions that determine the evolution of what we call the morbid tableau.Z88" As with a Bonnafe or a 
Nietzsche, Tosquelles is out to tear through the matrix of myth. The manifestation of the catastrophic in 
its phantasmic form is accorded a human value. It pertains to a principle of creation, coherence and 
maintenance. It is where the body and society facilitate the task of understanding existential change 
revealed through a "revelatory consciousness289", where, "the subject lives a situation290," it is the 
inauguration of a, "site" a, "clearing" of, "something happening, something emergini9b' from the very 
"simple" encounter. 
With W eizsacker, we see a proposed a principle of perpetual formation beyond crises ensuring 
a new center of gravity within the organism. The Gestaltkries (the principle of form) to which the 
activity of the Gestatultung (the putting into form) is accorded, is where unity is one of a constitutive 
transformation where, as Weizsacker writes, "There are laws of form.292" Henri Maldiney, who would 
eventually fmd himself in fraternal amities with Tosquelles and Oury at the clinic of La Borde, in 
following the idea of a new center of gravity within the post-critical organism, reasoned this to be, at 
once echoing Goldstein, Monakow and Mourgue, and Tosquelles, "the auto-movement of the 
animal. .. genetically determined within every here and now, a biologically operative space, where each 
direction constitutes a line of life.293" This, is the Gestaltung, what we have seen Oury describe as a 
"site" of "emergence," a field, where something of the non-objective emerges, where "something 
happens?%, Thus the assertion by Tosquelles in relation to the personality, "there is not integration 
without disintegration" is as he writes of an "internal dialectic," one that appeals to this post-critical 
moment of a new "center of gravity" ensured within the constitutive genesis of the organism and its 
conservative ontology. We also see Weizsacker assert before Tosquelles that, "There are laws of 
formation," but to this he adds, "yet each form is unique.295" The instinct conserves (Freud) in that the 
principle is one of renewal and reconstruction (Monakow and Mourgue, Goldstein, Weizsacker), yet in 
its reconstruction the same-state-affairs is no longer of the same, but a new system of references. 
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8: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
Tosquelles saw the Erlebnis, lived experience, and more precisely the Erlebnis of the end of the world, 
the Vecu of the catastrophe, to be a transcendental experience, yet an experience, "not in the practical 
sense of the word.296" For Tosquelles, the Erlebnis of the end of the world was a revelatory experience 
where the personality accorded an "existential efficacity" to experience, pronounced through the 
mock-biblical phantasm, a phantasm, as we have noted, pertaining to the personality considered 
"organismically." This was to position Man in his creative, active, capacities where mental illness 
would thus lose its passivity. The pronouncements of mentally ill man's active process of psychosis as 
the announcements of Man's creative capacities are thus joined by the appeal to the what Tosquelles 
pens to be the efficiently lived: 
Be it a dream, an imaginative phenomenon ... an event of everyday life ... Everything can become lived 
experience and experience of the efficiently lived. 
Lived experience, in announcing a new post-catastrophic (Goldstein), post-critical (Weizsacker), 
post-Apocalyptic (St. John) existence in the wake of its precursory "existential catastrophe" 
(Tosquelles), is a creative manifestation of the Self, both active and efficient. In Tosquelles briefly 
drawing upon the small Phenomenological study of Paul Louis Landsberg, he ventures to propose not 
an opposition between two types of the experiential 'I', but an existential modality of the 'I' itself. 
Lived experience, a vital, efficient experience, an experience, as we have seen, addressing the principle 
of things-coming-to-be and the emergence of form, is accorded a transcendental character as an 
alteration to the mechanical character of the 'I' of the empirical evenr97 : 
The "I" ("JE") that we find with lived experience appears always as an "I" ("JE") different to that which 
lives the events of everyday life. An event can reveal to us the experience it contains sometimes a long 
while after its announcement.298 
The transcendental 'I' is tied to a revelatory function, a "revelatory consciousness/99" it is the 
revealing agency of phenomena, for lived experience supposes a revelation of the self and world, it is 
where such disclosure of things-coming-to-be, of emergence, of the rooting of the gestalt with its 
suffixes of -ung (Prinzhom, Oury) and -kreis (Weiszacker), is not formulated, nor premeditated but 
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anticipated by the clinician. It is the fecund announcement from within the empirical, upon that 
crossroads between the psychological and the pathological, where a bio-psycho-social announcement is 
articulated. It is, as we have seen Oury describe it, a "mirage of the everyday," a dimension blurring 
categories requiring a particular approach, a particular thinking, sense, intention and value where 
presence "reigns" breaking with the mechanical nature of events to which Tosquelles accords the role 
of a, "strict consciousness.300" We therefore position, with Tosquelles, the Erlebnis of the end of the 
world, with its phantasm of a delirious function, through paths of the Biblical (St. John) and the 
Neurological (Goldstein, Monakow and Mourgue, Weizsacker), to be a grand revealing both at the 
level of the psyche and the body tied to the emergence of form, and to the existential phenomenon of 
presence (recall Oury's description of l'Aimable Jayet). Thus, where we previously wrote, 1947, was 
the year of a particular complex, the emergence of the enigmatic pronouncement of Man and Madness, 
we can now write, 1947, was the year pronouncing a revelatory consciousness, announcing a lived 
experience, of the existential phenomenon. Where we wrote, accorded to mental illness, was a 
revelatory nature, as principle of an existential catastrophe (catastrophie existentiel), we can now 
write, existential catastrophe brings into play a vital need (lebensnotendigkeit), announcing a principle 
of formation (Gestaltung) and coherence (Gestaltkreiss) within a new beginning as hallmark of a 
revelatory consciousness. The principle of formation and coherence, sees the New Jerusalem descend 
as a Whole new world in the wake of the passing of the first earth, as with the organism in the wake of 
crises and the personality in the wake of an existential catastrophe. 
Although Landsberg makes a brief appearance in the 1948 thesis, one limited to a paragraph of 
citation by Tosquelles outlining the transcendental 'I', we would do well to consider Landsberg's 
exposition on the Christian experience of death within his one and only complete publication Essai sur 
L 'experience de la Mort. We put Landsberg forward along with the likes of St. John, Goldstein, 
Wiezsacker and Monakow and Mourgue. Landsberg's assertions of Christian death can give greater, 
complimentary weight to the religiosity ofldea supporting the terrain of the end-of-the-world-experience, 
or more precisely, of the phantasm of the-end-of-the-world, its pronouncement of a principle of things-
coming-to-be, and the transcendental experience it brings into play. Indeed, what Tosquelles deems the 
Erlebnis of the end-of-the-world through which the personality is announced wholly new through a 
reconstructive genesis of psychosis, Landsberg calls the experience of death against which a unitary 
synthesis of man and the divine reside. Landsberg saw the ontological fundament of the experience of 
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death to be a "unifying transformation301" (transformation unificatrice) marking the transformative task 
of man. 
9: Tosguelles and neo-Catholic phenomenology 
In the preface to Landsberg's 1946 Essai sur L 'experience de la Mort, Jean Lacroix described 
the short one-hundred page work by the Catholic disciple of Max Scheler, as his, "intellectual and 
spiritual testament of Paul-Louis Landsberg.302" This intellectual and spiritual testament was of an 
engaged philosopher who, in 1937, had been asked by Leon Brunschvicg to teach a course at the 
Sorbonne on the philosophy of existence and who would eventually be arrested by the Gestapo in a Vichy 
Lyon in March of 1943. Again, we retake a phrase in deeming the unoccupied zone of France, "the 
questionably free Vichy State." Jean Lacroix, in his preface to Landsberg, would call it "a zone said to be 
free. 303 " The philosophical manuscripts of Landsberg, studies spanning the Renaissance and 
Phenomenological movements have, according to Lacroix, long since disappeared. He writes that 
Landsberg, "had disseminated three important manuscripts on the conception of man. Up until now, not 
one has been recovered.304" The three manuscripts had been sent before Landsberg's suicide on 2nd April 
1944 at the camp of Orienburg near Berlin. His short work, as both an intellectual and spiritual testament, 
was, for Lacroix, "pages, at once lived and thought,305" an adage most fitting to the sentiments of the 
post-war psychiatric corpus, of a psychiatry at once lived and thought, concretely affirmed from the most 
simple yet dramatic of human experiences, bearing the seal of the Erlebnis, and the post-traumatic 
delirium of the end of the world, the reconstructive announcement and emergence of a new world in the 
wake of deluge. 
What Landsberg deems a, "unifying transformation" is at once both a spiritual and vital process 
present within the dissolution of the organism, where dissolution necessitates revelation. This was a 
dynamic of two sides, one of realisation, the other of actualisation, both, pertaining to the personality. He 
writes: 
This organic process [of dissolution] pushes the person to resist with his realisation. On the other 
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hand, this organic process is opportunity for his actualisation. One could even say, that the givens 
of psychic existence, are equally transformable by personalisation.306 
This, the process of ''unifYing transformation" is where the organic and the psychic meet under the rubric 
of personalisation. Yet more than this, the role of personalisation, of the personality-coming-to-be 
(Werdesein) is an organo-dynarnic principle of actualisation to which the organic is a relative 
signification of the personality. Landsberg calls this transformative process the, "spiritual appropriation of 
death307" which he presents as the transformative task for humanity: 
Personal existence is not a fatality. It has for its task the transformation of the fatality of death 
into liberty. 308 
For Landsberg, this transformative task is one where Man is to realise and etemalise himself, an 
impulsion, an "act" at the very, "root of being, a vital need (lebensnotendigkeit) to affirm oneself.309" 
Here we recall a patient of Tosquelles announcing, "I am eternally made man," at once declaring the 
capacities of experience (Straus) and a reconstructive psychic act of affirmation (Tosquelles). Death, thus 
changes its nature from a mere material negation of life to an affirmation and actualisation of the 
personality through a realisation resonating at the level of the organic, as well as the psychic. The 
phantasm thus presents itself once more as the imaginary incarnation of this resonance announced 
through what we saw Oury call these "monsters of language." How close this is to Oury's syncretic 
initiation of insulin. A unifYing transformation is pronounced through a realisation said of personalisation 
in the face of dissolution, be it of the organism or the personality/consciousness (Oury, Landsberg, 
Tosquelles). Being, is thus not being towards death but being towards a realisation of the eternal, the free, 
and the possible where death is transformed into an active principle of unitary life. Landsberg tells us that 
death, is surpassed as an "event of the future," where the affirmation at the "root of being," the act of 
realisation, "implies a surpassing of time310" itself. It is where for Tosquelles, man becomes his destiny 
through a "creative imagination", the phantasmic announcement, "I am eternally made man." 
In following the Pauline and Patristic convictions of the Spanish philosopher Miguel de 
Unamuno, Landsberg ventures to propose a state of expectation as, "discovering infinitely more than the 
sentiment of man.311" Indeed, where Unamuno was to write, "Expectation is thus the noble fruit of our 
efforts which produces being ... and what produces a reality," Landsberg would pen, "Expectation, 
constitutes the sense of our life and prolongs the affirmation contained within the intimate structure of 
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being in general.312" Expectation, is the act of personal existence, it is "the spiritual appropriation" of 
death, an "incomparably intimate" factor of being towards realization, or as Tosquelles has it, a 
"revelatory consciousness. 313 " For Landsberg, expectation (/'esperance) is not the same as hope 
(l' espoir). Hope doubts, expectation affirms, but it affirms through a "creative movement of our existence 
as a whole.314" The impulsion at the root of existence, the causative factor to act and actualise at the root 
of being, is an impulsion towards a "creative" expectation, and with it, comes the new and the possible, 
life, affirmation, in the spiritual appropriation of death understood as a process of personalisation: 
Without the analogous impulsion towards expectation, trees would not produce the new life of their fruit in 
autumn. We know with Man, in that he is a spiritual person, cannot exist without expectation. This is not a 
hope for something or another, but creative expectation.315 
The task of human existence for Landsberg, is therefore, this creative expectation and more specifically, 
of the actualisation of this expectation through a realisation and revelation. This, had personally 
resonance for Landsberg, for as he was to tell Lacroix in the sununer of 1942, "I have encountered Christ, 
he has revealed himself unto me.316" For Landsberg, it is Man, of the new religion, announced through 
Christ, who can, "transform and transcend his mortal condition," that beyond death there exists "Life.317" 
Landsberg draws upon "terrestrial life" to show that it is not to be met with fate, but possibility, creative 
and transformational possibility. The end, destruction of the self, is not ultimate but precursory to a new 
birth where dissolution marks a principle of emergence, not of the form itself, but of the coming-to-be, 
enabling the 'I' to, for Landsberg, transcend the "mortal condition.318" Perpetual disintegration marks an 
affirmative principle of possibility, it marks the capacities of reintegration through revelation. More than 
this, the transcendental experience of the 'I' is structured, in terms of Christianity, for Landsberg around 
the apparition, or more precisely, upon the revelation of Christ. He writes: 
The apparition ofChrist ... marks the real change of the human situation.319 
With Landsberg's personal revelation, "I have encountered Christ, he has revealed himself unto me,320" 
we see that actualisation is contingent upon a revelatory declaration through which a personality comes to 
be, yet it is not mere empirical, mechanical experience as Tosquelles is keen to highlight, it is a 
transcendental experience, and for Landsberg, it is a transcendental experience of death, a 
transformational experience said of man's properpersonalisation: 
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At each instance, the world is destroyed. The instant dies in its birth. The past devours the future ... The 
instant, the only dimension and chance of presence, is thus the only chance 
of possible existence ... 321 
This incessant dissolution marks a concordant integration, he continues: 
In truth, if there is a life that is a death, then there is a death that is a life. 322 
And from this double proclamation we retake Tosquelles: 
The crucial phenomenon explodes to give birth to a new beginning.323 
For Landsberg, revelation is the transformation of death and the announcement of human liberty said of a 
transformative possibility exemplified by the psychophysiognomy of Saints. Similarly, for Tosquelles, a 
"revelatory consciousness" announced through the end of the world mock-Biblical phantasm is the 
pronouncement of a new world marking the reconstruction of the personality. Delirium is thus the active 
principle and revelatory agency. Destruction, the crises, the near complete dissolution of the self 
(Weizsacker), does not announce negation, but an eternal, affirmative dialectic of unity, one that 
celebrates the New Jerusalem (St. John). For Weizsacker there is always a new center of gravity within 
the organism in the wake of the near-fate of the subject, and as with the sigh it is not merely limited to 
pathological reasoning, but experience itself (Straus). As with Landsberg's Christian dialectic, there is 
LifeNie beyond life/vie or rather Life/vie within life/vie. Landsberg continues: 
Life in the biological sense of the word, shows, in terminating, that it is the basis of presence, an 
indispensable base for the realisation of human spirit within human being ... This is not the necessity of 
death, but a special way of uncovering the multiple virtual structure of our terrestrial existence. 324 
For Landsberg, the philosophical act transforms the sentiment oflife and death where man is the result of 
an internal activity. Likewise for Tosquelles, the psychotherapeutic encounter transforms the sentiment of 
madness, where man is the result of an internal activity, projected through the phantasm of the end of the 
world. Where in the first, man participates in the world of ideas, in the second man participates in the 
world of man. Philosophy and Psychiatry are thus married by the inherent transformation of man borne 
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through his revelatory capacity, a capacity subject to traumatic extension and delirious pronouncement. 
Where in the first, the human person close to the divine participates in his proper eternity, in the second, 
the psychiatrist before the phantasm participates in a drama of undecided limits and possibilities. Both, 
reach into an area rarely accessible to most, the Real, beyond the veil in the most Nietzschean of senses. 
The privilege, is one of revelation, concretely affirmed through a dimension of contact. Liberty within 
death (Landsberg), liberty within madness (Tosquelles) sees an active principle of creative personalisation 
and revelation, not announcements of a terminus, a limit marked by an eventual and fmal dissolution, but 
an affirmation marked by continual transformation and reconstruction, new centers of gravity, unique 
forms within the organism and within consciousness. Thus we see Tosquelles write as if a palimpsest of 
Goldstein, Monakow and Mourgue, W eizsacker and Landsberg: 
To say in an all too hasty yet nevertheless true fashion, the life of man- always developing its singularity-
is complex and self-managing. Life invents its own forms of existence. It is in this sense that one could 
consider life as an act of trial and error in its effectuating of new forms of organisation. Man, to become his 
destiny makes use of his creative imagination .. .It is the reelaboration of the work in question that 
determines the concrete and variable life of men in their spaces of existence ... that which founds the 
concrete life of men is unveiled and accentuated by the creative imagination ... Life is, and above all 
remains, the art of living. 325 
Where Landsberg speaks of the essential liberation within death Tosquelles speaks of the essential 
liberation within madness. Where Landsberg announces his revelation of Christ marking the 
transformative principle of man, a patient announces his eternal creative nature - "I am eternally made 
man," marking a revelatory consciousness of madness. Both, as if a phanstasmic politic, appeal to an 
initial transformation with the conversion of the human attitude as its effect. Both appeal to a revelation 
through a transcendental 'I' seeing man not before death or madness, but before the illimitless capacity, 
undecided limits, before an active principle at the root of man himself (the lebensnotendigkeit) . Where 
Landsberg sees death as an active principle, Tosquelles sees the announcements of the end of the world 
phantasm affirm the active nature of mental illness and not, as we have previously noted, a passivity- the 
subject becomes the object in the wake of crises, catastrophe where a vital need maintains wholeness in 
the wake of a detached figure from its vital ground (Goldstein, Weizsacker), the Lacanian fecund 
moment. This, as we have seen, hallmarks what Bonnafe deemed to be a project of disalienation which 
finds a particular structure within the avatars of man revealed and disclosed by mental illness. Thus we 
see Oury write: 
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That which permits us to decipher the concepts articulating and organizing the elements of everyday 
existence [!'existence quotidienne]: transference, the unconscious ... the fundamental notions of the 
phantasm, of identification, of interpretation, etc ... come from a framework which supports action in the 
direction of a permanent disalienation ... 326 
10: Of Men and mock-biblical Nietzschean Divinities 
The therapeutic plane is one of human encounters. It is the psychiatrist who extends his scientific corpus 
by listening. Tosquelles writes that it is of"the here and now327"announcing, "creative possibilities328" not 
merely for a sector psychiatry but for the creative, lived capacities of man himself. It is not the product 
that concerns the psychiatrist, but the process and the coming-to-be of form, the putting-into-form-
gestaltkries, gestaltung, the principle of aesthetic genesis resonating at the level of the personality and the 
body (the phantasm) pertaining to the efficient value oflived experience. We retake Tosquelles: 
... The spontaneous poetic production of men, or rather, its poetic reformulation, this most pronounced 
putting into form ... 329 
Yet again we here another patient under the care ofTosquelles: 
I am God, I have always been God ... are you God? You do not have creation. That which was created was 
nothing of you. You did not want that which didn't exist.330 
We have seen how the pathological event lived by the patient saw an existential catastrophe 
expressed through the phantasm of the end of the world: psycho-pathology proper. The unique signature 
to this is the "creative imagination" (Oury) and the "revelatory consciousness" (Tosquelles) where a 
presence of something, the emergence of something, is announced, where a path emerges from within 
the lived intimacies of the phantasm. If in the first instance we observe the sentiments and emergence of 
the thesis of Tosquelles, in the second instance we observe the phenomenology of emergence and the 
revelation of phenomena within an all-inclusive, co-efficient, lived, drama. The revelation of the Self 
and world marks the transformative and creative capacity of the Christ (Landsberg) and madness 
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(Tosquelles ). This psychiatric art of medicine is the art of sympathy, the art of accompaniment where 
man is the living art. As with Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the man of madness announces a world of new 
values, where he is the agency for institutional and theoretical renewal. As we have seen with our 
selections from Tosquelles' thesis, this enables us to move towards understanding schizophrenic 
catastrophe in terms of a biblically analogical transcendental body. 
Conclusion: schizophrenia and the psycho-pathology of death and rebirth 
In our second chapter, we have observed how lived historical experience urged a medical embrace of an 
apocalyptic thematic. We have also observed a particular notion of the world, a phantasmic world, where 
psychotherapy goes from a mythic reality to an everyday reality, and as to how Tosquelles' thesis 
appealed to a profound psycho-pathology addressing notions of creation, emergence, possibility, and 
heterogeneity. It was important for us to see the chemotherapeutic context within which such notions 
corresponded. Insulin and the clinic of Saint-Alban provided us with such a context through which we 
were able to study the phenomenological assertions of Oury and Tosquelles, and notably begin to bring 
hitherto unadressed notions to the fore such as the "syncretic" post-comatic state and the physiological 
phenomenology of the sigh (analogously extended to characterising the philanthropic ideal of the clinic). 
We have seen how this appeals to an ethical consciousness, for the post-comatic state requires a 
maternage, an accompaniment, a co-inclusion of the patient and clinician, a profound relation. This is 
where we understand the "art of arts" to be an "art of sympathy." Furthermore, this has enabled us to 
localise the specific nature phenomenology adopts in terms of psychiatry. We have not only observed 
how the notions of catastrophe and revelation are unique to Tosquelles' doctoral thesis of 1948, but also 
how such notions are important for a psychiatric phenomenology valuing experiential knowledge over 
intellectual knowledge and classical nosography. In terms of this organo-dynamic dialectic, or in Ey's 
words, in terms of the "bio-psycho-socio-gestalt", we also investigated the notion of the Gestaltung and 
the Gestaltkreis. This further enabled us to understand the theme of rebirth and post-catastrophic, 
post-traumatic processes of reconstruction. We have seen how such notions addresses space and rhythm 
and how they correspond to a dimension rarely accessed, the site of re-construction, the space of 
re-articulation and re-building - a privileged, intimate space into which the psychiatrist is initiated. 
In our next chapter we will identify a "phenomenological sentiment," how it informs the 
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diagnostic, and more precisely, how it is understood as an "empirico-phenomenological attitude," an 
attitude that addresses the transcendental at the same time as the empirical. 
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Chapter 3: Psychiatry and Phenomenology: an introduction to the empirico-
phenomenological attitude1 
The function of the Praecox Gefiihl, whether performed by the nurse or the doctor, is the attempt to make 
the most use of certain moments, of "fecund moments," which usually pass unnoticed._ Jn everyday life, 
there are quantities of things that pass unnoticed for people._ .and sometimes it is a very small detail that 
can even change the path of existence itsel£ The therapeutic process addresses a mode of existence, it 
addresses an instant "opening", a reflection, an encounter, a true encounter. 
-Jean Oury, Pathique et Fonction d'AccueiP 
Knowing comes through feeling. 
- Erwin Straus, Les sens du sens3 
Introduction: the phenomenological sentiment 
We have previously observed two instances of ethical articulation defining the very ethical intention and value of 
psychiatry, the "good intention" of psychiatry as Oury has it. The first instance of ethical renewal was that of the "art" 
of mental alienation with Pinel where anatamo-pathology was not divorced from the discourse of the passions, the 
second that of a "disalienation" and the "art of sympathy." From the former, alienation would emerge as the non-
violent therapeutic measure, from the latter, a politic of desegregation and compassion would define the basis for a 
post-war Institutional Psychotherapy and the renewal and re-elaboration of the psychiatric personage. From here, in 
our second chapter, we ventured to analyse the defming phenomenological instances in the doctoral thesis of 
Tosquelles, the figurehead of the post-war fraternity, the "gelling agent." His study showed us as to how the 
biological, the theological and the psychoanalytic dovetailed to form a "polydimensional" paradigm of a post-war 
clinical perception, one of value to the patient-clinician relation, to the psychopathology of schizophrenia, and to the 
architectural vision of the Institution. 
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In this final chapter to the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry, we will 
approach the question of the diagnostic through our understanding of the ethic and phenomenology. We will be 
selective in our usage of the term phenomenology, and we will principally restrict our investigation to the 
particularity the phenomenological viewpoint Dr. Oury adopts, one that departs from the notion of the 
celebrated phenomenological epoche, or rather "bracketing off' of the world, yet one, unlike the strictly 
phenomenological tradition, which doesn't overestimate and over-invest in the transcendental Ego. At the 
same time, we will see how this view is faithful to the phenomenological tradition in addressing the work 
of von Weizsacker and Henri Maldiney, and demonstrate how a phenomenological diagnostic accords to a 
certain 'primordialism'. This will enable us to see how the schizophrenic symptom is one that is of a 
transcendental level, and most importantly how an "emprico-phenomenological attitude" relates to this. 
Most importantly, we will see this "phenomenological attitude" take the notion of human contact and 
presence as its distinguishing feature. 
We will also work towards explaining how the psychiatric diagnostic is at once 
phenomenological and ethical and more precisely, we will see how the work of Dr. Oury epitomises this 
"emprico-phenomenological attitude. 4" We will also keep to a point of clarification, namely, that 
psychiatry does not imitate phenomenology, but rather, edifies this phenomenological attitude. We will 
see the psychiatrist broadening his role and how this phenomenological diagnostic encourages a clinical 
debate beyond the remit of isolatable clinical symptoms. Key notions of the "pre-semiological," the "non-
linguistic," the "pre-objective," the "pre-cognitive", the "pre-egoic" and the "pathic" will be indeed seen 
to pattern the vocabulary and concerns of neurologists and psychiatrists alike, and more importantly, how 
such notions enable Dr. Oury to understand schizophrenia as "a trouble of transcendence" and a "trouble 
of incarnation." 
Our chapter will remain faithful to what we have called a "phenomenological sentiment" and we will 
substantiate this by selecting key moments within the work of Eugene Minkowski, Eugen Fink, Jean Oury, Erwin 
Straus, Henri Maldiney, Arthur Tatossian and Hubertus Tellenbach, figures that remain estranged from the remit of 
British medical historiography and scandalously under-researched. 
182 
1: The phenomenological way of seeing the world 
There is a particular sentiment pertinent to our enquiry. What we deem sentiment is an attitude 
continually present within the clinical considerations of the psychiatrist and the worldly observations of 
the phenomenologist, considerations and observations that address the most concrete of human levels, 
from the "most ordinary of experiences5" to the "profundity of human existence.6" In a true Nietzschean 
sense, and in fact in appeal to the worldview of Pinel, we could also call this a "noble sentiment." The 
sentiment, is a phenomenological one, yet we should note that the term "phenomenology" and its well-
worn adjectival form of the "phenomenological," has itself found lengthy employment. Since the notable 
and definitive inauguration of the term with Immanuel Kant in his laying the foundation for the sciences 
of exactitude7, phenomenology has indeed become the most recognisably employed term throughout the 
disciplines. Of the same epoch as Kant, was Friedrich Oetinger, a prominent exponent of the Pietist 
tradition, and a theologist impassioned by the theosophy of Jakob Bohme, who saw phenomenology as 
designating the study of the intimate, divine correspondences and interrelations between the visible and 
invisible world8. For the mathematician Johann Heinrich Lambert (with whom Kant corresponded from 
1765), "Phiinomenologie" would mark the title of the fourth section to his Neues Organon of 1764. In 
Lambert's 18th Century scheme paralleling Newton's mechanisation of the world picture with such 
notions as the "world-edifice" and "the system of the world," phenomenology was considered to be the 
"doctrine of apperances" because appearances, for this notable physicist of a post-Liebnizian Germany, 
were the foundation of empirical knowledge itself. The post-Kantian Idealist, Hegel, in an appeal to what 
he called "Absolute Knowing," delivered us to the enigmatically yet hastily penned Phenomenology of 
MincfD this was a documentation of the Neo-Platonic, Messmerist and Bohmean currents permeating 
the minds of the leading thinkers of the day. Phenomenology marked an approach, an initiation even, into 
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a majestic sensory achievement analogous to the comunion with God sought in religion. For Hegel, the 
once Tiibingen student of theology, phenomenology described the accession of consciousness to a mode 
of self-critical thought beyond all non-questionable mythical "givens." 
Franz Brentano, the Tiibingen-trained founder of the school of "the science of mental 
phenomena," elsewhere termed "scientific psychology," was born seven years after Hegel's death in 1831. 
In his doctoral dissertation of 1892 entitled On the Multiple Senses of Being in Aristotle, Brentano 
declared his passion for the "multiple modalities" of existence. Phenomenology was not so much a term 
to be traditionally employed, but an attitude explicitly and faithfully alluded to, one that appealed to a 
world of process and variation. Brentano sought a method of accessing the true unity of man, where truth 
rather than exactitude was the founding inspiration. In Brenatno's work, this appeal was by way of the 
Scholastically-weighted notion of "psychognosy," which for Brentano, ever the introspective psychologist 
of the late 19th Century, designated a particular methodology of what he called "descriptive psychology," 
a sceince of the mind bringing to light the elements of human consciousness and the unity of their 
connection11 • Brentano was a formative influence on Edmund Husserl who saw phenomenology to go one 
step further than the psychognosy of his mentor. With a graceful vocabulary of description, Husserl 
qualified phenomenology as a, "field of neutural research" proceeding in a purely intuitive fashion, an 
intuition of essences (Wesenschau), an "essential inuition," "laying bare" the "sources" and unified 
"generality" of all things, giving them "clearness." For Husserl, man was within a world of mistaken 
consciousness, a world obscured by habits and preconceptions, a world whose truth had been masked by 
the idealised formulations of mathematical physics since Galileo. Man's world, was one of scientific 
crisis necessitating phenomenological resolve12. 
The measure of such resolve was for Brentano a "descriptive psychology" addressing the unity 
of consciousness, and for Husserl it became a "science of maternal origins, 13" laying bare a path from 
empriciallife to transcendental life and with it, an access to the original and true nature of all things. Yet 
this science was not only a corrective measure to what Husserl called a "naive realism" where man 
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existed independently of the world, but a method declaring the coalescent genesis of world and man, an 
attitude taking the "intuition" of "essence"as its starting point, a method "bracketing off' the 
presuppositions maintained by nafve realism and the idealisations of mathematical physics. Truth had to 
be accessed, and it couldn't be so through natural history, objective psychology and natural scientific 
medicine. 
This approach to the world was extended by Husserl's cohort and founder of the Berlin school 
of experimental psychology, Carl Stumpf, who, true to the lead of Brentano - yet with more of a 
restrained pen which by no means produced a less impassioned vocabulary - referred to phenomenology 
as the sudy of "the ontological relation between sensory contents. 14" Phenomenology was a sceince 
disclosing the unity of consciousness within which truth was to be found. This science of disclosure found 
sympathetic extension through Martin Heidegger, Husserl's assistant at Freiburg, who did not want to see 
a phenomenology follow the normal sequences in which experiences habitually run, but rather engage 
with the question of a transcendental truth, a "problem of the truth-character of being (veritas 
transcendentalis)" as he had it15. The sympathies and sentiments of phenomenology continued with 
Heidegger leading an appeal to the a priori level of man, where, as he was to write, "The a priori 
character of being and of all the structures of being accordingly calls for a specific kind of approach and 
way of apprehending being - a priori cognition. 16" This a priori cognition, that of a pre-conceptual 
communication with phenomena, one paralleling Husserl's "pure" intuition of essences and "essential 
intuition," was to constitute the very sentiment of a phenomenology declaring the hidden profundity of 
the life-world, of a particular attitude taking transcendental truth and the a priori cognition of being 
(Dasein) as both its theme and founding anthropological gesture, as declaring, for some, "the hidden piety 
of divine being within. 17" The prioritising of an a priori cognition and a pure intuition of essences, were 
for the phenomenologist, veritable archaeological tools for uncovering the truth of mind and world I man 
and world. This was both Heidegger's and Husserl's salutary gesture to Kant's genius, a genius which 
delivered us to the faculty ofthe Imagination working an aesthetic synthesis oustide of the object-concept, 
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a "faculty of a priori intuitions" proper, "of a pure inuition," of "pure representations. 18" Indeed, if 
phenomenology had a politic, it was to address the subsistent essence of things, as index to an 
"objectivication" that did not seek to abolish the communication of and with the world, but further 
understand its most intimate workings. What this communication was to disclose, was a transcendental 
truth momentarily stepping out from its obscurity, a truth, as if, to use a word by Heidegger, always 
"withdrawing" with man's approach. What the phenomenologist did, in anticipating this announcement of 
a withdrawing agency of all things, was to keep a respectable distance with the horizon of the world19, 
and in doing so maintain the anonymity and inaccessibility of a Judea-Christian divinity20• 
Of worth in highlighting this particular phenomenological sentiment, is to also recall the disciple 
of Edmund Husserl, Eugen Fink, a phenomenologist who crafted the most alluring of phrases, and who 
wrote of phenomenology's task to be, "the bringing to light of the equivocal" (Entwirung einer 
Aquivokation).21 The undertaking of the phenomenologist, true to the Husserlian appeal to transcendental 
truth, and Heidegger's appeal to transcendental a priori cognition, was to "open up a horizon or 
panorama/2" and to address a "cosmological horizon?3" For fink, phenomenology was an equivocal 
philosophy, a philosophy that did not unfold in accordance to "pre-determined" objectives- a science that 
would not be contented in finding its assurance within the empirical fact (the ontic field of phenomena). 
Rather, phenomenology was founded upon an "uncertainty" of phenomena and that within this 
"uncertainty" there would be "possibility" of getting closer to the transcendental geneses of the subject and 
world. Man and the world were thus co-inconclusive aspects of a cosmos, and phenomenology the 
privileged pursuit of this enigma to which all could turn through their very existence. For Fink, the 
elucidation (Aufklariing) of the equivocal, was a descent into the "authentic problematic," into an 
"enigmatic depth24" or rather, a penetration to the very "interior of pre-given everyday man,25" or even as 
an, "opening between the Earth and Sky.26" This elucidation would in turn bring to light a transcendental 
truth, namely that man and his cosmos are an "impossible monograph," immeasurable and without 
conclusion. For Nietzsche, the impossible monograph was an infinite horizon to which the philosopher 
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could but be an "Argonaut" of an ideaf7: 
We argonauts of the ideal, with more daring perhaps than is prudent, and have suffered shipwreck and 
damage often enough, but are ... healthier than one likes to permit us .. .it will seem to us as if, as a reward, we 
now confronted an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody has surveyed yet, something 
beyond all the lands and nooks of the ideal so far, a world so overrich in what is beautiful, strange, 
questionable, terrible and divine ... 28 
In neighbouring the sentiments of Nietzsche and his immediate mentor Husserl, Fink accorded 
Phenomenology the role of a "progressive research" into the "absolute origin" of all things. What he 
sought was a comprehension of the "anonymous horizon" (Nietzsche's infinite horizon). Man, for Fink, 
was as an existence- albeit a doubtful one29 -within the constituting "transcendental flux30" of movement 
and "auto-transformation3 ~, of the world. This is indeed a beautiful phrasing, and one that is reminiscent of 
Nietzsche writing of the primordial "gospel of world harmony." Such terminology declared an appeal to 
the "Logos of the world"32within which the authentic and permanent situation of man resided, a situation 
of eternal "constitutive production33" to which phenomenology would prove the most fitting method of 
enquiry. 
Such phenomenological enquiries nurtured the comprehensive anthropology of the Frankfurt 
School, and most notably the Thought of the neurologist Jiirg Zutt who indicated a two-tiered phenomenal 
reality. Zutt, who received a formative education in theology and phenomenology as well as medicine 
(theology and medicine throughout the history of psychiatry seemingly go hand in hand), saw the body 
not as an isolated physiognomy of the world, but as a phenomenon continually integrated and interlaced 
with its surroundings and its milieu (Umgang). More specifically, the body was both of the aesthetic and 
physiognomic, at once of the transcendental and empirical - ontic-ontological (to use a Heideggerian 
term). In Zutt's words, the body was to be conceived as "aesthetico-physiognomic.34"This was a notion 
providing plausible pretext for introducing the body as being of two, subtle, interlacing coalescent levels. 
The "supporting-body" (tragen de leib) was proposed as that which is lived within sensation, an implicit 
support, as "the hidden and ever-present frame of reality,35" as an unnoticed yet constant support to the 
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life of man. The "body-as-it-appears-to-be" (erscheinende Leib) was proposed as that which is declared 
within an "atmosphere" ofhabitualities and in being so it was seen to belong to the physiognomic domain. 
Both these dimensions compose what we commonly call human being, and more importantly, what we 
call the body. With these two levels, Zutt saw the body to exist within a reality that was at once affective 
and physiognomic. Just as the eye is to light, and the ear to noise, the body, for Zutt, is affective and 
"comes to be not just within perception" but within "sensation and feeling." True to the sympathies and 
sensitivities of the phenomenological attitude, the "supporting-body" was not to be said of cultural 
idealisations and a world of pre-determined objects, but of a "pre-conceptual" communication with the 
world where, prior to conceptualisation, the body existed as pure sensation. With this, the lawful 
connection between self and world said of the supporting-body was not of objective perception 
(Wahmehmung) but of feeling (Empfinden). Man was to be inaugurated within the world affectively and 
"pre-conceptually," and the body would stand for the "veiling and unveiling its essential nature.36" 
Certain historical examples from the disciple of linguistics, to which Dr. Jean Oury has often 
turned in order to better explain this transcendental domain of constitution, also prove of fundamental 
worth to understand the specific development of a phenomenological sentiment within psychiatric 
enquiry37• With general linguistic theory, for example, there is a "given language" which is enunciated 
and constituted, and "sense" from which language emerges. This is a basic tenet to general linguistics, 
and it was notably established De. Saussure when he spoke of the "material sound" (the constituted 
spoken language) and the "incorporeal language" (the ever present frame of constitution from which 
language emerges)38 . Similarly, the Polish linguist De Courtenay, who was a key influence on De. 
Saussure, delivered us to the idea of the "sounds oflanguage." He proposed two key technical terms: the 
"physiophonetic" (phonological) dimension and the dimension of "phonic images" which belonged to the 
"psychophonetic" (morphophonological)39. These were not separate dimensions but coalescent: sound 
doesn't exist without the phonic image. Just as the body for Zutt doesn't exist without its incorporeal 
(aesthetic) support, the physiophonetic and the psychophonetic are interlaced realities. The Russian 
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linguist Nikolai Trubetzkoy, advanced things in the field of phonology by presenting the idea of the 
"atomistic" and the "universal." The phonetic, language proper, was of the atomistic order, the 
phonological as "that which we imagine to pronounce" belonged to the universal, prior to the 
enunciation40• This was very much similar to De Courtenay's physiophonetic and psychophonetic model. 
The phonetic for Trubetzkoy, belonged to the atomistic - the level of language; the phonologic - the 
universal - belonged to the realm of sense (of the "incorporeal" for Saussurian linguistics). The 
transcendental level of constitution thus exists, for these linguists, as the phonological level furnishing the 
phonetic - there is a constitutive dimension beneath, or prior to, the phonetic. It is language that comes 
from sense, the atomistic from the universal, the sound from its image. 
Within the history of Quantum Theory, also, a particular sentiment is present. The physicist 
David Bohm appealed to a coalescent order of things. This was depicted by an intimate narrative of what 
he called an Explicate Order and an Implicate Order. The given (composed world) is constituted by what 
Bohm called a "sea" of energy, "understood in terms of a multidimensional implicate order" furnishing 
the very principle of life41 • There is the "undefinable," indefinite and immeasurable the apparently 
defmable, definite and measurable. What Bohm appealed to, was the "relevance of new differences" and 
more importantly, "the perception of new orders, new structures and new measures.42" Much like a Fink 
declaring the impossible monograph of man, Bohm therefore tells us that in giving a "primary 
significance" to this immeasurable and indefinite dimension, any attempt to establish a permanent, 
fundamental theory would "have no meaning." Rather, what each theory does is to abstract and make 
relevant a certain aspect where, "general modes of description that belong to a given theory serve to 
relevate a certain content.43" Indeed, whether a linguist, physicist or psychiatrist, phenomenology marks 
an abstraction of the immeasurable and indefmite into a relevant theorisation, not just of the empirical fact, 
but of the transcendental reality underpinning everyday life. Therefore it is not surprising to see Bohm, 
who was a keen reader of both the Aristotelean and Taoist text, revert to the "immeasurable" in much the 
same way as Oury often reverts to the "impossible." We also recall Horace Torrubia, the Catalan 
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psychiatrist, drawing upon the adjective "undecided" in speaking of the limits of man, and the eminent 
neurologist Erwin Straus write of the "immeasurable endowment" to man himself. 
What therefore marks the phenomenological undertaking is a particular attitude expressed by a 
particular language, one that seeks not to disclose the all-constituting frame of reality, but develop its 
significance. The History of Ideas is therefore patterned by an array of personages who stand as luminary 
pillars supporting the very post-Kantian edifice of phenomenology's scope. Indeed, the word 
"phenomenology" has a tradition of its own, one that has proven the most weighty task of many a scholar 
to elucidate, both as a foundation for the sciences, as a necessary "propaedeutic" to the sciences, or even 
as a theologically grounded rendition of the world picture44 . Yet for Dr. Jean Oury, a pioneer of post-war 
French psychiatry and ever the champion for a "concrete phenomenology,45" the integrity and candour of 
the phenomenologist is not to be found with the intellectualisation of human affairs or a 
"bureaucratisation of Thought," as Tosquelles had it in 194846. Rather, as Oury put forward in a seminar 
held at Angers in 2002, the "sincerity" of the phenomenologist, is in him being an artisan of the concrete, 
or a builder who listens, in his addressing a reality to which, as Helmut Plessner was to assert with poise, 
"the empirical sciences of nature are unsuitable.47" Oury explains: 
Phenomenology is not to be found within weighty tomes - of course we can read them, why not? -But it 
is present each and every day, within everyday life, when we encounter someone for example. The 
phenomenologist always has scraps of paper on him upon which he notes down his observations and what 
he hears. There are some extraordinary phrases that have been said by schizophrenics, and we can say that 
phenomenologists, when they are honest, pick all this up and do something very effective with it.48 
For Oury, who himself starts from what he calls "metapsychological hypotheses ... from concrete 
abductive inferences,49" these phrases of the schizophrenic are allusions to a greater directive activity of 
things, they are explicit of a transcendental dimension, indicative of a more profound, "initial" human 
reality, of another "scene ... where something happens.50" Addressing the world perceived other than 
through a "logico-positivist" optic of a traditional, "positivist ... scientific" logic therefore becomes the 
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measure of phenomenological honesty and the sincerity of its method. The observations of the 
phenomenologist, noted down on scraps of paper, scribbled as if a modest observer to the great events of 
the day, declare, "the possibility of following a path that is neither classical nor normative ... " one that 
discloses "a domain of the most primordial of environments. 51" The phenomenologist under the "honest" 
auspice is as a Cezanne who sought to "paint the virginity of the world,52" an unexploited virginity 
declaring itself to man through sensation. For Cezanne this communication was through the "singular 
sensation of the blue.53" For Henri Maldiney writing in 1953, it was through this sensation, that reality is 
not merely said of the "sum of objects that surround us," but is rather situated, "at a more elemental 
level...within which a profound communication is rediscovered,%' a communication in turn shadowed 
and masked by "the intellectualisation and mechanisation of modem man and his universe. 55" Where the 
phenomenological attitude would urge Husserl to assert the crisis of man and his scientific world to be of 
a "naYve realism," and Heidegger would write that man was still not thinking/6, Maldiney asserted that, 
"that which is most lacking in modem man, is sensation. 57" Before man thinks, he feels, and he senses. 
The phenomenologist Paul Louis Landsberg (who is unknown to the English speaking shores), 
a once student of Max Scheler, was a thinker who proved of decisive import for the 1948 doctoral thesis 
of Fran9ois Tosquelles. Through Landsberg, Tosquelles was able to show that phenomenology addressed 
human experience and existence beyond empirical experience, that it addressed a more profound level of 
the transcendental 'I' and its announcements beyond the given certitudes of an empirical world. This was 
a post-war phrasing by Tosquelles and an echo of Husserl who appealed for a phenomenological method 
to begin from a "natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and 
persons ... to the transcendental life of consciousness.58" Yet the pen ofTosquelles, rather than being close 
to a Neo-Kantianism, was closer to the fated Gestapo-hunted Landsberg who, in his appeal to "revelatory 
life" beyond the limits of "chronological life," favoured the phenomenology of spiritual life and a 
Christology over the "rigorousness" of phenomenological psychology and the Husserlian School of 
phenomenology. Landsberg, did not divorce himself from the very identifiable markings of a 
191 
phenomenological attitude through which the rigorous and the spiritual can meet, for he saw 
philosophical address to be of a more affluent level of life beyond tbe empirical event, beyond the 
"given," of a world intricately knitted by indispensable transcendental relations, a world truer tban that 
which is commonly taken for granted and observed by classical science. As he wrote: 
Phenomenology has shown that human experience is richer from the qualitative viewpoint, rather than 
from the idea borne from classical empirical experience. It has also shown that the contents of experience 
is never a simple co-existence of isolated givens ... but that it contains necessary relations. 59 
Such a world, was disclosed to Landsberg through the Christ, where as with Cezanne's blue which 
captivated Maldiney in 1953, revelation comes through sensation, the unmarred "virginity" of the world 
to which tbe Husserlian purity of intuition allots the role of "essence," another "scene" even, within a 
world of"double aspects" as the psychophysical worldview of Gustav Fechner had it in 186060• 
If we observe and spend time with the work of Henri Maldiney, Fran9ois Tosquelles and Jean 
Oury, what we cannot fail to notice is that the word "phenomenology" comes to designate an attitude 
sensitive to processes constituting something of tbe concrete, an attitude attentive to "the most originary 
of human situations, 6 ~, another "scene" of life, be it of the fecund moment between tbe psychological and 
the biological as Tosquelles' thesis ventured to underline, or the ontological maintenance of the nervous 
system, as witb the neo-Jacksonism of Henri Ey and tbe Gestalt neurology of Kurt Goldstein, von 
Monakow and Mourgue, and Viktor von Weizsacker. This was the focus of our previous chapter where we 
saw neurological terms such as the "organismic principle" (Goldstein); "syneidesis;" the "horme" 
(Monakow and Mourgue) and the "crises" (Weizsacker) distinguish a scholarship that highlighted a vital 
necessity of organic reconstruction and dissolution, a background against which the organism evolved. So 
too was it where we saw notions such as the Wahnsfunktion of Gruhle mark a post-traumatic 
reconstruction of the lawful connection between self and world through delirium in the wake of trauma 
(Freud) and existential catastrophe (Tosquelles). And we also saw that tbese studies extended Freud's 
inaugural proposition of the organism's "need to restore an earlier state ofthings.62" 
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This maintenance of the empirical subject at the level of the psychical and the biological, invites 
the question of a saliency beneath the everyday, taken-for-grantedness of the self, world and body, of a 
dimension, to use the designations of twentieth century phenomenologists, beneath, or prior to, the 
thinking empirical subject. A clear declaration of this "phenomenological attitude" was given in the 1948 
doctoral thesis ofTosquelles we have oft quoted throughout our study: 
The "I" ("JE") that we find with lived experience appears always as an "I" ("JE") different to that which 
lives the events of everyday life. An event can reveal to us the experience it contains sometimes a long 
while after its announcement.63 
From this statement, one faithfully taking its lead from Landsberg, man is said of two levels, or rather two 
I's: the empirical 'I' and the transcendental 'I', a life of two aspects (Fletchner), and it is the psychiatrist's 
task to engage with such a narrative, elucidate it phenomena and more importantly, decide the point of his 
intervention64. The transcendental for the likes of Tosquelles, Oury and Maldiney, is a word that can 
appear simultaneously deployed within the phenomenological and the theological. Lacan himself, did not 
speak of the transcendental body, but opted for the more enigmatic description of an, "incarnated body," a 
body that is not merely an "empirical fact, 65 " a mere isolated physiognomy, but transcendentally 
constituted and interlaced with its world, as "the ear to sound and the eye to light.66" Maldiney paralleled 
Lacan by writing of the "transforming and transposing67" of the body; the body as a "vivant-vecu" 
(living-lived), a body both empirically and transcendentally lived, a body that is "not a closed independent 
unity68" but a phenomenal field where "something else is at play.69" Similarly, Gisela Pankow, a disciple 
of Kretschmer and eventual dear colleague to both Oury and Tosquelles, would display similar theoretical 
punctuation to Lacan in asserting schizophrenia to be a "trouble of incarnation:" schizophrenia is a 
"transcendental trouble70" where the subject is not properly incarnated within his body. This trouble of 
transcendence or a trouble of incarnation presents two theologically-tinged expressions immediately 
addressing the role of a profound level of reality to which the phenomenologist turns, a "transcendental 
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world ... of sensation71 " for Maldiney, and a world continually punctuated by the studies of Oury and 
Tosquelles, of concerns for transcendental truth (veritas transcendentalis) and its organismic, psychical 
and spiritual expression. Such was a Tosquelles of 1948, who in drawing attention to the psycho-
pathology of schizophrenia, indicated the profound modification to the transcendental 'I' surpassing the 
"isolatable" empirical fact. He did this in order to bring to light the role of an unnoticed yet constant 
support to the life of man, the troubles of this support, the changes to this support, and the announcements 
manifesting at the level of this support. Thus is the position of Maldiney, who informs us not so much to 
consider the symptom or the tableaux of clinical indices, but rather the "expressions of the psychotic. 72" 
Indeed, Maldiney is of those phenomenologists to whom Oury accords an "honesty," of those who jot 
down their observations of statements and gestures declaring a deeper constitutional level to man, 
observations enabling us to go from the objective to the subjective, from the empirical to the 
transcendental, from the reality of objects to the reality of sensation and feeling. 
The question of this transcendental 'I', or transcendental support, can also be posed at the level 
of the nervous system, the biological and cerebral, as we have previously seen the likes of Monakow and 
Mourgue, Goldstein, Weizsacker, Ey, and Janet demonstrate so ably. Furthermore, it can also be suggested 
at the level of the psychical and spiritual, as Tosquelles and Landsberg have shown. For the latter two, in 
tandem with the neurology and Gestalt-psychology of the former, the transcendental was as if a vast stage 
upon which empirical man stood and lived, as if the ground supporting the figure, constituting the life of 
man by way of an intimate figure-ground relationship. Thus when Tosquelles writes that there is a 
transcendental 'I' and an empirical 'i' it is not so much to present an opposition, but rather alert the reader 
to an intimate activity of the figure-ground relationship, and explicitly hint at the role of the constant 
support to his psychical and biological life. So too is it for Maldiney, who writes of the body, as being of a 
two-tiered order, as being of a double aspect, the "vivant-vecu." 
For Tosquelles, in taking his lead from the neurology of Goldstein and Weizsacker, the figure-
ground dialectic is where there is an "organismic principle" at work, ensuring a continual maintenance 
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and performance - a vital ontology of integration and disintegration. With the phenomenology of 
Landsberg, man could not be without his revelatory and spiritual ground (being-towards-revelation), with 
the neurology of Monakow and Mourgue the organism works through a "Syneidesis," the auto-
reconstructive instinct of the organism, the vital necessity to maintain. Thus we see Tosquelles assert, in 
extending the figure-ground dialectic of neurology to the psychiatric concerns of the personality, that 
schizophrenia is where the "curtain falls" upon the stage, where something "collapses" within the 
concomitancy between the empirical and the transcendental, where the dialectical relation of the figure 
and its ground is upset. So too for Oury, who in echoing the near-theological sentiment of Lacan and 
Pankow appealing to the "incarnated" body and the "troubles" of incarnation, would later note that man 
exists supporting this "curtain," but when he can no longer support the curtain's weight it falls, and there 
is a "collapse of transcendence" itself73 , there is a trouble of "incarnation," a trouble of the transcendental 
body necessitating an industrious reconstruction. In the event of this trauma, delirium (the Wahnsfunktion) 
marks a return to equilibrium, albeit one that is psychotic and different to before. 
We can therefore see the commonality of a particular sentiment and vocabulary shared between 
the phenomenologist and the clinician. For philosophy spanning its most ancient form to its contemporary 
rendition, the "immeasurable" and "undecided" was said of the Logos, typified by the Heraclitean adage, 
listen not to me but the logos. What Heraclitus in fact invited the man of enquiry to do, was venture 
beyond the empirical fact. Indeed, much like the Greek medic-philosopher, the psychiatrist, impassioned 
by the immeasurable constitutive agency of things, abstracts from the transcendental level and works with 
the question of the Logos74, for as we see Jean Oury tell us on one occasion: 
Last month, I spoke of the Heraclitean Logos, and Lacan expounds Heidegger's "Logos." [ ... ] With 
schizophrenia the fundamental characteristic is dissociation, the Spaltung, where the Logos does not 
function ... within dissociation there is the deterioration of the Logos.75 
The "phenomenological attitude" is resolutely adopted within several domains at once. Of course it is 
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within philosophy, but also within biology, linguistics, physics and psychiatry. And even if particular 
schools within such histories at times do not even venture to mention the term "phenomenology" itself, 
the phenomenological "attitude" can nevertheless be strongly present. For Georges Lanteri-Laura, the 
field of psychiatry was of a particular token gesture in it, "conserving the phenomenological attitude, 76" in 
it edifYing this very attitude, where traditional medical concepts were to be re-elaborated through 
phenomenological notions of the world. Similarly, earlier in 1949, from within a psychiatric milieu that 
had experienced the horrors of war, the Eugenic systematic starvation of the mentally ill, the humanitarian 
call of Balvet, the de-alienist appeals of Bonnafe and the doctoral thesis of Tosquelles, Dr. J.H. Van Den 
Berg would write of a "new orientation of psychiatry" characterised by a "phenomenological position," a 
position that would seek to develop a new conception of clinical and anthropological proportions 77 • 
We thus have a plane of mutual concern, an attitude and vocabulary shared within numerous 
fields. Where the physicist Bohm would write, in a tone remarkably similar to Eugen Fink, of a striving 
for "new theoretical notions of order. .. without abstract preconceptions of the world78" Tosquelles would 
write of "are-elaboration of man and his spaces of existence" within a "variable concrete reality. 79" For 
the former true to his mentor Einstein, the abstraction was from a universal "sea" of constitutional energy, 
for the latter, the abstraction was from what Lacan deemed the Real (not Reality) and what 
phenomenology deemed the Horizon. For Lacan, the transcendental level of constitution enrapturing 
physicist and phenomenologist alike was the Real, and the Real, as if the divinity of the theologian and 
the universal force of the physicist was, "that which permits us to exist.80" This constitutive and 
transcendental dimension to all things, is not be known in its entirety, but abstracted into a relevant 
pertinence for the psychiatrist; the Real can only be put into relief, relevated (to retake a wording of 
Bohm), it is of an "inextricable resource", and for Lacan it would even fmd its symbolic pronouncement 
with the mystery of Mount Sinai and its flashes of illumination81 , for the Real appears like a flash of 
lightening, it leaves its mark, as a lightening bum upon a tree, but its entirety is of an impossibility, as 
Oury says, it is the "impossible Real". Ever-present yet beyond a measurable grasp, what Lacan deemed 
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the Real was the constantly displaced horizon of the phenomenologist, anonymous in its entirety, relevant 
in its abstraction. For Fink, this horizon was always to be displaced, the monograph of man was 
impossible to write, the phenomenologist could only be mesmerised by something so near yet so 
distanced, the monograph of the Logos of the world could but be put into relief and abstracted, yet never 
concluded, never known in its entirety. As we have previously asserted: "What the phenomenologist did, 
in anticipating this announcement of a withdrawing agency of all things, was to keep a respectable 
distance with the horizon of the worlcf2, and in doing so maintain the anonymity of a divinity." This is 
why Heraclitus urges us to listen to the Logos, and that the psychiatrist, in the words of Oury, is a builder 
who listens. The Real (the constitutive agency of man's psychical, biological and spiritual life proper) is 
an "impossible Real," rarely touched and pronounced through the schizophrenic episode83 . Schizophrenia 
is indeed an opening onto this dimension, but it is an anthropological dimension unique to the people of 
this earth, that is, to all of humanity. We exist, by virtue of the impossible horizon where the barriers of 
impudent convention are mere illusions of the habitual world, for the have no dealings with the ritual 
world (!a folie). To this we recall Tosquelles: 
The real is that which is here before us, most of the time, in front of us, and that which remains 
outside of us. We will never be able to grasp it in its totality. It is placed upon the horizon to 
which each person walks towards, yet it is a horizon that withdraws, even to the rhythm of each 
walking man. 84 
Thus we discover a string of synonyms within the history of this particular attitude, a sentiment, a 
vocabulary of a particular thinking: the Real ofLacan, the Unconscious of Freud, the Logos of Heraclitus, 
the Horizon of the phenomenologist, the Absolute of Hegel and the Universal Energy of the physicist85 . 
This sentiment is shared by philosopher, linguist and psychiatrist alike, from which a relevance can be 
abstracted for the betterment of the epistemological ground of each discipline. What we can see, is a 
position or a sentiment favouring a constantly displaced horizon of constitution, where the empirical 
intimately coalesces with the transcendental, and where the measurable and determined are not without 
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the question of the immeasurable and undetermined. Thus in the same breath as we speak of the 
schizophrenic trouble of incarnation as being the trouble of transcendence, we can speak of the morpho-
phonological trouble, the trouble of the supporting-body (the aesthetico-physiognomy of Zutt), the trouble 
of Logos, the "illness of the Logos" as Oury says86, the problem of the auto-movement and construction 
of the body. We can even venture to chose between a pathological logic of the trouble (as did Freud) or a 
linguistic logic which points to a veritable relation between the body and language, where the trouble of 
language indicates a morpho-phonological trouble within a zone of incarnation, where there is a trouble at 
the level of the "vital necessity"- a patholinguistic trouble even. 
Julien de Ajuriaguerra and Henri Hecaen, who in following the likes of Henri Head, Delmond 
and Goldstein, asserted the diverse employment and the alterations of the functions of language (the 
verbal, the nominal, the syntactic and the semantic) within aphasia and schizophasia. These troubles 
indicated a "general dissolution" at the structural level of the schizophrenic, that is, where the functional 
modification of the centres oflanguage is found: 
With the patient, we thus see linguistic troubles of varying levels, but that which dominates is a non-
linguistic trouble that the linguists and noeticians consider as the fundamental trouble from where the 
linguistic problem comes87. 
And to this we hear an Oury of2004: 
In neurological terms -and there is even deviation within neurology- we see that linguistics can be drawn 
upon to study the troubles of language ... some neurologists have called this 'Aphasiology' where several 
levels are distinguished. For instance, language and writing are not the same thing. We fmd lesions, if not 
cerebral lesions, within reading that are not the same as within writing ... There is the level of glossology 
where there are troubles of language proper, and we understand that language, is parole - at times there 
are troubles at the level of parole. There are those who say that there are not troubles at the level of parole 
but of writing itself. This is not simply agraphia in the traditional sense, but ergologic where we find a-
technical troubles. Troubles of writing for example, are a-teclmical troubles and clinically, many 
neurologists have often confused the two88. 
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The a-technical trouble is the trouble of organisation upon a constitutive level (a transcendental level). 
That which is put into question by psychosis- even upon the plane of general linguistics and analytical 
logic, at the levels technically referred to as the ergological and glosseological - is of another level, a 
level that Freud referred to as the ethnological where organisational laws are found, laws of 
transcendental organisation where, to repeat a fitting adage, "something else is at play." It is these laws 
that are troubled within psychosis, for as Oury further notes in a phrasing that expands upon the assertions 
of Ajuriaguerra and Hecaen some fifty years later, "these ergologicallaws reassert themselves upon other 
levels. For example, what we call schizophasic language, which is at times a destruction oflanguage, has 
nothing to do with aphasia.89" The question of the relation between the organic, the psychical and the 
linguistic does not exist independently, therefore, of the "phenomenological attitude," rather, it edifices it. 
Neuro-biology was no stranger to notions of transcendental constitution or transcendental 
organization, and the idea of a transcendental activity behind the empirically given reality confirms 
neurological fundamentals. The integration and disintegration of the organism, for example, is most 
notably displayed by the figure-ground dialectic of Goldstein and the syneidesis of Monakow and 
Mourgue. These are in fact two picturesque narrations of the organic and the psychical, a narration of the 
bio-psychological Gestalt where we have the phenomenon of form (Aujbau). This also demonstrates the 
solidarity of psychical and motor troubles and the interlacing of energetic and instrumental systems -
what Henri Ey called an "organo-dynamism." 90 Here, in the historical sense of the term, if 
"phenomenology" was to be used within neurology, it used to designate a window onto the creative 
tendencies of the organism and the vital necessity re-establishing equilibrium. This is in fact a window 
opening onto the question of transcendental truth. Indeed, this was the general law of the economy and 
utilisation of nervous energy to which the neurologist focused his attention, a law not merely of the 
instrumental, but of the energetic, and in the same breath as the neurologist was deemed a neuro-
psychiatrist91 so too was he confidently deemed a "neuro-phenomenologist." 
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Whether the philosopher, the neurologist or the psychiatrist vocationally sensitive to such 
debate of the constitution of the empirical subject and his world, of the varying degrees of language and 
the body, and who ventures further than the requirements of his trade to equate man's significance in 
penning such notions as the "Horizon", the "Logos," and the "immeasurable", it is not unusual to also see 
words such as the "primitive" and the "primordia?' begin to appear within his professional lexicon ~ 
terms borrowed from the descriptive library of the phenomenologists who note down their observations 
and what they hear on scraps of paper. It is here that we find grand majestic notions such as the "Rear 
(Lacan) present themselves almost as twentieth century metaphysical synonyms for the constitutional 
agency of the world to which Heraclitus urged us so much to heed ~the Logos. And it is also here where 
we begin to fmd, upon closer inspection, notions of the "pre-semiological," the "non-linguistic," the "pre-
objective," "pre-cognitive", "pre-egoic" and "pathic" pattern the clinical vocabulary of neurologists and 
psychiatrists in their addressing the problems and troubles of the semiological, the linguistic, the objective, 
the cognitive, the egoic, and the pathological. There is seemingly always a precursory dimension to that 
which is given, something prior to the empirical, isolatable symptom. 
The theologically schooled Heidelberg psychiatrist, Hubertus Tellenbach, in his widely 
respected work on the phenomenology of melancholy, indicated a particular attitude necessary for getting 
closer to this state-of-affairs beyond the "symptom" of pathological processes within the organism. Like 
Zutt, Tellenbach did not want to consider the body as an isolated physiognomy of the world but as an 
interlacing agency: 
This attitude does not allow itself to be guided by the prejudices of a theory (neither that of soma to genesis 
nor psychogenesis). Consequently, we do not view the endogenous appearances as "symptoms" of hidden 
somatic or regressive processes, rather we try to grasp that in which the essence of these appearances 
reveals itself; in other words we take the appearances as phenomena.92 
What this shows is not so much an alternative direction to psychiatry provided by phenomenology, nor a 
path leading to what has often been termed "anti-psychiatry" for it is not our concern to equate social 
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alienation with mental alienation for fear of nullifying phenomenological attitudes which bring us closer 
to a rich and descriptive psyho-pathology. Rather, what we see demonstrated by Tellenbach is the 
expansion of the psychiatric corpus itself, one that is deemed phenomenological by virtue of its attempt to 
engage with transcendental notions of the patient-clinician relation. In the words of Henri Maldiney, 
writing within the same decade as Tellenbach, it is an attitude that doesn't position the: 
Patient as the epithet of the illness [where] it is orientated, even at the level of clinical observation, by the 
pressure of establishing a diagnostic .... of situating the expressions of the patient upon a horizon of 
possible preconditions and nosological categories.93 
We see therefore, that the symptom begins to lose its isolatable character when it is anthropologically situated. With 
similar appeal, such an attitude has seen Arthur Tatossian underline the alternative roles played by the medical 
symptom and the psychiatric symptom - and this is of great value for understanding the role of 
phenomenology within psychiatric enquiry. Tatossian, a youth prodigy of letters and philosophy, was 
from an immigrant Armenian family. He is the founder of what can only be described as the Marseille 
School of psychiatry in 1960, and he was considered nothing short of a luminary among his students for 
penning in 1979 what is thought to be, "a bible faithfully retracing the quasi-totality of works by 
phenomenological psychiatrists.%' For this psychiatrist steeped in the tradition of twentieth century 
phenomenology, whose conceptual make-up was similar to Zutt and Tellenbach, the medical symptom is 
"isolatable" within a causal chain because it is a sign of a pathological somatic process. Contrastingly, the 
psychiatric symptom belongs to a non-localisable order requiring a shift from classical nosography to far 
richer descriptions addressing another "scene" of phenomena. For Tatossian, the medical somatic 
symptom is the sign of an illness relayed in a causal pathological chain, and as with Maldiney's words, 
Tatossian stresses the limit of this by seeing the patient of the somatic symptom as an "epithet of the 
illness." What Tatossian and Maldiney mean is that the medical symptom exists through the causal 
manner by which the illness occurs, and that it is displayed exteriorly without mediation (anschaulich). 
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The psychiatric symptom, comparatively, does not allow itself to leave what Tatossian calls the 
"descriptive plane" and therefore requires a mediation: the psychiatric symptom requires rigorous 
description because it exists in what Tellenbach calls a, "rhapsodic arbitrariness,95" that is, it exists within 
that ever present yet unnoticed frame of reality, one that is at the forefront of Oury's thought in writing: 
"in everyday life, there are quantities of things that pass unnoticed for people ... and sometimes it is a very small detail 
that can even change the path of existence itself.96" The psychiatric symptom is therefore reserved somewhat of an 
enigmatic role, one that is not of the isolatable empirically given, but of the "interlaced": "we ourselves are 
symptoms97" as Oury declares. Another distinction Tatossian makes is that the isolatable clinical symptom is 
metonymic in function, and the psychiatric symptom metaphorical function: 
This independence [of medical symptoms] is not so with the psychiatric symptom ... psychiatric symptoms 
do not allow themselves to be separated as each and every one attains its proper value in its relation to 
other presents.98 
This is precisely because, as Oury indicates, the psychiatric symptom is at the level of the existent. The 
psychiatric symptom surpasses what appears to be an isolationist limitation of the medical symptom, for 
psychiatric symptoms are presented as traits of an interconnected global presentation, non-localisable, 
contingent and dependent phenomena rather than independent and localisable signs of a malady. The 
psychiatric symptom concerns the person's way of being. Metaphorical description becomes the hallmark 
of a phenomenological attitude, and more precisely, of an "adjectival psychiatry" (Bonnafe). This 
phenomenological attitude is not that much distanced from Paul Louis-Landsberg, who we recall wrote of 
phenomenology as appealing to an experience that is," ... never a simple co-existence of isolated givens," 
but containing, " ... necessary relations.99" To borrow from the thesis of Tosquelles, the psychiatric 
symptom emerges from a, "constellation of concomitant relations. 100" The medical symptom does not rely 
on the interaction between the observer and observed whereas the psychiatric symptom is within a 
"primordial" constellation, a primordial integrated state of affairs. The clinical somatic symptom is 
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independent as the soma is not alienable and therefore immediately apparent to vision. The contrast 
between the medical and psychiatric symptom necessitates the contrast between the clinical modifications 
of the patient's behaviour and the transcendental modifications of structure. This points to an experience 
that is at once empirical and transcendental, of the vivant-vecu (Maldiney). Added to the contrasting 
functions of isolatable and non-isolatable symptoms, are the independently existing manifestations of 
material comportment (sensory-motor, verbal, gestural) and the manifestations of the transcendental 
dimension, of the Vecu proper. Psychiatric experience can therefore appear as dual and nuanced, as a 
double-aspect, as an address of a two-tiered phenomenal reality, as both empirical and apriori where 
transcendental organisation is given to description (metaphor) and not merely to conceptual hypotheses 
(metonymy). For Tatossian, in a phrasing indirectly emulating the sentiment of Landsberg, it is where: 
These modifications of the lived ... are not reducible to partial functional problems of 
psychism ... for they are hidden beneath that which immediately shows itself to the psychiatrist101 . 
And for a Tosquelles of 1948 it was where, 
The "I" ("JE") that we find with lived experience appears always as an "I" ("JE") different to that which 
lives the events of everyday life. An event can reveal to us the experience it contains sometimes a long 
while after its announcement. 102 
Tatossian, took his immediate lead not only from the phenomenology of Husser!, but more importantly 
from the psychiatric studies of Johann von Glatzel103. With this phenomenological foundation, he sought 
to underline a fundamental "co-relation" between the empirically constituted and the transcendentally 
constituting. What this means, is that there is a dialectical oscillation between traditional empirical 
experience and transcendental experience - we are never properly within the empirical, within reality, 
even if we believe to be so, for there is a vast dimension of constitution beyond the given - the ever 
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present frame ofreality (which Lacan deemed the Real). Although it appears that Tatossian advances an 
apparent duality of the medical and psychiatric symptom, what he does in fact do, in following the likes 
of Minkowski, Binet and Simon, is to show that the symptom is composed of "essential" and 
"accessible" characteristics. Mania, for instance, is an excitation that is of an "accessible" order, yet its 
"essential" character resides with the being of the maniac, that is, in the relations between self and 
world104• What this points to, is a psychiatric experience being of an "intermediary domain" between the 
transcendental and the empirical, "between the ontological and the ontic" as Tatossian writes. We thus see 
him, as an inevitability to his expedient "faithfulness" to phenomenology, quote Heidegger in his "bible" 
of phenomenological psychiatry, and allot, "an ontic-ontological vision 105 " to psychiatric enquiry. 
Psychiatric experience is therefore a layered and textured experience, and in the words of Landsberg, a 
"qualitative experience"- a phenomenological experience. 
Psychiatry neither wants to be blind to fact nor essence, and it is here that the psychiatrist has 
the unique privilege of surrendering himself to the patient's mixed modality of empirical and 
transcendental experience: the psychiatrist enters onto a terrain, that "other scene" that normally passes 
unnoticed within man's habitual empirical experience of the world. It is where, to retake a beautiful 
wording of a young Nietzsche, the barriers erected between impudent convention of lowered. The 
phenomenological "honesty" to which we have seen Oury refer, is therefore not merely attributable to the 
phenomenologist, but the psychiatrist also, and in fact, the phenomenologist and the psychiatrist engage 
in the same pursuit. As a young philosopher once wrote in 1968 under the sway of the very 
phenomenological attitude and intoxicated by the phenomenologist's horizon, it is where "the ground 
which is now the surface is called depth. 106" Indeed, it is where the profundity of things begin to surface. 
The clinical experience, the intermediary experience between the ontic and the ontological, is where the 
dimension of transcendental organisation renders the empirically given more profound, to endow it with a 
profound quality, and where the world posses a profundity it previously did not possess - Psychiatry 
becomes a hermeneutic of Being, that is, of the existent: 
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The acquired experience of the phenomenological psychiatrist carries two necessary levels: to uncover the 
transcendentally eidetic implications (the phenomenon, the essence or the a priori) of empirical 
comportments (the symptom or rather the brute fact) of the patient and to gel them with empirically 
givens107 
Beyond the empirically given, beneath the empirical "surfaces" of things, behind the brute facticity of the 
world and the inherent security of material reality, there are "transformations of the Self, 108" the "essence" 
of objects (Husserl), the "enigmatic depth" (Fink), one that pertains not to the nosographic category, 
isolatable symptoms, nor to what Oury has called the "nosographic astuteness" of psychiatry, nor to what 
Tosquelles speaks of as the 'I' of "empirical" "mechanical" experience, but rather to what Ludwig 
Binswanger highlighted in the case of Suzann Urban, to be of an order, "that can not be directly 
apprehended109"- a level prior to the "inscription of perceptive systems,110" an evasive level, difficult to 
grasp, a level, where as Oury notes, there are "mutations of the state of the soul111" and where for 
Cezanne the virginity of the world resided, undeclared in its entirety, impossible. This is to go from a 
world of habitual objectivity to belief and faith, yet a belief and faith, in Oury's words, that cannot be 
thematised112, Fink's inconclusive monograph. 
For Oury, the state-of-affairs where "there is something else at play," is not a theoretical 
correlate, but something more dialectically decisive, something that is not accessed by a conceptual 
consciousness, but through a more pre-conceptual disposition. Here, in a realm prior to the 
conceptualising mind, the question is of the patient's presence (the veritable preoccupation for Heidegger 
and Binswanger), which is of the transcendental body proper: "the question of presence ... fragile .. .it is 
the correlate of a standpoint, not merely theoretical, but dialectical, where an event (Ereignis) which has 
modified existence can manifest itself. 113" Similar sentiment has seen Maldiney assert on grounds of 
presence and transcendental experience, that a symptom is "the infinity of the multiplicity of its 
expressions114"- a symptom is the expression of presence. Thus the line of Oury: "we ourselves are 
symptoms." Arthur Kronfeld also indicated this phenomenological sentiment to psychiatric 
symptomatology in noting that, "The dependency of particular psychic changes or particular bodily 
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changes is indeed determinable, but not intelligibleY5" Indeed, in speaking of the psychiatric symptom, 
or the primary symptom, we not only enter a realm to which Tatossian in the textured miasma of the 
phenomenological attitude allotted an "enigmatic arbitrariness," but also where we ascribe, "the specific 
in the apparently unspecific. 116" It is where Maldiney delivers psychosis to the everlasting authority and 
anonymity of the Logos of the world system, namely, where psychosis, as with the horizon of the 
phenomenologist, "does not allow itself to be seized upon. 117" This is a mirroring gesture to Martin 
Heidegger who pointed to the everlasting mystery of being, namely that Dasein is unknowable, 118to 
which Kurt Schneider would indirectly appeal in writing of a level of "inaccessibility" (Untergrund), as 
something that is determinable in its anonymity, yet impossible quantify in its entirety119• As we can see, 
phenomenology, or rather the phenomenological attitude, furnishes the psychiatrist with a descriptive 
vocabulary and an "adventurous" zest for the "profundity" of experience, broadening the scope of the 
classification of illnesses: it is not the symptom of a regressive process which concerns the psychiatrist, 
but the reality of the phenomenon (Tellenbach), the declaration of profundity and modification. Such 
phrasing can do nothing but deem the very diagnostic undertaking of psychiatry phenomenological, to go 
from empirical objectivity to a non-thematised belief, to go from "surface" to a "depth" that is at once 
"enigmatic" (Fink) and arbitrary (Tatossian), "undetermined," to go from the symptom to the 
phenomenon, or rather, from a world of appearances to a world of essences (Husser!). 
For Wolfgang Blankenburg, 120 in his study on borderline schizophrenics, phenomenology 
provided psychiatry with a method of understanding the "deficiency" in common sense. He elsewhere 
termed this deficiency the loss of "natural evidence" or the loss of "natural belief.12], For others ~ Oury 
and Tosquelles in particular ~ in amalgamating the neurology of Goldstein and Monakow and Mourgue 
with the assertions of Freud's "Introductory Lectures", delirium announces a new formation of the 
personality, an "emergence" of a "pre-intentional" level, where, in the words of the Swiss psychiatrist 
Jacob Wyrsch, "schizophrenia is not necessarily said of destruction nor of a permanent deficiency. 122" Yet 
whether we oscillate between the paradigm of a "deficiency" and "loss" of common sense or the deficit of 
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natural evidence as Blankenburg would have it, or of a "constructive renewal" as the likes of Oury, 
Wyrsch and Tosquelles promote, the attitude remains one that takes the "primordial" and "primary" into 
consideration as well as the "empirical" and "constituted," the transcendental 'I' (modifications of 
structure I structural modification) as well as the empirical 'I' (modifications of comportment I 
behavioural modification)123, the energetic economy of organic integration and the instrumental functions 
constituting the "morphological organisation of the nervous system" as well as the instrumental sensori-
motor functions (Ey, Monakow and Mourgue)124: the vivant as much as the vecu (Maldiney). 
When we tum to look at the work of the neurologists, at times called the "gestalt-psychologists" 
or "neuro-phenomenologists" - of a Wiezsacker; a Monakow; a Mourgue; a Goldstein; the organa-
dynamism of Henri Ey- and place them alongside the phenomenology I Neo-Catholic Christology of 
Landsberg (which is what Tosquelles does in fact do with his doctoral thesis of 1948), we see that the 
organic and spiritual question of man's psychical and biological renewal cannot exist without the 
transcendental question of his maintenance and revelation125• Pierre Janet, for example, pointed to a 
"primary psychology" informed by the ontology and "fecundity of the embryo" to which the personality 
would be an analogous product126, and Von Monakow127 along with Henri Ey128, in mapping the 
reconstructive genesis of the brain and the architectonic of the nervous system, pointed to what we have 
previously called, the "continual instinctual formation of the organism. 129" Such appeals brought to light 
the ever present maintenance of man and his world, one that could only be paralleled by the analogies of 
Biblical Genesis - the mock-Biblical phantasm of the end-of-the-world-experience to which Tosquelles 
turned in a post-war age thirsty for renewal. In Tosquelles' words there is a, "vital need 
(lebensnotendigkeit), an impulsion to arrive at a new form of unitary life. 130" 
To speak of phenomenology within psychiatry and neurology, is to speak of a particular attitude 
towards this unitary life, one that is both empirical and transcendental, one, in the words of the eminent 
neurologist Erwin Straus, not solely of, "a patient observation of manifesting phenomena131" as the 
pathologist or natural scientist would have it, but of a mode of analysis "respecting phenomena in their 
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emergence.132" For the Basque psychiatrist Horrace Torrubia, it is upon such grounds that the psychiatrist 
has, "to be always alert to details, to nothing even, to that which appears as anodyne ... to even a grain of 
sand or a drop of oil... within a logic that permits us to leave nai"ve evidences and pre-constituted 
ideas. 133 " This logic does not seek to relegate but suspend pre-constituted ideas, a "primordial 
anthropological politic" for von Wiezsacker, where for Oury, in following the lead of Erwin Straus, the 
decisive diagnostic moment is said of the felt and not the thought. The therefore felt becomes the act to 
which the thought can only appear as secondary - the sensation of Cezanne's blue calls forth the 
unmarred "virginity of the world," the world is disclosed to us through feeling. Initially we feel before we 
think, we exist atmospherically for it is the heart which responds before the brain. The felt is of a 
dimension "prior to edification" because it is of the level of the supporting-body (Zutt). This is where 
there is a primordial "scene," and more accurately in Zutt's words, "the manifestation of fundamental 
troubles of psychotic structures. 134" For the psychiatrist to penetrate the "ambiguity," where the most 
characteristic traits of the clinical tableau can manifest, Oury, who himself starts from what he calls "the 
metapsychological hypotheses, from concrete abductive inferences, 135" indicates as if in appeal to the a 
priori cognition of Heidegger (an appeal that seems to initially characterise the phenomenological 
attitude), that we need to leave the terrain of objectivist conceptions of the world in order to have an 
immediate unreflective experience. He writes: 
It must be stressed that if we are to have access to this site, we cannot be within systems of a 
representative logic, of prejudgments proper. We are all within the habits of thought, of "good sense," 
there are barriers and screens which stop us from accessing this domain of emergence136• 
This sentence, indicates a consciousness prior to conceptualisation, and more precisely for Oury it would 
qualifY, as we have seen, a shift from objectivity to a non-thematised belief. These words were written in 
1989, and mirrored a 1947 encounter with a patient named Jayet. With Jayet, Oury wrote of the need to 
"lower our arms in order to continue upon a path ... and to abandon nosographic auspices 137" and almost 
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forty years later we see him write of the need to step out of systems of prejudgment and the necessity to 
leave a representative logic behind. As we have described in our previous chapter, this path of which 
Oury speaks, is a phenomenological path leading from empricial life to transcendental life and the 
original nature of things- Husser! would say it was to penetrate the "essence" of things. Yet more than 
this, Oury's descriptive language carries an appeal to the "honesty" of the psychiatrist, the need to 
suspend prejudgement, the need to heed the Logos, the need to address an existent, a person. It appears 
then, that this "phenomenological attitude" is where there is the question of the constituting and emerging 
demanding both a more extended role of the psychiatrist in his abandoning of the "preconstituted" idea. It 
is where the psychiatrist enters a zone of absolute indifference, a zone "masked by prejudgement, 138" to 
enter into a pre-perceptive zone, between the ontic and the ontological, as if paralleling the "great mystic 
achievement" of William James139, the psychiatrist enters a zone of "absolute passivity within which 
perceptive systems will be inscribed140." 
We have established that the psychiatrist is in a constant oscillation between the empirical and 
transcendental, between the feeling and the thought, between the logos and the objects of the world, 
between an eternal anticipation and technical preoccupation. For Tosquelles, the psychiatrist was, "in a 
movement of anticipation carrying rigour ... as a precession unto itself ... a difficult path, full of stones of 
every nature, towards this impossible Real/4b towards the constantly displaced horizon. For Torrubia, 
the psychiatrist would not be the classic observer of a determined world, but always within an observation 
contemporaneous to the Horizon and the Logos, he would be before an opening of the world and man, 
"Yet the function of this openness is where the observer is always included in the observation ... The 
classic observer masks visibility. 142" These assertions are all hallmarks to a "phenomenological attitude," 
one that is edified by psychiatry, and more precisely, by an Institutional Psychotherapy. 
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2: The primordialism ofMinkowski 
A notable yet rarely mentioned example from the history of psychiatry will further elucidate the 
"phenomenological attitude," namely, a short essay written by Minkowski in 1934, one which very much 
carries an honesty. In wanting to see the question of man's constitution deepen with the lexical 
sophistication of the phenomenologist's vocabulary, Eugene Minkowski published this somewhat cryptic 
essay in Evolution Psychiatrique entitled, "Constitution and Conjlict. 143" With this wording, Minkowski 
was clear with his intention, for what concerned him was the psychiatric address of the transcendental 
level, that is, the level that Goldstein translated as the "organismic principle"; Oury the Gestaltung, 
Weizsacker the Gestaltkreis, and Tosquelles the transcendental 'I' beneath the 'I' of the empirically given. 
For Minkowski, in a gesture emulative of Fink's impassioned appeal to the "cosmological horizon" of 
man144, constitution was a, "cosmic constitution" of "interior life,145" of a "scene" within which the 
"primordial phenomenon" emerges. More importantly for Minkowski, it was here, behind the facades of 
the everyday, that the "absolute sincerity" of the "transcendental Ego146" exists. In terms of prose, the 
phenomenological declaration was clear because the "cosmic," the "primordial," the "constitutional" and 
the "sincerity" of the transcendental Ego subsist and maintain the empirical subject. What Minkowski 
indeed ventures to show, is that "constitution" is something much more than a mere "static" level of 
psychical genesis, when considered as a phenomenological "contexture" of psychopathological life. As a 
result, he attributes a "primordial" importance to the clinical symptom and in doing so qualifies the 
question of presence. 
Minkowski also showed that this "phenomenological attitude" could be faithfully edified and 
extended to the concrete human situation through psychiatric experience. What Minkowski further 
highlighted, was the "vital necessity" and "spiritual necessity" of psychopathological life. This is what 
Tosquelles would later devote his doctoral thesis to, exemplifying the vital and the spiritual through the 
Erlebnis of the end of the world. 
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Minkowski's essay shows the extent to which a psychiatrist (or Alienist to use the correct 
historical terminology) can be passionately touched - as Tosquelles would also be some fourteen years 
later- by the question of man's interior life, just as much as a Bergson or a Merleau-Ponty would be in 
their quest for a psycho-spiritual rendition of the world picture. Indeed, it is here, almost as a precursor to 
the 1948 doctoral thesis of Tosquelles, that Minkowski draws upon the word "phenomenology" in 
wanting to communicate a notion of a life seemingly more "spiritual" and "profound" than "linear" and 
"chronological," of a life more "revelatory" (the transcendental I) than "habitual" (empirical 1), of a 
constitution more "active" and "creative" than "static," of symptoms more "nuanced" than "isolatable", of 
a physiognomy more "interlaced" with the world than an "isolated" given - these are in fact, the 
adjectives he resorts to throughout the essay. 
The determining constitutive agency of all things, is what Minkowski called a "creative elan" -
a life and form-giving force, much like the notion of the elan vitale to which Bergson often turned. Yet 
the creative elan pushes us into more enigmatic territory, for it brings into play psychical processes of 
creation as much as organismic. Indeed, such a notion would see Minkowski's passionate and confident 
Finkian pen declare that, "The creative elan, emanates from the depth of its sources and in an elementary 
way determines the contexture of life - understood in the phenomenological and not the chronological 
sense of the word ... 147 " This creative elan, as with the horizon of the phenomenologist - the 
"cosmological horizon" of Fink for example - the Real of Lacan, and the Logos of Heraclitus, was for 
Minkowski to both "preside over our destiny and evade us. 148" This enigmatic realm of constitution, at 
once before and after the species, is as if a divinity at play. We once again retake Tosquelles who now we 
see not only echo Lacan's notion of the Real (which is a parallel to the horizon of phenomenology), but 
also Minkowski's notion of the creative elan: 
The real is that which is here before us, most of the time, in front of us, and that which remains outside of 
us. We will never be able to grasp it in its totality. It is placed upon the horizon to which each person walks 
towards, yet it is a horizon that withdraws, even to the rhythm of each walking man. 149 
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The Real and the elan, are the constitutive agency, the transcendental agency. Thus where schizophrenia 
is a trouble of incarnation, and a trouble of transcendence, it can also be understood as a trouble of the 
creative elan. Minkowski, in turn, did not venture to speak of the trouble of incarnation, but rather of 
"cosmic constitution." Numerous turns of phrase can indeed mark a mutual concern for this level of 
constitution, incarnation and revelation, and a veritable list of the synonymous notions of the psychiatric, 
the neurological and the phenomenological could be drafted to bring to light this attitude and vocabulary 
appealing to a non-objective faith (Oury). 
For Minkowski, there existed a "game ofrelations150" composing the life of the subject. Within 
this game the symptom was a signification of a greater phenomenal reality, or to retake Tellenbach's 
words, an essence (phenomenon) of an appearance (symptom). What Minkowski called the "constitutional 
order," was the transcendental order, the "cosmic" order within which personal conflicts and traumatic 
events interact. The constitutional order and the order of events and conflicts were thought to be in 
constant interaction designing the life history of the subject, conditioning the biographical path of man 
proper151 . There is, therefore, a living narrative between constitution and conflict, and Minkowski's 
intention with presenting such a more profound understanding of the transcendental plane underpinning 
man's existence, was to evade the "sterile discussions" and "sterile practices" of a "vertical attitude. 152" 
This vertical attitude is one that seemingly still reigns today, for we are ourselves within an age where the 
generality of the illness is enough, of merely considering the symptom and not the essence, that is, of not 
seeing the double-aspect of the "accessible" and the "essential" (Tatossian). To speak of psychopathology 
is a pretext for speaking of the more profound modifications underpinning our everyday existence; 
moment to moment; day to day, year to year. To speak of schizophrenia is a pretext for speaking of a 
person and a particular "way-of-being, 153" or rather, in Minkowski's words, "phenomenological life." But 
for this great undertaking, we mustn't be restricted by the temporality of bureaucratic measures which 
have no dealings with the interior life of man. 
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Minkowski's presentation of a two-tiered phenomenal reality (of the constituting and 
constituted) was not merely to show how psychiatry could be an address of the "cosmic" foundations of 
man and his psychopathological phenomena, but also to show that beyond the symptoms of an illness, 
psychiatry is an engagement with a "particular way of being154" and an "essential" nature (Tatossian) -
the essence as Husserl had it. As we have seen Oury note, "nosographic astuteness is not enough, 155" to 
understand the psychopathology of psychoses, for something much more is required of the diagnostic to 
work on a transcendental level. The consideration of the vivant is not enough because there is always the 
strategically anonymous counterpart of the vecu. When we speak of diagnosis, it is a psychiatric diagnosis 
of the vivant-vecu, one that engages with the interior life of the subject as much as exterior life. This line 
of enquiry is personified by Tosquelles, Oury, Minkowski and Tellenbach, each of whom resonate neatly 
within the works of Maldiney156: the symptom is not a mere "isolatable" moment, but an essence, a 
phenomenon of a profound level of constitution and conflict, it is an anthropological expression, an 
expression of transcendence and in being so we ourselves are symptoms. For Minkowski, in appealing to 
the creative elan with its "cosmic conflict," the psychiatrist would come closer to a "scene" where, "man 
can assert all his grandeur, 157" where the diagnostic engages with what Wolfgang Blankenburg has 
deemed the level of"transcendental organisation."158 
Minkowski provides us with a very valuable indication, because he addresses the coalescent 
narrative between the visible empirical sign (the symptom) and the modification upon the constitutional, 
transcendental level (the phenomenon). In his own words, it is ascribing a "primordial importance" to the 
psychopathological event, and most importantly attributing an importance to "the personal nuance" of the 
particular "state of being" with the person of schizophrenia159. Thus is Minkowski's intention when 
distinguishing between the particularity of the schizoid and the generality of the symptoms of 
schizophrenia: 
The schizoid is not said of "isolated" symptoms which can be seen to compose schizophrenia, but is 
sooner said of the particular way of being that is characteristic of the schizophrenic personality which 
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distinguishes an altogether other morbid personality ... This way of being which conditions the most 
factually essential of "being a schizophrenic" is reflected within symptoms ... To not want to speak of an 
obsession or a hallucination in terms of the constitution of the subject is to renounce the particular way in 
which the human personality carries itself in view of psychopathological phenomena, or better .. .it is to 
attribute a primordial importance to this personal nuance of man. 160 
Minkowski doesn't offset the schizoid and the schizophrenic but rather to brings to light, in the words of 
Hubertus Tellenbach, "the transformation of the unity in the stream of elementary processes.16t, Far more 
than a mere reflective game between the empirical, visible symptom and the transcendental level of 
"cosmic" "primitive" phenomena, Minkowski argues for an activity and necessity (call it vital or 
spiritual) from which the symptom emerges for it is the empirical emanation of a constitutional world, 
"zone" (Oury) or "scene" (Fechner) where, even the "presiding forces" of man's "destiny" are found162. 
Such forces, far from remaining hidden, can be brought out within the "concrete" empirical givens of 
man's reality, thus is the symptom, as a visibly accessible "counterpart" to a far deeper constitutional 
"essential" reality. Here, Minkowski prefigures the direction ofTatossian's appeal to Husserlian method-
we retake once more: 
The acquired experience of the phenomenological psychiatrist carries two necessary levels: to 
uncover the transcendentally eidetic implications (the phenomenon, the essence or the a priori) 
of empirical comportments (the symptom or rather the brute fact) of the patient and to gel 
them with empirically givens. 163 
We have, therefore, an image of this two-tiered reality: there is the ever moving transcendental plane of 
constitution, the "moving ocean" as Minkowski has it164, within which we have the "primordial" 
phenomenon, the essence (Husserl), the dimension of the "sincerity" of the transcendental Ego, and the 
plane of isolatable moments, the empirical edifice, the surface to the depth (Deleuze)165• Both are in 
constant oscillation. We once again recall the words of this young prominent philosopher: "the ground 
which is now the surface is called depth. 166" As we have seen Tellenbach make clear, it is more of a 
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question of essence than the symptom, more of the essential then the accessible. Concordantly for 
Minkowski, yet nigh on thirty years earlier to Tellenbach, the psychopathological event is a domain of 
constitution exceeding the categorical requirements of nosology because it anticipates a cosmological 
state of affairs beyond the limits of strict logico-positivism, where we "put into relief more profound 
notions167" of man and the world. Minkowski, therefore, in speaking of the "particularity" of the schizoid, 
accords the phenomenon a particularity and essential nature within a plane of movement and constitution. 
In no way does there exist a categorical difference, for between the phenomenon and the 
symptom there is the "essential" role of the nuance, that is, the "personal nuance" which, for Minkowski, 
carries a "primordial importance.168" Yet if it is not the symptom per se to which Minkowski turns in 
speaking of the schizoid, then what does he actually speak of? In drawing upon the "particularity" of the 
schizoid and not the generality of schizophrenia, Minkowski asserts the primordial nuance to be that 
which, " ... penetrates to the depth of man ... " that which brings into play a "new thinking" and a" hitherto 
unannounced instrument of analysis. 169" In doing so he shows that psychiatric symptoms are not mere 
signs of a malady, but belong to an archaeological enterprise of man. This unannounced instrument of 
analysis, is the diagnostic, and more importantly in the words of Minkowski, it is a "penetrative 
diagnostic"" initiated by a, "vital contact with reality" and an "interior resonance170." 
3: Oury, Schotte, Weizsacker and the Pathic 
Some fifty years after Minkowski penned a raw yet definitive description of the constitutional level in an 
appeal to the "phenomenological" notion of non-chronological "internal life" and of a diagnostic working 
through a "vital contact with reality," Jean Oury, in September of 1984, was invited by the University of 
Paris VII to deliver a yearlong series of lectures on the subject of the psychiatric diagnostic and the 
primary symptoms of schizophrenia. The series was entitled, "A propos the primary symptoms of 
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schiophrenia171" and was of the same year as the eminent phenomenologist Jacques Schotte- the leading 
authority on the neurophenomenological work of Viktor von Weizsacker - delivered his series of lectures 
at Louvain University entitled, "The Oeuvre of Weizsiicker -towards a thinking of the clinic. 172" Both 
series of lectures displayed a striking similarity of sentiment and phenomenological attitude. Where one, 
through an accumulation of over forty years' clinical experience, spoke of the necessity to not only 
position the question of the clinical encounter in relation to the primary symptom, but at the 
transcendental and constitutional level, the other, a disciple of Ludwig Binswanger and guiding cohort to 
Lacan, spoke of the necessity to think the clinic in terms of a "primordial anthropology" of shared human 
experience. Where one, with emulating gesture to Minkowski's nuanced "penetrative diagnostic," would 
speak of the transcendental trouble, of the "encounter as the manifestation of the Other. .. where a 
structural difficulty is felt...as if within a dialectic of the near and far, 173" the other would assert a 
"therapeutic commerce" on grounds of the patient-clinician relation: 
The medical discipline of Mediziner (the scientific researcher) must incessantly be placed within the very 
art of Arzt (medical practice). Thinking should circulate between these two fields within a constant 
reciprocity ... that the entirety of medical description must inscribe itself within the patient-clinician 
relation. 174 
Indeed, the key point in following on from Minkowski's assertions of a "penetrative diagnostic175" and a 
"vital contact," is that the transcendental trouble is felt and not thought, that the trouble is felt as an 
essence (Tellenbach) and not thought as an isolatable symptom. Unlike the empirical symptom, the 
transcendental trouble is at the most primary of levels, where there is a "vital commerce" between Self 
and Other, and where a clinical objectivity is said of a "vital reciprocity" bonding the patient-clinician 
relation- the shared politic Lucien Bonnafe had continually endorsed throughout his years of practice176. 
The simultaneous underlining in Paris and Louvain, was of a logic of the clinical relation 
different to that of a naturalist objectivity upon which modem medicine is founded. Appealing to this 
clinical objectivity of the Weizsacker-coined "therapeutic commerce," Oury began his lecture series with 
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the question of the clinical encounter, the dimension of "affective contact" (to borrow a term from 
Minkwoski), and as to what it actually means to encounter the varying expressions of human existence 
disclosed by the clinical encounter: the hebephrenic, the paranoiac, etc. 
Oury would speak of a dimension, a zone, a scene, where, "something happens," where there is 
a "putting-into-form," a level of "emergence177" upon which the fundament of the problem can be 
discerned through feeling and through a "vital contact" (Minkowski) with the patient. With the 
schizophrenic, there is a trouble of transcendence, a collapse even, where the presence of the patient lacks 
a substantial anthropological form. With the contact of a schizophrenic something is "lacking," there is a 
particularity of form and organisation and constitution of the Other. As Oury would later say, this 
particular presence to the schizophrenic, "can be felt, it takes many years of practice, but when a 
schizophrenic walks in his presence is not centered, the points are everywhere ... you can feel this upon 
instantly seeing a schizophrenic.178" Here, in February of 1985, we see Oury appeal to the clinical 
dialectic within which the therapeutic commerce of Weizsacker is played out, the dialectic of the 
encounter and the clinician-patient relation proper. Such appeals, are not for the determinations of 
modem medicine, but by way of the perennial psychiatric question reiterated by Henri Ey in his preface 
to the republication of Bleuler's landmark study on schizophrenia, namely, "what is schizophrenia?179" 
Oury, upon similar ground asks: 
Maybe the undertaking is to try to define not what we call the fundamental symptoms, but that which is 
always in question when we encounter a schizophrenic. The procedure would most probably be simple, it 
would be to ask those of a certain clinical experience the following: "at base, what is it that pushes one to 
say that a person present before you, a person encountered, is a schizophrenic?180 
The aim of Oury's seminars of Paris VII, was not so much to draw a tableaux of the symptomatology 
following Kraeplin's dementia praecox, Bleuler's schizophrenia, Freud's hebephrenia and Kurt 
Schneider's clinical psychopathology of schizophrenia181 . It was not so much to address the fundament of 
the symptom by virtue of nosography and the classificatory undertaking of Emil Kraeplin, but to see as to 
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how the question of the primary pathognomic symptom of the scission of the psyche (Spa/tung) is posed 
within a logic of therapeutic commerce, a logic of the encounter, a logic sooner of a "transcendental 
structure ... of transcendental organisation" (to use the terminology of Blankenburg) rather than an 
"empirical dimension. 182" 
Oury's seminars of 1984 were symptomatic of a particular resistant politic to the standardisation 
of psychiatric discourse, and today the resistance has increased its resiliance. Oury delivered his seminars 
at a time that saw the third installment of the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders) that had first been introduced in 1956. For Henri Ey, in his introduction to the republication of 
Bleuler's work on schizophrenia 183 , the legacy of DSM represented a decline of nosography, the 
weakening of the question of schizophrenia and the veritable corruption of the psychiatric ethic. Indeed, 
for Ey, the undisputed father figure of French psychiatry, DSM was nothing other than, "the reduction of 
psychoses and neuroses to isolatable troubles and disorders 184 ." What better indication of a 
phenomenological attitude? The use of the DSM diagnostic criterion marked for Ey the risky "dissolution 
of nosography to the trouble, 185" that is, to the isolatable trouble. Oury also, midway through his first 
lecture of November 1984, spoke out against the increasing bureaucratisation and reductionism of 
psychiatry and its "simplism186": 
For several years ... primary symptoms have been presented in the form of a catalogue ... a catalogue passes 
through a machine. Certain Parisian hospitals will soon - and maybe it has already happened - will no 
longer resort to the artisan practice of the encounter to understand schizophrenia. All that is now required 
is to complete a questionnaire. 187 
This, a resistance that would fmd its extension two years later with Oury's seminars on Creation and 
Schizophrenia where (with somewhat more pronounced tone) he would warn that, "if we lose sight of the 
creation and manifestations within madness, we allow ourselves to drift towards DSM 111! 188" For Oury, 
the greatest danger with the DSM format was the reduction of life (the vivant-wicu) to a logic of 
"chronicity," a logic of the "regulator" and the "chronometer, 189" a logic reducing the phenomenon of 
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man to the function. As with a Minkowski of 1934, life is phenomenological and not chronological, life is 
affective and not functional, it is where the psychiatrist addresses a "particular way of being", a 
"person190" and at best, a veritas transcendentalis (inidicated by Heidegger's faithfulness to a priori 
cognition). To this we recall Horace Torrubia's charge against systems of medical classification: 
Clinical nosography has a function of closure given that the observer-clinician is outside of the 
semiological plain ... Yet the function of openness is where the observer is always included in the 
observation ... The classic observer masks visability. 191" 
Throughout his lecture series, Oury presented the case of a certain contact, "beneath perceptions 
and gestures, surpassing the strict observation said of the objective.192" This communication beneath or 
prior to the objective and representational level of things, prior to the objective, perceptive level of a 
Cartesian subject-object dualism, found its clinical accentuation within the phenomenological studies of 
the Danish psychiatrist Rfunke who had introduced the notion of the Praecox Gefiihl193 - a diagnostic 
function that in fact prefigures the thoughts ofMinkowski writing in 1934. 
The Praecox Gefiihl was the address of a defmitive human category, a "vital communication 194" 
of a "pre-objective level." It operates within the instant of seeing a patient, within the instant before all 
theoretical speculation, an instant not given to perception but to sensation, the instant, for example, of 
Cezanne's blue. As Oury had it in 1984: 
When we are before a schizophrenic, there is the odor of the schizophrenic, not an odor of the nose, but an 
odor in the sense that there is an unmistakable something that even surpasses intuition itself. We say, "it is 
a schizophrenic," and several weeks or months later, after the diagnostic has been undertaken, to 
somewhat respect the traditional formulas concerning the evolution of the illness dear to Kraeplin, we see 
that he is a schizophrenic.195 
219 
What this does is show that the level of what Weizsacker called "pathic existence," the Pathic self of inter-subjective 
commerce, is not one opposing the movement of a subject's motor activity and the passive perception of an object, 
but rather it brings them together. This is the feeling, or the vital communication that urges Oury to speak of "an 
unmistakable something" to the schizophrenic, much like the blue of Cezanne disclosed the "virginity of the world." 
As we noted earlier it is where we leave the terrain of objectivist conceptions of the world so 
that we can have an immediate unreflective experience of the domain of emergence and constitution, 
where we have seen Oury note that an, "absolute passivity" is required on the part of the psychiatrist. The 
Praecox Gefohl therefore concerns the psychiatrist's grasp of the malady upon a level of a particular 
corporeal communication, one that is said of the V ecu, the body of sensation, where there is, to borrow a 
word from Oury, a "resonance" with that which is presented, where something is "immediately felt" 
within the "instant of seeing. 196" Seeing and feeling are simultaneous to which thinking is secondary. The 
instant of seeing is not said of perception, for this pathic communication is as we have noted of a "pre-
perceptive" level. Just as Minkowski, with his "penetrative diagnostic" noted there to be an "interior 
resonance," and Cezanne noted the sensation of the blue disclosing the virginity of the world, the order of 
the Praecox Gefohl is of the felt and not the thought, of an affective contact prior to theoretical 
speculation itself where there is a tactile state of affairs between the patient and clinician. Thus for Oury, 
upon this pre-objective level of the encounter, the diagnostic marks the "greatest dignity" towards the 
Other, or the "absolute minimum of a dignified act towards the Other," and that within the clinical 
encounter with the patient, the diagnostic motivation does not so much fmd its imperative with the 
catalogued "collection of primary symptoms," as would be the case with the DSM format, but with ''the 
person197" and the modifications of transcendental structure (the transcendental 'I') therein. 
The question of the primary symptom, is thus one posed in terms of a primary anthropological 
dimension par excellence (the pathic), where we not only have the question of sensation but of relation 
also, of the "entre-deux" (Zwischen) and the "entre-les-deux198" (the between-two and the in-between-of-
the between-two), not in terms of a dualistic logic separating clinician and patient, but of an affective 
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anthropological logic true to the standpoint of Weizsacker where beings are primordially and 
atmospherically bonded within a "therapeutic commerce." Within this commerce, we exist 
atmospherically, we are beings of feeling and not thinking. The diagnostic said of this pathic 
communication, deployed within this commerce, 199 is where the primary symptom of schizophrenia 
becomes one of anthropological significance, one that is of the felt (empjinden), one that is grasped 
(Tellenbach) within the encounter and the instant of seeing the patient. 
So too is the question of the encounter as the inaugurating dimension to the clinical relation 
posed at the outset of Jacques Schotte's lecture series at Louvain of the same year. He begins with the 
notion of this "commerce," a word patterning the breadth of Weizsacker's scholarship, as the basal 
situation, as the condition even, as the determining category not just to the clinic, but to the world of man 
itself. "Commerce," finding its German equivalent with the word Umgang, is drawn upon by Weizsacker 
in the most social of connotations and it is understood as an "exchange within a plurality ... of a dialectic 
accentuation, that of exchange within a reciprocity200" at the base of human existence itself. Commerce, is 
a reciprocity and exchange, a communication said of what Weizsacker deemed a "pathic" exchange 
between man, and more importantly, between the clinician and patienr01 . That is why Schotte entitles his 
series, "towards a thinking of the clinic" for the pathic is the most primordial of sensations, and it is 
opposed to the pathetic. As Oury would note, "the pathetic is of the representational, the pathic is of the 
pre-representational.202" The Praecox Gefohl is said of the pathic, of the pre-representational dimension 
to existence, the dimension of man's transcendental structure proper, which for Minkowski was the level 
of"cosmic" constitution furnished by the "creative elan" (was this Minkowski's divinity?) 
The "pathic" appears as an etymological neo-formation by Weizsacker, one that is presented as 
a decisive anthropological category proper203 . For Weizsacker, man is inaugurated at this level of pathic 
exchange in terms of a decisive reciprocity, where he, "is a being determined by a commerce.204" 
Commerce, thus understood as a level of constitution, as a "pathic" inauguration of man, is the "basal" 
not merely of the clinical situation, but of human life itselF05, the unnoticed yet constant support to the 
221 
life of man. What the clinical situation does, is to accentuate that which is at the base of human life, it 
brings the basal into relief, it brings the Vecu to light. The description of medicine for Weizsacker, 
therefore finds its essentiality within the question of relation and the constancy of this human reciprocity, 
for as Schotte notes, "Medical description in its entirety, must inscribe itself in the patient clinician 
relation.206" This inscription is said of an objectivity where for Weizsacker the world is "ambient/07" and 
"tonal." Primarily, we exist atmospherically within a world of sensations, and for Oury, the world is said 
of "the most primordial sensation of sensations. 208" As Weizsacker was himself to note: 
The reality of man is thus seen as a constant explication of the Self with an ambient world (Umwelt), a 
constantly renewed encounter between the Self and the ambient world, a fluctuating commerce of the Self 
and the ambient world.209 
Commerce is thus presented as a level where there is, to draw from the phenomenological vocabulary of 
Schotte, the "essence", the "primordial" and the "essential" constitutive reality of man - a reality of 
exchange within a "pathic" economy prior to the edification of the empirical psychological subjecr10 : 
before man exists as a cognising subject, he exists within an ambience, within a pre-perceptive zone. To 
retake an Oury of Paris VII, it is not of a purely "empirical dimension" but of "transcendental 
structure,m" and to retake Tatossian, it is not solely of the "accessible" but also of the "essential." The 
empirical and the essential thus come after, or mask, the transcendental and the essential. The Praecox 
Gefohl of Rfunke is said of the level of "primordial" exchange, of this fluctuating "ambient" economy of 
the "entre-deux" and the "entre-les-deux," it is prior to the edification of a subject-object world. For Oury, 
it is where, "we need to place ourselves at a certain level to have a certain resonance with that which 
presents itself,212" at a level that is sooner of the pathic and pre-representational rather than the thematic, 
representational and pathetic213 • Retaking Tatossian's earlier description of the symptom, we can venture 
to say that the accessible level to the symptom is of the thematic and the pathetic, and its essentiality is of 
the pathic and pre-thematic. The task of psychiatry therefore, is to understand and develop a therapy of 
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beginning from the pre-thematic, a therapy of the non-isolatable symptom, of man himself- we ourselves 
are symptoms (Oury). 
The notion of commerce seeing man borne within an "ambient" exchange, delivers us to what 
Oury has termed the very "essential quality" of the Praecox Gefohl where the "entre-deux" and the 
"entre-les-deux" are not only said of a reciprocity ( Gegenseitigkeit) but of a solidarity. We retake Schotte 
in writing: 
Commerce, reciprocity and solidarity are the three primordial concepts of that which we can call the 
anthropology ofWeizsacker.214 
We can see that the psychiatric diagnostic and the question of the primary symptom of schizophrenia, is 
deployed within this pathic primordial politic of the pre-representational where for Oury there is even the 
"root of the creation of Space itself.215" And this furnishes us with a better ground upon which to 
understand Oury's preliminary method, of his "metapsychological abductive inference." In grouping 
together the assertions of Oury, Schotte, Tellenbach and Minksowki we have a very definitive concern for 
the transcendental level of constitution, its modes and its upsets, a veritable bringing to light of the 
primordial through an attitude and diagnostic deemed phenomenological. 
Commerce, with reciprocity and solidarity as signatures to a medical anthropology finding its 
concrete diagnostic extension with the Praecox Gefohl, is the primary, constitutional, transcendental 
category of the human where there is, to retake the gestalt vocabulary of Oury, "emergence" and a, 
"putting-into-form." Thus where Oury writes that a "diagnostic is the minimum of a respectful 
undertaking towards the Other" it is said on grounds of this affective commerce, reciprocity and solidarity 
working at the most primary and essential of human levels, a level understood as a pathic category. As 
Schotte would also assert, reflecting upon Weizsacker's Fundamental Questions of Medical Anthropology 
of 1947, "the importance of this category is where man, in that he is of the human, is already defmed as a 
commerce: such is his primordial and essential reality.216" Of similar appeal, Oury, on grounds of the 
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Praecox Gefohl said of this commerce, reciprocity and exchange - the three primordial pillars of 
Weizsacker's medical anthropology- puts forward the idea that therapy does not so much concern the 
primary symptom that presents itself, but an understanding and undertaking of the person: 
To speak of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia is a pretext to rightly speak of that which is in 
question ... a point of view that that is not a list of primary symptoms but rather of a position we have when 
we are engaged with such work, where there is an encounter with that which we have a tendency to call a 
schizophrenic.217 
It is here that the diagnostic is inaugurated not on grounds of explication (erklarung), but of sympathetic 
comprehension (verstenhung). The former is said of the objective and thematic, the latter is said of the 
pre-objective, of the pathic and pre-thematic, the primordial world of, in retaking an adjective of 
Weizsacker, "ambient" human relations. Thus, we remember a young war-marked Bonnafe of 1946, 
writing of the vocation of psychiatry as the art of sympathy and of the psychiatrist's solidarity with the 
alienated, to which we also recall our previous characterisations seeing psychiatry as the art of 
accompaniment, the art of the bein-with, of the miteinandersein (the being-with-the-other). As Weizsacker 
himself outlined, the clinician is not a subject facing the patient considered as an object, the clinician is 
not within a unilinear (eingleisig) "representative thinking" (das vorstellende Denken) where a subject is 
directed towards the object, but rather where both clinician and patient are within a "circular reciprocity," 
a circulation and reciprocal ambient circumvolution, where, to cite Schotte, "the living human encircles 
the ambient world at the same time as the ambient world encircles the living human.218" The Praecox 
Gefohl - which is what Minkowski termed the diagnostic by penetration - as working at this level of 
sympathy and comprehension (proving a vital contact with reality for Minkowski), as working at the level 
of the pathic (pre-representational) prior to the pathetic (representational), is a level of description rather 
than explication, of metaphor rather the metonymy. The primary symptom is that which is immediately 
felt, it resonates within the atmosphere of that which presents itself This is the vital dialectic of the 
"entre-deux," one marking an anthropological relation between the clinician and patient. Oury's phrase 
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resounds once again with an increasing weight strengthened by the likes of Minkowski and Weizsacker, 
namely that, "we ourselves are symptoms.219" 
Eugene Bleuler, in the spirit of nosography and with etio-pathogenic pen true to the theoretical 
stance and nosographic sentiments of Kraeplin, introduced the term "schizophrenia" in 1911. However, 
Kraeplin's terminology of dementia praecox was used in France at Saint-Anne until just after 1940. The 
principle primary symptom of Schizophrenia was presented by Bleuler as the "Spaltung," a primary 
symptom of dissociation, understood as a, "schisis" or a scission within the homogenous project of the 
person. We have seen Oury assert the symptom of dissociation to appear at the existential level of the 
encounter where the Other is as if dispersed, "you can feel it" he writes, this, the felt encounter, the 
defming "concrete abdutive inference" of his metapsychological approach. It is here that the Praecox 
Gefohl serves as indicator, an index even, for apprehending the primary symptom, not objectively 
inferring it or explicating it, but "intuitively grasping" it within the commerce of the pathic, pre-
representational primordial level of constitution, at the most initial of levels of affective exchange where 
where the Spaltung is said of the disharmony of dialectically pathic exchange and reciprocity between the 
patient and clinician, not only as a trouble of incarnation, but also as a trouble of the "entre-deux" and 
"entre-les-deux," a trouble of the anthropological category or even as its disproportion, a trouble of 
transcendence proper. As Oury writes: 
There is a dispersion rather than a concentration, there is a no-where, there is the elsewhere, there is a 
presence that functions incorrectly .. .It is question of the encounter. .. something happens within the 
encounter. . .it is not a question of a collection of primary symptoms, but as certain have said, of a 
person.220 
As the Spanish psychiatrist Salomon Resnik outlined in his phenomenologically grounded Personne et 
Psychose of 1973221 , there is the "particular presence of the schizophrenic" -what Oury calls the "odor" 
of the schizophrenic222• The presence of the shizophrenic marks the Spa/tung, there is the sense that he is 
not there, that the patient is absent, that, in the words of Oury, he is, "elsewhere," his presence is lacking. 
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Most importantly, this sensing of an anthropological disproportion is primarily felt within the atmospheric 
commerce between men, the affective interchange proper (miteinandersein). The felt disproportion with 
the person of schizophrenia is nothing other than a fundamental difficulty of being-with-the-other 
presenting itself as a primary symptom, of dissociation on the primordial level of the pathic - it is, as 
Oury would assert, a problem of the mit-, a problem of the being-with223 • It is where there is a dissonance 
at the primordial level of the constitution of the subject, a problem at the level of "emergence." The 
primary symptom, the Spa/tung, thus becomes said of a problem of transcendental structure rather than a 
level of empirical comportment, where the trouble of the "entre-deux" announces a trouble of 
transcendental structure itself, and where, in the words of Tatossian, "the essentiality is of a tactile 
order.224" The patient is dissociated, there is a scission in his pathic presentation, there is a lack of his 
presence felt within an ambient commerce, the schizophrenic's body is in dispersal where as Oury 
describes, "there is merely a part of a fmger that remains ... we think we address a person, but we address 
a hand, a toe or a button.225" the idea we need to keep with here, is that the diagnostic works through and 
objectifies the anthropological bond. The schizophrenic does not merely present an anthropological 
deficit, but as we saw Minkowski assert, the question is of a particular affective modality. Disproportion 
is felt as an anthropological modality within Weizsacker's affective commerce. 
The question of the primary symptom of schizophrenia, as identified by Bleuler, the Spa/tung, 
when posed at the level of Weizsacker's therapeutic commerce to which Rfunke's Praecox Gefohl is the 
most faithful and "honest" of diagnostics, is said of that which is felt by the analyst and not thought, it is 
translated by a clinical objectivity in line with an anthropologically decisive level of exchange between 
clinician and patient, of an "inobjective reality" as Maldiney writes226. Such questions, or rather such a 
sentiment or phenomenological attitude, is one that hallmarks the seminars of Schotte and Oury, pointing 
to this inobjective reality, of a clinical objectivity that, in following the lead of Hubertus Tellenbach, does 
not seek to isolate the symptom within a pathogenic causal chain, but pose the question of the non-
isolatable phenomenon. In doing so, the symptom is said of man, and again in retaking the adage of Oury: 
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we ourselves are symptoms. This phenomenological attitude does not pose the question of schizophrenia 
as a trouble of comportment or cognitive deficit, but rather asserts the respect of the Other with the 
question of the transcendental modification of structure. This is the address of sympathy, comprehension 
and accompaniment, the level of commerce and exchange, where the diagnostic is said of the pathic, and 
psychiatry said of man. 
Commerce, which is played out within the dimension of the pathic, is said of the "primary," 
"primordial" category of the human, to use two words dear to the vocabulary of phenomenology and 
recurrent within Schotte's lecture series. Within this commerce, the relation between observer and 
observed, between patient and clinician is said of a solidarity and reciprocity (Gegenseitigkeit). This was 
the fundament to Weizsacker presenting the case not merely of medicine, but of an "anthropological 
medicine" just as the diagnostic is of an "anthropological diagnostic." The Praecox Gefohl, is nothing 
short of the most anthropologically faithful diagnostic, one taking "therapeutic commerce" as its 
functional criteria. Thus, when Oury tells us that, "there is the odor of the schizophrenic," it is of the known 
through the felt, a comprehension furnished the pathic diagnostic (Praecox Gefohl). 
4: The primordial and the pathic: a guest for essence and communion 
What we have previously called in our previous chapter, the "art of accompaniment' (which paralleled 
Bonnaf6's description psychiatry as the "art of sympathy") now appears not so literal and objective as it 
originally once did, for such notions are clinically punctuated in the psychiatrist approaching the question 
of a transcendental plane of constitution furnishing and supporting the empirical, in him entering into the 
narratives between the transcendental constituting ground and the empirical figure, in him requiring an 
"absolute passivity" in order to gain access to the pathic zone - the primordial scene proper. More 
precisely, we now understand this art, which we saw Pinel deem the most "noble", as a phenomenological 
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art, that is, a human art. This is why Tosquelles speaks of the project of psychiatry, or rather and 
Institutional Psychotherapy, as a re-elaboration of man and the spaces of his existence. Psychiatry, 
therefore, is at once creative, ethical and phenomenological. 
The accompaniment and sympathy of which we speak, are not objective condoling acts, but 
anthropological dispositions, or rather "affective dispositions" which gain a valuable significance within 
the psychiatric encounter. It is where we have the, "vital" dialectic of the "entre-deux," and Minkowski's 
"vital contact with reality." Here, we find a neighbouring notion by Tatossian where he speaks of the, 
"profundity of human existence,227" which is what we have seen Minkowski further characterize as the 
"cosmic level" of constitution, which is the level of the creative elan. Such was a Tosquelles of 1948, who 
in approaching the mock-Biblical phantasm of the end-of-the-world experience in terms of the "I" of a 
transcendental consciousness speaking and announcing a truth beneath the "mechanical" and empirical 
"1." Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, the phantasm is both organismic and psychical within an 
investigation that took us from the neurology of Goldstein and Weizsacker, to the phenomenology of 
Landsberg. The phantasm is a declaration of transcendental reality (Lacan's Real) -unitary life itself28 . 
Thus when we hear Oury speak, on grounds of the Praecox Gefohl and the pathic, that with the 
fundamental symptom of schizophrenia the patient is "elsewhere" and "nowhere," we can understand this, 
in terms ofTosquelles' thesis, to be a question of the lack ofunicity and a "collapse" of the transcendental 
constitution229 (this in terms of Goldstein's neurobiology and even Landsberg's Christology). But as we 
have seen, this "fecund" event, is not necessarily negative, because the phantasm is a revelatory 
mechanism, and madness discloses and reveals that from which we are habitually distanced, a "bitter 
revelation" as Tosquelles often said. 
The coalescence of the transcendental and the empirical is, in Tellenbach's terms, the shift from 
the symptom to the essence. This shift in turn points us to an experience disclosing human presence to be, 
in the words of Ludwig Binswanger, "authentic,230" which is where Edmund Husser! proposed to 
"essence231 " to be (whether or not Husser! accessed the true, authentic and essential nature of things is 
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questionable, that is, whether or not he possessed an experiential knowledge of phenomena rather than an 
intellectual knowledge). Similarly, for Arthur Tatossian, this realm of essences implied a move away from 
"nosography" because nosological categories are themselves "critically refined" through the disclosure of 
the "originary foundation" of existence and the primacy of experience232. This shift from the nosological, 
is where the clinical encounter amplifies and discloses a primordial anthrpology, where it brings to light 
(to use a phrasing of Maldiney), or rather where it puts into relief the transcendental variations and 
modifications between the Self and World, disclosing ever so rarely man's structural geneses and his 
"initial formation." This is why we have the "quality" of the penetrative diagnostic (Minkowski) or the 
Praecox Gefiihl (Riimke, Oury), because it penetrates what Husser! called the "living present.233" For 
Tatossian the "profundity of human experience," this penetration into the immediate and essential nature 
of all things was of a tactile order rather than an intellectual orde?34 and it is under this auspice, one of 
the sensual and felt rather than the intellectual, that Oury that we see Oury speak of a future-anterior time 
of the encounter within which the Praecox Gefiihl of Riimke unfolds, within an anticipatory dimension of 
feeling and sensing the Other, that zone of "absolute passivity" where our pre-constituted ideas of the 
world are suspended, an instant, to retake the wording of Heidegger, of pure a priori intuition: 
This anticipatory dimension, is not a pure intentionality. It is that which corresponds, in terms of the 
grammatical plane, to the future anterior. True presence, is of the future anterior. It is not something 
encased in the speaking subject of the past or the future, because this, would already be too late. True 
presence is something that is in relation with that which opens, with the opening. 235 
Tatossian's enigmatically and phenomenologically penned phrase defining the instant of the 
patient-clinician relation to be a disclosure of the profundity to existence, is where that which is accessible 
to vision (anschaulich), the visible sign proper (the isolatable medical symptom), gives way to the 
announcements of transcendental life and an "enigmatic depth,236"to use the descriptive vocabulary of 
Husserl's most faithful disciple Eugen Fink. Such descriptions mark a joint concern, for where we have 
seen Fink and Deleuze write of depth, Tellenbach writes of essences, Minkowski writes of "cosmic 
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constitution," and Oury writes of the "odor of the schizophrenic ... surpassing intuition itself.237" These 
descriptions lend themselves to elaborating the profundity not merely of human interrelations, but of the 
patient-clinician interrelation and the ethical enterprise of psychiatry. Psychiatry is phenomenology, 
phenomenology is psychiatry, yet only as long as the ethical is understood in terms of the human 
encounter and the necessity to accord human presence the role it demands. When Pinel characterised the 
enterprise of medical assistance as living "within the presence" of the patient, he weaved together the 
ethical, the phenomenological and the diagnostic providing a tapestry of human existence, the very 
principality of medicine, theology and philosophy. 
Pathic communication (to use the terminology ofWeizsacker) does not so much create the new 
and novel but reveal the ever present profundity to our reality. As Tatossian asserts, in an acute wording as 
if to sum up the appeal of the phenomenological attitude: 
Life does not build itself upon our model.. .it is the human condition that follows the model of the life of 
the cosmos, within which there is the transpersonal and primitive.238 
This, echoing Ludwig Binswanger's appeal to the primacy of presence and existence: 
Medical psychotherapy, as with somatic medicine, in no way creates new forces. On the contrary, where 
the latter can merely isolate, concentrate and direct the reigning forces of the organic and inorganic 
universe or cosmos, the former also merely isolates, concentrates and directs the reigning 'forces' of the 
cosmos ofbeing.239 
What the encounter marks is an instant of Fink's inconclusive "monograph," the coming forth of the 
"virginity of the world" (Cezanne), it is where, in the words of Goethe, "experience is but a part of 
experience" - the horizon or the Real (Lacan) cannot be known in its entirety, and, moreover, it is the 
virginity of the world which resides within us, yet ever so distanced from our habitual consciousness, 
albeit one, in the eyes ofHusserl, which was mistaken. New living forces are not created, but an originary 
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foundation is disclosed- a proto-model of the world and life. 
What we have seen Tatossian call the "primacy of experience" is for Husserlian phenomenology 
revealing of the essence. Thus we see Minkowski write of the, "absolute sincerity of the transcendental 
Ego," a sincerity which subsists in the primitive and primordial life world of all things. In the words of 
Binswanger, we encounter a constitutive agency for it is, "that which makes the given possible, that 
which transcendentally constitutes it 240 " - Lacan's Real To this primitive, primary domain of 
transcendental constitution, Husserl attributed "passive processes" that were conceived as, "self-
regulating," "automatic" and unifying processes prior to the thematised activities of the speaking and 
thinking psychological subjece41 . These processes maintain the "unicity" of man organically and 
psychically242- "initial" processes (to retake an adjective used by Oury). The experience of this level, in 
the words of Husserl, is "pure," free from cultural idealisations and preconstituted ideas, free from 
habitual obscurations. This is why Oury accords a "future anterior time" to this experience, one that is 
initiated by an "absolute passivity," which for Husserl was situated beneath the theoretical and technical 
preoccupations of the empirical subjecr43 . Husserl 's "pure" experience of a pre-thematic world where the 
"originary foundation" is disclosed, can therefore be firmly equated with Oury's reflection upon the 
pathic as the most "primordial of sensations,244" as the level of "ambient" commerce and exchange for 
Weizsacker, the level upon which the Praecox Gefilhl comes into play, the "essential" level which 
Minkowski saw the diagnostic "penetrate. 245" 
The experience of Presence, essence and the primitive, is not one grasped by an intellectually 
inferring constituted subject because as Oury reminds us in a brief reflection upon the aesthetico-
physiognomy of Jiirg Zutt, "it is a pre-intentionallevd46" which demands a more naked subject prior to 
theoretical and technical preoccupation, one of an "absolute passivity." Indeed, prior to the clinician 
donning his technical garb he must first be naked, exposed to the primary and primitive, passive to the 
world, innocent to the declaration. The Praecox Gefilhl is more of a state of being than a technical 
operation, for the psychiatrist, rather than being the somatist, who in distinguishing the soma from the 
231 
psyche, draws upon the isolatable symptom within a pathological chain to further understand the 
pathogenesis of an illness, the psychotherapist adopts what Hubertus Tellenbach has described as an 
"empirico-phenomenological" attitude enabling "an ambient exchange with the patient that is oriented to 
a vital intuition of his nature?47" And to retake Oury, this is where, "we cannot be within systems of a 
representative logic, of prejudgments proper" because "we ourselves are symptoms." This is an attitude 
that takes "appearances as phenomena," and one that is, "not guided by the prejudices of a theory.248" 
What else is the Praecox Gefohl other than a vital intuition of the patient's essential nature, one that is 
unique to human existence? One that is reminiscent of a Platonic appeal to transcendence, urging us to go 
beyond the outward appearances of things249, to penetrate the veils of the world, to remove the masks 
behind which the gospel of world harmony and the virginity of the world exist. 
This vital intuition of a non-prejudiced attitude, one requiring a consciousness less crowded by 
habitual thinking, one that momentarily saw Tosquelles with a modest pen ask, "clairvoyant?250" is of the 
pre-thematic (Husserl) and pre-representational (Oury) where there is a non-objective grasp of Presence 
(to borrow two recurrent adjectives from the studies ofBinswanger). It is where the psychotherapist must 
set aside his theoretical preoccupations and surrender himself to what Merleau-Ponty described as a, 
"primordial faith/51" which is, as we have seen, that non-thematisable form of belief for Oury. Similarly, 
yet less enigmatically to Merleau-Ponty's coining, Oury likens the task of the Praecox Gefiihl to "clearing 
the ground" of presuppositions, and to "suspending preconception." Elsewhere, he likens the diagnostic 
task is to a Kenotic theology in writing that, "the faculty of emptying out" has to be present for us to have 
access to this domain252• For Tellenbach, this is the "empirico-phenomenological attitude" which takes the 
phenomenon, the essence and the transcendental organisation of man as the very minimal structure from 
which we can depart. In his work on melancholy, Tellenbach writes that: 
The phenomenon .. .is that which is hidden. With visible symptoms we can only speak of experience in that 
something is visible .. .It is because the illness is announced through symptoms that are not shown, that 
diagnostic inferences are called for. For something to show itself, there is no need for inference. When a 
melancholic speaks of a modification of the spatially lived (vecu spatial), I can apprehend this as a 
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symptom ... but I can also apprehend it as a phenomenon. In this case it is nothing of the indication of the 
illness but something where a character ofbeing of melancholic presence manifests.253 
The symptom indicates a phenomenon, and with this empirico-phenomenological approach 
suiface does indeed become depth (Deleuze ), that is, a far deeper reality is pronounced. This depth for 
Husserl had many a coining: the proto world of life, (Ur-lebenswelt) where there are "passive geneses," 
the primary reality of"irnrnediate experience," a "pure universal nature," the "pre-thought" (Vor-Denken), 
and of what he deemed the "compossible" world of the "pure Ego 254 " (the realm of the pure 
transcendental Ego for Minkowski). We can even venture to suggest, along with the psychiatric studies of 
Halleman and most notably his study on paraphrenia, that this particular dimension to things is "pre-
temporal" and "pre-historical" (vorzeit)255 which very much ties in with Oury speaking of a "pathic" 
"proto" site where there is even the constitutive, constructive root of space itself256. 
What we have seen Tellenbach call the vitally intuited, is where the patient is encountered as a 
presence, what Weizsacker understands as the dimension of affective commerce where a "pure" 
objectivity is at play (to borrow an adjective from Husserl). Clinically, this pure objectivity is where the 
given reality of the symptom houses yet a greater narrative to man's existence, where as we have seen for 
Tellenbach, appearances become essences, and for Deleuze, suiface becomes depth. The psychiatrist thus 
works at the level of the empirical and transcendental, at the level of the visible and the invisible, the 
ontic-ontological, where he is initiated into working with the figure and the ground through an encounter 
with the person, of that which for Maldiney, is, "yet to appear upon the surface ... where the task of 
psychiatry is precisely to bring it to light.257" This marks the very task of the empirico-phenomenological 
attitude for as Tatossian notes it is here that psychiatric practice becomes a question not so much of a 
psychiatry working at the level of "explication (erklaren), but clarification (klaren), 258" where we have 
seen Oury assert a clinical objectivity to be not of explication (erkliirung), but of sympathy and 
comprehension (verstenhung). 
The question of enigmatic depth (Fink), of presence (Binswanger), of the profundity of human 
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existence (Tatossian), therefore points to the psychiatrist's apprehension of the primary symptom through 
a diagnostic not working to a classically oriented criteria of isolatable medical symptoms within a 
pathological causal chain, but working at the level of transcendental experience beneath the empirical 
semiological symptom. A penetration of a reality that Tatossian has called, "pre-semiological.259" This is 
precisely what Oury's seminars on the primary symptom of schizophrenia and his salutary gesture to the 
Praecox Gefohl underlined: the importance of the pre-thematic and pre-representational level of 
constitution which is the most primary and defmitive of anthropological categories. And to this we again 
hear Schotte speak of a medical objectivity defined through a commerce of"essence", of the "primordial" 
and of the "essential" constitutive reality of man. The psychiatrist is as the monk, yet the divinity to 
which he turns is commonly called madness, the liturgy; psychosis and the faith; phenomenological~ a 
non-thematisable belief (Oury) or a primordial faith (Merleau-Ponty). 
What was for Tatossian the "pre-semiological," for Oury is the "pre-thematic" and "pre-
representational," which for Schotte, is the "essence," the "primary", the "primitive" and the 
"primordial." Proof again of a vocabulary and sentiment shared. Husser! further wrote of this level to be 
one of a, "primordial bond" (Ursprung) which was faithfully complimented by the likes of a Minkowski 
with notions of, "interhuman contact260" and "vital contact.261 " Tatossian also, as if combining the 
pathic of Weizsacker and the cosmological sentiments of Minkowski, accords "human life262 " an 
"anthropo-cosmic" role where the empirical symptom is but a mere isolatable moment within the reigning 
kingdom of the transcendental activity of all things. There is thus a fluctuating dialogue, what we have 
previously deemed a nuanced coalescent narrative, between the symptom and the phenomenon, between 
appearance and essence (Tellenbach), between the empirical and the transcendental, between a 
"constituting" "enigmatic depth263 " and a "constituted264 " surface of empirical reality, between the 
"accessible" and the "essential" (the vivant-vecu dialectic for Maldiney). As Tatossian outlines: 
With neurosis, there is a weakness of the empirical self but a great strength of the transcendental Self ... but 
with delirium where the patient affirms his autonomy and force, there is resistance and struggle, the force 
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of the empirical Self does not allow the weakening of the transcendental Self.265 
Where it is all too easy to favour this proto-level as the intentional constituting the eidos 
(essence) of an intellectual consciousness, the psychiatrist, be him a Binswanger, a Minkwoski, a Straus 
and their extended tradition with the work of Wolfgang Blankenburl66, Tatossian and Tellenbach, would 
opt for the pre-intentional and the pre-thematic to be the most faithful address of the Ur-Lebenswelt (the 
proto-world of life) furnishing the epistemological horizon of psychiatry. Here, the intentional and the 
pre-intentional by no means invite a duality, or two different consciousnesses, nor a division of the 
transcendental and empirical ego, but rather, they are to be considered as two moments of the same 
transcendence, or better, two moments of the same transcendental consciousness - as proof of a will to 
unity. As Tatossian notes: 
Intentionality gives up its place to pre-intentionality ... one needs to distinguish the intentionality of 
intellectual consciousness, wholly reflexive, and the ground of the "operative," "working" intentionality of 
"active consciousness" upon which the lebenswelt is founded.267 
This ground of the "operative" category does not belong to intellectual knowledge because it is 
a primary mode of apprehension, intuitive grasping (Tellenbach),feeling (Straus) and sensation (Oury). 
The Husserlian sentiment is clear, for this attitude invites a "bracketing-off268" of empirical givens, 
cultural idealisations, and a "suspension" of prejudgmenf69. It is where we saw Oury write that a, 
"clearing of the ground" and the Kenotic category of "emptying out" is required in order for the patient to 
be grasped as presence270, in order to have that "pure" experience, that state-of-affairs for Tellenbach 
where the prejudices of a theory do not hold sway and intellect gives way to experience. As Karl Jaspers, 
inhaling the Husserlian air of his time, momentarily proposed in his Psychopathology, there is a, "setting 
aside of prejudices271 " in order to see phenomena in their emergence, "directly272" and "purely." This is 
the appeal to a "direct experience,273" (which the Praecox Gefiihl in fact is) and it goes in the direction of 
what some neuroscientists sympathetic to the "purity" of the Husserlian cause have characterised as 
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"direct perception,274" similar to that of elementary Yogic experiences. Thus Tosquelles once more, 
"clairvoyant?" and Oury again, "I start from concrete metapsychological hypotheses." To recall the 
Catalan militant Horace Torrubia, who was neither explicitly Husserlian nor Heideggerian in his 
referencing, but a psychiatrist like Tosquelles steeped in the philosophy of the Catalan region and its anti-
fascist imperatives, this is an attitude even "sensitive to the grain of sand.275" And to once again recall 
Erwin Straus, the neurological luminary who became the key figure of the Gestaltpsychologie movement, 
it is an attitude respecting, "phenomena in their emergence276" where man's "immeasurable endowment" 
subsists. 
For the disciples of Arthur Tatossian277, Jean Naudin and Jean-Michel Azorin, this "direct 
givenness," this direct experience, this Husserlian "return to the things themselves," this "pure" 
experience and "vital intuitive" grasp of essence (Tellenbach) where phenomena are in emergence 
(Straus) is possible only through an attitude where "clinical matters of fact can be experienced directly" 
owing to "the absence of presuppositions and the methodological suspension of prejudices which stand in 
the way of direct access to phenomena.278" Indeed, as Lanteri-Laura would note, this attitude: 
Presupposes a constant oscillation between a purely intuitive practice, engaged in the immediately present 
experience with a patient, and a theorizing activity that tests present clinical experience against 
psychopathological concepts inherited from the past.279 
Theorisation is thus seemingly secondary to the clinical encounter, to the vital communication between 
the clinician and patient, subsisting at the structural, emergent level of man, or as Husserl saw it, "the 
primal source-point, from which springs the now, and so on.280" As we saw with a Jean Oury of 1947 
before his patient Jayet, "nosographic astuteness is not enough281 " because here, within this "commerce" 
(We!zsacker) of "primordial sensation" theoretical activity and theories in circulation are "suspended,282" 
and "presence is sensible283." It is upon such a ground, in the address of the primordial and transcendental, 
of the primal source point (Husserl), that Wolfgang Blankenburg writes of (as if the crowning gesture to 
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all phenomenological appeals), "the emergence of a possibility peculiar to human experience.284" This is 
the address of the primacy of experience between the observer and observed where for Husserl the "thesis 
of reality" is suspended, "bracketed off." 
Only through this suspension of habitual thought patterns can we have the immediacy oflived 
experience (Erlebnis), the "living present,285" only by clearing the ground of our daily clinging to world 
concepts can we access the pre-intentional and pre-thought (Husserl), the pre-semiotic (Tatossian) and 
pre-representational (Oury). Thus when Oury speak of the Kenotic category of "emptying out" it is so 
that we can get closer to grasping the emerging subject, an Other, without intellectual and technical 
preoccupation. The felt, an instant of the clairvoyant even (Tosquelles) belong to that "penetration" 
(Minkowski) and the coming-forth of what Husserl called a "universal nature.286" Thus we again retake 
Oury of Paris VII in 1985 asking, "that when a person is present before us, who we encounter, what is it 
exactly that urges us to deem him a schizophrenic?287" The answer is prior to language, within primordial 
sensation where Cezanne's virginity of the world implies not merely an experience unique to psychiatry 
and to art, but to humanity as a whole, which is why, it is the defmitive anthropological category, prior to 
and beyond the barriers of impudent convention and the common popular reason of habitually conceived 
reality. 
5: Schizophrenic Deficit and Schizophrenic Industriousness 
In following Immanuel Kant, Wolfgang Blankenburg saw the level of transcendental 
constitution to be "common sense.288" Husserl worded it as, "universal nature.289" Yet for Blankenburg, 
this common sense was also a, "natural evidence.290" The role allotted to this natural evidence was to 
ensure what Hubertus Tellenbach has deemed a "lawful connection291 " between Self and World, the 
implicit yet ever-present frame of"natural experience292" proper, a ground in Blankenburg's words: 
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Permitting tactility, taste, the sentiment of tat which is adequate, the knowledge of the Other even before 
knowing him, the capacity to distinguish that which is pertinent and that which is not ... the logic of the 
world (weltlogik), a naturallogic.293 
This realm of a "natural logic," a Weltlogik synonymous with Neo-Kantian terms such as "common 
sense" and "universal nature" (constituting the coherence of the empirical subject within the world), was 
for Blankenburg a factually determining "transcendental organisation.294" As he wrote, it is the level of, 
"the conditions of possibility where the relation between Self and World actually function. 295" For 
Blankenburg, the borderline schizophrenic demonstrated a "problem" of transcendental organisation and 
natural logic. Where Binswanger spoke of an anthropological disproportion, and Lacan spoke of the 
trouble of incarnation, Blankenburg speaks of the trouble of transcendental organisation and Oury speaks 
of the trouble of transcendence. Phenomenology indeed becomes a fraternal enterprise, edified within a 
psychiatry where the ethic is paramount and where the patient is an existant, reflecting the profundity of 
our own nature and conflicts we are yet to realize ourselves. 
With similar approach, Tatossian (a cohort of Oury, Maldiney, Tellenbach and Blankenburg 
well) saw the weakening of the transcendental self within neurosis to be the "weakening" and 
"deficiency" of common sense. The resistant struggle between the empirical and transcendental self 
within delirium is understood as an upset of the Husserlian "passive" and "active syntheses."296 Likewise, 
Oury speaks of the "profound trouble" of schizophrenia, of the "collapse of transcendence" proper, where 
there is "a profound trouble ofincarnation297" (Lacan), a problem of the "initial" human level prior to the 
empirically incarnated subject. This level of"transcendental organisation" of which the "profound trouble 
of schizophrenia" corresponds, is conceived by Tatossian as the pre-thematic level of biographical 
movement, the lebensweg, the non-objective auto-movement (selbtsbewegung) of the Self that the 
immediate, pre-semiological diagnostic apprehends298• This is where we see Oury announce to Paris VII 
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that the work and concern of the psychiatrist, and more precisely of an Institutional Psychotherapy, is 
with the question of the person, his movement, his constitution, and the "respectful undertaking" towards 
the Other99• 
The psychiatrist thus works at the intuitive level and the technical level. His method and 
attutide is "empirico-phenomenological" (Tellenbach), where, to retake Lanteri-Laura, the psychiatrist's 
approach is, "a constant oscillation between a purely intuitive practice, engaged in the immediately 
present experience with a patient, and a theorizing activity which tests present clinical experience against 
psychopathological concepts inherited from the past.300" Troubles of this level, of the transcendentally 
constitutive dimension, of the proto-world disclosed through a diagnostic "sensing the pathic," have 
further seen Blankenburg propose schizophrenia to be a "loss of natural evidence/01 " which is a synonym 
not for a cognitive deficit but rather for a trouble of "common sense," "natural belief' or "natural logic." 
Here the new evidences of delirium replace the lacking natural evidence, furnishing a facticity of non-
evidence and a delusional series ofreferences302• This line of enquiry (psychiatric and Neo-Kantian?) can 
inform what we have previously seen to be the mock-Biblical delirium announcing the end of the world 
phantasm fmding a Husserlian reception in, "the real world only existing to the extent that it is constantly 
taken for granted that experience will continue to unfold in accordance with the same constitutive 
style. 303 " Tatossian, in following Blankenburg, has seen the transcendental substitution of natural 
evidence with new non-evidence to be the upset of the "pre-historical level" of passive synthesis resulting 
in the discordance of the empirical subject, where schizophrenia is considered to be an "egological" 
problem understood as an upset between the transcendental and empirical ego304. As a result, what 
Tatossian deems the "reassuring legitimacy of common sense305" accompanying actions is lost, that is to 
say, that the loss of natural evidence with schizophrenia is where "necessary objective knowledge" lacks 
"efficient working, 306" and where the world logic is replaced by alternative evidence that is not 
necessarily of the factual order of "natural logic." With delusional judgment thus becoming the 
substituted basis of the evident and factual world, the logic of fact matters little for the schizophrenic. As 
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Blankenburg writes, "the whole constitutive structure of transcendental subjectivity and objectivity, the 
natural experience of the world, of reason, of truth and of reality has broken down.307" To this we can 
recall Oury and Tosquelles who do not speak of a, "schizophrenic deficit" or "breakdown" in common 
sense, but of a, "collapse of transcendence" and the "profound trouble of incarnation." Where 
Blankenburg and Tatossian point to the incapacities of everyday life through a functional deficit of 
common sense and the substitution of natural logic with a non-natural logic, Oury points to the extension 
of the capacities of man's psychical life through the industrious possibilities of delirium 
( Wahnsfunktion )308: 
The school inaugurated by Henri Ey appealed to a permanent deficit without considering the 
reconstruction of something, a reconstruction which sometimes, when the temperament is rich enough, 
surpasses the aesthetic productions of the normopath. This is not to say that one has to be a schizophrenic 
to be a genius, but that upon this level, that which is in question within the encounter, is a person ... Our 
work concerns the person ... The encounter is that which concerns the existent and the manifestation of 
what we call, in somewhat of a banal way, the Other. 309 
Schizophrenia is understood either as a negation of the workable cohesive constitution of common sense 
and "natural logic," yet a negation that is creative and revelatory. The phenomenological concern can 
therefore become seemingly split into two schools. Naudin and Azorin, tutored by Tatossian, who had 
himself delivered the Husserlian-weighted thought of Blankenburg to the French psychiatric milieu in the 
1960's, are of the school of the "functional deficit" in writing that: 
Natural experience achieves an equilibrium between evidence and non-evidence ... Moments of doubt 
lead to a thematisation which replaces non-concordant evidence with a new concordant evidence. 
Confronted with doubt, schizophrenic experience does not succeed in re-establishing this equilibrium and 
let's non-evidence proceed forth without ever overcoming it.310 
Oury, however, presents a less stringent appeal to the demands of this universally grounding common 
sense (sensus communis) of man and seeks to propose, in following the sentiments of the Heideggerian-
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weighted Tellenbach311 , that schizophrenia is not so much a concern of "natural deficit,312" or what 
Binswanger termed, in appealing to the lack and breakdown of the natural constitutive foundation an, 
"anthropological disproportion,313" but that: 
Among other illnesses, as a trouble of rhythm, is a disrhythm. Our work consists of the attempts to 
reestablish a certain level of rhythm, and for this, one has approach the site where space and time are 
themselves secondary. That which is primordial is rhythm. As Hans Von Bulow writes, "In the beginning 
there was rhythm." We can also say that rhythm is the "auto-movement of space" ... When there is rhythm, 
there is opening ... Rhythm, the putting-into-form, manifests the oeuvre, and that which is put into question 
within this specific space of creation and emergence of the most profound troubles, is the absence of the 
objectified oeuvre.314 
For Naudin and Azorin, in following Blankenburg and Tatossian, schizophrenia is said of the absence of 
natural evidence (Binswanger's anthropologically disproportionate presence) and without successfully 
overcoming the disproportional equilibrium between the pre-intentional and intentional levels there is a 
permanent deficit or destruction. This is Henri Ey's "permanent deficiency" to which Oury 
counterbalances with an aesthetic reading of schizophrenia as both industrious and creative illness315 . 
Indeed, we recall that for Jakob Wyrsch, in his phenomenological study of the personage of the 
schizophrenic which Oury has himself often referenced, "schizophrenia is not necessarily said of a 
permanent destruction.316" With the school of Tatossian, we see the proliferation of delirium over the 
factual, where the common evidence of man is replaced by the references of delirium, and where delusion 
is said of a deficit, of a substitution with a "false frame of references" denying common sense its 
grounding of the empirical and the factuality of the life-world. For Oury, schizophrenia is said of the 
absence of the "objectified oeuvre" where there is a "disrythm" and an upset to the transcendental 
incarnating organisation of the subject. Where Tatossian rests upon the Blankenbergian argument of the 
loss, deficit and lack of common sense and natural belief, Oury takes the reconstructive post-traumatic 
paradigm of Wyrsch, Griihle (Whansfunktion) and Freud as his theoretical signposts. We recall Freud in 
his introductory lectures: 
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The paranoiac rebuilds the universe ... not to the most splendid of truths ... but to a new level oflife ... his 
delirious effort is a means to rebuilding. We take it for a morbid production, the formation of a delirium, 
and in reality a means of healing, a reconstruction.317 
Where Naudin and Azorin, in following Blankenburg, speak of "evidence," Oury takes his lead from 
Freud's observation of post-traumatic reconstruction and speaks ofthe "work" (Oeuvre) of schizophrenia. 
Yet whether the assertion is one the Institutional Psychotherapy of a post-war generation favouring 
themes of industry and revelation with aesthetically crowned gestaltist appeals to the creative and 
renewable possibilities within psychoses318, of the oeuvre and rhythm, or if it be of the phenomenological 
psychiatry of Marseille with its anthropological appeals to the universal necessity of common sense319, of 
natural evidence and its functional deficits, the joint appeal of both these phenomenologically-weighted 
schools of psychiatry, of La Loire and Marseille, is one where the "profundity of human existence320" is 
the imperative, and where to speak of isolatable symptoms is not enough to qualify the "art" of psychiatry, 
and most importantly, the art of sympathy or the art of acocmpaniment. Indeed, both schools venture 
"beyond the distinction of psychosis, psychopathology and normality321" in striving to know and assert 
upon the ground of human being in general, and the projects of Marseille and La Borde are two species of 
the same genre. Thus the diagnostic, for both these schools edifying the phenomenological attitude, 
becomes one of "the primary reality of immediate experience,322" where "the world unveils itself,323" 
beyond objective perception (wahrnehmung) and into an, "aesthetic domain of apparition unveiling an 
essential nature (wessen),324" that is, of the "forgotten and ever present frame325" of reality. Minkowski 
himself had hallmarked such appeals, in seeing "the rigid symptom" to be replaced "within the flux of the 
world.326" 
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6: The atmospheric landscape 
Viktor Von Weizsacker, like Sigmund Freud, was a contemporary of Martin Heidegger, however, 
all three failed to meet. They do meet, however, as we have progressively seen, within the project of an 
Institutional Psychotherapy, and specifically, within the work of Oury and Tosquelles. For Weizsacker, the 
pre-thematic dimension of vital communication was, as we have seen, the "pathic." The pathic is a field 
within which we exist as primordial sensation, prior to us being the psychological decisive subject to 
which we commonly accord the empirical 'I' of our habitual activities and thought patterns. For Tatossian, 
the pathic existence of man is not merely one of an existence within sensation 327 because the 
commmunication between patient and analyst is "vital" and in following Blankenberg's appeals to the 
universally constitutive role of common sense (elsewhere termed "naturallogic328"), Tatossian saw pathic 
communication to be "tactility in the form of an atmosphere329." This follows Minkowski for whom 
atmosphere was a "concrete atmosphere," one of the felt, one of "affective contact. 330" The pathic 
encounter, is thus conceived by Tatossian to be an "atmospheric" dynamic englobing and encircling the 
clinical relation. Moreover, for Minkowski, this is an instant of co-presence, belonging to the anthropo-
cosmological domain of human existence, one where "harmonic phenomena" provide the constitutive 
transcendental underpinnings of man-in-the-world331 by virtue of a "vast arc" (elsewhere deemed the 
creative elan) traversing man and cosmos332• 
The clinical encounter is an atmospheric situation. It is felt and tactile. This state of affairs is not 
unique to the psychiatric encounter, because it is anthropological and belongs to the human community as 
a whole, but what the clinical encounter does, is accentuate the atmosphere that constitutes the subject, 
that is, from which the subject emerges. More recent phenomenologists, Vannoti and Gennart in particular, 
follow the concerns of Heidegger and his psychiatric transposition through the work of Hubertus 
Tellenbach, Arthur Tatossian, and Erwin Straus, in order to situate clinical contact as belonging to, "a 
horizon essentially carrying the form of an ambient world - a world which situates us within an environ 
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of sensible qualities (odours, lights, the tone of the voice), and from this pathic communication we have 
with the environ, a certain atmosphere or ambience which is deployed around us.333" This phrase in fact 
sheds greater light on the assertions ofTosquelles writing of the Real: 
The Real is that which is here before us, most of the time, in front of us, and that which remains outside of 
us. We will never be able to grasp it in its totality. It is placed upon the horizon to which each person walks 
towards, yet it is a horizon that withdraws, even to the rhythm of each walking man. 334 
In terms of phenomenology, and Heidegger and Maldiney in particular, this environ of the 
atmospheric encounter pertains to the living subject's being-in-the-world, where the subject is 
transcendentally implicated, thrown into a world of ambient relations335 . It is where Erwin Straus would 
assert that the subject, "never remains immutable, that in the changes of his accidents there are sensations, 
perceptions, pure thoughts, volitions. 336 " Indeed for Straus, man is sensibly implicated within a 
developmental, moving landscape, a "pathic landscape" as he called it. True to the empirico-
phenomenological attitude favouring the "primordial," the "essence," and the "primary," Straus asserted 
that this "pathic landscape" is "pre-thematic" and "pre-objective," that is, prior to the reflexive subject. As 
In the landscape we are encircled by a horizon; the further we go, the horizon always displaces itself with 
us ... In the landscape we never realise that we have left one area to find ourselves within another and that 
the area within which we find ourselves never embraces the totality?38 
It is this very function of the englobing and encircling horizon, one paralleling Minkowski's vocabulary 
of a "vast transcendental arc" englobing human relations, that for Straus marks a decisive shift from 
nosography to topology. This is demonstrated by the following: there is a fundamental difference between 
the space of the pathic landscape (of the shifting, transcendental atmospheric horizon), and geographical 
space, which is fixed, coordinated and delimited. Straus writes that geographical space is systematised 
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and closed where the position of the spectator is always determined within a systematic context. The 
space of the pathic landscape, on the other hand, is where the spectator is always positioned at the center 
of a spatial system englobed by a horizon of atmospheric relations339. The pathic landscape designates a 
zone of pre-conceptual and "pre-thematic340" activity within which the subject is uniquely determined 
(atmospherically determined). Jean Oury outlines the Strausian context well: 
The pat hie moment ... this field, this site, is a landscape. Erwin Straus asserts that we ourselves are within a 
landscape where as soon as we move, the horizon changes in following our position. When we encounter 
someone, we are within the landscape with that person. It is the quality of this landscape that is a pathic 
quality, of a certain warmth, a certain lightness, or a certain colour .. .it's a way of feeling, of sensing the 
pathic ... 341 
Oury's sensing the pathic, is Tellenbach's intuitive grasp, and it can also be considered to be the a priori 
cognition of Heidegger, the "essential intuition" of Husser!, and the Praecox Gefohl of Rfunke to which 
Oury remains a faithful exponent. 
This pathic moment, for Straus, is conceived as the most "original and authentic of 
situations.342" For Maldiney, in appeal to Straus and Fink, it is where we have the "self of feeling, as an 
open and full receptivity,343" where for Oury with the sentiment of a Minkwoski and a Tellenbach in 
urging psychiatry to go beyond nosographic astuteness, "we ourselves are symptoms.344" It is where, in 
retaking Minkowski, we have the "living flux of reality.345"For Maldiney, this primordial situation is a 
"being-with-the-world" rather than a "being-in-the-world, 346" the most decisive anthropological category 
of primordial communion, or of the "two within one" as he writes - the ultimate moment of union. 
Maldiney writing of a being-with-the-world is prior to the establishing of a subject-object dualism, it is 
pre-thematic, true to the sentiments ofWeizsacker and Straus, for as we see Straus write: 
The act of presence, to sensibly feel.. .is the living of the being-with which is deployed in the direction of 
the subject-object. . .ifwe were to attach such a pathic moment to objects, we would in turn reintroduce it 
within a conceptual domain, and nosological and pathic distinctions would already find themselves 
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nullified. 347 
And to this Maldiney faithfully adds that, "What we call the sensibility to colours, to forms, to sounds, is 
completely constituted by this pathic moment. 348" The instant of co-presence is said of intuitive 
receptivity that precedes thinking itself. We therefore see Oury write, in taking his lead from Straus and 
Maldiney, that: 
One of the most important elements of that which is at the base of human existence, is that of the pathic, 
the most primordial of sensations. It is not of the pathetic, which is of a representational order, but of the 
pre-representative .. .it characterizes the initial manifestations of the human dimension .. .it is one of the 
fundamental dimensions of existence?49 
And to this we retake Binswanger once more who, in direct appeal to the primordial bond uniting human 
beings (where the barriers of impudent convention do not hold) writes: 
Being-with-the-other and being-for-the-other, in their purely human dimension ... are at the base of 
authentic relations of friendship, of love ... 350 
For Maldiney, within the Strausian landscape, "man is naked within feeling.351" True to the 
phenomenological traditions favouring an anthropological politic of primordial union, the affective 
landscape of co-presence declares an ever-present, constitutive frame of man and world as the primitive 
and primordial foundation unique to humanity itself. For some, this is said of the Real (Lacan, 
Tosquelles), for others, it is said of "common sense" (Kant, Blankenburg, Tatossian), "natural logic" 
(Blankenburg) or "universal nature" (Husser!), of a world beyond or beneath empirical preoccupations 
and certainties, of a world beyond the cognitive forms of appearance (Nietzsche, Plato), a world of 
endowed with a transcendental value. 
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The subject said of the pathic, is emergent and like Zutt's aesthetico-physiognomic body, it is 
neither an isolated nor solitary phenomenon352. The proto-world within which this emergent subject 
dwells, is a pre-perceptive subject coming-to-be within feeling. We recall that in his lecture series of 1984, 
Oury prioritised the Praecox Gefohl over classical nosography, the felt over the thought, and in doing so 
he positioned the primary symptom schizophrenia to be one of the primordial atmospheric relation. This 
is why Oury writes that, "we ourselves are symptoms." To further cite Maldiney: 
The subject-object polarity, of a subject objectifying the world who at the same time distinguishes the 
world-object through the interior redoubling of the consciousness of the self, is not deniable but secondary. 
And this is only possible because of the most original of situations, that of feeling. 353 
Moreover, this pathic apprehension, is not only said of a progression from feeling to knowing, or rather, 
where knowing is said of feeling, but of a direct communication with phenomena: 
The pathic precisely belongs to the most original states of the vecu .. .it is the immediate, intuitive-sensible, 
pre-conceptual, communication of the present that we have with phenomena.354 
The pathic landscape is prior to subjective, nosological and pathological distinctions because it is prior to 
identity and representation itsel.f55, prior to the geographic subject. In the pathic landscape we exist as a 
presence prior to the subject-object dichotomy, prior to the thematising psychological subject. In the 
geographic landscape we are fully incarnated and thematised within representational systems (which we 
in turn need to step out of to enter that Kenotic catgory). This is another indication on how to understand 
the distinction between the Real and reality. As Oury often says, "the Real is not reality." 
The pathic landscape (Straus, Maldiney, Weizsacker) is sympathetic (Bonnafe), and we have 
previously deemed this accompaniment. All three terms appeal to an atmospheric communion, a vital 
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union. For psychiatry of the empirico-phenomenological attitude, both patient and analyst are implicated 
within this sympathetic landscape, and arguably, it is a landscape Pinel had indicated when he invited us 
to "live" within the "patient's variable modes of existence," to live "within their presence." Maldiney 
similarly asserts, with the sentiments of Fink and Heidegger, that, "the opening of the landscape is never 
the same, because the near and far are never the same,356" and where Straus writes with the most 
phenomenological of pens that, "the painting of the landscape does not represent what we see, it makes 
visible the invisible.357" 
What the notion of the landscape communicates to us in the least dictatorial way is that there 
exists a field of sympathetic relations358, or rather atmospheric relations, not only bonding the patient-
clinician relation, but all bonding beings - a sympathetic communitarianism prior to representation itself. 
As Maldiney adds, "we are within the landscape with that person." This is why it is the primordial and 
primitive anthropological category, because it is the primary disposition -presence. The patient and the 
clinician are within an atmospheric communion situating beings359 and the clinical encounter brings into 
relief this universal "primordial bond" (Ursprung), that is, the formative and definitive anthropological 
category to the human condition, and in being so it is universaL 
7: The phenomenological diagnostic 
Without introducing the Straussian landscape is it difficult to fully appreciate Maldiney when he 
writes of an "aesthetic pre-conceptual contact" where the sympathetic authenticity of the clinical relation 
excludes, "at once condoling or projective sympathy and the objective attitude which shelters psychiatry 
from the human condition.360" In the atmospheric landscape, we neither exist 'as' an Ego nor a cognitive 
subject, because the existent is within an atmospheric flux of feeling (and feeling comes before thinking). 
Similarly, the phenomenological sentiment of Hubertus Tellenbach highlights a, "vitalism" in writing of, 
"rhythmic phenomena ... toward becoming atmosphere, toward the sphere of wordlessness and the look, of 
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melting into a 'whole' / 61" and Helmut Plessner in writing of a region other than that of a reality 
immediately to-hand asserts that, "It is just the modes of being, of vitality, which are indifferent to 
intellectual interpretation ... And still they form a phenomenal reality of the most pronounced kind, for 
whose investigation the empirical sciences of nature are unsuitable.362" These assertions, again lend 
greater import to understanding as to what exactly Lacan means by the Real and why Oury often says that 
"the Real is not reality." Oury later extended this phenomenological worldview, on grounds of the 
Praecox Gefohl, in writing that the diagnostic is not one of empathy, but of sympathy, of a pathic "pre-
intuitive" communication between beings, where, "there is an aesthetic harmony ... not an etiquette, but a 
way of being with the other. .. It is where something happens ... where there is not simply movement but 
something of a distinctive order. 363" It is what Pinel urged us to do in living within the "presence" of the 
patient. Going one step further with the freedom of phenomenological vocabulary, the studies of Bin 
Kimura, have likened this communication, this vital union, to be both "inter-subjective" and "intra-
subjective.''364For Oury, in drawing upon the German language, this is the instant of the "mit." As he 
noted in 2004, "the "mit" is where we cannot have the inter - without the intra - subjective.365"This is 
precisely what Maldiney means we he speaks of the "two within one," that is, the decisive moment of 
non-objective sympathy. Similarly, Hubertus Tellenbach, in writing of "atmospheric communication," 
does not draw upon the terminology of the "inter" and "intra-subjective" instant, but rather speaks of 
"trans-objective" and "trans-subjective" mutual contad66. The inter-subjective and the intra-subjective, 
as with the trans-objective and the trans-subjective are one and the same primordial and primitive state of 
affairs which knit the tapestry of man within the "instant of co-presence." Thus Tellenbach writes of a, 
"co-presence rooted in atmospheric participation.367" The terminology of Kimura and Tellenbach, pattern 
a phenomenology of interpersonal relations and serve as complimentary parallels to Weizsacker's notion 
of "commerce" and the "pathic landscape" of Straus: a phenomenology of pre-perceptive spatiality prior 
to systems of intentional certainty. As Oury elaborates: 
249 
It is necessary to recall these phenomenological terms ... where this domain is logically re-representative-
it should not be recuperated within a logico-positive system. This domain, is pre-predicative, and above all 
pre-intentional. .. 368 
What we have seen Lacan call the "instant of seeing," is an instant of "feeling" a Kenotic 
instant, one of contact, of affective vital commerce within an atmospheric environ, or rather, in the words 
of Weizsacker's immediate influence, Max Scheler, a landscape of "affective contagion.369" It is here that 
we see Maldiney, in following Merleau-Ponty, announce that, "we touch and we are touched ... where the 
flesh (chair) of the world is revealed to us. 370" We see Straus, therefore, who at the same time in writing 
that, "feeling is to perception as the cry is to the word," tells us: 
Within feeling, the becoming of the subject and the becoming of the world are deployed at the same 
time ... The present, the now, offeeling is neither of objectivity nor subjectivity because it belongs to both 
of these together. For living being, the self and world are deployed at the same time as feeling. Within 
feeling, the being lives self and world, the self within the world, and the self/or the world.371 
Schotte deemed psychiatry, in following the medical vision of Weizsacker, to be an "anthropological 
medicine" and we can understand this in terms of the primitive category of affective, tonal, pathic, 
atmospheric and sympathetic life. From here, we can extend Maldiney's assertion that psychiatry is 
within the situation of man if man is within the situation of psychiatry. We understand this in terms of a 
pre-objective communication where beings are constituted by the stimmung (mood) within the instant of 
co-presence (Maldiney), where "there is not a preexisting fragment of the world, but its emergence.372" 
The fundament of the clinical situation thus appears to rest with this decisive atmospheric, tonal, felt 
moment and the "intuitive grasp" (Tellenbach) of the transpersonal and primitive (Tatossian). For Fink, it 
is where there is an "opening between the earth and sky," for Husserl, it is the coming forth of the "living 
present," for Straus, it is where "knowing is through feeling,373" for Oury it is where there is the question 
of the primary symptom, and for Schotte, it is how an "anthropological medicine" is characterised. The 
dialogue between the patient and analyst is a pathic one, one that is upon a vital landscape where both 
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patient and analyst exist as "one" prior to the subject and object duality, prior to the geographic landscape. 
It is an "atmospheric," "pre-human" dialogue. It is a dialogue that the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, 
articulated so beautifully in penning: 
That which before all else characterises the world, is an encounter between two beings, one that is without 
its equivalence in nature ... All psychical activity is brought into actuality by this event. .. This plane within 
which human existence is deployed and that is yet to be conceptually seized is that which I call the entre-
deux (Zwischen). Actualised through infmitely variable degrees, it is the arche-category of human 
reality. 374 
To which we can add a Maldiney of 1953: 
There is a pre-human world ... ofpathic moments and sensations .... where we rediscover the proof of our 
co-existence and of our original co-births. 375 
For Buber, the encounter with God was to mark the eternal Self, for Binswanger, this pathic, 
vital, transcendental communication was not a phenomenon solely manifested within the clinical 
encounter because it was at the base of all human encounters, "of friendship ... of love." This is why we 
have called it a sympathetic communitarianism, a contractual activity even, of primordial union bonding 
humanity passing unnoticed within the habitual consciousness of everyday life of empirical man and his 
routines. The transcendental dimension prior to the edification of man and his objects, within psychiatry, 
is the declaration of psychopathological existence itself~ where the constituting and ever present frame of 
reality comes to light in all its primacy, albeit it momentarily, like a flash of lightening upon a clouded 
Mount Sinai (Lacan). This pre-objective scenario of sympathy and atmosphere is where, according to 
Heidegger's pen of 1927, there is, "the possibility of discovering innerwordly beings in general, the 
worldliness of the world376"precisely because it is an instant of revelation. Thus Maldiney, in aligning 
himself with what he calls "the school of possibility," doesn't seek to write of a being-in-the-world, but in 
251 
following the lead ofEwrin Straus, writes of a being-with-the-workf77, within the world and of the world, 
with man and of man. 
Binswanger, in wanting to maintain the patient at the level of what Paul Riceour, in following 
Minkowski, described as a, "vital flux," envisaged the diagnostic to be a, "diagnostic by sentiment,378" the 
influential phenomenological scholarship of the Swiss psychiatrist Jakob Wyrsch appealed to, "a 
diagnostic through intuition. 379 " Tellenbach has followed by characterising the diagnostic as, "an 
atmospheric diagnostic380" or one of an "atmospheric sensitivity." And for Oury, the diagnostic is 
deployed within a sympathetic landscape, for, in retaking Straus, the landscape is one of "pathic 
moments" and felt qualities, decisive anthropological moments: 
The pathic moment ... this field, this site, is a landscape. Erwin Straus asserts that we ourselves are within a 
landscape where as soon as we move, the horizon changes in following our position. And when we 
encounter someone, we are within the landscape with that person. It is the quality of this landscape that is 
a pathic quality, of a certain warmth, a certain lightness, or a certain colour .. .it's a way of feeling, of 
sensing the pat hie ... 381 
This is why the landscape can be ascribed the term of the mit, because we have the co-births and co-
existences of which Maldiney speaks, and even the innerworldliness of all things. Here, we conclude with 
an excerpt from a recent interview with Oury to further understand psychiatry to be an anthropological 
medicine: 
D.R: Somewhat rhetorically we can ask as to what is the phenomenology, ethic and diagnostic 
of psychiatry or rather an Institutional Psychotherapy? It is not a mere duality but the mit that is 
at work, it is the !'avec, not merely a being-with-the-other, but as Binswanger said, it is where 
man exists as mit-mensch, to be encountered, of the other, for the other and with the other. We 
can say that this is the level prior to the subject and object because man exists sympathetically. 
In following Maldiney, this is not an objective condoling sympathy, but sympathy of a vital 
communication, of a pathic bond between existing beings, a primordial dialogue, a communion 
even. Man, before all else, exists sympathetically - we can speak of an atmospheric diagnostic, 
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a diagnostic through intuition, which is a diagnostic at this sympathetic non-objective level. The 
body is within a resonance of the atmospheric tonal moment (stimmung), an instant of co-
presence, but this instant exists prior to the subject-object delimitation. Zutt has called this the 
domain of the affective body, the supporting body, an aesthetico-physionomic level382• Henri 
Maldiney has even deemed this primary or primordial level of contact "pre-human," prior to 
incarnation. Maldiney has also asserted this level to be where man is at his most naked, where 
man exists as feeling before he is a thinking, conceptualising, cognising subject as Straus said. 
We can also use notions of the pre-cognitive, pre-representational, pre-egoic, and pre-objective, 
to describe a contact prior to all these categorisations. It is a level of feeling (empfinden). For 
the theologically influenced phenomenology of Landsberg, a phenomenologist who is sadly 
ignored but one who is extremely important, a very profound and sincere thinker who had fled 
from the Gestapo during the Occupation of France, it is where the personality-comes-to-be 
(Werdesein), the transcendental level of "unifYing transformations." We can see such appeals 
with the neurology of Monakow and Mourgue and their notion of Syneidesis borrowed from 
Saint-Paul, and Weizsacker's organismic crises where he writes of the Gestaltkreis- a vital 
necessity. All these very important aspects are married through the work of Tosquelles, Oury 
and Lacan, and with haste we can say that unifYing transformation is at level of the flux of life, 
of vital sentiments, and of a spiritual effort (lebensnotendigkeit) - the will to unity. Helmut 
Plessner said something very good, namely: that there are modes of existence, modalities of 
vitality, "which are indifferent to intellectual interpretation ... And still they form a phenomenal 
reality of the most pronounced kind, for whose investigation the empirical sciences of nature 
are unsuitable." This asserts the diagnostic of being-with-the-other, of the mit, which is upon the 
level about which we speak, a level which is not of empirical or deterministic science, but of 
sympathy, where two beings do not exist independently but together in one. Sympathetic 
existence, to retake Plessner, does not give itself to intellectual interpretation, but is of a most 
pronounced reality, a transcendental reality, a constituting reality, and this reality. All this 
pertains to Tosquelle's appeals of the Transcendental 'I' that defmed his thesis of 1948. By 
qualifYing this level of things, in terms of psychiatry, it enables us to speak of discordant 
relations , transcendental modifications of structure and problems of transcendence itself. 
J.O: It is precisely this with which we work, a vast field. To be with another, mit in the German 
language. With schizophrenia there is a profound trouble of the being-with-the-other. For many 
years now I have spoken about the collapse of transcendence and the trouble of incarnation. It is 
possible to speak of all these things, to expand upon them, and to articulate them distinctly, for 
we must also keep in mind what I have called "l'avec"- as you suggest it is not the "avec" but 
"l'avec", it is more than merely being with a patient, it is a far more profound relation. There 
was a remarkable Danish phenomenological psychiatrist, Ri.irnke, who presented an extremely 
clear exposition at the first international congress of psychiatry in Paris in 1950. It was a 
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revision of all the phenomenologies - an astounding work. Before this, he had written about a 
notion he called the Praecox Gefohl. Gefiihl appears both within the German and Danish 
language and it means a direct association, almost affective, almost intuitive. Lacan, in his 
article on the three temporalities spoke of the instant of seeing, the time of the understanding 
and the moment of conclusion. The Praecox Gefohl, is the instant of seeing. Rumke said that 
upon immediately seeing a patient, who enters, we do a diagnostic. This requires much 
experience and this diagnostic is the Praecox Gefohl. He would later often recount his 
experiences. One time is where a patient enters and Rumke turns to his students and says, "this 
man is a schizophrenic". The students, however, think otherwise: "we have done a multitude of 
tests, he is not a schizophrenic!" After six months the man returns for a rendezvous ... a 
schizophrenic. A similar thing, the praecox gefuhl, is found with the extraordinary German 
psychiatrist Kretschmer. It was Giselda Pankow who had worked with Kretschmer. He used to 
say to his students that if they were not capable of performing a diagnostic upon the patient 
entering, from the patient walking from the door to the seat, they were not capable of being 
psychiatrists! So what is in question here, is not language, nor parole, it is of the same logic of 
language because it is a logic the body. This is why I spoke earlier about writing .. .I'm thinking 
of Klages, someone truly impressive who wrote a book on graphology. He speaks of rhythm 
and cadence. We are at the level of rhythm, and with the schizophrenic there is a profound 
trouble of rhythm. I often say that the schizophrenic is dis rhythmic ... this is an internal rhythm. 
We can work with this, and it immediately shows itself within the body, for example, the way 
we stand. When we observe someone who is not schizophrenic - and we can use this image -
he is assembled and gathered to a single point. With the schizophrenic, there are many points, 
and we can immediately feel it. I have a friend whom I have known for many years ... He was 
someone very sensitive to the ways of being - there is a lot of intuition within such work. He 
once spoke of a schizophrenic who he saw at his clinic in England. The patient entered, but it 
was as if he wasn't there, he was seemingly elsewhere. He asserted that the patient was still in 
the park and he said to him, "You're still in the park no?'' This is at the intuitive level, Praecox 
Gefohl. I often say that the act of performing a diagnostic is but an aspect to the respectful 
undertaking towards the other. Thirty years ago there was a group of the Freudian schooL It was 
fashionable to say, ''we want nothing of a diagnostic, we are psychoanalysts!" There was a man 
who even said, "I saw a patient, and after six months I knew he was mad." I told him that he 
was responsible for a homicide by stupidity. The Diagnostic is not an etiquette because it is an 
ethical undertaking ... To perform a diagnostic is a phenomenological undertaking.383 
Whether the diagnostic is one of intuition (Wyrsch), atmosphere (Tellenbach), sympathy (Bonnafe) or the 
Praecox Gefohl (Riimke, Oury), all these descriptive notions are one and the same state-of-affairs of the 
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psychiatric encounter, punctuating a situation of mutuality, the entre-deux, the mit, man as mit-mensch as 
Binswanger said, man who exists to be encountered (Dasein ist Mitsein ). This, hallmarks what Maldiney 
calls the, "psychiatric situation384" where mentally ill man and nursing man are themselves founded and 
forged within the psychiatric encounter, within that instant of seeing, within the "drama" as Lacan said, 
by virtue of a non-objective, sympathetic, vital, pathic contact- this, the level of a primordial communion, 
or a primordial bond (Ursprung) even informing the consultation and hospitalisation of the patiene85 . 
A particular case in hand concerns is a publication of 1990 where Jean Oury featured alongside 
Henri Maldiney and Jacques Schotte. The title of the publication was entitled Le Contact, and Oury's 
contribution carried the heading, Pathique et Fonction d'accueil en Psychotherapie Institutionnelle, the 
aim of which was to distinguish the "function of consultation" (jonction d'accueil) and what has been 
classically referred to as the function of "admission." In drawing upon this distinction, Oury underlined 
the importance of the pathic by bringing to light its intimate relation with the "function of reception" as 
well as underlining the necessity of undertaking "an immediate diagnostic." The act of receiving a patient, 
that is of consultation, and the function of admitting a patient are not the same concern. The function of 
admission is, as Oury describes, somewhat of a brutal antagonism, which in fact threatens the pathic 
landscape and a closes down the possibility of undertaking the most anthropologically faithful of 
diagnostics (Praecox Gefohl). He writes: "Admission, is an administrative term, of a naive scientism 
even ... when an urgent case arrives with the police or the orderlies, he is thrown into a room without his 
clothes. Certain psychiatrists justify their attitude, ''we need to see him naked ... we must establish a 
protocol of measures ... sometimes patients have been completely stripped ... some without their artificial 
limbs, without their watches, without their dentures ... There was a case of a patient in a sector hospital: 
his artificial limb, his clothes, his dentures, his glasses and his watch were removed. He was in a pure 
state! And we speak of a respect for the Other!" 
In terms of the empirico-phenomenological attitude we have studied, admission becomes a 
dubious function because it can be considered to limit access to the pathic landscape, a bureaucratic 
function that limits the atmospheric penetration (Minkowski) into the transcendental grounds of "the 
person." The function of reception and consultation is however a contrast. Reception, is a "preliminary 
gesture," it "allows time," time to even lightly ameliorate the "actual and future" of the patient because it 
is not the time of routine consultation or the "chronometer," but rather the "existential time" of the 
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existence of the patient. For Oury, this latter function, unlike admission, is not said of a traditional, formal 
logic because the "apprehension" of the primary symptom, access to the pathic "initial" level of existence, 
is neither "positivist" nor "scientific," but of a diagnostic pertaining to a "poetic" and tonal logic (mood 
and feeling), of a "pre-predicative, pre-representational, pre-intentional site par excellence." The function 
of consultation, is where there is access to a scene where something happens and the diagnostic, is a 
diagnostic of the pathic landscape: "a diagnostic that can only be performed if we are within a landscape." 
Consultation is thus never of the routine, for "with each consultation there is a new scene!" Indeed, for 
Oury, the diagnostic is a "rigorous quasi-poetic adventure1" into what we have seen Eugen Fink deem an 
"enigmatic depth" or for Tatossian, "the profundity of human existence." This depth, as Oury affirms, can 
even be said of the "passive syntheses" of Husserl," yet it is not to directly adhere to a particular 
phenomenological school because phenomenology is a description of the levels of existence leading to a 
more profound picture of the person, one that goes from the surfaces of the world to the depths of a 
primary anthropology from which the body emerges, where there is even the inscription of destiny and a 
"propaedeutic" of the science of karma, where certain organisational laws are to be found beyond the 
classical remits of medicine, philosophy and theology, where there is a pre-spatial dimension directing the 
emergence of all things, an "impossible" zone revealing itself "like a flash of lightening upon a clouded 
Mount Sinai." 
Conclusion: phenomenological psychiatry 
In this chapter, we have explored a particular sentiment at work within the mind of the philosopher and 
psychiatrist alike. We deemed this a "phenomenological sentiment." For Hubertus Tellenbach, the 
sentiment is concretely and practicably understood as an "empirico-phenomenological attitude" adopted 
by the psychiatrist. We have seen how this attitude implies a primitive, pre-semiological reality, or rather, 
a two-tiered phenomenal reality of the empirical and the transcendental. In this way, it is a world-view 
faithful to the phenomenological tradition, yet not restricted to it. With this world-view, we saw that 
clinical experience demanded an epistemological framework that not merely addressed the isolatable 
clinical symptom within a pathological causal chain, but also the psychiatric symptom within an 
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atmospheric landscape. It is here, that the marriage of phenomenology and psychiatry is embodied by the 
psychiatric situation. Thus we remember Oury, who asserts that "we ourselves are symptoms," namely, 
that the diagnostic is within the psychiatric situation and works according to a sympathetic pre-cognitive 
dimension. This is why we saw Tatossian assert the psychiatric symptom, unlike the isolatable medical 
symptom, to be "pre-semiological." 
Our chapter also worked towards understanding the role of the pathic for the clinician, and of 
highlighting shared drama, the shared "co-efficiency" (Oury), by looking at phenomenological notions of 
the encounter. This enabled us to understand the diagnostic to be qualified through the commonality of 
experience. In this way we saw the distinctiveness of psychiatric experience and how the psychiatric 
encounter exemplifies the anthropological foundation of phenomenological enquiry. In doing so, we have 
emphasised the importance of positioning the diagnostic as an ethical undertaking, namely - the 
diagnostic of the praecox gejhul which epitomizes the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of not just 
any psychiatry, but of the project oflnstitutional Psychotherapy most notably. 
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Postscript: Towards the Ethic of Psychiatry 
We need to situate that which a "poetic logic" puts into question. 
-Jean Oury, Pathique et Fonction d'Accueil1 
Our thesis serves as an introduction to a mathesis, as a path into a vast landscape of clinical and 
philosophical activity. The work of Jean Oury and the post-war historical sentiment nurturing his Thought 
have hitherto remained un-addressed on English speaking shores, notwithstanding its international allure. 
We have sought to introduce the central tenets of Dr. Oury's work and the enterprise of Institutional 
Psychotherapy, by assessing the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry. In 
doing so, we have been introduced to a specific world-concept, one that remains faithful to the historical 
and conceptual apparatus behind the therapeutic enterprise of Institutional Psychotherapy, one that even 
goes back to Pinel. 
In studying the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war French psychiatry we were 
able to provide a historical and conceptual account of the factors behind the sense, intention and value of 
Institutional Psychotherapy. We have dealt with a particular rationality, and without exploring this 
psychiatric rationality, first demonstrated by Pinel, and mirrored by a war-marked French generation and 
phenomenology itself, then approaching the question of as to what exactly an Institutional Psychotherapy 
is, would be difficult. 
As a direct result of our bi-focal methodology (that is, the equivocation of the ethic, 
phenomenology and diagnostic), the question of an anthropological medicine has both proven a necessary 
development of our thesis - requiring further, more detailed attention. There are also other areas that 
require greater analysis, areas that are equally as pertinent and important for the English speaking 
audience and medical historiography as a whole. For example, an investigation into the questions and 
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therapeutic practices of Group psychotherapy, as well as the clinical techniques and methodologies 
developed at La Borde over the years, and as to how they have been refmed and extended, was not 
provided. Likewise, we did not provide hermeneutic readings of the chosen material because the 
methodology was selective and it drew upon instances within clinical and phenomenological works that 
were important for communicating the clinico-philosophical rationality of Institutional Psychotherapy, 
and more particularly, of its founder and director, Dr. Jean Oury. Indeed, that which our thesis 
encouraged, yet was unable to comprehensively address, was that greater hermeneutic work remains to be 
undertaken, not merely on the studies of Dr. Tosquelles and Dr. Oury but on those providing the medical 
and philosophical support for expanding psychiatric and phenomenological doctrine. The key works that 
remain to be addressed are a necessary consequence of the thesis in guiding future post-doctoral enquiry 
and research. These are: Vom Sinn der Sinne, ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Psychologie by Erwin 
Straus (1939); Von Weizsacker's, Der Gestaltkreis:Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen 
(1950) and Grundfragen medizinischer Anthropologie (1948); Henri Maldiney's Penser l'homme et la 
folie: a !a lumiere de !'analyse existentielle et de !'analyse du destin (1991) and Regard, parole, espace 
(1974); Tellenbach's Geschmack und Atmosphiire: Medien menschlichen Elementarkontaktes (1968) and 
Melancholie (1961), and Bin Kimura's, Der Sinn der schizophrenen Symptome (1965) and 
Psychopathologie de !a Schizophrenie (1979). Studying these works would have provided us with a 
stronger theoretical and critical register through which to (1) narrate the advancement of 
phenomenological psychiatry on the continent (2) greater understand the transformation of traditional 
medical concepts, and (3) distinguish between the undertakings of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy. In this way we could have situated the work of Michel Foucault, the work ofGuattari, and 
the key role Dr. Oury played in the development ofLacanian analysis. 
We could have also have plotted the historical narrative of the psychopathology of 
schizophrenia and demonstrated how key phenomenological notions such as the "Gestaltkreis", the 
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"Pathic", the "Umgang" and "Sympathy" informed a workable clinical model attentive to the 
anthropological question of phenomenology without forgoing the importance of clinical nosography. This 
has not only been exemplified- in particular- by the biological studies of von Weizsacker (1922; 1934; 
1942; 1950; 1957), the neurological studies of Erwin Straus (1919; 1935), the psychopathological 
investigations of Kimura (1965; 1967; 1971; 1975) and Tellenbach's studies of endogenous psychoses 
(1956;1957;1967;1975), but by the psychotherapeutic project of Dr. Jean Oury and Jacques Schotte also 
- a project to which Jacques Lacan himself was theoretically and fraternally indebted. For us to do this, 
we would have needed to explore the evolution of the concept of schizophrenia and the historical 
development of diagnostic systems. This is work that remains to be undertaken. 
Our study has nevertheless established a ground upon which to undertake future research into 
areas that have been indicated but not fully developed within the present research. We have a greater 
understanding as to what exactly is the role of psychiatry, the ethic, and the phenomenological. Moreover, 
we have arrived at an understanding of the personage of the psychiatrist and we have moved towards 
understanding an interpretive framework where the theological, phenomenological and the 
neurobiological dovetail one another, a framework called forth by historical necessity - a necessity that 
very much exists within our age and its crises. 
The role of psychiatry 
Psychiatry is at once scientific and philanthropic, at once a vocation and a specialisation, at once ethical, 
and phenomenological in its diagnostic undertaking. What the work of Dr. Oury and an Institutional 
Psychotherapy appeal to, is that psychiatry is, in the paternally faithful words of Felix Guattari, an 
"ethico-aesthetic paradigm.2" In moving through the ethical, phenomenological and diagnostic, we have 
seen how the concern of institutional psychotherapy, one that is exemplified by Oury's Thought, is not 
medicine as social measure, but medicine as therapeutic measure, and in being so we deem it a 
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transcendental therapy. We recall Henri Ey: 
The psychiatrist is increasingly a medic who comes to the aid of his diminished 
brothers of humanity, and less a personage to which Society delegates its powers of 
social defense.3 
For Pinel, anatomico-pathological enquiry into mental alienation was not to be divorced from the 
discourse of the passions, and in being so medicine would not be divorced from anthropology. Indeed, 
throughout our study, we have explored the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic of post-war psychiatry 
towards developing a consciousness of Institutional Psychotherapy and the philosophical and clinical 
issues by which it is underpinned. What we have progressively observed throughout our three chapters, is 
that the roles of the ethic, phenomenology and diagnostic peculiar to an Institutional Psychotherapy of 
post-war France, are inseparable, one from the other because they are said in a singular and same sense. 
What Philippe Pinel deemed the art of mental alienation, was reconceived by Lucien Bonnafe as an art of 
sympathy. Horace Torrubia expressed that the logic of this art was to be one permitting us to leave naive 
evidences and preconstituted ideas behincf. For Fran<;ois Tosquelles, this logic was a poetic logic, a 
compassionate art of "creative imagination,5" one demonstrated within the writings of the mystic Ibn 
Arabi and the cosmology of Averroes, one that works towards making, "a re-elaboration of man and his 
spaces of existence6" possible. Indeed, psychiatry, the art of sympathy, the art of arts (Pinel), is, to retake 
a term we have oft used by Oury, an art of"possibilisation." 
Psychiatry addresses a person, not merely a life, but an existence, a presence in as much as it 
addresses the organic and the dynamic, the ontology of nervous function and the ontology of the 
personality. To speak of the primary symptom of schizophrenia is a pretext for speaking of the person -
the art of sympathy is an art of human relations, an art of the entre-deux. We draw upon Buber once 
more: 
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That which before all else characterises the world, is an encounter between two beings, one that 
is without its equivalence in nature ... All psychical activity is brought into actuality by this 
event ... This plane within which human existence is deployed and that is yet to be conceptually 
seized is that which I call the entre-deux (Zwischen). Actualised through infinitely variable 
degrees, it is the arche-category of human reality.7 
As we have seen Minkowski write, it is phenomenological existence that crowns the concern of 
psychiatry, and not chronological life. The pathic (Weizsacker); the landscape (Straus) is where there is 
not merely man-in-the-world but rather man-with-the-world (Maldiney) - the felt, the tonal and the 
ambient prior to the known. This marks what Lacan, in reply to a Bonnafe of 1946, deemed the drama of 
man because the art of sympathy, is a dramatic art where the psychiatrist is a dramatic personage. 
The pathic (Weizsacker), the landscape (Straus), atmosphere (Tellenbach, Minkowski), the 
entre-deux (Buber) !'avec: being-with (Oury), !'entre: the in-between two (Kimura), pertain to the ethic, 
the phenomenological and the diagnostic. The crowning representative of these three dovetailing agencies 
of practice is the Praecox Gefohl. The Praecox Gefohl is an ethical undertaking, a phenomenological 
undertaking, it marks a dialogue (Buber) at the most primordial and primitive (Schotte, Tatossian) of 
human dimensions, a dimension that we saw Weizsacker deem the "pathic." It is where we have seen an 
Oury of 1984 announce that, "we ourselves are symptoms.8" 
As Oury later reflected in a seminar of 19'h June 1991: " ... the effervescence of the "pathic" ... 
the most primordial of levels where "tone" and "atmosphere" manifest ... This is what I concern myself 
with, where at the level of an underlying reality, where factors, parameters and tonality- which contribute 
to atmosphere - are put into question.9" Our study has demonstrated that this underlying reality - the 
transcendental - is as much a concern as the empirical, the pre-cognitive and pre-thought as much as the 
cognitive and thought. In following, Wolfgang Blankenburg, we have seen this to be the address of the 
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implicit yet ever-present frame of "natural experience.10" For Oury it is where there is, "the mit ... the zone 
of abduction ... the place of echo, 11 " a zone of "concrete abductive hypotheses. 12" 
Delirium, analogy and the body 
Delirium marks the industrial paradigm of madness. It is productive, revelatory and affirmative. Most 
notably, we saw it to be, in following Tosquelles, an announcement of analogical life, at once at the level 
of the biological I organismic and the psychical (psycho-pathology). This marked, in following the 
phenomenological sentiment of Landbserg, "the Transformation of fatality into liberty, 13" a key phrase 
prefiguring that of Bonnafe in writing, "to speak of psychiatry, is to speak of liberty. 14" This liberty, 
begins with Pinel and Tuke, it is reasserted by Bonnafe and Tosquelles, and it finds its anatamo-
pathological expansion within the work ofFreud (post-traumatic reconstruction), Gruhle (Wahnsfunktion), 
Goldstein (catastrophe), Monakow and Mourgue (Syneidesis), Henry Ey (evolution and dissolution), and 
Weizsacker (crisis) with their underlining a genesis not just at the level of the organism, but at the level of 
the personality itself. 
For Landsberg, from the viewpoint of Catholic Christology, to whom Tosquelles turns in his 
thesis of 1948, personal life and biological life mark the permanent and progressive actualisation of the 
human person15 to which only a phenomenology can deliver the most sincere of insights and scholarship. 
He writes: "phenomenology has shown that human experience is richer from the qualitative viewpoint.16" 
Phenomenology thus furnishes psychiatry with a particular viewpoint, lived out within the diagnostic, 
edified by the ethic the empirico-phenomenological attitude proper. As Oury asserts in a July of 2003, 
"all this constitutes the very fabric with which we work, 17" a permanent, creative and unfinished project, 
an inconclusive monograph (Fink), and why, "we say that psychiatry and psychoanalysis is an unfinished 
project, always in construction ... always at its outset. 18" 
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We have seen how a dialectic of catastrophe and revelation operates at the level of the biological, the 
existential and the historical. In the Ancient Greek language, "Apocalypse" ( anoKUAD'JITJ) is the word for 
"Revelation" ( anoKaA.uu~) and "Revelation" is concomitantly pronounced "apokalyyis." Apokalyyis is an act 
of revealing, a making-known, an act of disclosure that fmds its ushering within a cataclysmic, catastrophic 
event. We recall that the New Jerusalem is revealed to Saint John in the wake of the cataclysmic passing of 
the First Earth. This passing of the First Earth is where the new personality is announced through the mock-
Biblical delirium in the wake of, "existential catastrophe", a decisive event of schizophrenia, a decisive 
revealing. Psychosis is a revealing, and on these grounds we are able to identify the central strands to 
Tosquelles' doctoral thesis of 1948 and indeed, to Institutional Psychotherapy itself: 
(1) The catastrophic complex is a mode ofrevealing: In his thesis of 1950, Oury spoke of the "eye of 
Shiva," Shiva - the Indian God of catastrophe and revelation, the "space of metamorphosis" and the 
"mutation of the personality." Tosquelles, in 1948, did not write of Shiva, the third God of if the Indian 
Trimaturi, to announce the fecund moment of catastrophe, but of a "permanent reconstruction" within a 
psychotic existence lived as either an, "immanent danger" or a, "prophecy.19" For Saint John, The New 
Jerusalem announced a new equilibrium of the earth to a divine principle, just as the paranoiac personality for 
Freud announced an existential equilibrium through the reconstructive, industrious workings of delirium. 
(2) Delirium is a revelation: We saw Gruhle deem this the "delirious function" - the Wahsnfunktion. 
In following both Freud and Rumke, Oury, speaks of the "psychotic equilibrium," a new equilibrium in the 
wake of the opening of Shiva's eye. In the wake of catastrophe and trauma there is rebirth, metamorphosis. 
Reconstruction is thus not without catastrophe, the phenomenon explodes to mark a new beginning. The 
existential catastrophe experienced by the schizophrenic, is as with Saint John's New Jerusalem of the New 
Testament and the post-war people of France, an announcement of a new world, a declaration of possibility, 
industry and creation. This is where the question of the ethic intertwines with the question of psychological, 
biological and socio-cultural industry. At the same time, this marks the ethico-aesthetic paradigm of 
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psychiatric concern. Prophet of madness, prophet of the New Testament, Prophet of the New Jerusalem: a new 
logic of the world (Weltlogik) is announced through a phantasmic vision straddling deluge and revelation. We 
saw the mock-biblical phantasm resonate not just at the level of psychical life and of the personality, but of 
the organism also, for as we have seen it is where Viktor Von We!zsacker's post-critical organismic reprise 
comes into play, as does Goldstein's catastrophic reaction. 
(3) The phantasm is of the biological and the psychical: This proved, for Tosquelles, as we have 
previously noted, "the affirmation of Man's human condition.20" This affirmation is a double proclamation 
where affirmation is to catastrophe as Revelation is to Apocalypse, a proclamation with the Erlebnis of the 
end of the world as its vehicle addressing the organic and the psychic. This proclamation can be paralleled by 
yet another double proclamation we saw announced through the phenomenological sentiments of Henri 
Maldiney, that is, that man- nursing man and mentally ill man- is situated within the psychiatric situation if 
the psychiatric situation is situated within man. The catastrophic and revelatory thus mark the psychiatric 
ethic. 
(4) The ethic is founded within the conjoined announcements of the biological and the psychical: It is 
where the Biblical and the Clinical meet through a psychiatric rendition of lived analogical narratives, staged 
upon the existential landscape where the clinical scene is played out. Wbere we saw Saint John announce the 
Apocalypse, is where Tosquelles sees the schizophrenic, through the phantasm of the end of the world 
complex, announce the world of an "existential catastrophe" within Lacan's "drama of man." The organism, 
is, as we have suggested, a Pauline organism, a Biblically symbolic ontological material, that of Syneidesis, 
one of a self-conscious dutifulness unto itself, to renew and maintain its global character, an organism staging 
an auto-construction. The "drama of man" is thus staged at the most elementary of psychical and biological 
levels. At the limit, we could infer the organism, in terms of this lived analogy, to be Johanian, a Revelatory 
organism. Goldstein, Monakow and Mourgue, and Weizsacker appeal, as does Freud with his assertions of the 
paranoiac delirium, to this revelatory function of the maintenance of psychological and biological life. 
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(5) Man's existence is biologically and psychically dramatic (psycho-pathology): Indeed this striving, 
this effort understood by some ~ Monakow and Mourgue, Tosquelles, Landsberg ~ to be a spiritual effort 
(lebensnotendigkeit I syneidesis), in remembering the neurologically weighted words of Freud, was not "the 
most splendid of truths," but a functional attainment to, "a new level of life." It is where, as we have seen, 
man builds his very universe of existential reference, where the notions of building and industry fmd a 
simultaneous register upon the level of the organismic (Goldstein). Where for Goldstein the catastrophic 
reaction comes into play at the level of the organismic within the silent yet clamouring, decisive and 
elementary intimacies of the biological, for the psychiatrist, in taking his lead from Freud's observations of 
post-traumatic reconstruction of the personality through delirium, the industrious function of re-formation and 
re-announcement of the personality is transposed to the level of the existential, to man's "global character 
within society." Man is thus presented anew, but ever the global phenomenon. 
(6) Man is a transcendental agency: Such a sentiment thus sees the biological, the psychological and 
the Biblical raised to synonymous levels in an appeal to what we have seen termed, "unitary life." Likewise, 
with Tosquelles, the Stoic term adopted by the neurologists Monakow and Mourgue, Syneidesis, undergoes 
similar analogical transposition to the level of the existentially lived: the auto-construction of the functional 
hierarchy of the nervous system, signature of a spiritual maintenance within the organism, all be it one 
overwhelmingly Bergsonian in the eyes of Oury, becomes the unitary principle underpinning the organa-
dynamic ontology of integration and disintegration. This is what we saw to also prove the crux ofHenri-Ey's 
neo-Jacksonian organo-dynamic psychiatry against the backdrop of a cerebral pathology, and where we saw 
Pierre Janet announce a primary psychology with the formative instinct of Man~ the organism's and the 
personality's continual embryonic evolution ~ in the name of Monakow and Mourgue's Horme, the first 
instincts of all instincts. 
The Erlebnis of the end of the world as announcing a fecund moment between the biological 
and the psychological, an opening, a tear, a fissure in the tapestry of man and his world within which the 
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psychiatrist enters, the point of the psychiatrist's intervention proper. This is where we have seen the 
phantasm to announce man's psychic body, the organo-dynamic body (Ey)- where the biological and the 
psychological announce a striving towards, "unitary life." This, delivers us to a ground composed of the 
Biblical, the neurological, the psychiatric and the phenomenological. Or, rather than a ground, it becomes 
the functional working paradigm. Upon such a ground, Saint John's prophetic vision becomes a Biblical 
cipher to the phantasm of the schizophrenic. The phantasm is as if a Greek Mercury, or a Roman Hermes, 
winged messenger to an argonaught, or to a Perseus before a Medusa, or a psychiatrist before the fecund 
moment, announcing the narratives of psychopathological life, delivering a message spoken in a language 
of psychical life inscribed within the body, a language, in retaking Lacan's words of 1947 to Lucien 
Bonnafe, "as ancient as humanity itself." 
Where for St. John, the principle of construction was to be found within the Word of the Divine, 
"in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God," for the neurology ofWeizsacker it is to be found 
within the Gestaltkreis, the circle of form. 
(7) Phantasm and Revelation: Man emerging from the fecund moment at the crossroads between 
the biological and the psychical, that fissure, that tear within historical and psychological tapestry (bio-
psycho-socio-gestalt), is where Syneidesis (St. Paul, Monakow and Mourgue), the post-critical new center 
of gravity within the organism ensured by the Gestaltkreis (Weizsacker) and the catastrophic reaction 
(Goldstein) are, for Tosquelles, announced as the Vecu. We thus exist not as being-towards-death, but 
being-towards-revelation, where consciousness (Landsberg, Tosquelles) as with the organism (Monakow 
and Mourgue) is revelatory. The Erlebnis of the end of the world is thus hallmark to the "catastrophic 
complex," and the catastrophic complex is not only a declaration of unannounced possibilities and creation 
but an introduction to the psycho-biological narratives of unitary life. In the wake of catastrophe, we 
rebuild anew. 
Dissolution, upon such terrain is an affirmative notion. It is part of that internal dialectic to which 
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Tosquelles appealed: at once biological, psychical and historical, a concordant renewal and spiritual 
maintenance (lebensnotendigkeit) of man's personality and historicity. Thus we remember Landsberg, who 
in writing against the terminal dissolution of the body, positioned being- through the sentiment of Catholic 
Christology - as not being towards death, but being towards revelation and renewal through the very 
presence of the Christ within man, through Christ revealed to man: "I have encountered Christ, he has 
revealed himself unto me." 
(8) The apparition of the Christ, announces the body as transcendental (Landsberg): Revelation 
and Renewal, themselves the ordinal themes informing the 1948 thesis ofTosquelles and the latter seminal 
exposition of art and schizophrenia by Oury, provide the founding upon which Tosquelles deploys the Vecu, 
said of the mock-Biblical delirium grounded upon, and fmding its extension and elaboration through, St. 
John's Vision, Goldstein, Weizsacker, Manakow and Mourgue and Landsberg, where catastrophe and 
revelation marry in a bid to unitary life and its creative maintenance. To recall one of the patients of 
Tosquelles as if speaking as a Zarathustra , it is where, "I am eternally made man," where a spiritual 
industry is at the level of the organismic and the psychical, and the existential finds its analogical 
declaration. It is under these industrious and revelatory auspices, founded upon the scholarship of 
neurology, phenomenology and psychiatry, urged by historical necessity, conjoined under the 
announcements of the phantasm and its resonance at the level of the biological and the psychical ( organo-
dynarnic ), reverberating within the Biblical, that Tosquelles speaks of psychiatry addressing the, "living 
art." 
(9) A transcendental therapy must address a transcendental principle: To speak of the 
schizophrenic episode in terms of an active principle is to address the living, industrious milieu of the 
organism and its world. This is where Maldiney thus asserts that, "there is only psychoses within the 
existent." Psychosis and man thus become the mutual register. We retake the double proclamation of 
Maldiney: Man - mentally ill man and nursing man - are only within the psychiatric situation if 
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psychiatry is within the situation of man. Thus the psychiatric art, is, as we have previously noted, one of 
possibilities in the name, not of the determination of man's creative capacities, but of their extension in 
the name of revelation and where the revelatory principle is said of the re-elaboration of man himself. 
Here, we find ourselves at the institutional question and the vocational adjective of Horace Torrubia, 
where man and the institution are of "undecided" limits, where the institution finds an undetermined limit 
to its organization, or where organization is accorded that Nietzschean sentiment of an, "undiscovered 
country, yet to be surveyed." This, a bio-psycho-socio gestalt (Ey) of undecided limits (Torrubia) and 
undiscovered lands (Nietzsche), this "vertigo" inspiring the psychiatrist (Bonnafe), is where man is 
figured as the institutionalising agency, himself blueprint for the architecture of what we saw Oury call, 
"possibilisation" where the institution becomes a site of emerging, unannounced new forms said of the 
Gestaltung with the circle of form, the Gestaltkreis as constitutive principle and "genesis as its 
comportment", a site of emergence (erscheinen), within which, for Landsberg, the personality-comes-to-
be (Werdesein). Indeed, where for Landsberg the Werdesein was said of a "unifying transformation," for 
Tosquelles we saw this to be an appeal to "unification" and "unitary life" - where the neurological and 
biological undergo an analogical transposition to the existential and to "man's global character within 
society." Psychiatry's art therefore finds its palette with these analogical transpositions. Here, we retake 
our previous assertion, that, "This, the process of "unifying transformation" (Landsberg) is where the 
organic and the psychic meet under the rubric of personalisation. Yet more than this, the role of 
personalisation, of the personality-coming-to-be (Werdesein) is an organo-dynamic principle of 
actualisation to which the organic is a relative signification of the personality," and we now parallel it 
with Oury writing on the Gestaltkreis, "I'll retake an elaboration by Weizsiicker. .. The crisis, is the 
moment of possibility, if there wasn't crisis, there wouldn't be anything at all. At the extreme, everything 
would be of an unbearable monotony, a necropole.2t, And to this we can add yet another assertion 
previously written and in doing so further highlight the sentiment of life's necessary catastrophe: "The 
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"fecund moment" (Lacan); the "crisis" (Weizsacker), the moment of not being able to "fit" necessitating 
the "catastrophic reaction" of reforming to an "organismic principle" maintaining wholeness (Goldstein); 
"syneidesis" that cerebral auto-reconstruction (Monakow and Mourgue); a "vital need" (Tosquelles); 
Freud's instinctual compulsion; is where the organism thus marks a qualitative modification of the whole 
necessary to maintain the encounter between the organism and its milieu in the wake of deluge, trauma, or 
very near complete dissolution." 
(10) Psychiatrv. as indicated9 by Dr. Oury, is a transcendental art of the biological and the 
psychical, of the cor:poreal and the incor:poreal - it addresses the psycho-biological architectonic. 
Catastrophe thus becomes the necessary condition for revelation and creativity at the organo-dynamic 
level, maintenance requires the crisis, the trauma, the catastrophic reaction. The Gestaltung and 
Gestaltkries mark dissolution and catastrophe just as, in retaking the ancient Greek language, 
"Apocalypse" ( anoK<iAD\IfTt) marks "Revelation" ( anoKaAum<;) and "Revelation" marks "apokalyis?2" The 
psychiatrist occupies a privileged role within the "drama of man," for he is before the disclosure of these 
revelatory (Landsberg, Tosquelles), ancient (Lacan) narratives of the biological and the psychical, 
announced upon the existential terrain, a terrain of contact and a shared, inclusive situation, a terrain 
seeing man as the living art (Tosquelles) and psychiatry as the art of accompaniment, or, the art of 
sympathy (Bonnafe). 
4:The orientation of future research 
We had stated at the outset, that our study was fuelled by a contemporary urgency. Our thesis has worked 
towards demonstrating that an Institutional Psychotherapy, or rather, psychiatry proper, is to be 
technically installed in a system of historically conditioned inter-human relations. The psychiatric 
encounter is a human encounter, the psychiatric situation is a human situation, where there are two poles 
282 
of security and liberty. As Tosquelles noted, "the permanence of the encounter is indispensable and it is 
the presence of medicine that supports it.23" Similarly, on the grounds of our thesis, we can assert that the 
presence of the patient supports the art of medicine, anthropologically, pathically, phenomenologically. 
This is why we saw Tosquelles deem man the "living art", because it supports the art of arts (Pinel), the 
art of sympathy (Bonnafe I Baruk). The reigning question, one which provides the basis for future 
research into Institutional Psychotherapy and indeed psychiatry, is as to how the psychotherapeutic 
encounter can be made possible independently of La Borde clinic, in other clinics, in an age of 
technocratic Simplism and bureaucratic measures. As Tosquelles further elaborated, "we need to learn 
from the patient how to decrypt the general sense of the hospital.24" This leads us to the necessity of a 
continual research, not merely into the historical factors at work behind an ethical consciousness and 
reformed medical concepts, but into notions of work - ergotherapy and sociotherapy proper - and as to 
how it is possible for these technical areas to constitute the organism of the institution, in an age of 
Simplism. 
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Appendix 1: An Interview with Dr. Jean Oury 
David Reggio (Goldsmiths college, university of London) and Mauricio Novello (Hopital Bicetre, Paris) in 
conversation with Jean Oury, La Borde clinic, September 11th' 2004 (unrevised) 
1: The architectonic concern 
J.O: Voluntary ignorance .. .it's what I call "technocratic simplism" 
D.R: Yes, both terms highlight the very real danger of gross indifference, it existed under Carrel, and it exists 
today. The conditions of what you have previously called a "Simplism," is possibly even inscribed within the 
pathology of what Wyrsch in 1956 at the second International Congress of Psychiatry called "normoses", that 
is, normopathy. In terms of the practice of psychiatry, it is necessary to recall Binswanger who asserted that 
man was in the situation of psychiatry if psychiatry was within the situation of man. In terms of 
phenomenology, Henri Maldiney addresses this concern very well, and upon the clinical and institutional 
plane yourself, Tosquelles and Bonnafe also. Indeed, we mustn't lose sight of man himself, of existence- it's 
what Tosquelles reminded us, namely that institutional psychotherapy is present where man is. We can say 
that psychiatry is a vocation that is defined through its engagement with existence, with the "avatars" of 
existence as you have often said. This is important, because there is a danger that with a certain blindness of 
research and practice, or a stubborn indifference, or a voluntary ignorance, or a simplism permeating clinical 
enquiry, to put it simply, existence is lost, and therapeutic possibilities are limited and even nullified. Of 
course Treatment exists today but it is not necessarily therapeutic! Here we can retake all the critiques of 
logico-positivism, from Weizsacker, to Straus, to Horace Torrubia, Oury and Tosquelles. The hallmark of 
medical anthropology was that it defmed itself against what Weizsacker called "natural scientific medicine", 
and similarly, phenomenological anthropology defmed itself against the anthropology of natural history. 
These are very important markers, points of distinction, for the direction of Institutional Psychotherapy. 
J.O: Yes, the voluntary ignorance of which you speak, and its direction, is extremely dangerous 
D.R: We can also say that the body for the logico-positivist, is not the body of medical anthropology, 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis. I have always been struck by your elaborations of the body. As Zutt 
wrote, the body is not an isolated physiognomy, it is aesthetico-physiognomic. From here, I think it is 
important to be concerned with the architectonic and its announcements, both its latent, evident and analogical 
announcements, from the simplest, most concrete of levels. With all this, an Institutional Psychotherapy has 
stayed faithful to a poetic constitution of man: it is important to underline the nuance and the architectonic, a 
poetic logic of constitution. Such sentiments have been displayed in terms of psychiatry by yourself and 
others for over forty years. As I'm speaking I also remembering Tosquelles constantly situating the question 
of method by way of a cosmogony of groups, of constellation, of a polydimensionial diagnostic, a difficult 
and necessary task, of working with heterogeneity concretely, a concrete phenomenology beyond necessary 
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measures and determined capacities. The question of the architectonic, the "art of systems" for Kant, is 
fundamental for the question of Institutional Psychotherapy ... Maybe these are the themes we could cover 
today ... 
J.O: Let's begin with a very important clarification, which you have suggested. It is often said that psychiatry, 
as with psychoanalysis, is still unfinished. It is still a vast field. Lacan had this image, that such research, 
psychoanalysis, Freud, Lacan and the like, was exactly within a vast developmental landscape where there 
would be a small conditioned surface to decipher. Lacan even said that here we would fmd the softened 
watches of Dali. So one has the impression that the technocrats don't exactly say that psychoanalysis was a 
fmished project, but that it is 'said and done', firmly delimited, neat and tidy, that we can describe things with 
relatively simple notions. So, this is why we say that psychiatry and psychoanalysis is an unfinished project, 
always in construction, a field. It is absurd when people carry defmitive judgments .... what you call voluntary 
ignorance, which is a very fitting term, is precisely this. 
D.R: Psychoanalysis is far from Freud. I would say that it was envisioned as an encyclopedic enterprise, and it 
is not by chance that Weizsacker saw the psychoanalyst to belong to the school of medical anthropology! 
Weizsacker published a very interesting article in the 1920's for the International Journal of Psychoanalysis of 
which Freud was the editor. His theme was "a case of organic neurosis". From 1919 onwards Weizsacker was 
working around the term 'psychosomatic' - an almost invaluable concept which was later bastardized. It's 
interesting to note, that for Weizsacker, neurosis was not inscribed within a temporality (zeitlos) unlike 
sclerosis. 
M.N: Exactly, and here we can also say that people seem to forget that Charcot was upon Freud's shelf, and 
Freud, Shelling and Heidegger upon Weizsacker's shelf1 What's more is that psychiatry and psychoanalysis 
have become a very temporal science ... and increasingly moral 
J.O: Yes, this is a bit more complicated- we would have to do a critique of history. The logic of history is said 
of the present, it is not a vision of the past, the past does not really exist. If we were not here to decipher the 
past it would not exist because we ourselves are within a process as its very logic. We can't exactly say that 
psychiatry is always to be invented, those who say this tend to say anything they like. We had constantly 
struggled against this sort of angle, this slipping towards what I call 'Simplism'. And paradoxically, this 
simplism is often presented in complex form, with very complicated formulae. Nevertheless, it is still 
simplism. What I want to say, and what I have said since the very beginning, is that we should concern 
ourselves with the 'simple' as opposed to 'simplism'. I often ask as to what is more simple than standing up? 
Than walking? This is very simple, but if we study this neurophysiologically such a study is unfinished, it is 
of an extraordinary complexity, almost a permanent miracle. To have that which is simple, the fact of being-
here, the fact of saying hello, of performing a very simple diagnostic, we need to traverse an enormous 
complexity, if not, we find ourselves within simplism, and simplism, is an open path to dictatorship. 
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M.N: And today it is a scientific simplism, therefore it is extremely dictatorial. .. 
J.O: The concentration camps of Auschwitz had the scheme of adequate/inadequate, and such a simple 
language is employed today. Adequate/inadequate, it's the language of Social Security and the Health 
Organisation. There are people who are adequate for a certain area .. .it's of the homogenous ... they are 
homogenised with such an ideology. This is to say that the schizophrenics - if they exist - are put together, the 
alcoholics- together, those suffering with Alzheimer's -together. You are not allowed to mix them. 
D.R: We spoke of this the other day, of the tendencies to aggregate and homogenise ... this is where there is 
the importance of concretely situating the question of the architectonic and heterogeneity ... these are not just 
concepts to titillate the intellect but realities. 
J.O: It is precisely this. The architectonic is based upon heterogeneity and not homogeneity. That's the 
fundamental word, "heterogeneity". It is a fundamental word for many, but especially for Tosquelles. He often 
said that the milieu needed to be heterogeneous, even within the educational milieu, of the educators 
themselves. Ferdinand Deligney always spoke of heterogeneity and it is far from being a traditional term. We 
fmd the term with Hezoid who said that if there is no heterogeneity there is discord, war. So the question is as 
to how we maintain heterogeneity? - It is completely opposed to a simplifying logic of allocation. 
M.N: How can it be that the government are in deficit by absolutely billions ofEuros? It is unbelievable that 
the Social Security is in deficit by 13 billion Euros ... maybe it's a lie or something else. It is indeed difficult to 
reach a reasonable conclusion about such inefficacity, if such deficit were by way of a good cause it would be 
worthwhile, but what is the cause? They would have been better off spending all this money in Africa. 
J.O: It's an enormous sum, when we see the day patients in the hospitals, the numbers are five to six times 
more than here - ten times even. It seems to me that there is absolutely no organisation of daily life, the ill are 
left unattended to, sometimes they are left wandering about in pajamas, sometimes they are confmed to 
padded cells, and this costs six times more than here. 
D.R: Maybe we can even say that there is a geometricisation of man, the rule ofhomogenisation proper and 
its historical tendency. This requires much elaboration but it is interesting to observe Plato's Timaeus and his 
Republic together, the geometry of the body and the state, of the soul and the Republic - and then we have all 
the analogical laws revived by the French 191h century medic-theosophist, the fascination of embryology and 
the construction of state, physiological architecture and state architecture. Malfatti de Montereggio turned his 
Thoughts to such things around 1850, and it's not surprising that Deleuze took him up in 1946! But this is the 
work of the historian of Ideas ... For today, in terms of psychiatry, I would say that we have the question of 
systems of alienation ... 
M.N: This is extremely important, invaluable and very complicated- it's a group research this: Plato, 
geometry, Soul, State and the Body - because such an argument highlights tendencies that are very much 
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against vitalism. There are systems of alienation that gnaw away at what we call the elan vitale. We see the 
homogenous groupings of cells and units, paranoiacs here, obsessives there, autistics here ... In fact, there is no 
life for these people ... they are far from the elan. 
D.R: To borrow a term from Minkowski, they are far from the creative elan- it's increasingly difficult to 
keep with the elan and the transcendentaL We can even say there is a grave distancing, that there is a 
distancing from a vital ground. I think this underlies the importance of - among others - Victor Von 
Weizsacker who spoke of pathic moments, of a vital communication, an atmosphere. We can see this pathic, 
or even pre-pathic, communication with Heidegger, Binswanger, Minkwoski and Tellenbach among 
others ... and let's not forget that transgression was somewhat favoured over transcendence, maybe Foucault 
should have been more attentive to these things. 
J.O: This condition of which we speak, is nothing new. I have always cited Spitz on this. Before the war of 
1940, all the work that Spitz did in the United States was on hospitalisation, and it was later taken up by 
Merleau-Ponty in 1947at the College de France for his course on the 'structure of behavior', something very 
important and worthwhile. In following Spitz, Merleau-Ponty speaks ofhospitalisation, and Spitz, did well to 
show that in the first months of life we are asceptic in the Pasteurian sense of the word - Pasteur was someone 
very good. This is to say that there is a cerebral atrophy with the child who wears a mask, who does not talk, 
the child of several months who does not speak. So, from birth there needs to be an atmosphere, an ambience, 
of smells, sights, gestures, voices - that which is important for the construction of the individual, a subject. If 
not, if we don't have this ambience, this atmosphere ... well ... we see that a lot of children are marked for life, 
profound troubles of schizophrenia .. .it stems from very far back you know. 
M.N: We can say that this is the trouble of verbs. 
D.R: It is Weizsacker, the pahic pentagram composed ofKonnen, Durfen, 
J.O: Precisely, it is the trouble of verbs. In the United States there was a German refugee, near Chestnut 
Lodge in Washington. His name was Reitzman, and he spoke a great deal about these profound troubles, even 
seeing them as being the base of psychoses, troubles which in German we call mutternischgeit, that is to say, 
of the maternal, maternitude. We can see such grave troubles with drug addiction, troubles which stem from 
very far back in an individual's life. There is an entire study to be done on this, beginning with the work of 
Jacques Schotte ofLouvain, ofSzondi, ofLacan even. (phone rings) ... 
D.R: And this puts chronicity into question ... this temporality had nothing to do with chronos, let's say it is a 
mechanical intervention that has certain effects upon the temporal structures of man's pathology. 
M.N: Exactly. What you say is very interesting because you highlight an inscription at the genetic level even-
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retaking your idea of the pathology of the normoses that Wyrsch spoke about. All this si a vast and important 
work that needs to be done! More broadly we can also say that today with this scientific simplism there is 
such a quick form of consultation to avoid hospitalisation, but it's completely false, another form of 
hospitalisation is created which produces a veritable chronicity, they haven't even the time to undertake a 
somation. 
1.0: The architectonic understands all this, all that is being put into question here, of the chronic, of 
atmosphere. All in all, the undertaking is simple, it is not complex, the undertaking of that which we call 
Institutional Psychotherapy. I've always said and will continue to say in drawing upon Tosquelles and others, 
that atmosphere, ambience, is important because today there are grave ideologies of the pseudo neurosciences 
which say that atmosphere is not important. Ambience, therefore, carries a significance, because to put 
someone in a cell group carries no liberty, it furnishes nothing because it is inscribed in the genes, in the body, 
a psychopath wherever we put him will always be a psychopath, it is very banal to say this. In one of the 
medical journals we regularly receive, there was a small article saying that within Alzheimer's and its 
evolution of dementias, atmosphere counts, that it is important. I hadn't seen this said for many years! 
Atmosphere does count, it is important, because it can even delay the evolution of dementia. 
M.N: And it can also be seen to bring a new destiny to dementia 
1.0: Yes, correct, even to dementia itself, and even to the organic- neurologically, atmosphere counts, to say 
this is very simple 
M.N: What we see today is that we have gone from anthropomorphism to laboratoromorphism, because today, 
men are treated like rats. This signals a suffering within laboratories, and laboratories want to maintain, each 
and every time, an increased invariability. For instance, I observe within a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts 
of Paris that they use a wealth of medicines within isolation rooms, and each time the action is more severe 
than the last. Patients' arms are braced, things like this. I also work, as part of my research, in the emergency 
department, and the other day I received a Tunisian man. He was in a psychotic crisis. He was the victim of a 
certain religious therapy, because today when we speak about Arabs etc. it is a moral treatment, one that is 
terrible. He had been in France for two days, he was without papers, and already had a wound on his face. I 
saw him and he was in a bad way. He was shouting a lot, "you Frenchman" etc. And I said to him, "You're 
mistaken, I'm not French, you can hear my accent, I don't speak like a Frenchman." People had hit him 
previously, a moral treatment, to get rid of him. Anyway, I decided to take something to help him sleep, which 
he accepted. Sleep is an important treatment because there is the question of cycles, of glucose, of energy, all 
very important dimensions. I spoke to a nurse who somewhat respects such efforts - and such nurses are not 
frequent! I told her that I wanted him to be hospitalised because there was a day doctor who could speak 
Arabic and that this communication could furnish something positive for the patient. Because I had given him 
something to help him sleep, we had provided him with extra padding so that he wouldn't fall out of the bed 
and hurt himself, and he felt a certain degree of comfort. Later, in the morning a group of nurses, whom I can 
only describe as being extremely perverse, removed the padding and cushions, and he began to start shouting 
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again, ''you whores", ''you sluts". The nurses were female. The patient was once again in a mess so I was 
called to return and I saw that he was restrained, braced. I was asked if I wanted to give him more medication 
but I refused because I wanted the day doctor to speak with him in Arabic. The doctor arrived (I had notified 
him the day before that he may be needed) and he started to talk with the patient in Arabic. The patient 
immediately became calm and asked if he could please be removed from his restraints. He was denied this, 
and he became aggressive once again. They are in the process of messing everything up, for they could at 
least have done a gesture, detached the right arm for instance, but they didn't! This costs 800 Euros per day. It 
is unbelievable. 
J.O: In this way the Social Security can easily be in deficit 
M.N: And this patient, he is conceivably a suicide bomber, clearly he was already ill in his own country, he 
arrived in France with dreams, somewhat ministerial dreams, but it is nevertheless a good dream to want 
establish ourselves in a new country. Unfortunately he found himself within a very difficult situation that he 
could not comprehend, this is the responsibility of Social Security. But as you say, there is homogenisation 
and discourses that are of a simplism. And with this, there is not the time for somation nor atmosphere, if 
there is an atmosphere, it is a bad one. If I was not already this far into medicine, I would be tempted to stop, 
because the atmosphere is bad. 
J.O: Let's take crisis centers for example, that is to say places of short-stay that carry this hypocritical spirit. 
Here, many things are destroyed, the history of the individual for example, because we cannot know another 
person within a critical short stay period. With short stays, medium stays and long stays, it is no longer of the 
medical, it becomes a question of the medico-social, yet it is not even of the social, for these are under-
medicalised systems, like what we call I.M.A.S, these places of specialised treatment. 
M.N: And the proliferation ofi.M.A.S on the planet will see catastrophic results. 
J.O: Here, at La Borde, our daily costs are very low, inferior when compared to the daily costs of the I.M.A.S. 
So the state would be wise not to trouble us too much, because here, not only are the costs low, but we have 
patients that are much more difficult than the ones you find in the hospitals, you have seen this for yourselves. 
The Social Security inspectors who visited even noted that we have a majority of serious schizophrenic cases 
exceeding that of the hospitals, and this is interesting for the inspectors because it is much less expensive. To 
fight against under-medicalisation we need assertions on both national and international levels, a form of 
resolving resistance. It's what we see everyday, not just within the clinic and the hospitals, but within the 
I.M.P (Medical. Pedagogical. Institute.), we see management and administrators who are not doctors, it is 
atrocious where decisions are made without considering the educators. I am thinking about a place in the 
South of France where there are educators with an enormous experience, psychologists working with difficult, 
psychotic children, educators who have been working for over thirty years. A director arrives, and begins to 
make decisions without asking these people and he upsets everything. For instance, to have a meeting once a 
week about the time you have spent on something is a horror. But this is everywhere. Therefore, I have 
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always said that it is necessary to have Associations, a Cultural Association for example, to try and put 
Associations into place as best as we can, so that we are not devoured, because many psychiatrists are nothing 
but accomplices. 
M.N: Yes, many psychiatrists have developed a general psychiatry, a psychiatry developed by generalist 
doctors ... 
D.R: It perpetuates a destructive indifference ... at all levels, it's everywhere - the family, the small business, 
the school, and it's directly related to the temporality of chronicity - we can ask as to what the pathological 
effects of this are ... we also see at the same time the serious problems of communications within these social 
units ... 
J.O: This is exactly the case. Twenty years ago I said to myself that there was about ninety to ninety-five 
percent who are accomplices. Tosquelles said to me that I had exaggerated slightly and told me that there was 
eighty percent. But there are many, yet at the same time they are not all bad. We see for example within the 
meetings of the Annales Medico Psychologique, which is more or less traditional, a profound theoretical 
conceptual approach ... (tape stops) 
D.R: In your work, Dr Oury, the role of Constellation has played a key role in maintaining the profound 
conceptual approach ... 
1.0: Yes, correct, if it were not for constellation, all this work of Institutional Analysis, or Institutional 
Psychotherapy as it was often called, a continual analysis and resistance to massive social alienation and its 
hierarchy would not be realised 
D.R: Because with constellation we have the liberty of circulation, one cannot work without the other. Things 
need to circulate and form a constellation, if they are blocked we have an oppression not just of a social level, 
but of a psychopathological level. ... 
1.0: Precisely, the liberty ofparole ... the moment of constellation comes into effect, let's say, over one or two 
hours, we speak of the history of the patient, but we speak about other things, of affective relations, hatred, 
sympathy etc. And the following day, or several days later, there is a change within the person. This patient 
who was agitated and furious before now sits before me changed. It is by no means of the magical. With this 
we can see that we touched upon a more or less conscious fashion, upon the encounter, we can say that we 
have touched upon the analysis of counter-transference even, and why not, of course there is this! For instance 
when we ask a nurse, "would you like to go on holiday with this man" an influence will unconsciously appear 
the following day, when the nurse walks past this man, the look will not be the same, the look will become a 
gesture. This is what matters and this is what we can work with. What does this mean? It means that with 
people concerned in such matters, there is something of themselves that they do not know, which is put into 
question. We can say that it is at the level of their unconscious desire, in the Freudian or Lacanian sense of the 
291 
term. It is this inaccessible unconscious desire that places them 'here', in a certain way. Ifthey are 'here', it 
proves that they are not elsewhere. The idea of the constellation was used by Tosquelles, but notably by the 
long-dead psychiatrist Elkheim, who knew perfectly of the developments of psychiatry in the United States. 
He had prepared something for the 1956 2nd International Congress of Psychiatry in Zurich on schizophrenia. 
He brought with him the experience of a famous clinic near Washington, at Chestnut Lodge where he had 
worked. At this time, there were two psycho-sociologists who wanted to explore the clinic, Stenton and 
Schwartz, who had noted an extremely complicated patient enclosed within the institute. Two psychoanalysts 
saw this patient separately, individually, and they never met. Stenton and Schwartz observed how things went, 
they approached the psychoanalysts suggesting that what they were doing was not working and that maybe it 
would be best if the psychoanalysts were to meet one another, to speak of the patient as well as other things. 
Within several hours of the psychoanalysts meeting, the clinical taboo was altogether different. And the 
patient, he was no longer enclosed. As we say, something happened that exerted an influence. We can 
generalise the formula of Stenton and Schwartz to have the constellations as I have described. That is to say, 
to modify something of people who are interested instead of being dispersed, that when they are put together, 
there is something that is much more integrated, even within the very existence of the patient in question. This 
can work very well at times. 
M.N: It is interesting because Freud had read Goethe, in addition to the likes of Charcot and Weizsacker as 
David has often said, and Goethe had been extremely influenced by this notion of constellation, because there 
was this question of atmosphere. We also have the question of psychosis, and a corporeal complexity because 
there is the individual body that passes into a difficulty of individuation. Here, we fmd this social aspect 
where, evidently, there is the question of the unconscious, it is a logic of relations. We also need to be wary of 
what I call positivist neuroscientists who principally exert an action upon the family. They lobby the family in 
fact. For example we can observe the organizations for autism- this is a very serious concern ... 
J.O: It is the problem in France. Families are grouped within the U.N.A.F.A.M. (Union Nationale des Amis et 
Families des Malades Psychiques ) ... It has much power... We can say that it profits from the destruction and 
deficiency of psychiatric structures to say that, "he is well", and we can see that psychiatrists are not capable 
of healing our children. There is an infiltration everywhere, in the ministry as much as in the medico-social 
associations ... 
M.N: This is lead by what I call positivistic neuroscientists, who are somewhat irresponsible. I saw for 
example a researcher here, in France, who said that the therapeutic result of her research was a woman being 
able to enter a lift. I said that it was irresponsible because, in truth, we don't need medicine to enter a lift, we 
wear a protective vest and we enter the lift, it is less expensive! There exists a positive reinforcement with 
medicines in terms of behavior. Moreover, there is this perversion of families, because there is not access to 
this unconscious desire enabling the possibilities of communication. When I see autistic children for example, 
I get them to exercise, I get them to move, and in this way we arrive at, as you say, a communication. 
J.O: We need to be careful with the narrative of families, those who are the most active are those who have a 
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paranoiac tendency, they have power and they are favourised by the present-day structures. In returning to a 
neurological context - and there is even great deviation within neurology - we see that linguistics can be 
drawn upon to study the troubles of language - even though Freud had put into question the logic of mental 
illness in terms of pathology. Some neurologists have called this Aphasiology where several levels are 
distinguished. For instance, language and writing are not the same thing. We find lesions, if not cerebral 
lesions, within reading that are not the same as within writing - I'm saying this rather quickly because it 
requires much time and elaboration. There is the level of glossology where there are troubles of language 
proper, and we understand that language, is parole - at times there are troubles at the level of parole. There 
are those who say that there are not troubles at the level of parole but of writing itself. This is not simply of 
agraphia in the traditional sense, but of an ergologic level where we fmd a-technical troubles. Troubles of 
writing for example are a-technical troubles and, clinically, many neurologists have often confused the two. In 
the late 1940's Tosquelles and Lacan introduced me to Juan de Ajuriaguerra who was an exceptional 
neurologist- he in fact reformulated all of neurology. He was a refugee from the Basque country who worked 
at Saint Anne and who had written a marvelous work on the cerebral cortex with Hecaen. This was an 
extraordinary study. Neuroscience is nothing of this, and psychoanalysts would do well to remember such 
studies. 
D.R: It's important you mention Ajuriaguerra because he stands alongside Monakow and Mourgue, Goldstein, 
Weizsacker, and phenomenology itself. These figures, save for Goldstein, remain unknown to the United 
Kingdom, even Goldstein is scandalously under-researched. I gave a seminar in London on Monakow and 
Mourgue. After, we began to speak about the notion I introduced of Syneidesis. With this, I did a quick 
conceptual history of things and it enabled me to introduce Tosquelles' thesis in a more faithful manner, I 
began to speak of genesis, reconstruction, delirium, and how Tosquelles analogically weaved these things 
together. Interestingly enough, the students of phenomenological philosophy responded better than the 
students of psychiatry! What I wanted to say is that if these very important areas are ejected from 
psychoanalysis, psychiatry and neuroscience - which they have been - then we are left with the disparaging 
antithesis of the human concern - which is presently the crisis of medical assistance where misdiagnosis is 
commonplace. What is the difference between the problems of objective psychology and the problems of 
neuroscience? Erwin Straus, in 1935, did a very important critique of objective psychology, he asserted that 
the reduction of the subject to a mere organism of Stimulus Response reduced possibility. That's why he 
tended to speak of a "psychology of possibility" in terms of a subject who is a biography of experiences - he 
is very close to Weizsacker, and therefore to phenomenological anthropology. It seems that today, we are 
quick to reduce the person to a function - man is no longer an agency, but a function ... Straus was somewhat 
prophetic is what he said ... how can the drama of madness for example (and it wasn't just Iacan who spoke of 
drama but Weizsacker also for whom the illness was a drama of three acts), be depicted upon the screen and 
through the instruments of neuro-imaging? And what I say is not to condemn psycho-pharmacology, of course 
not ... 
J.O: Precisely. These neurologists of whom you mention also knew their phenomenology and phenomenology 
is not a fantasy, it is concrete, in terms of the world, of people, of the clinic. I always underline the importance 
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of a critique of phenomenology through Husserl. In a seminar at Saint-Anne several months back I had 
decided to read a magnificent article by Eugene Fink, who was Husserl's assistant, a remarkable work, very 
concrete. It appeared in 1933, so it is nothing new yet it is ignored, when you mention phenomenology they 
ask "why?" This is why I say that psychoanalysts are ignorant of physiology, medicine, phenomenology. As 
you suggested earlier, Freud did not hope for this - on the contrary! What we have now is the direction of 
ego-psychology. Freud was betrayed by the Freudians and Lacan had attempted to reestablish something with 
the mirror stage but it didn't matter because the Lacanians ended up removing the entire base of Lacan! 
People speak of the Freudian cause, but there is not merely this to Freud! It is annoying, because if we ignore 
the very important fields not just to Freud but to others, then we are accomplices to segregation. 
In 1967 in Paris, there was a reunion with Maud Mannoni, Lacan, Tosquelles which later appeared under the 
published title of L 'enfance Aliemi. At the end of the reunion, Mannoni turned to me and said that we were 
heading towards a hyper-segregation. And this was said in 1967! Therefore, a psychoanalyst who ignores 
phenomenology is terrible. However, there is the school ofLouvain, Jacques Schotte, Szondi, for instance, 
that has developed work of astounding insight, beginning with the successors ofBinswanger in 
Switzerland ... The phenomenology of depression is nothing to do with the phenomenology of melancholy, 
and yet we see articles written by psychoanalysts who speak of neurotic depression- which in truth means 
nothing- and who are against psychopharmacology which they ignore completely. To ignore all these things, 
is to be an accomplice, and to be an accomplice is terrible, an accomplice of segregation ... A long while ago 
when we were still performing insulin cures, the Sakel cure, atmosphere was important, I had patients who 
told me that their best memory was having the Sakel cure. It was performed on the condition that it was done 
carefully and vigilantly, yes, it degenerated with the hospitals, it became a horror. 
D.R: The atmosphere is a creative dimension where we have the question ofparameters ... we see this with 
insulin therapy which requires particular conditions to work properly ... but insulin requires time, time for a 
specialized team, time for the coma, time fore the surveillance, time for the patient to sweat and be changed, 
time for the patient to emerge from the coma ... numerous temporalities in fact ... 
J.O: Correct. In the 1960's I was in discussion with an eminent, inimitable researcher. We spoke of the dosage 
of insulin and the provoked hypoglycemic coma. It took 150 units of insulin to provoke a coma. Yet, ifthere 
was an atmosphere, where we spoke to the patients, had some music playing in the background, where there 
were correspondences, we could reduce the dosage of insulin by half and it would be as effective as 150 units. 
This proves that there are parameters, and not merely chemical parameters, there are physiological parameters 
at the same time as cerebral glucose. All this matters greatly. Similarly, when we speak of insulin, we can 
speak of parole, of a reunion. We need to treat the hospital to treat the patients. The hospital is ill. There is an 
accumulation of regulation that needs to be treated -the hospital requires treatment in order to treat. It is a 
double movement. The entire project set forth by Tosquelles in the 1940's in France at the clinic ofSaint-
Alban was to challenge the suppression of units, contentions, of closed agitated areas .. .It is not simply a 
question of suppressing this or that, but of slowly infiltrating. There needs to be a collective structure in order 
to treat the hospital. The collective, is not a closed structure. Deleuze in his study of Foucault spoke about 
form and force. Form is the function of hierarchy and everyday life is organised around a diagrammaticisation 
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of forces. In actual fact, there is not an organised putting into form of things, it is multifocal. There are times 
when I myself do not know what is happening, and for the better! For something to hold, a point is necessary, 
a neutral point. With Deleuze's reflections on Foucault, whom I myself am not too keen on, he draws upon 
someone I like a lot- where the neutral point is found- Maurice Blanchot. In a similar vain to Heraclitus he 
spoke about the passion of the impossible, corresponding to an absolute zero. For things to hold, if we even 
consider a mathematical formula for instance, there needs to be an absolute zero, there needs to be an 
exteriority to thwart this false antinomy of interior/exterior exterior/interior. With the short-stays in these 
crisis centers there is no diagrammatisation of force, they want to recentralise everything within the form. 
M.N: And they saturate the form ... 
J.O: A remarkable juridical psychoanalyst, Pierre Legendre, said that we can even construct a triangle of the 
Organisation, a triangulation of power, parole and death. And what is there at the center? Well, it is the 
juridical, which regulates. Here, we can also refer to Giorgio Agamben, who is fashionable at the moment. In 
his study entitled, L 'Etat D 'Exception he shows that we are increasingly within a reality of exception that is 
defmed as a coalescence between the legislative and the juridical. There is always a good reason to undertake 
such a study. For instance, I was told at an I.M.P yesterday in the South of France, that two cleaning ladies 
rested near a window to smoke a cigarette. The secretary saw them and told them that smoking was not 
permitted. The following day they received a letter on behalf of the managerial director telling them to be 
careful and that if it happened again ... well you know the rest ... This is the juridical, the state of exception, of 
the legislative, the executive, and at the same time it is a denouncement, where we see a denouncement appear 
in the same way as it did within the concentration camps- I'm thinking of the tappots. The tappot, was a 
prisoner of the camp seduced by the S.S, an idealator, who would inform ofthose who should be persecuted 
or not. Yet such a structure is increasingly apparent everywhere today. In the factories I see the same thing, 
since the thirty-five hour rule they have reduced the possibility of speaking, and there is an idealator present. 
This is increasing, and most clearly within psychiatry. It is interesting to review this problem. Agamben, for 
example, draws upon the Roman word 'justitium'. Justitium is where there is a degeneration between 
auctoritas and authority. Authority is not force, it's the Symbolic. Authority is ofpotestas, of Will, of 
potentiality, of capacity, and this is what is always menaced within structures ... 
2:Incarnation 
D.R: As a productive consequence to what we have been discussing today, and remembering our conversation 
oflast week, maybe we can turn our attention to the body and the debate of narcissism. For example, there is 
the question of the level of narcissism and incarnation, and its pronouncement through, let's say, the 
schizophrenia. I would say this is important because here we also have the question of energy, but not in the 
thermodynamic sense of the term ... but in the Greek sense of energeia ... 
J.O: Yes, this is extremely important, we must speak of this. In Creation et Schizophrenie I spoke about the 
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distinction between primary and secondary narcissism - I had conversed with Jacques Schotte about this 
many years ago. We need to distinguish between primary narcissism, which we can call originary narcissism, 
and specular narcissism. Specular narcissism, is at the level of the Self (moi) - we can retake all of Lacan 
here. Originary narcissism, is the very base of the personality. For example, when Lacan says, "search not for 
the Other elsewhere but within the body," I believe it to be at this level of originary narcissism. In the German 
language when we speak of the body, the Korper, it is of being in general, and more or less of the specular. 
By contrast, the word 'Leib' is more of the body, but a body in terms of what Merleau-Ponty calls the flesh 
(chair), the incarnation. We find this with Pankow, who shows well that schizophrenia is a profound trouble 
of incarnation in the theological sense of the word. At times, it is trouble at the level of primitive identification. 
This is at the level of originary narcissism. In my opinion, with schizophrenia, when we talk of disassociation 
- the spa/tung- it is at the level of originary narcissism. When we say, "it is badly delimited, that there is no 
limit" I often say that it is because there is paradoxically no opening. We can say that catatonics are closed 
and this is why there is no limit. For there to be a limit, there needs to be an opening. 
D .R: In the case of schizophrenia where there is no unity of the Self, where we speak of the Spaltung and the 
Sperrung also, this opening would inevitably be developed gradually over time. It is a very delicate pursuit, a 
surgical task of transference even, a surgical project as Dr. Novello often suggests. 
J.O: Yes, it is precisely this, "to graft an opening," as we say, the graft of transference, which is at the level of 
originary narcissism. We can very well see that when we work something at this level we keep in mind that 
originary narcissism is a basal energy so to speak. I like to replace the word 'energy' which seems to me to be, 
as you suggested, overtly thermodynamic and mechanicist. I prefer to draw upon the Greek word, which you 
rightly mentioned, energeia. The Latins translated this word not as energy but as actus, and energeia is close 
to poeisis. It seems to me that originary narcissism is a condensed form of energeia. Freud, in following the 
quality and intensity of energeia, asserted the Ego Ideal. Already in 1914 he distinguished between the Ego 
Ideal and the Ideal Ego. The Ideal Ego is on the side of speculative, the Imaginary, almost embodied yet 
imaginarily so. The Ego Ideal, is a point of clairvoyance, a vaporous point within the Symbolic where it is in 
direct communication with originary narcissism. With Lacan asserting, "search not for the Other elsewhere 
but within the body," we see it to be of an inscription upon the level of originary narcissism - you alluded to 
inscription earlier. I have said in the past, that pathological foreclosure is a defect of a fundamental function, 
what I call the foreclosive. The foreclosive, is that which permits the surroundings to distinguish themselves. 
But we can't reify all these things, it's very dangerous to say, "Here is primary narcissism ... here is primary 
repression". Psychosis is a defect of primary narcissism. Many years ago a schizophrenic said to me that what 
was happening was a flight of the void. This seemed remarkable to me in the sense that primary repression 
could be an enclosure of the void. We can also say that for there to be a remembering, memory of course 
needs to function, but above all there must not be a flight of memory, and more than this, of a memory which 
we do not know. When I said that psychoses was of a defect within primary repression, this defect was 
announced by a forgetting of forgetting ... 
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D.R: Blanchot tended to work with this idea of anamnesia, the forgetting of forgetting and its role you 
position at the level of originary narcissism. 
J.O: Yes, it's extremely important this. Through Blanchot, I place the forgetting of primary repression to be 
latent within originary narcissism. Blanchot's book, L 'Attent L 'Oubli can help us to ask as to what form of 
waiting there is within primary narcissism. It is an absolute waiting, a waiting for nothing. In German it's the 
word erwahrten, an indefinite waiting. We can distinguish between erwahrten and a 'waiting-for-something'. 
The area that specifies primary narcissism itself, the material so to speak, is of the outside-of-waiting, where 
there is nothing. I had spoken for many years at Saint-Anne about primary narcissism and I said that this 
outside-of-waiting corresponded to a veritable turnaround within the thinking of Freud, who justifiably had 
broken from his group in 1920. After this we have Beyond the Pleasure Principle where he speaks of the 
death drive. He also later speaks of the death drive in The Economic problem of Masochism of 1925. Freud 
explains it very well although all too hastily. He allows himself to be duped because he confounds the death 
drive with the destructive drive. We can say that the destructive drive is a form of amalgam between Eros and 
Thanatos resulting in destruction. The death drive, is the drive par excellence, one of total silence yet of the 
greatest concentrated energy. It is this that furnishes energeia through the drive, the force, of primary 
narcissism. 
M.N: There is a refusal of the body in this instant. .. 
J.O: Yes. That which is in question by psychosis- even upon the plane of general linguistics and logic, as we 
said this morning, at the level of ergology, of glosseology- is of another level that Freud calls the ethnological 
leveL Everything we have spoken about today points to this. Upon this ethnological level there are laws, and it 
is these laws that are troubled within psychosis. These laws, however, reassert themselves upon other levels. For 
example, what we call schizophasic language, at times a destruction oflanguage, has nothing to do with aphasia. 
And at the same time there is the question of the relationship with the law, the relationship with the Other, to be-
with-the-other. .. 
D.R: On that point I would say that today, we have defined the phenomenology, ethic and diagnostic of 
psychiatry or rather Institutional Psychotherapy. To be with the other, it is not a mere duality but the mit that is 
at work, it is the !'avec as you have often said, not merely a being-with-the-other, but as Binswanger said, it is 
where man exists as mit-mensch, to be encountered, of the other, for the other and with the other. We can say 
that this is the level prior to the subject and object because man exists sympathetically. In following Maldiney, 
this is not an objective condoling sympathy, but sympathy of a vital communication, of a pathic bond between 
existing beings, a primordial dialogue, a communion even. Man, before all else, exists sympathetically - we can 
speak of an atmospheric diagnostic, a diagnostic through intuition, to retake the Swiss lineage. The body is 
within a resonance of the atmospheric tonal moment (stimmung), an instant of co-presence, but this instant 
exists prior to the subject-object delimitation. Zutt has called this the domain of the affective body, the 
supporting body, an aesthetico-physionomic leveL Henri Maldiney has even deemed this primary or primordial 
level of contact "pre-human," prior to incarnation itself. Maldiney has also asserted this level to be where man is 
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at his most naked, where man exists as feeling before he is a thinking, conceptualising, cognising subject as 
Straus said. And this Dr, is what is striking when you say that "we ourselves are symptoms" because it is based 
in all these notions of the pre-cognitive, pre-representational, pre-egoic, and pre-objective, to describe a contact 
prior to all these categorisations. It is a level of feeling (empfinden). For the theologically influenced 
phenomenology of Landsberg, a phenomenologist who is sadly ignored but one who is extremely important, a 
very profound and sincere thinker who had fled from the Gestapo during the Occupation of France, it is where 
the personality-comes-to-be (Werdesein), the transcendental level of "unifying transformations." We can see 
such appeals with the neurology ofMonakow and Mourgue and their notion of Syneidesis borrowed from Saint-
Paul, and Weizsacker's organismic crises where he writes of the Gestaltkreis- a vital necessity. All these very 
important aspects are married through the work of Tosquelles, Oury and Lacan, and with haste we can say that 
unifying transformation is at level of the flux of life, of vital sentiments, and of a spiritual effort 
(lebensnotendigkeit) - the will to unity. Helmut Plessner said something very good, namely: that there are 
modes of existence, modalities of vitality, "which are indifferent to intellectual interpretation ... And still they 
form a phenomenal reality of the most pronounced kind, for whose investigation the empirical sciences of 
nature are unsuitable." This asserts the diagnostic of being-with-the-other, of the mit, which is upon the level 
about which we speak, a level which is not of empirical or deterministic science, but of sympathy, where two 
beings do not exist independently but together in one. Sympathetic existence, to retake Plessner, does not give 
itself to intellectual interpretation, but is of a most pronounced reality, a transcendental reality, a constituting 
reality, and this reality. All this pertains to Tosquelle's appeals of the Transcendental 'I' that defined his thesis of 
1948. By qualifying this level of things, in terms of psychiatry, it enables us to speak of discordant relations , 
transcendental modifications of structure and problems of transcendence itself. 
J.O: It is precisely this with which we work, a vast field. To be with another, mit in the German language. With 
schizophrenia there is a profound trouble of the being-with-the-other. For many years now I have spoken about 
the collapse of transcendence and the trouble of incarnation. It is possible to speak of all these things, to expand 
upon them, and to articulate them distinctly, for we must also keep in mind what I have called "I' avec"- as you 
suggest it is not the "avec" but "l'avec", it is more than merely being with a patient, it is a far more profound 
relation. There was a remarkable Danish phenomenological psychiatrist, Rilinke, who presented an extremely 
clear exposition at the first international congress of psychiatry in Paris in 1950. It was a revision of all the 
phenomenologies- an astounding work. Before this, he had written about a notion he called the Praecox Gefiihl. 
Gefiihl appears both within the German and Danish language and it means a direct association, almost affective, 
almost intuitive. Lacan, in his article on the three temporalities spoke of the instant of seeing, the time of the 
understanding and the moment of conclusion. The Praecox Gefiihl, is the instant of seeing. Rilinke said that 
upon immediately seeing a patient, who enters, we do a diagnostic. This requires much experience and this 
diagnostic is the Praecox Gefiihl. He would later often recount his experiences. One time is where a patient 
enters and Rumke turns to his students and says, "this man is a schizophrenic". The students, however, think 
otherwise: "we have done a multitude of tests, he is not a schizophrenic!" After six months the man returns for a 
rendezvous ... a schizophrenic. A similar thing, the praecox gefuhl, is found with the extraordinary German 
psychiatrist Kretschmer. It was Giselda Pankow who had worked with Kretschmer. He used to say to his 
students that if they were not capable of performing a diagnostic upon the patient entering, from the patient 
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walking from the door to the seat, they were not capable of being psychiatrists! So what is in question here, is 
not language, nor parole, it is of the same logic of language because it is a logic the body. This is why I spoke 
earlier about writing .. .I'm thinking of Klages, someone truly impressive who wrote a book on graphology. He 
speaks of rhythm and cadence. We are at the level of rhythm, and with the schizophrenic there is a profound 
trouble of rhythm. I often say that the schizophrenic is disrhythmic .. . this is an internal rhythm. We can work 
with this, and it immediately shows itself within the body, for example, the way we stand. When we observe 
someone who is not schizophrenic - and we can use this image - he is assembled and gathered to a single point. 
With the schizophrenic, there are many points, and we can immediately feel it. I have a friend whom I have 
known for many years ... He was someone very sensitive to the ways of being- there is a lot of intuition within 
such work. He once spoke of a schizophrenic who he saw at his clinic in England. The patient entered, but it 
was as if he wasn't there, he was seemingly elsewhere. He asserted that the patient was still in the park and he 
said to him, "You're still in the park no?'' This is at the intuitive level, Praecox Gefohl. I often say that the act of 
performing a diagnostic is but an aspect to the respectful undertaking towards the other. Thirty years ago there 
was a group of the Freudian school. It was fashionable to say, "we want nothing of a diagnostic, we are 
psychoanalysts!" There was a man who even said, "I saw a patient, and after six months I knew he was mad." I 
told him that he was responsible for a homicide by stupidity. The Diagnostic is not an etiquette because it is an 
ethical undertaking .. . To perform a diagnostic is a phenomenological undertaking. We do not speak to a small 
child of three years old in the same way as we speak to a grandmother. This is to say that a schizophrenic, a 
maniac and a confused man are all very different. This is what is most misunderstood! To perform a diagnostic 
is of the phenomenological and all these things of which we have spoken, to consider the life of others, the 
constellation etc. relate to the diagnostic. At times, we learn a lot! It is the patient who tells me such things, it is 
not me who comes up with them! We know well that the phenomenologists did not fmd their ideas within their 
head! They had little pieces of paper upon which they noted down the things they heard. There is a remarkable 
book on schizophrenia that appeared in 1949 by a Swiss psychiatrist, Wyrsch. It is called, the person of 
schizophrenia - a magnificent work, an extremely modest work. We need to be modest. Modesty plays an 
important role. We mustn't be the cunning one. 
M.N: I think, in returning to the institutional question of others, today there exists more of a danger with the 
Imaginary, the illusory, rather than delirium itself. We begin to ask the question as to whether we are capable 
of entering such structures, such series. Within this relation to the other, a relation that is not a mere duality as 
we said, there is the question of benefiting from the undertaking of such a diagnostic yet not profiting as to the 
possible directions it could provide us with. Today, in general, contrary to the Greeks, the diagnostic is 
associated with a prognostic because there is a determinism of things, and it furnishes nothing. Another issue 
equally as important is that the majority of psychoanalysts utilise the transference with a lack of ethic towards 
the other because it is the psychoanalysts who transfer everything! It can be the most ridiculous of situations. 
For example, a person who does not have any children of their own, works with children to replace the lack of 
her own children, they become her children. This is absurd, yet common. Today we are absent, mirrors are 
used to hide us. It is a game of mirrors. People enter into this game of mirrors where they are no longer able to 
find themselves. This morning you more or less said that we are somewhat isolated owing to circumstances, 
there is the question of the difficulty of transcription, of the refusal of the body, of this refusal of life even. 
299 
When we speak of the schizophrenic we allude to a person who is divided, but more than this the 
schizophrenic inhabits another world, a separate world, 'his' world. 
D.R: We are close to the Imaginary and the Symbolic here ... 
J.O: What we can also say is that the Imaginary is not the imagination. There is a contamination by an 
ideology that infiltrates the Imaginary. Lacan tells us that the Imaginary is "consistency". The Symbolic, 
however, is not clever, it is a point, a marker. In a schematic fashion it is possible to have an overtly 
hierarchical system where we develop a paranoia. In schematising these things, we almost render the 
Symbolic the Imaginary. However, the undertaking of which we speak - remembering our conversations last 
week - approaches phenomenology concretely. When we see a patient, the ethic, the respect, is not to 
embarrass him, but to respect the other who is there with his personal problem. This needs a permanent form 
of phenomenological reduction, a 'bracketing off' of things, a putting things into parenthesis. What I have 
been saying for over fifty years is that to arrive at this base formula, which is a phenomenological formula, 
the question we ask is, "what am I doing here?'' "What are you doing here?'' It works, because at this very 
moment we are - as Maldiney says - within the same landscape of the patient. We are not on one side with 
the patient on the other side. For possibility to exist, we need to be in the same landscape. It is this notion of 
the landscape in relation to the undertaking of putting things into parenthesis, the bracketing off, that 
corresponds to a phrase of Tosquelles: In medicine and surgery, if there hadn't been the 19th C. discovery of 
asepsis there wouldn i have existed the possibility of surgery or medicine. Even in psychiatry, it is this is in 
question, there needs to be asepsis. Unfortunately, it seems to me that people do not know where they find 
themselves, yet they want to apply intricate techniques like psychoanalysis without clearing the ground. To 
clear the ground is to permanently ask, "What am I doing here?'' If not, then we create a supplementary 
pathology, what I call patho-plasty. 
D.R: We can see this bracketing-off with the phenomenological reduction ofHusserl, we see it with Jaspers-
who still privileged the normal - Binswanger, and later with Tatossian and his circle, although it is not strictly 
Husserlian per se because we can see this approach through many schools of philosophy throughout the ages. 
It is to suspend prejudgment, what Husserl calls the transcendental epoche. From here we can say that there is 
also the question of, "How am I to approach him?" a question of suspension, which is synonymous with, 
''what am I doing here?'' We're a little theologically pre-emptied when we say this ... 
M.N: And this patho-plasty is greatly evident within plastic surgery, it's incredible, the surgeons perform 
terrible surgery because they do not clear the ground, they do not put things into parenthesis. 
1.0: Yes, exactly, to clear the psychical ground, the existential ground. This is why we shouldn't try to be 
cunning. This is not to say that we are friends with the patient, this too is extremely complicated. This is why I 
find Lacan's phrase of great value, the first phrase of his seminars on anguish, where he says, "transference is 
a subjective disparity", it is not a reciprocity. We can attribute this phrase to the collective, a disparity .... 
300 
M.N: Yes, we enter into the question ofheterogeneity ... 
D.R: Precisely, of the architectonic ... 
J.O: And if we say this, the technocrats interpret it as justifying a visible distinction, with all these measures 
of accreditation and valuation for example ... In the psychiatric hospitals they stress that nurses should wear 
overalls, even with a badge. They say that this is done so as not to disorientate the patient. The first 
undertaking we did here, was to dress the patients in their own clothes because there would be the possibility 
of relationships at the same time as personalising themselves. 
M.N: Today they strip the person of his belongings, they de-personalise him ... you mustn't be 
heterogeneous ... 
J.O: It is indeed terrible. With the uniform, or the pajamas they provide, you cannot be heterogeneous. And 
what with the nurses wearing overalls, we find ourselves one-hundred years behind. This is a very serious 
problem because if we do not do something about this, all the discourses we undertake will be in vain, they 
will be useless. For example, when there are conflicts within the establishment it's just as well there are 
conflicts- an establishment without conflicts is a cemetery! It proves that there is life. But there are Conflicts 
and conflicts. Sometimes I have assisted in the needs of other establishments. They have told me that they 
have this conflict, that conflict, and that they have called upon an external psychonalayst to intervene .... 
M.N: Yes, they frequently do this now, they even invite external groups to intervene, it is terrible, worst than 
the inquisition! 
J.O: So, the visiting psychoanalyst, who knows absolutely nothing about the going's on within the 
establishment, what I call the Absolute of an absurd neutrality, a pure neutrality, will prove useless. There are 
a lot of unemployed psychologists and psychoanalysts, and it is in their interest because the establishment 
pays them and they can at least survive. But for the establishment it will prove useless. Unfortunately this was 
even the position of Dolto because she visited many establishments as an external. There is a veritable 
confusion of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. These above all must not be confused. We must surely 
fmd the means through which people can express themselves, it is what we call, here at La Borde, a "liberty 
of circulation." The liberty of circulation necessitates the possibility of the encounter, of real encounters. The 
encounter is not foreseen. If it is, it is not an encounter! A real encounter touches the Real, not the Symbolic 
or the Imaginary ... it marks, where things are no longer the same as before. The liberty of circulation is where 
there can be possibility, or as Maldiney says, "possibilisation", the "possibilisation" of the encounter. Thirty 
years ago, a dreadful, reactionary periodical by the name of Minute presented an article declaring "Oury and 
Gentis to organise encounters" ... (alllaugh) .. .it's a mess to say this! So I said, ''yes, it's true, of course we 
organise encounters, we program chance!" - it was ridiculous. It is not enough to treat and nurse a 
schizophrenic, this is not enough, this is merely asepsis, the necessary condition ... 
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D.R: You said this as early as 1947 in your text on L 'Aimable Jayet, a patient of Saint-Alban- there is a point 
in the essay where you assert that to approach Jayet, "nosographic astuteness is not enough." It is a 
remarkable and important text .. .Indeed, to approach a patient requires more than what is necessary .. .It is 
where there is the question, "How am I to approach him?" The question of possiblisation where "nosographic 
astuteness is not enough" ... 
1.0: Voila! I was already saying this in 1947! 
M.N: This question of circulation is important because it has a relation not merely to the dire but desire also. 
At times you need to give voice to the person so that he can nourish himself and progress, this is even where 
the stratification of the body is not ready because, as you are saying, we are at another leveL You are correct 
about what you say about the Symbolic because the symbolic is a fixed point, an indicator, and the Self is an 
apparatus of marking and indicating. The moment it stops indicating it is completely lost. So what I am saying 
is that the normopathy is worst than mental illness ... 
1.0: It is the worst, normopathy is an incurable disease ... We can distinguish between the dire and the dit. This 
is discerned by Lacan, but most notably by Emmanuel Levinas who distinguishes it well - even though he 
didn't appear to understand anything about the unconscious. The dire is close to what we call language (Ia 
langage), but not a spoken tongue (Ia langue) because language is the structure of the unconscious. When 
Lacan said that, ''the unconscious is structured like a language" he did not mean it to be of a spoken tongue 
(Ia langue), yet he does not draw upon the distinction enough. There is a gulf between language (Ia langage) 
and the spoken tongue (Ia langue). Poetic language, carries more information than scientific language. There 
are tones, the voice, what we call "demarcations", there is an entire science of this. On the side of language 
(langage) I put the dire, and on the side of the spoken tongue (Ia langue) I put the dit. The dire permits there 
to be the dit. With schizophrenia there is a de-structuring of what I call the "fabric of the dire". When primary 
repression does not function properly, repression itself does not function. Similarly, when there is de-
structuring at the level of the dire, it would seem that there is no task at the level of the dit. Our work is not to 
give lessons in speech production, but to work with encounters, chance, transference, desire, at the level of the 
dire. And Levinas showed that unconscious desire was on the side of the dire. In following this, and at the 
same time, keeping in mind Pankow who spoke of the "graft of transference", I say that we do "grafts of 
space", work with the space of the dire, because we know well that the fundamental trouble of schizophrenia 
is the trouble of space. The "space of the dire" is where there is possibility for schizophrenics who are 
incapacitated, who are nowhere ... they are somewhere and this somewhere is the space of the dire, where 
there is desire. (Oury presents a photo). During the war, this man had been an engineer working with solar 
energy, a very intelligent man, completely mad. He couldn't be anywhere, not in his bedroom, not at the table, 
not in his bed. He had found himself an old bicycle and he had also found an old typewriter that he would 
often use. But to see him in my office was not possible, so much so, that I had to write to him asking him if 
we could meet under a tree. So he arrived and we both keep a distance, if I was to approach him too closely 
he would walk away, we had to maintain a distance with him. This man traveled a great deal by bike, he 
couldn't be anywhere. He couldn't enter the chateau of the clinic. We had worked with him for one year, there 
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was an entire team working with him - teams functioned better then than today because today things are a 
little deserted. Anyway, one night, after a year of working with him, I was told that he had arrived at the 
chateau, that he had sat down in a chair, and that he had opened a newspaper to read. The same night, another 
patient - who was not schizophrenic but slightly melancholic - told me that she had sat down in her usual 
chair and began to knit when she saw a man she had never seen before sitting beside her who looked 
extremely comfortable within the chair, contended, reading the paper. This is the space of the dire, he sat in 
the chair, he unfolded the paper, there was a desire here, but it didn't last. To work one year to see five 
minutes like this is worth every effort. Similarly, I had spoken to a child psychiatrist a long time ago, who had 
been working with a girl who was almost post-acephaletic, psychotic. After fifteen years, and gigantic efforts 
by the psychiatrist, she smiled. Fifteen years of effort, for a smile. This is what counts. But the Social Security 
ignores this, it doesn't care. 
M.N: It counts, it is humanity 
J.O: A smile is spontaneous. We can ask the question, "how much does a smile cost?" There are no smiles in 
the hotel d'acueille! 
D.R: This, for me, in approaching by way of historical accounts, is the signature of the vocation and I think 
that Bonnafe and Baruk were correct in seeing psychiatry as a vocation. Baruk often spoke about the notion of 
Tsedek, a Talmudic term, uniting charitability and justice- he introduced the term in the 1940's and it needs to 
be studied once more ... But as we are saying, the smile after fifteen years of effort, is the signature of the 
vocation ... the smile has its own logic, poetic .. .it cannot be measured by routine logic, it is an instant, an 
opening, it is of the pathic ... and of course, we do not wake up in the morning and say to ourselves, "I must 
smile at him or her today ... today I will be in the pathic .. " 
J.O: Henri Baruk ... very interesting ... Yes, the smile is not of pure linguistics, it is much more, at the level of 
ergology, of the body, of a very complex logic. The smile is not a laugh, the laugh is more or less aggressive. 
We can save time with a smile, but that doesn't mean you have to smile on purpose. If we walk pass someone 
a little paranoid and we don't smile, we will be working with them for weeks. But if we smile, in a second, we 
have something, a reaction, and we save time ... 
D.R: We can even say that with a poetic logic we travel from the most simple of things to the complex .... 
J.O: Exactly, we work at the level of the poetic, a level infinitely more complex than the logic of computers ... 
D.R: The smile is an opening, a spatial announcement ... such gestures are not of a logic, as that which informs 
DSM-IV for example .. .it has a particular logic of assessment ... But the spatial announcement is not 
foreseeable- as you say, it is not about programming chance ... 
M.N: Exactly, because logico-positivism is extremely linear and simple ... 
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J.O: Precisely, we work at the level of gestures here at La Borde. This is within the domain of what is called 
the "deictic". Here, when people know each other they don't speak to one another much, but they gesticulate, 
there are gestures. It is of the deictic. I have often said that there is an articulation between the anaphoric and 
the deictic. The anaphoric, is, for example, where I have met Mr. X, let's say, eight days ago, and today 
someone tells me that they have seen Mr. X. I hear this, and it means something to me because there is 
already an anaphorical construction, a carrier of construction so to speak. For people to know one another 
here at Le Borde, they need to be here for a while, to spend some time here for there to be the anaphoric. It is 
the anaphoric that permits. This counts enormously, and it is the fabric of parole, of the dire. 
M.N: It is the notion of constellation ... 
J.O: Yes. What's more is that I had read an essay in 1967 which said that the quantity of information 
communicated through a poetic language is infmitely larger than the quantity communicated by way of a 
scientific language. It showed that 65 percent of information is communicated through a scientific language, a 
scientific message, thus there is a redundancy in this communication. With poetic language, however, it was 
95 percent ... You need to have complexity to have the simple .... 
M.N: Also, we can say that neurons function in a modulating manner, it is not merely 0-1 because between the 
0 and the 1 there is a discharge, a complexity and an incredible infinity ... 
D.R: yes, there is the nuance, poeisis between the 0 and the 1, the passage from 0 to 1 is infmite even ... 
M.N: exactly, the nuance, the modulation ... psychiatric drugs are modulating, they perform a plastic surgery 
of the person, a plasmation even, a somation. The extra-pyramidal effects that were once thought to serve as 
positive effects are now completely ejected from debate. I think this is absurd, because we lose the dimension 
of things like the Symbolic. What we have now is a unidimensionality in thinking that other systems will 
function as a cure, but in reality it is not a cure because what people tend to forget is that there is the 
production of a person, that the person is modulated. From the moment there was a surgical logic borrowing 
structures from the body, in performing a selection as if an electric grid of yes/no, yes/no, they could 
transform the person how they wanted to ... 
J.O: At the same time in following pathology and in terms of immuno defense, there are enormous 
variations ... When I was at Saint-Alban with Tosquelles there was a researcher who was of Jewish-Ukrainian 
origin and who had sought refuge at the clinic, Michel Bardach. At the Pasteur Institute he had undertaken a 
study of immunological defenses in terms of pathology, of mania, schizophrenia, catatonia etc. At the time 
there was a cancerolitic test, that is to say, it tested the immunological defenses against cancer. The canceroltic 
test, that is, the test to show defenses against cancer, showed that within the family of cancers, the resistance 
of the normal stood at 100, but with the majority of catatonics, it was lowered to 10. With the maniacs 
however, the approximated resistance rose to 300 - remarkable, they could have even gone naked into the 
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snow naked if they wanted to! Yet this is variable. In the wake of a terrible emotion, after a horrific deception, 
a depression related to an event occurs or a even a cancer of the blood can occur merely one month later. 
For example, there was a widow whose husband had died accidentally and she had developed a cancer of the 
blood one month after the event. And there are other cases like this. The body is not a thing, it is within the 
Symbolic, within language (langage), within these areas, and it is in our interests to work and develop this. 
M.N: Also, the schizophrenics are very well adapted at a certain point within their universe. At times, when I 
see autistic children, I can say that there is a variation where some things are activated and others are not etc. 
Certainly, there are areas for certain functions where like Columbian children we enter caverns to collect 
precious stones - caverns that adults themselves are fearful of entering. The situation is somewhat like this, 
there are hopes. That is to say that the moment we affirm ourselves - with humility - to be doctors there is a 
variation at the level of an interrelation enabling us to understand and exist within the situation within which 
we find ourselves. 
D.R: And here we have the co-implication of intersubjectivity and intrasubjectivity which is the fundament of 
the miteinandersein 
J.O: Yes, we can say that there is only intersubjectivity if there is intrasubjectivity. There was a time when I 
had wanted to do a topic of the being-with-the-other (!'avec). We need to be careful with such a notion 
because it is not enough to say that 'I am with others'. Intersubjectivity, is fundamentally intrasubjectivity. 
M.N: This is very important even when we speak of the relation of one unconscious with another. Yet, as we 
are saying, Lacan was too quick at times. People actually think that the unconscious is a language (a spoken 
tongue)! 
J.O: Yes, we can see that people have even searched for words in the unconscious. They concluded that they 
were unable to find any. Of course! Because language isn't there! It is for this reason, when people were 
saying this, that Lacan introduced the term 'Lalangue' ... Freud and maternal language. This is to say, of that 
which is not attainable but here. It is not a spoken tongue. It is a maternal language ... 
D.R: It is a constitutive dimension. Lacan didn't use the word dimension here, but 'Dis-mention' .. .its rarely 
discussed this term and I can't remember it ever being mentioned on British shores, but then again, Lacan in 
London, it is not so evident ... but as you said ... Lacanian-ism 
J.O: Yes, the dis-mention, the mention of the dis. It's an interesting term, and it was a somewhat precious term 
for Lacan. He tended to be like this. Nevertheless, it's an attractive term ... we can develop a study of all these 
terms, it needs to be done, and it's a vast undertaking .... An unfmished project. 
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